

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS • CHICAGO 37

Agent: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS • LONDON

A FOREIGN POLICY
for
THE UNITED STATES

EDITED BY QUINCY WRIGHT

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE
SEYMOUR BERKSON
BERNARD BRODIE
CHARLES C. COLBY
ALEX N. DRAGNICH
HERBERT FEIS
WILLIAM T. R. FOX
ALLEN HADEN
JOHN N. HAZARD
KENNETH HOLLAND
CORNELIS W. DEKIEWIET
ROBERT D. LEIGH
LEO PASVOLSKY
CLAIR WILCOX
JOHN A. WILSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS • CHICAGO

THE
NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION

The Twenty-second Institute

QUINCY WRIGHT • DIRECTOR

THE Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago have been made possible through the generosity of the heirs of Norman Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated to the University a fund to be known as "The Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation" on January 27, 1923. The letter of gift contains the following statement:

The purpose of the foundation shall be the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world-order. The aim shall always be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion.

Annual Institutes have been held at the University of Chicago since the summer of 1924. The lectures delivered each year have been published in essentially their original form in a series of volumes of which this is the most recent.

COPYRIGHT 1947 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. ALL RIGHTS
RESERVED. PUBLISHED 1947, COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

INTRODUCTION

THE Twenty-second Institute under the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation took place at the University of Chicago, July 15-19, 1946, on the subject of "A Foreign Policy for the United States." The lectures and discussions of this Institute are presented in this volume.

While all the Harris institutes have touched on problems of American foreign policy, on two occasions that subject has been dealt with directly. The Seventh Institute in 1930 concerned "Interpretations of American Foreign Policy," and in 1934 the Committee of the Harris Foundation published a series of recommendations resulting from extensive discussions among the members, entitled *An American Foreign Policy toward International Stability*.

Comparison of the record of these earlier institutes with the contents of the present volume indicates significant changes in American foreign policy, particularly an increased emphasis upon military technology, general security organization, the Near East, and Russia.

The earlier discussions obviously gave no attention to the atomic bomb, a subject which figured largely in the recent discussion, and they devoted relatively little space to military technology in general. They did not, however, entirely overlook the influence of military invention on American foreign policy. In the session of 1930, a British speaker, after urging co-operation of the British and American fleets for policing purposes in lieu of the traditional British "command of the seas" and the traditional American "freedom of the seas," writes: "If you knew, as I do, that now one such aeroplane bomb can destroy all life in Central London and that it can't be stopped from doing so, why you wouldn't be worrying about whether cruisers had six-inch or eight-inch guns" (p. 101).

The recommendations of 1934 urged that, in framing American foreign policy, the destructiveness of modern war be given major consideration (p. 7) and that such offensive weapons as mobile artillery, tanks, bombing airplanes, warships and submarines capable of operations distant from bases, and aircraft carriers be prohibited in order to minimize the prospects of sudden conquest (p. 22). The atomic

INTRODUCTION

bomb appears merely to have emphasized a change which serious thinkers had earlier apprehended.

In respect to international organization for security, the changes in American policy have been remarkable. An American at the Institute of 1930 said:

Did you ever hear of any candidate for the House of Representatives or the Senate who, during the past two or three years, asked voters to support him on the ground that, if elected, he would try to put the United States into the League? There are, however, many candidates—both men and women—who have appealed for votes on the issue that they would try to keep the United States out of both the League and the Court [p. 12].

In spite of this, the speaker said that the United States was “almost certain” to “cooperate with the League more frequently, normally, and cordially until for all practical purposes it became an associate member of the League for all of its non-political activities” (p. 16). The 1934 recommendations went beyond this. They urged that the United States consult through the organs of the League to maintain the Pact of Paris, settle political disputes, facilitate peaceful change, and promote world stability; participate in the determination of aggression; and impose discriminatory embargoes against aggressors (pp. 27-34). These recommendations were considered advanced at the time, but the United States has gone much further in accepting the United Nations Charter. In the discussion here presented, international organization for security is a subject of major interest, and some of the participants thought that the United States should attempt to extend the powers of the United Nations to direct control of certain activities, particularly atomic energy. The increasing importance of international organization for security in the thinking of Americans is illustrated by the number of Harris institutes on the subject in recent years. The subject was briefly dealt with in the First Institute, that of 1924, which was mainly concerned with Europe. The Institute of 1936, for the first time, devoted exclusive attention to the subject, but the preoccupation of the United States at the time is suggested by the title “Neutrality and Collective Security.” The Institute of 1939 dealt with “International Security”; that of 1940 with “The Foundations of a More Stable World Order”; and that of 1945 with “Peace, Security, and the United Nations.”

The Near East, which was recognized in the recent Institute as an area of important American interest, was not mentioned at all in the recommendations of 1934. It was mentioned only once during the Institute of 1930, and then as an area outside American political in-

INTRODUCTION

terest (p. 12). Although the area was thus slighted in the institutes devoted to American foreign policy, the First Harris Institute, in 1924, had dealt with the subject in relation to Europe, and the Institute of 1942 was entirely devoted to the area.

The increased importance of Russia in American foreign policy is most striking. While Russia has loomed large in every discussion presented in this volume, it was not referred to at all in the recommendations of 1934. In the Institute of 1930 it was mentioned by a British lecturer as in the outermost ring of "world diplomacy" (p. 79) and by a Japanese lecturer as important in the policy of that country. Two statements made by the latter speaker seem of sufficient significance today to warrant quoting. Referring to the Japanese indignation at the American Immigration Law of 1924 and the Hawaiian naval maneuvers of 1925, he said: "There are in Japan, although a small minority, some people who wonder whether, after all, Russia without any racial prejudice may not be the ultimate friend of Japan" (p. 179). Later, describing a visit to Sun Yat Sen in 1923, the same speaker reported Dr. Sun's conversation, "I have been the friend of Japan. So when Japan won the war over Russia I was overjoyed. I thought, 'now the time has come for Japan to lead the whole of the Asiatic races out from the dale of the white man's domination.' . . . But what did Japan say and do to us? You behaved as though you were one of the white races and turned your back to us . . . and you lost your place as the leader of the Asiatic races. We do not need you any more. I am now organizing the union of Asiatic races with the help of Russia" (p. 231).

It should be noticed that the scant attention to American relations with Russia in these institutes devoted to American foreign policy was somewhat rectified in the First Institute of 1924, which dealt mainly with Europe, and in the Institute of 1935, which, under the direction of the late Samuel N. Harper, was entirely devoted to "The Soviet Union and World Problems."

The present volume includes not only the public lectures delivered during the Institute by Messrs. Fox, Pasvolsky, Wilcox, Feis, and Holland, but also the formal statements by round-table leaders opening discussions, and extensive extracts from the discussions themselves. The latter have been revised and approved by the speakers. A list of the participants in these discussions and the full program of the Institute are appended.

QUINCY WRIGHT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I. THE GREAT POWERS

THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER GREAT POWERS	3
<i>William T. R. Fox</i>	
THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM	17
<i>Cornelis W. de Kiewiet</i>	
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION	25
<i>John N. Hazard</i>	
DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS	34

PART II. GENERAL SECURITY

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS	75
<i>Leo Pasvolosky</i>	
THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF ATOMIC ENERGY	89
<i>Bernard Brodie</i>	
DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY	97

PART III. REGIONAL POLICIES

THE FAR EAST	129
<i>Joseph W. Ballantine</i>	
DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST	139
THE NEAR EAST	162
<i>John A. Wilson</i>	
DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST	170
EASTERN EUROPE	195
<i>Alex N. Dragnich</i>	
DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE	202
LATIN AMERICA	224
<i>Allen Haden</i>	
DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA	234

PART IV. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

THE EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT	259
<i>Clair Wilcox</i>	
FREE ENTERPRISE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY	271
<i>Herbert Feis</i>	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ADJUSTMENT OF GREAT-POWER RIVALRIES FOR RAW MATERIALS AND TRADE <i>Charles C. Colby</i>	284
DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES	292

PART V. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND CULTURAL RELATIONS <i>Kenneth Holland</i>	313
RELATION OF IDEOLOGIES AND COMMUNICATIONS TO FOREIGN POLICY . . . <i>Robert D. Leigh</i>	328
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY	339
<i>Seymour Berkson</i>	
DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATIONAL POLICIES	349

APPENDIX

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS	395
--------------------------------	-----

INDEX

INDEX	397
-----------------	-----

PART I
THE GREAT POWERS

THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER GREAT POWERS

By WILLIAM T. R. FOX¹

THE phrase "the United States and the other great powers" implies three things—that the United States is a great power, that it is not the only great power, and that there is more than one other great power. Each of these three assumptions deserves to be examined with care, in order to discover whether it should be accepted as fixed and true for all purposes and under all conditions.

That the United States is a great power has been generally conceded for half a century. Its power broke the bloody stalemate of the first World War and mightily influenced the peace settlement following it. Its role was even greater in the Washington conference of 1921-22, whose participants established a new order in the Pacific. Happily, this new order was established without the war, which has been an ordinary preliminary to such general conferences, first being fought. In the Pacific the United States never fully abdicated its great-power position; but as to the settlement of Europe agreed upon at Versailles the record is clear. American power and American ideals shaped that settlement, but Europe was then led to believe that American power would be used neither to support that settlement nor to promote its orderly modification. Appeaser and appeased alike believed that during any critical period of readjustment American influence would not be brought to bear in time to affect the outcome. Preoccupied with internal conflict, American opinion left its diplomats free only to lecture other governments on the virtues of good faith and good neighborliness. It forbade them to promise the victims of bad faith and bad neighborliness anything more than "all verbal aid short of war."² It was almost as if the United States were not a great power at all—almost but not quite, because all the world

¹ Institute of International Studies, Yale University.

² *Peace and War* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), issued by the Department of State to demonstrate the rectitude of Secretary Hull's foreign policy, is studded with warnings to the aggressor that the United States will not risk war to stop aggression.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

knew that the colossus of the West might some day awaken or, what might be equally decisive, it might thrash about in its sleep.

In an earlier day American preoccupation with internal affairs had meant only that the world might act as if the United States were not a great power. Today the world watches anxiously a primary election in Nebraska or a Senate debate on O.P.A., because America's power is so great that it makes little sense for any nation to plan except on the basis of some hypothesis regarding the outcome of various American domestic disputes. Most of the rest of the world fears more what the United States may do with its colossal power in a moment of irresponsibility and preoccupation with problems of domestic reconversion than what it may do if it sets out deliberately to use that power to achieve specific foreign-policy objectives.

First reactions both in this country and abroad to the Lilienthal report and the Baruch proposals on atomic energy control show how profound a relief it was to many to discover that the United States was formulating a clear policy. That this policy was, in addition, bold and carefully thought out was almost less important than that the international policy of the American government was being considered on its own merits and not developed as a by-product of the bitter domestic dispute over military versus civilian control.

The willingness of so many foreign governments to wait for an American lead in this, as in so many other fields, shows how eager they are to have American power used purposefully and in accordance with the high ideals that successive American secretaries of state have continued to pronounce. One may conclude that the United States *is* a great power, that it is no longer possible to sterilize that power by acting as if it did not exist, and that American power will make for stability in the contemporary world only if it is deliberately exercised to achieve clear objectives of foreign policy.

Is the United States the only great power? Mr. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, apparently believes not, if one is to judge by the obdurate character of his behavior in recent four-power conferences. Neither do his fellow-conferrees, if one is to judge by the importance which they seem to have attached to winning Mr. Molotov's assent to their various proposals. Yet appearances may be misleading. It is possible that what has been going on in Paris is a sideshow, that the important question of our time, the international control of atomic energy, is being negotiated in New York. In these latter negotiations, if the United States were known to be willing to

THE OTHER GREAT POWERS

use the atomic bomb to win assent for its control scheme, its position would be very different from what it now is; for, in terms of physical striking power, the disparity between a nation with a stock pile of atomic bombs and one without is enormous.

In the natural course of events the United States cannot hope for very many years to maintain its present monopolistic position. But is there likely to be anything natural about the course of events? The phrase "natural course of events" in this particular context implies that course which is likely to be followed so long as there is neither international agreement for effective control nor decisive action by the United States to preserve its present unique position.

But let us suppose that negotiations for international control drag indefinitely, that the suspicion grows into certain conviction that some power is deliberately prolonging the negotiations until it, too, shall have achieved the explosive release of atomic energy. How would the government of the United States meet such a diplomatic maneuver? Mr. Bernard Baruch has declared that "before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons it must have more than words to reassure it." Mr. Baruch may only have meant that the United States will not surrender the bombs which it now is making so long as there is no international control scheme which meets its minimum requirements. But will the United States require more than words to reassure itself before it permits any other nation to acquire a large stock pile of atomic bombs? Is this country prepared to use its atomic energy monopoly to force acceptance of what its officials believe to be minimum essential safeguards?

Unless it is prepared to do so, its bargaining position in the New York negotiations is not improved by its present sole possession of the bomb. Clearly, it is not so prepared; but, equally clearly, there will be voices heard with increasing frequency as the months go by which will say that it is better to have a one-way atomic war sooner than a two-way atomic war later. It is toward this latter contingency that responsible students of international politics must direct their hardest thinking.

There are, doubtless, courses of action which Soviet diplomacy might follow which would justify in the eyes of many Americans the invocation of the absolute weapon. This the Soviet statesmen know, and this knowledge means that, for a limited period under a limited set of circumstances, the United States must be regarded as *the* great power.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

A moment's reflection on the kind of world order which would result if the United States did formally invoke its dread weapon reminds one, however, of what Professor Charles E. Merriam has called the "poverty of power." It reminds one of how *limited* an appeal can be made to the minds and hearts of men if that appeal is backed up by nothing more substantial than a large stock pile of atomic bombs. An atomic energy control scheme dictated under the shadow of bomb-carrying B-29's could hardly evoke that faith in one another which Mr. Baruch has correctly declared to be an indispensable element in any successful effort to achieve international control.

The government of the Soviet Union is going to accept no control scheme which significantly prolongs the period of American monopoly or which requires that government to accept by treaty a position unequal to that of the United States. The initial proposals of both Mr. Baruch and Mr. Gromyko before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission recognize this. The Soviet government, however, is finding it exceedingly uncongenial to remain in the inferior position which it now occupies, even for the duration of the negotiations for the international control of atomic energy. It has therefore proposed through Mr. Gromyko that certain preliminary agreements be negotiated before the commission turns to the more serious business of an international control plan. In these preliminary agreements the use of atomic weapons would be outlawed, their manufacture would be prohibited, and the destruction of existing weapons would be ordered.

Whatever might be the reactions of American public opinion to the other elements of the Gromyko proposals, large sections of American opinion would certainly agree, as a preliminary to negotiations for international control, to outlaw the use of atomic weapons. This would reduce further the already slight chance that an occasion could occur on which it would be either morally defensible or politically feasible for the United States to use the bomb as an instrument of diplomacy. Outlawry now would therefore somewhat improve the Soviet bargaining position during the critical period of negotiating a complete control plan.

Outlawry or no outlawry, Mr. Baruch cannot now approach the Soviet delegates with a control proposal in one hand and a bomb in the other. Our conclusion must therefore be that the day is not yet at hand when American policy can be developed on the assumption that the United States is the only great power. There are at least two.

THE OTHER GREAT POWERS

Are there more? This brings us to the third assumption. On the eve of the second World War there were seven powers which recognized one another as great powers. For each of those seven, membership in the League of Nations did mean or would have meant permanent membership in its Council. Three of these seven—Germany, Italy, and Japan—have paid the penalty of total defeat in total war by forfeiting great-power status, at least for our generation. To the four surviving victors—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France—has been added China, a newcomer to the ranks of the great powers, if one uses the analogous test in the post-war period, permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations.

By this test a country like the United States, which can produce atomic bombs, and a country like China, which cannot produce the airplane to carry them, are both recognized as first-rank powers. So are France, whose defenses stood against the Wehrmacht for a scant six weeks, and the Soviet Union, which not only hurled back the assaulting Nazi hordes but destroyed them in the process.

The five permanent members of the Security Council are further distinguished from the other United Nations by the legal capacity of each to veto any substantive United Nations action in the security field. There is, however, another kind of veto which certain powers possess, a veto which would remain even if Dr. Evatt and the many small-power opponents of great-power hegemony could strike from the United Nations Charter its present Article 27, the article containing the objectionable Yalta voting formula. This is the veto of indispensability, the veto possessed only by those powers whose opposition to collective action would make a mockery of any pretense that that action was being taken in the name of the world community.

It is not possessed by France or China. As for Great Britain, the question of her indispensability to the United Nations is not operationally significant; for a strong United Nations is indispensable to the preservation of Britain's leadership.³ The veto of indispensability is possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The leadership of one of these two powers, the United States, is recognized by so many governments—including those of the other American republics, of the Philippines, and of Liberia, not to mention certain governments in the British Commonwealth and certain others in

³ Cf. Percy E. Corbett, *Britain: Partner for Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946).

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

western Europe with a Western orientation—that it can count upon the support of a majority of the United Nations in any critical vote. The United States veto of indispensability need therefore rarely be invoked. The other indispensable power, the Soviet Union, is in the unfortunate position of having to remind the world continuously of its indispensability. It is a subject neither for praise nor for blame if a diplomacy of intransigence and a jealous watch over its veto characterize that power's behavior.

In a true system of collective security there would be no indispensable participant. Overwhelming force would always be available to check any aggressor, even the most powerful. The United Nations might conceivably work without the United States or the Soviet Union. Neither it nor any other system of organized quasi-collective security can be made to work against either of these two giants.

Europe and the world have for centuries been accustomed to combine against the "Great Disturber," whether his name was Louis XIV, Napoleon, Hohenzollern, or Hitler. Thus there has long been a rudimentary collective security system. It has not prevented war, but it has preserved the members of the Western state system. It has not prevented war because successive bids for one-power hegemony have been met by forming the grand coalition against the Disturber only reluctantly and at the eleventh hour. The advocates of formally organized collective security have sought to make the power of the great coalition continuously available, and not only at the eleventh hour, available against the small aggressor while he was still small.

In 1914 no one of the eight great powers of that day would have been immune from police action by the other seven combined, but in 1914 the ideology of organized collective security was the property of a few British and American peace societies. It is a tragedy of our time that the ideology of collective security did not finally carry the day until a system of organized collective security had become immeasurably more difficult to operate.

It is difficult to operate because, as one distinguished University of Chicago professor declared, two is too few to collect. If either of these two proves to be the Disturber, veto or no veto, there is not that overwhelming power available to check aggression on which a system of organized collective security must be based. These two are already, from the power point of view, in a position which Louis XIV and succeeding aspirants to one-power hegemony in Europe reached only after they were far down the path of aggression. What is pos-

THE OTHER GREAT POWERS

sible against either of these two would be only that last-ditch resistance with ultimate victory in doubt and finally won, if at all, only by the narrowest of margins. This is the primitive collective action with which Europe has been familiar for three centuries.

With regard to the third assumption implicit in the title of this lecture, that there are at least several great powers, our conclusion must be that, from the point of view of collective security, it is as if there were only two.

There is no sure escape from a third world war via the veto-elimination route. With the veto stricken from the charter it would, of course, become legally possible to order enforcement action against either the colossus of the Old World or the colossus of the New World. The result would not be a short, sharp, effective police action but a protracted and probably indecisive global conflict. Whether such a conflict would be called "war" or merely "enforcement action" would make little difference in the appalling misery it would bring in its wake.

Those who are sincerely apprehensive about future Soviet or future American policy need not be so concerned over the maintenance of the United Nations Security Council's unanimity rule in the vote to use force. A Soviet Union or a United States which has gone berserk will inevitably find itself confronted by the very coalition which the critics of the Yalta voting formula wish to achieve through the United Nations. Tinkering with the Security Council's voting procedure can make the formation of a grand coalition against a lawless aspirant for world hegemony neither more nor less likely.

Thanks, however, to the inclusion within the charter of the United Nations of Article 51, which declares unabridged "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack," the way has been left open, without contravening the terms of the charter, to check even a great-power aggressor. All that would be necessary would be for the United Nations, minus the unfortunate aggressor, to move from Flushing Meadows and Lake Success to Madison Square Garden and the Empire State Building and there proceed to implement the collective right of self-defense.

If there is no sure escape from general conflict via the charter revision route, it is only fair to add that there is no sure escape via any other route. There are, however, better and worse ways to try to achieve lasting peace. Even though true collective security is not now possible under the Charter of San Francisco, that charter creates a

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

mechanism for collective action which is appropriate for our time. Even when the collective action takes place outside the United Nations, the charter suggests the pattern.

The requirement of five-power agreement may well promote the habit of five-power agreement. It seemed to do so at San Francisco, although the record at Hunter College is not so clearly favorable. In Paris, Secretary Byrnes proposed to have the great powers agree to disagree and refer their disagreements to a twenty-one-nation peace conference. This proposal called for a departure from the Charter pattern, the pattern of negotiation which was also followed in negotiating the charter at Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and San Francisco. Only in the matter of inviting the Argentine government to come to San Francisco had there been, on a fundamental question, reference to a larger group while great-power disagreement still prevailed. This one experiment, in which final positive action was taken over Soviet protest and while that government was pleading for a few days' more time to find a basis for agreement among the Big Five, was not an unqualified success and was not repeated at San Francisco.

Secretary Byrnes's patient efforts at Paris to settle outstanding points of difference between Soviet and American points of view shows how great, in fact, has been his unwillingness to depart from the procedures of collaboration which alone have so far proved effective. These procedures are based on the principle of the two-stage consensus—of unanimous agreement among the nucleus of interested great states, followed by broader debate and final agreement in a wider community of nations.

It is one thing to demonstrate the desirability of agreement among the great powers; it is another to demonstrate on what they are to agree. What are the foreign-policy objectives on the basis of which American diplomacy should seek agreement?

Whatever may be the frictions among the Western powers, their capacity to avoid resort to force in settling disputes with each other and to concert common policy is patently so much greater than the capacity of the greatest of them to reach agreement with the Soviet Union that this question requires discussion largely in terms of Soviet-American relations.

On many specific issues London rather than Washington will appear to be the policy-making center of the West; and on many other issues Anglo-American disagreement will render ineffective the diplo-

THE OTHER GREAT POWERS

macy of either. It is a great oversimplification of the problems of Soviet-Western relations to discuss them as if Britain were not also a truly independent political force. Even in Britain, however, the speculation as to what would be Britain's position in the event of Soviet-American war—a war in which one Labour Member of Parliament suggested that Britain should offer the United States “all aid short of war”—testifies to the key importance of the Soviet-American relationship.

Two years ago the easy answer would have been that the Soviet Union and the United States had to agree chiefly on what to do with Germany, lest that country take advantage of Soviet-American disagreement and rise again. Two years ago, however, it was not known that Hitler's last legacy would be a Germany so thoroughly pulverized that it is difficult for statesmen today to believe that what remains of Germany is enough of a menace to provide a compelling incentive for continued collaboration. By continuing the war for eight long months after it was irretrievably lost, Hitler brought upon his country a destruction so complete that it left the surviving victors viewing each other as the greatest menace to future security.

Another easy answer would be that the United States should offer to co-operate whenever the Soviet Union agrees to mend its ways. David Dallin, for example, has written: “Today it is still possible for the Soviet Union to retreat in Europe to the limits of national Russia—to the natural borders of the three main Russian nationalities—and to reestablish the real independence of her neighbors. Tomorrow may be too late.”⁴ What is disturbing here is not the wish for an end to Soviet intervention in the domestic affairs of neighboring states but the implication that there is nothing that the United States can do to improve Soviet-American relations except to remind Soviet statesmen that crime does not pay.

A third easy answer would be for the United States and the Soviet Union to divide the world between themselves. According to William B. Ziff, “We must seek a new world equilibrium of power, in which the U.S.A. will follow a line of development paralleling that of the U.S.S.R. As we shall observe, this means a reversal of our present policy and a practical end to the small state.” Lest the reader be disturbed by this proposal, Mr. Ziff adds, a few sentences later: “Though our first duty is clearly that of guaranteeing the survival of our own nation, it cannot be in the cynical power terms with which

⁴ David J. Dallin, *The Big Three* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 276.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the world is unhappily familiar.”⁵ Even if one ignores the moral aspects of this suggestion and if one also passes over the possible difficulty that the peoples of western Europe and eastern Asia might not accept the Ziff proposal very graciously, there is room for skepticism on other grounds.

Soviet and American interests today meet and sometimes conflict at a myriad of points. Some of these clashes of interest are adjusted, and some are allowed to remain unsettled at least for a time. Under the Ziff plan there could be no postponement of difficult conflicts until a more favorable date. There would, in fact, be no room for minor clashes at all. The iron curtain which Winston Churchill sees being drawn across Europe would be permanently set in place. There could then be only the major head-on clash between the giant of Eurasia and the giant of the Western world.

Difficult as were the negotiations over Trieste, diplomatic exchanges were carried on in language which recognized the obligation to find a solution that accorded with the best interests of the peoples most directly concerned. The American negotiators put great stress on ethnic considerations. The Soviet negotiators referred again and again to the need for economic unity between the city and its hinterland. It was the journalists and not the diplomats who talked openly of giving the Soviet Union a window on the Adriatic or of sealing the Mediterranean off against Soviet influence.

If an attempt were made to merge all the outstanding conflicts into a single struggle to fix the precise line separating the zones of Soviet and American predominant influence, the attempt might well bring on the armed clash which the demarcation was supposed to avoid. To bargain frankly and openly for this or that division of the world into two spheres puts an unbearable strain on the negotiating process.

If the line were once fixed, one wonders how easy it would be to achieve its peaceful relocation. The pressure for change arising from changing demands for justice, from technologies changing at different rates, from differentials in birth rates, from new restrictions on the free movement of men or goods or ideas, and from the emergence of new loyalty patterns might force its relocation. It is difficult to see how any dynamic forces could express themselves within the framework of peace in the international relations of such a two-power world.

⁵ William B. Ziff, *Two Worlds* (New York, 1946), p. 263.

THE OTHER GREAT POWERS

America's domestic experience suggests a wholly different approach. There is nothing in American political history which indicates that a bipolar system cannot be made to work. The American two-party system has worked quite as well as the multiparty systems of western Europe. This is perhaps because the line between the two parties is not hard and fast, is not an iron curtain. Between the two large groups of voters whose allegiance to the Republican or the Democratic party is impervious to appeal from the other or from the outside lie numerous groups of marginal voters. Their allegiance to any one party is only contingent. It is often subordinated to their allegiance to some nonparty group—a trade-union, a church, a manufacturers' association, or a local interest group, for example. It is from these groups with contingent loyalties that come the decisive votes in every election. Furthermore, the effort which each party makes to appeal to these in-between voters tends to narrow the gap between the parties. The analogy suggested here is loose and imperfect, but it indicates some of the conditions for a flexible, but peaceful, balancing process in a bipolar world.

The first condition is that there be no fixed line of demarcation between the zones of Soviet and American influence; that, instead of an iron curtain, there be belts of frontiers. Europe already exhibits this pattern to a marked extent. In eastern Europe there are governments whose friendliness to Moscow meets every requirement of Soviet diplomacy. In western Europe are others whose independence is real but which have a more or less spontaneous Anglo-American orientation. In fairness to the Soviet Union it should be said that the friendliness toward the West of this latter group does not have to be planned for in advance in quite the same way as the Soviet government feels itself compelled to plan to have "friendly regimes" in countries adjacent to its borders. This is partly because the penalty to the United States for nonintervention in the affairs of the western European states is not so great as the penalty the Soviet Union might have had to pay if it had failed to interest itself in the affairs of its immediate neighbors. In eastern Europe the result might well have been regimes violently antipathetic to the Soviet Union.

In between the two zones just described lies a third zone of possible equilibrium. Here is an area which includes the traditional neutrals, Sweden and Switzerland, and the ex-enemy territories of Germany and Austria. The American interest would seem to be to move in the opposite direction from those who would make a clean-cut division of

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the world into two spheres. American diplomacy should seek to minimize the chance for direct clash with the Soviet Union by maintaining and strengthening the present pattern with its belts of frontiers. Only if this policy had been tried and had failed because of an unambiguous expansionist thrust from the Soviet Union, would it be time to put chief stress on a closer integration of the Western powers.

Another condition which would favor the peaceful evolution of the bipolar pattern is that the balancing process go on within, as well as between, states. Europe today is divided by more than geographic boundaries, so that this condition should not be hard to meet. In the competition between the ideologies of communism and liberal democracy for the minds and hearts of men, especially those in the in-between world of Continental Europe, there will be an inevitable further blurring of geographic boundaries.

The socialization of American democratic vocabulary, as evidenced, for example, by the inclusion of freedom from want among the four freedoms, and the corresponding democratization of Soviet socialist vocabulary may, even in the long run, promote a wider community of belief. In the short run also this tendency of competing vocabularies to move toward each other favors the cause of peace. It promotes the organization of interests and loyalties on other than territorial lines. Clash between groups which are not territorially segregated is less likely to take the form of war.⁶

The victory of the British Labour party has given the Western powers a new opportunity to appeal to the non-Communist left throughout Europe. The nobility, priesthood, and plutocracy, who may be distressed by this development, will hardly on that account throw their influence to the Soviet side; and the peasants, urban workers, and submerged colonial populations may have a new resurgence of faith in democratic values.⁷

Neither Moscow nor Washington is unaware of the advantages from their respective national points of view of ideological and economic diplomacy, especially in a period of rapid military demobilization. The Soviet offer of 600,000 tons of wheat to France on the eve of a crucial election is matched by the American offer of a substantial credit to Poland, provided certain conditions be met, including the

⁶ Cf. Jacob Viner, "The Economic Problem" in George deHuszar (ed.), *New Perspectives on Peace* ("Walgreen Foundation Lectures" [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944]), p. 87.

⁷ Cf. Frederick L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad* (New York: Knopf, 1946), p. 604.

THE OTHER GREAT POWERS

prompt holding of free elections. In so far as the efforts by the gentlemen in the Narkomindel and in the State Department to pierce the iron curtain are mutually successful, they promote not only a national but an international interest.⁸ If they pierce further and are mutually successful in reaching inside the national boundaries of the Soviet Union and the United States, an even greater international interest would be served.

There is a third circumstance which, if properly recognized, favors the peaceful development of Soviet-American relations. Western and central Europe, though no longer the home of the chief actors in the drama of world politics, is by no means a political vacuum. It is peopled by men with both the skill and the determination to govern themselves. The day is drawing to a close when the nations of Europe can be treated as pawns in Soviet-American relations. The free peoples of Europe, as Walter Lippmann has pointed out, will be equally resentful toward the Soviet leadership and toward the American if the economic and political recovery of that continent is much longer delayed by diplomatic impasses between the Big Two.⁹

This resentment would favor the growth of a sense of European consciousness, and with it there might even be a tendency for European countries to unite again around their natural center of gravity, Germany. The stage would then be set for a third world war in which the Soviet Union and the United States would again be reluctant allies because they had again failed to see in time where lay the greatest menace.

In this circumstance, however, there is not only danger but opportunity. Great-power agreement, if on issue after issue it is based on the wishes and interests of the peoples most directly affected, will tend to be self-enforcing; for local interest will then support the settlement and permit the orderly withdrawal of Soviet and American armed force from the in-between world. Once it has been determined that Europe is not to be partitioned in the manner of Poland in the eighteenth century, there is, as a matter of fact, no other basis on which the Soviet Union and the United States can reach agreement except that of respect for the rights of the less powerful nations lying between them.

⁸ Harold D. Lasswell has analyzed the potentialities of economic diplomacy for the spread of democratic values in his *World Politics Faces Economics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946).

⁹ *The New York Herald-Tribune*, May 14, 1946.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

The picture of great-power interrelationships has here been painted largely in terms of conflict and collaboration in Europe. The picture would have been markedly different if it had been painted in terms of rivalry in the Arab lands or in eastern Asia; but the conclusion would have been much the same. American diplomacy should oppose the drawing of a fixed line of demarcation between the Soviet and the non-Soviet worlds. The balancing process should be carried on within, as well as between, states. Agreement should be only on the basis of complete respect for local rights.

On the basis of such a program one may be permitted to have a cautious and restrained optimism about the future of the key international relationship of our time. If neither power trades too much on the unwillingness of the other to let relations between them deteriorate, if in neither do irresponsible politicians who wish to have bad Soviet-American relations for internal political reasons gain the upper hand, the way remains open for a prolonged period of accommodation.

It is important that direct and indirect clashes among the great powers be settled issue by issue and on their merits if this one world with its two poles of influence is to remain one world. In the direct open clashes there is perhaps no substitute for high-level direct diplomacy. In the indirect clashes the United Nations will come into its own as an agency for the settlement of issues by reference more to commonly accepted standards of fairness and not so much to the treacherous calculus of Soviet and American power in the particular area in dispute. With the liquidation of disputes growing out of the war, it is the latter indirect type which will move into the focus of world opinion and will be amenable to settlement most easily through United Nations procedures. With persistence and luck, with patience and imagination, the agenda of differences between the United States and the other great powers may be kept so short that the issue of our time which transcends all others in importance—the international control of atomic energy—will be negotiated in that atmosphere of mutual confidence which alone would permit agreement on a bold and effective control plan.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

By CORNELIS W. DEKIEWIET¹

THE capital event in Anglo-American relations in our times is the close military alliance of the two countries during the war. It is one of the genuine intellectual experiences of our generation to contemplate the recognition by the American general staff of the strategic necessities of global warfare. Out of the isolationist mood of America there sprang suddenly a brilliant and resourceful internationalism. There was the fullest recognition of the vital strategic importance of Great Britain itself and of the military advantages of the British Empire for the purposes of modern global warfare. I pay this deserved compliment partly to emphasize the realism of the American general staff. But I say it also in order, later on, to contrast its flexibility and originality in military undertakings with its lack of these qualities in meeting the political and diplomatic consequences of military success.

On the level of popular opinion there exists in certain circles in this country an opaque and stubborn screen which prevents an objective scrutiny of Great Britain and her policies. There is a popular historiography of the American Revolution and of subsequent British-American relations which insists upon difference and incompatibility. To read the debates on the loan to Great Britain is once again to recognize how deeply certain influential minds in our society are governed by a sort of traditional rancor which gives to the equation of British policy with perfidy all the accuracy of a mathematical expression.

The problem of British-American relations can have meaning only if discussed as part of the still wider problems of peace and security. The equipment of modern warfare forces each society to feel that its own security is incomparably its greatest problem. Yet a year after victory over Germany and Japan still finds our modern societies at the mercy of fluctuating forces that now draw them together in hope and now drive them apart in suspicion.

¹ Professor of modern European history, Cornell University.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Great Britain lost her sense of security at Munich. At Dunkirk her security collapsed entirely. The United States did all it could as a neutral nation to prevent the British loss of strategic control in western Europe from becoming an irretrievable disaster. The security of Great Britain was recognized as indispensable to American security. After Pearl Harbor, military and political leadership and diplomatic initiative in western Europe passed substantially into the hands of the United States, so that British security became a major American war aim.

For Great Britain to recover a sufficient measure of security, at least one of three major conditions had to be fulfilled. The first was to use the processes of war and the opportunities of victory to create in western Europe a new military and industrial power. That power could not be Great Britain alone. Ever since Munich, this had been quite clear. Indeed, an unchallengeable British predominance in western Europe had come to an end in August, 1914.

What might be the shape of this new military and industrial power? Winston Churchill hinted at it when, in June, 1940, he proposed the political union of France and Great Britain. At the time, it seemed the forlorn invention of a desperate mind. Yet the man who made the proposal was Churchill, and in the history of the war he is equaled only by the Russians in his persistent effort, however gloomy the aspect of his country's affairs, to discern the political consequences of military events. Churchill the statesman denied Churchill the historian in order that his country might live.

The proposal did not die with the collapse of France. In an extended form it was revived by Field Marshal Smuts in 1942. In an off-the-record speech before the British Parliamentary Association he pointed out that Great Britain had lost her financial predominance and her strategic security in western Europe. She could regain these only through a close and sustained bond between herself and other western European powers, notably France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. As a trial balloon the speech was a failure. It was greeted with hostility in Russia and indifference in the United States. Yet we must now recognize it to have been one of the significant proposals of the war. To assess the significance of this statement of war aims, we have simply to find the sum of the following quantities—the total manpower of these nations, their combined industrial capacity, the pooling of their technical and scientific skills, the acceptance of common economic and diplomatic aims, the reinforcement of strategic ad-

THE UNITED KINGDOM

vantages on both sides of the English Channel, and, finally, a still closer connection between four of the great colonial empires. Such a consummation would have been one of the most considerable events of modern history, since it would have established by the side of the United States and Russia the third indisputable power center of the world.

It is likely that such an achievement would in any case have been supremely difficult. Without the support of American military and political leadership it was quite impossible. With that support, the opposition of Russia would not have mattered. It is apparent that American opinion was not favorable to the establishment of a distinct western European security system. As events themselves show, there was failure or refusal to relate military undertakings to a clearly conceived and openly stated plan for western Europe. The evidence of this stares us in our guilty faces all the way from Austria to the Atlantic Ocean. The contrast with Russia's attitude in eastern Europe has been evident to the casual observer for a long time. In the darkest days, as in the brightest, Russia deliberately aimed at something beyond military success. That something was security.

In defense of the American military leaders it must be said that they confined themselves to the professional function of beating the Germans. Their task was to take the superb physical equipment which American industry had provided and use it to smash enemy resistance. Within the limits set by this task, their ingenuity and skill were probably without equal. Outside these limits, they were often indifferent and sometimes suspicious and resentful. It was almost as if they had splendidly learned the lesson of military internationalism without unlearning their political isolationism. We shall presently see that the fundamental explanation for American indifference to a distinct plan in western Europe in the interests of British and American security was that President Roosevelt had a greatly more ambitious design for solving the problem of postwar security.

Failing in the re-establishment of immediate security, to satisfy the requirements of security in the West, there was a second condition. This was to see that no other European power so greatly gained in strength as to inherit Germany's position and to continue to upset the balance of power in Europe. The one power, obviously, that threatened to do this was Russia. We now know that Winston Churchill was suspicious of Russia as early as Teheran and Yalta. We also know that there was a plan for the invasion of Europe

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

through the Balkans. It is not necessary to analyze the military advantages or disadvantages of attacking Germany through the Balkans to recognize that a victory over Germany would have immensely strengthened the Western powers in the Balkans and eastern Europe, once the war was over. That General Eisenhower was militarily correct in insisting on an attack by way of western Europe is probably true. Yet the fact remains that the British were denied the political advantages, or what they hoped would be the political advantages, of winning a solid foothold in the Balkans. What Great Britain obviously aimed at was to perpetuate an ancient condition in eastern Europe. In that region there had always been at least one other power that curbed the initiative and qualified the power of Russia. Once it was Turkey and Sweden; then it was Austria and Great Britain, and finally Germany. Now for the first time in her history Russia stood unchallengeable and alone in eastern Europe. She now held, indeed more than held, in eastern Europe the place Great Britain had once held in western Europe. This was a revolution of which we are only now beginning clearly to discern the immense consequences. Power and authority in Europe have abruptly moved from West to East.

To establish British security after the war there was a third possible solution, more ambitious and comprehensive than the first two. President Roosevelt made the effort to place problems of British security and, by extension, American security in a wider context than western Europe, in a wider context, indeed, than Europe itself. Security was not, in his judgment, a local problem or a British problem; it was a world problem. The appropriate guaranties for security could be found only in international understanding, based upon the firmest agreements between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. The progression from the early meetings of the Big Two—Roosevelt and Churchill—to the meetings of the Big Three—Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin—was the outward sign of the movement of Roosevelt's convictions from a wartime alliance with Great Britain to a far more enduring peacetime bond between the three great victors of World War II. Roosevelt was the conscience of the American people and, more than anybody else, the conscience of the democratic and anti-Fascist Western world. He was the conscience of the American people because he applied to international problems a more practical idealism than that of Wilson, in an effort to repair the American dereliction of international responsibilities at the end of the

first World War. He was also the active conscience of the Western world because he sought to make amends to Russia for a whole generation of hostility, suspicion, and misunderstanding. What diplomatic documents will never adequately reveal is the feeling which warmed Roosevelt's search for an understanding with Russia. With him it was obviously more than a shrewd calculation that a firm bond between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia was the best of all possible guaranties of international peace. Where Wilson had an austere faith in moral obligation, Roosevelt had a warm faith in good will and friendliness. He made a deliberate bid for the personal liking of Joseph Stalin, as if he could make the personal attachment between two men the effective symbol of an attachment between two peoples as well.

To prove his good faith, Roosevelt made the most significant concessions to Russia. One of these concessions was his refusal to give an outright and energetic American support to the organization of a separate security system in western Europe. Roosevelt died without realizing his grand design and without establishing the wider guaranties for which he had sacrificed real advantages in western Europe. Russia proceeded to set up in eastern Europe precisely the local security system which Roosevelt had forborne to set up in the West. Before he died, he probably suspected that Russia set a higher value upon Russian arms and unilateral Russian diplomacy, upon a shrewd calculation of individual advantage, and upon power politics than upon those moral, sentimental, and sometimes even friendly considerations which are an ingredient of American foreign policy. The problem of security in western Europe remains unsolved. Until it is solved, the British position in western Europe is of vital concern to the United States.

An American scholar whom I hold in respect for his moderation once explained to me that the disintegration of the British Empire was the single most important requirement for world peace. As long as its archaic fragments lie scattered over the earth's surface, he held that we were bound to live in restlessness, for nobody could move anywhere without stumbling over a piece of the British Empire or colliding with some stubborn imperial interest. This is a forceful expression of the doubt in many American minds of the proper attitude to be adopted toward the British Empire.

It can be conceded immediately that the British Empire is undergoing drastic change. In one sense it may be disintegrating, although

I believe the word to be misleading. Even then it is true that the manner of disintegration and what happens to the products of disintegration are matters of the most vital interest to America. An independent India would certainly not return to the shadowy confusion of Aurungzeb, nor would an independent Egypt lose its quality as a key port in the system of world communications and return also to the genial corruption of 1880. The manner in which these communities continue to live and develop in the modern world is of supreme importance to us all. As the great areas of imperial exploitation and rivalry—India, southeastern Asia, the Middle East—become politically autonomous, they will come face to face with a still greater undertaking than the achievement of political independence. That undertaking will be the introduction of the equipment and skills that alone will make independence alive and enduring. The fundamental defect of these regions has been not so much political tutelage as the insufficiency, in modern terms, of educational systems, of scientific staffs, and of technological equipment.

Great Britain has hitherto been the principal mechanism through which money and skills have been filtered to those parts of the world whose stability depends upon a supply of Western finances, equipment, and expertness. However clumsy or selfish or even cruel imperial activity undoubtedly has been, it has performed the cultural function of distributing the achievements of the West. In relation to the needs of Asia and Africa the distribution has been pitifully inadequate. The indictment of imperialism or, indeed, of Western capitalism is that its concern with human welfare and opportunity is too often secondary and incidental. Yet we must recognize that imperialism has always been more than a system of exploitation and subjection. It has also been the imperfect instrument of an indispensable cultural function. If we agree that the modern world can dispense with traditional imperialism, then we must still rescue and continue the activities that will bring irrigation and medicine to India and expel loan sharks from Burma and hookworm from West Africa. These activities are an investment in life itself. An investment in life is an investment in security. It is costly to build railways and schools or to fight disease, very costly. The grant of an American loan to Great Britain is clearly an act of farsighted and practical statesmanship. It contains the recognition that British strength and enterprise are still an important ingredient of American security. Above all, it

contains the recognition that the United States accepts responsibility for the changes in a fast-changing world.

The end of political subjection will be the beginning of industrial and social revolution. This is already clear in both China and India. Within measurable time, it will also be true in the Middle East. For the sake of its security, the United States is bound to watch closely the method by which political and economic change is effected in the colonial areas.

In the world there are two distinct methods of bringing about industrial, economic, and social change. The first is British and American in character; the second is Russian. In Great Britain and the United States the industrial revolution was, we can now see, a relatively slow, empirical accumulation of methods and institutions which took place over a period of generations. As a method of transforming society it relied upon individual enterprise rather than upon administrative compulsion, upon the investment of capital rather than upon an unfeeling and peremptory mobilization of labor and manpower. As far as American influence upon modern culture is concerned, this is the real American revolution. I say this not out of impertinence but to develop a necessary contrast with the Russian method of bringing about economic and social change. Before 1928, the British and American "revolutionary method," as we may call it, enjoyed a sort of cultural monopoly. They set a pattern and a pace for other societies—the Dominions, for instance—to follow. But the Russian revolution destroyed this British and American cultural monopoly. By the Russian revolution, I do not mean the violence of 1917. In cultural terms the real Russian revolution began with the great five-year plans. These were a method of bringing about desired industrial, economic, and social change by means that were swift, drastic, and compulsory. The five-year planners were men in a hurry, willing to spend life in order to save time and to undertake a brutal mobilization of labor and manpower as a substitute for the capital and the technical "know how" which the Soviet Union lacked.

The world is now endowed with two alternative methods of bringing about and sustaining change, and these methods are implicitly in competition for the allegiance of all societies that stand on the threshold of modernization.

The argument put forward is not an appeal for the United States to "save the Empire" by a merciful use of its wealth and influence. If that were so, then even the grosser passages in the debate on the

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

British loan might be justified. The argument is, rather, that the United States should use some of its wealth and some of its influence to continue, under conditions favorable to its own economy and to its own political convictions, the function of modernizing the critical backward areas of the world. Modernization in this sense aims at political self-direction, as well as the development of the social institutions and economic facilities proper for the welfare of the people in these areas. In India, in the Middle East, in China, the American choice is between an activity which aims at the orderly development of institutions and habits of life that are generally compatible with Western institutions and habits of life, or an inactivity that may help to plunge a considerable part of the world into an uncontrollable violence. If the United States is willing to accept some measure of responsibility, co-operation with Great Britain and the satellite colonial powers of the West is indispensable.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

By JOHN N. HAZARD^{*}

THE Soviet Union required little attention before the war in the formulation of American foreign policy. Soviet activities beyond its own borders were of relatively small importance to the United States after the Communist International slackened its militant campaign for world revolution. Not until 1934 did the Soviet Union join the League of Nations. The United States never joined. There was no world platform on which Americans met Soviet diplomats daily to discuss matters of world concern. The Soviet Union had not proved its strength and was largely ignored by the American public and policy-makers alike. Only when American interests extended into Russia itself did it become necessary to study Soviet attitudes and to devise a program designed to achieve objectives. If an objective could not be achieved, the position could be abandoned without loss of anything vital to the peaceful organization of the world or to the unhampered conduct of American affairs in areas which seemed important.

The war changed the situation. It brought the United States forward and aroused its people so that a desire developed to share in the solution of problems the world around. The war left the Soviet Union the most influential power in Europe and northern Asia and developed a self-confidence in Soviet leaders which had not been there before. The Soviet Union found itself for the first time able to make itself heard in the councils of the world. The United States found itself with a newly awakened national desire to share in solutions everywhere—from Siam to Iceland—but also faced with the necessity of considering the attitude of the Soviet Union in any formulation of policy relating to other than domestic issues. Even these domestic issues were not entirely exempt from Soviet influence. It is little wonder that the American people have come to look with concern upon the Soviet Union.

Reactions to the new situation have been varied. The frontier type of mind, often reflected in circles of the armed forces, has reached for

^{*} The Russian Institute, Columbia University.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the gun. It argues simply that if someone is in the way, get him out of it. Any evidence of willingness to discuss or compromise is taken as a sign of weakness and the first step toward a new Munich. Another type of mind sees the Soviet Union as the apostle of a kind of economic system which seems to be the inevitable candidate for world support. It has argued that if this system is to be accepted eventually, it would be saving of lives and treasure if it were not to be opposed but joined at the earliest opportunity. Between these extremes there has been all manner of variation. The academic man has been prone to seek for a program among the moderate views. It will be the purpose of this paper to present the general outlines of an approach designed for the moderate.

I

Formulation of policy must begin with an effort to understand the parties concerned. We Americans feel that we certainly understand ourselves. We also feel that we know the English, from whom many of us spring and with whom many have studied. In lesser degree, but with considerable certainty, we estimate reactions of the French, the Italians, the Swiss, or the Swedes. Our experience fails us as we proceed east across Europe. Only a few Americans have lived in eastern Europe for any length of time, and even fewer have been in a position where they could study what was going on. Those who have been so fortunate have been struck by the fact that accustomed yardsticks for estimating motives and reactions seem generally inadequate. One searches for the explanation. After extensive analysis the explanation appears to be simply that the people of the Soviet Union are not like Americans. They differ in historical background and political philosophy. Since an understanding of these two factors seems basic to any formulation of policy relating to the Soviet Union, a brief comment on them becomes appropriate.

The historical background of the Russian has little in common with that of the American. Until the twentieth century Russia was a land of peasants. Even today the Soviet diplomat with whom one is seated at any international conference will almost always be a peasant or of recent peasant origin. His beard is gone, but not his peasant habits of mind. Up to the very time that Lincoln freed the slaves, the Russian peasant was a serf. The heritage of serfdom hung on in the form of economic fetters until 1905. Illiteracy, which ac-

THE SOVIET UNION

complicated serfdom, continued until well after the revolution and is only now disappearing.

Americans who have dealt with mountain people or the racial or national minority groups in our cities can most quickly grasp the mentality of the Russian. Those attorneys who have sought to find an individual in such a minority group know the suspicion with which they are met. Defense takes the form of apparent lack of comprehension or feigned stupidity. A verdict of "enigmatic" is most often the result. A proved friend, however, would have no difficulty at all in finding out what he wanted to know.

To the Russian peasant the Westerner, with his broader education, his glib tongue, his tailored clothes, is a suspicious character whose motives are not written on his sleeve. Even his simplest proposals must be explored in private with friends to find out what harm lies in hiding for the unwary. If he presents a document for signature, there is special cause for concern. The Westerner and his advance agent, the diplomat, are awaited with the same misgivings as was the Chicago banker of the old days who came out to Iowa to discuss the farm mortgage.

The Russian peasant has more than personal cause for concern. The years 1812, 1914, and 1941 are burned indelibly on his memory. Americans have no such tradition of national disasters when armies swarmed onto the land. To the experiences of the three wars for the Fatherland can be added the horrors of the period of civil war and intervention following the first World War. Persia and Poland, Manchuria and Murmansk, were the paths of invasion. Control of these approaches has become indelibly fixed in the peasant mind as the key to defense. Personal and national security have become such an obsession as to cause the Westerner, in turn, to be suspicious. It seems incredible that a people is sincere when it protests so much, yet the facts seem to support such a conclusion.

II

The political philosophy of a people is often laughed off by the American as unimportant. Thoughtful students, particularly those engaged in careful writing, are so accustomed to searching for the truth that they cannot conceive of a whole nation acting in the belief that it has found truth. Americans explain such an apparent situation, if they discover it at all, as being a tool of leadership, which does not believe but manipulates the concept of absolute truth to its own

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

advantage. While such manipulation without belief cannot be entirely ruled out as a possibility, it seems unlikely. Such evidence as there is leads one to the conclusion that even the leaders believe the official political theory on which their society rests. In view of this fact, the Western world must learn the theory, even if it cannot accept it.

✓ Every school child and the leaders themselves believe that the Soviet system of economy is potentially the most productive in the world. The private-enterprise system is believed to be doomed to ultimate abandonment after a series of recurring depressions. At the same time, Soviet leaders do not underestimate the vitality of the private-enterprise system. They anticipate that the leaders of the Western world will make every effort to retain a system from which great personal benefits have accrued. These efforts are expected to take the form of struggles for markets between the private-enterprise countries, extending eventually to an attack upon the nucleus of the new idea and economic system.

Soviet leaders think it would be remarkable if Western leaders would permit themselves to be ousted without a fight, spreading into a world war. For this reason Soviet leaders have an added ground for suspicion. They expect to be attacked not only because they occupy the territory which has been invaded so often before but because they are the prophets of a new idea. The suspicion of the Russian peasant is compounded by the suspicion of the Soviet political theorist. The result is an almost fanatical tenacity in defending those points which appear to constitute defensive positions and a caution bordering on the unbelievable in approaching proposals made by the non-Soviet world.

✓ Soviet political theory has its missionary aspect. It would not run true to form if it did not. Almost all new theories have had apostles who wished to share with others the benefits of the truth they have discovered. This is the more appealing when, in doing so, one may make converts who can be expected to be political friends rather than potential enemies. Americans should understand this feeling as easily as any. In their personal lives they have been the most ardent evangelists. As a nation, America has been prone to believe that good things would follow from acceptance of the American way of life and "democracy, Western style."

Soviet leaders have frequently said that revolution is not for export. The 1940 experience in Finland showed that a people will not

THE SOVIET UNION

rally around a Soviet socialist banner unless they are ready for it. Finland could be conquered but not revolutionized. On the other hand, Hungary, after the last war, was ready for revolution, but it failed. The insurgents were strong enough to seize power but not to retain it against internal and external attack. Lenin watched the defeat of a genuine revolution which his young armies could not help. The Finnish and Hungarian situations constitute the extremes. Soviet missionary ambitions will probably be restricted to helping those who are prepared to help themselves along the road to what the Soviet Union believes to be economic salvation. It seems unlikely that Soviet leaders will give military support to revolution where it has no strong spontaneous local backing.

The ravages of the past war have reduced Soviet missionary potentialities. Loss of more than 7,000,000 killed; 25,000,000 persons made homeless; destruction of industry and mines in the most productive European areas of the Soviet Union; denuding of farms of tractors, draft animals, livestock, and seeds has put the population in no mood to expend energy or wealth upon those who do not show in advance that the investment would have every chance of success without giving rise to another world war. On the other hand, Soviet leaders can hardly be expected not to utilize such propaganda channels as may be open to urge populations to move toward the brighter future which they believe Soviet socialism offers.

III

From this review of Soviet characteristics, the conclusion seems justified that Soviet foreign policy is based upon suspicion tempered with cautious missionary zeal. There seems to be no national desire to conquer the world or even to penetrate physically areas beyond the traditional security belt, if these areas are not seeking Soviet support for social change, which is otherwise impossible.

If these conclusions be accepted, what might be the outlines of a United States policy relating to the Soviet Union? It might have three aspects: (a) taking measures to reduce and ultimately eliminate suspicion of United States motives as designed, singly or in concert with others, to attack or take other repressive sanctions against the Soviet Union; (b) taking measures to reduce and ultimately eliminate discontent arising from oppression, exploitation, segregation, or even neglect by ourselves or others, which discontent leads peoples to search for violent solutions; (c) preservation of power sufficient to

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

defend ourselves and, in combination with all peace-loving states, to dissuade others, wherever they may be, from seeking adventurous solutions to aspirations not recognized by the community of nations.

IV

What might be the instrumentalities and manner of effecting such a policy? Starting with the present time, the focus would be the United Nations. Reduction of the possibility of war and improvement of the lot of mankind through the Economic and Social Council would do two things: It would be one means of appealing to the security obsession of Soviet leaders; and it would also reduce the areas of misery, segregation, and neglect in which adventurous solutions to world problems are hatched. The Soviet Union cannot be expected to respond quickly to a situation of greater security. It is suspicious because of the failure of the League of Nations. It is suspicious because of the events in the United Nations and outside of it, during the past year. These suspicions must be overcome.

Certain simple techniques may help to reduce suspicion, once there is a basic policy established to recognize its existence and to take steps to eliminate it. Such techniques would bring Soviet delegates into the formulation of programs even before they are presented to the agencies of the United Nations. Soviet delegates may not respond at first, because they are going to be slow to think this a sincere effort to consult. They have become too familiar with a final draft which is presented with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude. Present copies well in advance of a formal proposal, and present these at the same time that they first go to the British or the French. Consider the language barrier and never bring in for immediate action a paper which Soviet representatives have not had well in advance for translation and study. Make proposals simple. Avoid language associated with a corporate mortgage, which tends to frighten the suspicious mind. If these rules are followed by men who are proved to be of good will and who have infinite patience, tact, and, if possible, the ability to explain themselves in Russian, a long step will be taken toward harmony. At the same time, not all conflict will be eliminated, because that is impossible.

In presenting programs to the United Nations, persuasion should be the first approach. If this fails after a truly sympathetic trial, one will face the temptation of driving the programs through with majority votes and veiled threats. Before this approach is attempted, the

THE SOVIET UNION

proponent should be called upon to assess soberly the power position at that particular moment and place. Realism is called for. Swiss delegates have learned long ago that they make their points by persuasion. Norwegians do not insist upon a vote which would endeavor to influence action on the United States-Mexican frontier if the parties are not prepared to conform. While the United States is certainly not in a position similar to the Swiss or the Norwegians, the times are such that even the United States cannot enforce what it thinks is right in areas too far away to be subject to its predominant influence. Even if the area is not too far away, the discord which would result may, after sober balance, be thought to outweigh the advantage of victory on the point concerned.

V

There is a field for action outside the United Nations. It lies in the sphere of United States-Soviet Union bilateral relations. Ever since recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, United States-Soviet relations have been governed by nothing more than an exchange of notes on a very limited field of subjects, augmented by a series of brief trade-agreements extending most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union in return for commitments to purchase. There is also an agreement on letters rogatory. It is time for a systematic review of our treaty relationships.

It is appreciated that the Soviet economic system will not permit many activities by foreigners, such as building of factories; conducting banking, insurance, and transportation activities; operating schools; and engaging in several professions. On the other hand, there are many activities which are permitted and others which would seem to be reasonable requests without causing any threat to the Soviet economy. If these were reduced to writing so that Soviet and United States officialdom at the working levels had rules to guide their conduct, much cause for friction would be avoided. To be sure, senior officials might find occasions to nullify the effectiveness of a provision if national policy required it. This is a risk inherent in all treaties; but if it had been listened to in the past, there would be no international law of consequence today and no need for Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.

Matters demanding special attention in such a series of treaties are authors' and inventors' rights, for which there is no standard pattern of protection in both countries. There is not even the right of a consul

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

of one of the nations to appear in the courts of the other as the representative of a citizen whose estate may require administration or who may have matters requiring litigation.

Cultural exchange is on a casual basis. Soviet students and professors in the United States are few, and American students and visiting professors in the Soviet Union are fewer. The receipt of periodicals and books by both sides is so irregular as to arouse surprised comment when it occurs, rather than when it does not. This situation is the more important in view of the differing historical backgrounds and political theories of the two peoples, to which reference has already been made. One can hardly reach understanding without materials and the knowledge which comes from residence and study in the other country. Private funds are not adequate to support such exchanges. Government funds must be available and should not be frightened away because of a cry that this is propaganda.

Finally, there is the cohesive factor to be anticipated from trade. Soviet-American trade has brought many Soviet citizens to America and down to the level of "one-story America," as two Soviet writers have entitled our nonmetropolitan scene. American engineers and business executives have traveled to the Soviet Union and become acquainted with men who spoke the common language of engineering and business. Confidence and understanding have usually, although not always, developed.

Some part of Soviet reluctance to show their country to outside travelers can probably be laid to a feeling that since the war it is not a show place. American travelers and students could be expected to return with doleful tales of conditions and draw conclusions which a change in the economic conditions would be expected by Soviet leaders to disprove. Trade with the United States and with other industrial countries will alleviate these conditions. There will again be pride in Soviet hearts, and gates will be opened—never fully to all comers, for there is and will be for a long time the suspicion to which reference has been made. Trade will require credits until Soviet internal conditions permit release of large quantities of raw materials to pay for industrial imports. Consideration should be given to the factor of speeding the relaxation of travel barriers in assessing the desirability of extending credits. If credits are not granted, the Soviet Union is certainly autarchic enough to go without; but if they are granted, they may hasten recovery and intercommunication of travelers and students.

THE SOVIET UNION

VI

Anyone who has toiled for some time in the field of Soviet-American relations would be the first to admit that they are not simple of solution. There is no room for the impetuous, the irascible, the vengeful, the indolent negotiator. One must match the patience of the Slav with greater patience. One must think quickly and act graciously, even when violently provoked. And, above all, one must believe one's Soviet colleague an equal and treat him as such. With such an arsenal of attributes, applied in the interests of a program such as has been outlined, there is reason to expect a considerable measure of success.

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

THE discussion about United States policy toward the other great powers disclosed several divergent points of emphasis. The opinions in the opening statements by Mr. Fox, emphasizing the possibilities of a stable equilibrium of power within the United Nations; by Mr. deKiewiet, hoping for a western European bloc under American leadership; and by Mr. Hazard, suggesting careful diplomacy which might allay Soviet and American suspicions of each other and of their policies, were by no means uncontested.

The predominant opinion considered the problem of United States relations with the Soviet Union as most important and emphasized the danger in those relations. There were, however, varying degrees of concern, varying opinions on the major points of conflict, varying interpretations of the reasons for distrust, and varying proposals for improving the situation.

The minority opinion considered the United States relations with Great Britain as more important. Some with this view considered difficulties with the Soviet Union as a consequence of too much American support for British imperial interests which conflict with Soviet interests. Others considered these difficulties a consequence of too little support for the British interest in forming a Western security bloc and in strengthening the general position of the British Commonwealth.

The role of the United Nations in international security was continually emphasized, but most of this discussion has been brought together in Part II.

SOVIET POLICY

✓MR. C. W. DEKIEWIET: I imagine that all of us here are very much perplexed about what the bases of Russia's policies are. In the nineteenth century, up to 1917, there was always a feeling that Russian diplomacy was better informed, also more tortuous, than Western diplomacy. Actually, Russian diplomacy has always been quite clear and not very tortuous. At the present moment I think we have again the same feeling about Russian diplomacy, that it is more sinister than it really is; that it is more shrewd and calculating than it really

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

is. Just at this moment we are reaching the conclusion that Russia is deliberately imposing the so-called "iron curtain" upon herself.

I am not sure that the Russians are quite as clear as we think they are about the way they are going. A clarification of American policy might enforce a clarification of Russian policy. We want a better understanding. To engage in a foreign policy that accepts impending hostility with Russia, I think, is folly; worse than folly, it is criminal. In other words, any foreign policy, whether it deals with England or any other country, has to bear in mind that the effects upon Russian relations are primary and must be considered as such.

MR. HANS LEONHARDT: Have we in America exhausted all possibilities of coming to an understanding with Russia? Have we ever sat together with them and tried to come to a global arrangement, or have we so far only limited ourselves to this or that particular point? Knowing that the Russians move in an atmosphere of suspicion, partly objectively justified, partly subjectively exaggerated, have we ever made a real effort to penetrate this atmosphere of suspicion and asked them, "What are your claims?" and have we tried to reason out with them the position of the whole world?

MR. DEKIEWIET: Under what circumstances, by what procedures, by what advances, could that effort be made? In other words, to get the Russians to sit down and discuss—that is itself a major undertaking.

MR. LEONHARDT: It would be difficult, but I could imagine that a special envoy could say to Joseph Stalin, "The survival of civilization depends upon co-operation between Western and Eastern powers; obviously, we have not been very successful, we have bogged down all over the world, and now we want to make the supreme effort to come to terms with you; we are going to be willing even to make some concessions, always, however, under the assumption that you want to come to terms and will tell us all your territorial demands, all your economic wishes, everything you dislike about us, any suspicion you may entertain."

The Russians ask themselves about our island chain in the Pacific reaching into the back door of Asia; we dominate, let us say, Greenland and Iceland. This tremendous Russian empire finds itself surrounded by American air power. While we may think this is all defensive, yet it may not appear to the Russians that way.

MR. DEKIEWIET: For the proposal to be realistic, I mean acceptable to the Russians, I think America would have to indicate first

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

what she was willing to do. I think you are correct in pointing out that, looking at America from Russia, the Russians have justification for suspicion and doubt.

MR. FOX: Was it not an attempt to do just what has been suggested that has caused Secretary of State Byrnes to remain in almost constant conference with top diplomats of the Soviet Union? He has spent about twenty-four out of his first fifty-one weeks in office out of the country in conference with high-level diplomats, almost always including Mr. Molotov. Possibly the way to achieve a general Soviet-American settlement would be to call off all conferences for about six or eight months in order to permit a little better preparation. A new conference would be convened only when each side was ready to discuss any item which the other wished put on the agenda.

One other comment as to the utility of achieving a settlement through a single grand negotiation. One advantage of talking about Trieste as if Trieste were a problem by itself is that you talk in terms of the interests of the inhabitants of Trieste and those who immediately front on the Adriatic. If you throw all Soviet-American differences into a grand pot and say, "Now we are going to talk about everything," then the vocabulary will tend to shift. The discussion will be in terms of "the Soviet Union yields on this point" and "the United States yields on that point," and every concession will be thought of as a demonstration of Soviet or American weakness or strength. I suspect that the negotiating process, which operates under almost unbearable tension now, might just completely collapse if a supreme effort were made to throw everything in the pot and then ladle out solutions in some equitable fashion.

MR. DEKIEWIET: In working out his foreign policy with Russia, Roosevelt assumed that Russia had become a nation in many senses like the Western nations, concerned, on the whole, with problems of security and not expansion. But Russia today seems to be making the opposite assumption, that the world is in a fluid, flexible situation where Russian opportunity is greater than that of any other nation, Russia being mindful not only of positive, concrete benefits at certain points, as the gentleman suggested, but also of what might happen within countries if the present confusion, political and economic, continues; and Russia looks upon that as an advantage.

This suggests, of course, that Russia never has abandoned her attitude toward world revolution; that the Comintern under some other

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

form exists or at least that the idea of a world revolution is implicit in Russian policy. I think Stalin himself in his Georgia electoral campaign let drop more than one hint that that was his conviction.

MR. BRODIE: Whether or not the Russian government has abandoned the idea of world revolution as an abstract ideal, it seems not to have abandoned at any time the hypothesis that the Soviet Union is not secure in a capitalist world, which means that her recent experience would only augment, rather than diminish, the urge to capitalize on present instability.

MR. GURIAN: The question, "What is Russia's foreign policy?" is a meaningless question because Russia always has several foreign policies at the same time. There is one Russian policy which aims at world revolution or, more correctly, does not aim at the provocation of world revolution but is determined by the belief that objective development in various countries will result in revolutionary situations. Then there is another policy which is primarily interested in security.

Therefore, it is absolutely meaningless to call together a conference to discuss the question of what Russian demands are. Russian demands change according to the situation. If a revolutionary situation developed, for instance, as a result of the inflation here, then, of course, the world-revolutionary line in Russia would be strengthened. If, on the other hand, Communist parties continue to suffer electoral and other defeats in France, Italy, and so on, then Russia will emphasize an old-fashioned security policy and abandon world-revolutionary expectations.

What is meaningful, I think, is a clear, straightforward policy toward Russia. To put forward demands which cannot be enforced has no meaning. I regard it as questionable to fight for free elections in Rumania, Bulgaria, or even Poland.

SOVIET CHARACTERISTICS

MR. McMAHON: Isn't there active in Western society an accepted hierarchy of values which is repudiated substantially by the Soviets, and must not such considerations be attended to in the discussion of differences at the political level, as well as in considering economic conflicts?

MR. HAZARD: Those differences are most important because they cause the Soviet Union to be unduly suspicious. Also, on our side, of course, they restrict intercourse because they frighten some of us.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

It would be my personal opinion that, even though, theoretically, Soviet theories are incompatible with our general theories, they do not enter into Soviet thinking more than to be the basis of this missionary idea plus the suspicion; and the missionary idea, as I have indicated here, is relatively limited and certainly must for some years be very greatly limited because of the loss which the Soviet Union suffered. So I think it would probably be wrong to say that the political ideas of the Soviet Union are such that we and they could never work out a peaceful coexistence.

MR. ELLSWORTH FARIS: Do the Communists claim to have absolute truth? Isn't that contrary to their dialectical theory?

MR. HAZARD: They claim to have absolute truth in this sense: that they do not believe they can be wrong in where they are going and in what the absolute goal is but that at any individual moment in history there is always a chance to go farther. They never think they have reached the great plateau. Even when communism is achieved, they will expect the dialectic process of development to continue. The absolute truth is something that is in motion.

MR. FARIS: What do you think about this temporizing and willingness to postpone their missionary zeal? I wonder whether it is related to their religious faith, because one Marxist group thinks that if nobody does anything at all about it the capitalistic system will collapse anyhow—it is inevitable, and therefore they can wait.

MR. HAZARD: That, of course, is not the view that the Soviet Marxists take.

MR. FARIS: No, there are two schools of them.

MR. HAZARD: Yes, the Second International as opposed to the Third.

MR. FARIS: Is that completely out of the present philosophy of the ruling classes?

MR. HAZARD: I can give you an example. When I was in England last summer, by chance I dropped into a group which I thought was going to be a meeting of Labour party union members, and it turned out to be a Communist group meeting, much to my surprise and much to my embarrassment. We got to talking about the attitude of Communists to the Labour party, and I said: "Is it not true that the Labour Party in England has proved at last that you can move from capitalism to socialism without a bloody revolution? Because if that is so, it is a very appealing thought to people who don't want to have their throats cut, assuming that the inevitable economic change is coming anyway."

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

The response was: "It is only temporary; as soon as the British conservatives realize what has happened, there will be the reaction and then the revolution to make the transition to socialism permanent."

MR. FARIS: They are trying to promote this everywhere; but if they don't promote it, it will happen anyway, won't it?

MR. HAZARD: Only after the spending of much blood and tears. In other words, they often measure things in terms of how many millions of lives are lost by delaying it until it happens by itself; and if the expenditure of lives is less than the expenditure of lives over the long period of time that it takes to come anyway, then in the balance it is perhaps worth while spending a few lives now rather than waiting another hundred years and having many people suffer before it comes. My point is that I think the cost is too high for anything other than the areas in the security belt and perhaps those beyond, which are willing to put on their own revolution and need just the 5 per cent more.

There is one point that no one has picked up tonight which seems to me to be an important one: It is my humble opinion that communism breeds in areas of discontent—all those things that I listed, segregation, neglect, and so on. If the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations is able to take the areas of the world which are ripe for some sort of violent change and bring them up to a level where neglect, segregation, oppression, and whatnot no longer exist, I wonder whether, perhaps, the area in which the ideas of communism might work might not be narrowed to the point where it was no longer of very much concern.

MR. DEKIEWIET: I wonder if we have not used language that is too mild in talking about Russian suspicion. Isn't Russian suspicion more than suspicion? It is an insistence on suspicion or, more adequately, a conviction. The Russians have a conviction that their analysis of foreign nations is a correct analysis and not susceptible, therefore, of any fundamental change.

I have here a piece of writing by Karl Radek, published in 1935, which seems to throw a good deal of light upon the Russian attitude, not to the Fascist powers but to the democratic powers with whom it has been allied.

The Soviet Union does not close the door to the possibility of striking a deal with imperialist powers which are waging a struggle with other imperialist powers, if the latter attack the Soviet Union; but in entering in on such an agreement the Soviet Union would not accept any responsibility for the specific purposes pursued by the imperialist powers parties to the agreement. Never and under no conditions

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

would it participate in the plundering of other nations, because participation in such a plunder would be contrary to the international solidarity of the workers. But against an attacking imperialism, agreement is permissible with any opponent in order to defeat an enemy invading Soviet territory.

I think I have named the fundamental principles of Soviet policy and have explained their interdependence. They are all derived from the basic fact that imperialism is unable to solve the great problems which mankind has to face today. A new imperialistic war will not solve them. It will lead to an immense destruction of productive forces, to unexampled sufferings among the masses of the people, and will achieve nothing except a new reshuffling of the possessions of the capitalist world.

One might point out that Radek got himself into quite serious trouble a year or two after writing this, and therefore what he has to say is not official; yet I ask this question without knowing the answer: Is it not, in the main, true that this sort of language, paraphrased, has been used by responsible Russian leaders since 1935, and therefore should we not pay attention to that conviction of the Russians that they have an analysis not simply of the nature of American policy but of American society that makes this conviction one which we cannot expect easily to eradicate from Russian thought and policy?

MR. HAZARD: There is this very real suspicion. I don't know whether it is possible to overcome it. It is absolutely impossible to overcome it in theory because Soviet citizens so thoroughly believe it; but I think that what the United States did under Lend-Lease during the war went some way toward overcoming it.

I am reminded of a Soviet general who was here in this country, who said they had drawn all their plans for the great war which they knew was coming without any expectation that the United States or England would help and that when we did help and sent Lend-Lease supplies it was the greatest surprise to them.

I don't think for a minute that any of this is going to come quickly, but I think that if you have the right kind of people handling Soviet-American relationships, we may, over a period of time, achieve a *modus vivendi* which will preserve the peace.

MR. DEKIEWIET: This suspicion can be removed only if the Russians themselves abandon some of these convinced analyses that they have made of what they call the imperialist system. It seems to have to be a renunciation of faith.

MR. HAZARD: It would mean a very real change. The more we ask them to change or tell them that they have to, the more they will adhere to their belief. That is not the proper approach, to tell the

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

Russians constantly that they must give up this idea, "aren't they blind?" and what not. It has been my experience that you have to work at modifying their opinions without mentioning it at all. There is no question that, for instance, with Mr. Hopkins they felt a certain sense of confidence that he was telling them the truth and that he really wanted to work with them, and he did seem to achieve miracles at times.

NEGOTIATING WITH RUSSIANS

MR. WRIGHT: I suppose that in Western diplomacy it is assumed that you ought always to operate on accurate, objective information. Would Mr. Pasvol'sky like to comment on whether there is a tendency for Soviet negotiators to assume certain hypotheses and always to discount whatever information they have in the light of their hypotheses?

MR. PASVOL'SKY: I think there is no doubt about that. They are separated from the world. If there is an iron curtain, even if it is a removable curtain, it operates in both directions. It prevents them from getting a clear view of the world as much as it prevents us from getting a clear view of them. They have to judge information on the basis of their hypotheses. I have seen them change their minds; but, whenever they have changed their minds, it has always been on the basis of a set of arguments that were worked out through a terribly laborious process of going over the same ground again and again.

MR. HAZARD: I have a case in point. During one period of the war we had some rather extensive commercial negotiations with them, and their negotiator, who was one of the vice-commissars of foreign trade, was here. He read what Congress thought, but he did not believe that it made any difference because he knew Lenin's statement that a parliament is a debating society, hence a parliament could have no influence on policy; and in his opinion, whenever the United States government negotiators said they could not do something because Congress would not permit it, he thought that was just a blind behind which the United States government negotiators could hide.

I had a very long talk with him, using his own language because I knew Lenin, too, and tried to explain to him that things had changed in our Congress since Lenin had written and that Congress did have considerable influence, particularly in some areas of the Middle West, and that we could not do what he wanted. But he finally went

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

away convinced that we could have and that this was our excuse; and it was not until a whole year later that they accepted the plan, having in the meantime studied it, as Dr. Pasvolsky said, and realized that there was some benefit to them in it.

One of the pleas I am making here is that we have men who not only know the Russian language, as Pasvolsky does—we haven't enough people like that—but also know their Lenin and their Marx and their Engels and their Stalin. I have ended many an argument by quoting chapter and verse which seemed to be appropriate at that point; and, once you had the Marxist teaching and it was opposed to the negotiator's point of view, there was no further talking until he went home and reconsidered the situation. It is a great help to know that Marxist background because it represents to Soviet negotiators what we might call the Prophets of Absolute Truth. It is a point of view to which we are just entirely unaccustomed.

I met a lawyer the other day who said he was startled to see that every Soviet law book begins with the equivalent of the Bible; that an American lawyer argues without any basic thesis which he accepts; he always considers that everything is open to consideration and argument, but not so with the Russians. Every law book always starts with the basic principles, which are the Absolute Truth principles, and then the rest of the law book is built as a footnote to that. That is the way they work and the way they think, and my humble opinion is that they do not do it to fool the people. I believe the people at the top really think that way.

MR. FOX: If we assume that we ought to embark on this program of very patient effort to make the Russians understand that we really are not crooks and swindlers; that we really do want to have this issue settled squarely and that, once settled fairly, etc., is there any possibility that smart Soviet diplomats may say, "Well, for some reason or other these people are being more than usually agreeable; let's see just how much we can get out of it"? Is there anything we can do to make them think that we also for some curious reason are inveterately suspicious, that we also some way or other have got to be won over, that we cannot be expected to be reasonable?

MR. HAZARD: We must not go so far in any immediate negotiation that we look as if we were leaning over backward to get a result, because that just makes it possible for them to carry on the bargaining a little bit further; in other words, they have the feeling that our

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

breaking-point is more remote than it may be, but I don't think that is quite the same thing.

On this thing of suspicion, I have found it very helpful in explaining some American point of view to show the selfish advantage of America. There are a lot of our people who think the way to go to the Russians is to say, "This is to your advantage," and then to explain all the advantages the Russians might get out of it without showing that there are any advantages whatever to the Americans. Of course, the Russians don't believe a word they say. But if you say, "This is what America, the great capitalist power, gets out of it," and if they can see that they also get something out of it, they believe it is something worth entering.

MR. STANLEY G. HARRIS: What is not clear to me, among the many unclarities of Russia, is the level at which Stalin functions. One of the generals who had seen service in the joint occupation of Berlin was in recently and said the French, British, Americans, and Russians were able to reach agreements on local administrative questions with comparative ease. On the other hand, in these international negotiations the Russian negotiators must, as I understand it, cable back to Moscow before taking a position on any major question. Is it your opinion that Stalin himself is a modern Genghis Khan, who personally decides everything of major importance, or is there a state department or its equivalent which controls foreign policy?

MR. HAZARD: No, I don't think that Stalin comes into every decision. I think one of the reasons why they cable back is that in the Foreign Office they try to co-ordinate the facts from all the cables from all over the world every day and see what the British and Americans are up to. So they cable back, in order that the men there can see what has happened in Tientsin or Bangkok or Calcutta that day that will throw some light on the thinking in New York. Therefore, the report has to be sent back to put it into the pot so the man on the American desk in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs can study the report in the light of the hundred cables before him. On a very serious thing like "Shall we give up the veto on the atomic bomb?" Stalin himself would certainly share in that decision; but I don't think he would as to whether or not the line should be ten miles one way or another on the Trieste frontier.

MR. GURIAN: The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be regarded as relations between private persons. I don't think that emphasis on suspicion and other psychologi-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

cal observations can help much. I am also of the opinion that the difficulties in negotiations are not caused by lack of experience on the side of Mr. Molotov or Mr. Gromyko. I am afraid that even if Mr. Molotov attended twenty conferences he would not change very much; for I don't think that his attitude, stubbornness, and methods are caused merely by psychological conditions, by a peasant background, or similar factors. I think that the difficulties are based upon quite different factors.

Most important is the fundamental divergence which Professor deKiewiet pointed out with the help of an old article of Karl Radek. I think that the Russians see the world situation in very simple and clear terms. They believe that we are today in a period of imperialism and the development of monopolistic capitalism. They are afraid that their country, in which a socialistic society is being organized or has been achieved to a certain degree, is always threatened with encirclement. From this point of view, it is true, they can accept a partial co-operation with some of the capitalist powers if it is necessary.

The situation which the article of Radek describes was not discovered by Radek. There is a traditional classification of wars very well known in Marxist Soviet literature, in which one of the types of war is the so-called "patriotic" war which was fought after 1941, after Germany attacked Russia; therefore it was necessary to win this war, as in 1918 it was necessary for Lenin to conclude a treaty with imperialistic Germany, with General Ludendorff and William II. That was necessary not because Lenin loved Ludendorff but because, if he had not concluded this pact, Sovietism would have been eliminated. Therefore, the Russo-German treaty of 1939 was not anything new and unique.

Now, in 1946, the war is won. Now the Soviets assume that a period of world revolution, of greater chances for revolutions everywhere, a fluid situation, has arisen; therefore, for the Soviets there is nothing objectionable in a policy of "wait and see what will happen." If there is a revolution, they will favor this revolution; if there is no revolution, then dialectics will be used in order to show that a period of capitalist stabilization has started. It is an important feature of Soviet theories to be very doctrinaire and at the same time very flexible. If the revolutions do not materialize, if the United States is too powerful, if the situation in Europe becomes stabilized, then the Soviets can make a temporary withdrawal, can adjust themselves, as

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

Lenin himself adjusted Russia to the peace treaty of Brest Litovsk, to the independent status of Poland, and to the existence of the Baltic States and Finland. Such "adjustments" have continued. Stalin, in 1939, declared that "Russia recognizes only one Finnish government, the government of Kuusinen," the leading member of the Third International. But this government of Kuusinen did not work, it could not deliver the goods; therefore, the revolution was called off. Kuusinen again became a minor official of the Comintern and the Finnish government was again recognized by Russia. Similar tactics can be used in the future. Therefore, when the difficulties of Russia's trying to favor revolution becomes too great, Russia can become very reasonable, and everything, every retreat, can be justified most impressively by quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.

Therefore, I would say that it is wrong and misleading to discuss the relations with the Soviet Union in psychological terms. I would say that such a sentimental approach does not help. One has simply to analyze the facts. One has to be as cool, as dispassionate, as the leaders of Soviet foreign policy. One has to see the power relation, the "interests"; one has to take into consideration: How far can Russia go without endangering herself? How far, for instance, can Russia go in her efforts to dominate Poland?

It is a very dangerous thing to make prognostications. But I will dare to discuss a development possible in the future. If there should be in a few months a kind of civil war or revolution in Poland, what will the Soviet Union do? Will the Soviet Union be inclined to drop Poland in the same way as she dropped her former program of Germany's deindustrialization, of cutting down as much as possible the German steel production? And will the Soviet Union perhaps suddenly discover that Stettin and Breslau are German cities which must be returned to Germany, to a Germany which would be under the decisive influence of a pro-Communist Unity party?

What will be the American attitude if a pro-Communist German committee, which at the moment is dormant, should again be resurrected? I know that this famous committee, which operated impressively during the war—almost completely composed of German prisoners—is recovering somewhat. I note, for instance, that there are some Bavarian Catholic members of this committee prepared to be active in the Russian zone. What would be the American attitude if Russia attempts to unify Germany, to utilize the feelings of Ger-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

man nationalism in the interests of resurrecting Germany under the Communistic or Unity party?

I cannot see how these problems can be solved by thinking about suspicion. I think we must take for granted that there is suspicion between the Soviet Union and the other parts of the world. I assume for one moment that the Soviet interpretation of the world is correct, that there is a decisive war going on—to put it, of course, in a somewhat oversimplified way—a war between imperialism and monopolistic capitalism, on the one side, and socialism and communism on the other side. It is obvious that this war must be accompanied by continual suspicion.

We must ask the question, What can be done under this self-evident condition? What can be done in order to show to the Soviets that their power craze has limits, that the hopes that there will be revolutions are wrong? Those are the questions that must be asked. The question of more or less suspicion is very interesting for writers of articles. If one has no opportunity to analyze the facts, it is, of course, excellent to talk about such psychological difficulties. I would like to hear from Mr. Hazard what he thinks about Russian foreign policy, if he believes that Russia will keep her expansion within certain limits—what expansion policies of Russia must be accepted, and so on. Those are the real questions. I cannot see that these psychological questions are of any help.

MR. HAZARD: I was thinking just now as you went over that material—I am glad that someone has brought it out because it does not happen to be something with which I agree—but I was thinking that when a criminologist tries to handle a criminal, he usually seeks to find out why the man committed a crime, and then he takes the steps which he thinks are best suited to handle the particular situation. If he does not seek to find out why the man committed the crime, he will be following the last-century approach of criminologists. He will just put the criminal in jail and lock him up. That is now considered a very benighted approach to the problem. I think to approach the Soviet Union without considering why they do something is a somewhat similar approach, so that is why I consider their suspicion.

MR. GURIAN: They interpret their state as a socialistic community surrounded by capitalists, imperialists, and so on. They believe that they are eternally at war with these capitalistic surroundings. That is, I think, a very reasonable explanation of the Soviet suspicion.

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

AREAS OF CONFLICT

MR. OGBURN: If we could shift the question from manners, would you care to comment on this question: What do you think are the areas of conflict which lie ahead between the United States and Russia, which, if we wish to avoid, perhaps we ought to see clearly, otherwise we might not know how to avoid them?

I presume this problem of areas of conflict might be divided into two problems. One would be the ideological conflict which has been mentioned already, and I presume the other conflict would lie along what we call "nationalistic" lines. A very good illustration is the case of Iceland. No matter what the diplomatic technique might be in that case, I suppose the Russians would not like to have an American air base on Iceland, and I suspect the Americans would not like to have a Russian air base on Iceland.

MR. HAZARD: I think there is undoubtedly an area of conflict on the ideological side. I think the area of conflict can be minimized if one appreciates that, when the Russians recognize the Argentine and do a certain amount of—what shall we call it?—meddling in our spheres of interest, we are often too prone to jump to the conclusion that they are trying to conquer the world. That is why I treated their policy as being one of suspicion tempered by a restrained missionary zeal. I think they will use every propaganda opportunity that there is because they think they have something that approaches the millennium to sell. They will use every propaganda opportunity, whether it be in the Argentine or in China or somewhere else; but I don't think it immediately follows from that that they wish to extend their forces to the point where they can conquer it.

As to Finland, I thought I drew the distinction clearly between the situation in Finland and that in Hungary, pointing out that sometimes Soviet ideological approaches are not accepted by a country, so that the country can be conquered but not revolutionized, and I think the Russians are very anxious to avoid a world war. Wherever there is an opportunity to support a nation which is bringing about its own revolution, it is a great temptation; but, in other areas where there is no revolution in the offing, the Soviets appreciate that if they were to support a change with force of arms they would bring about another world war and I don't believe they will go near the other country with arms; but that does not mean they won't continue to stir up what they can through the press and what not. So I think there is an area of ideological conflict which we can overemphasize

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

because we immediately jump to the conclusion that, if we see the Russians poking around in an area, day after tomorrow the Red army may be there.

As to the nationalistic side, I think you put your finger on a very real problem when you spoke about Iceland. I suppose that has caused more excitement in Soviet offices than anything else because they very definitely consider Iceland of importance only as it relates to them. They cannot see for what reason the United States would need a base in Iceland otherwise, and of course they associate it somewhat with the atomic bomb and with statements by some of our generals that we can now reach every point in the Soviet Union from the bases that we have, which is undoubtedly a fact but not one the pronouncement of which is calculated to cause friendliness in Russia.

MR. DEKIEWIET: There was a comment by Mr. Hazard that I think may mislead us, at least in the terms that he used. He gave the assurance that Russia was not contemplating the conquest of the world as if that should leave us at ease about Russian foreign policy. I don't feel at ease about Russian foreign policy even after that statement. It is probably true that Russia no longer has that missionary urge for bringing about conflict situations favorable to herself. I think it is probably also true that Russia has abandoned any adherence to the Marxist interpretation of the inevitable revolution in the capitalist nations.

I think Russia is suspicious of the United States or Great Britain as necessary opponents of revolutions but is no longer trying openly to foment revolutions in these countries, or, indeed, anywhere else. We should pay close attention to Mr. Gurian's comment that the world is in a state of flux, that it is infinitely rich in opportunity, and that it is capable of bringing about, in one locality or another, spontaneously, conditions very favorable to the Russian point of view or Russian expectations.

Let us take, for example, two distinct regions—Germany and China—and see what conditions may possibly be favorable to Russian expectations. What we need to remember about Germany is that she has seen three great experiments bankrupted; first of all, the Bismarckian experiment; second, the Weimar experiment, if that can be called a great experiment; and now, finally, the Hitlerian experiment. It seems to me reasonable to suggest that Germany cannot extract from within her own experience the makings of another experiment. Possibly if we keep her separated she won't even be given the

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

opportunity; but, if she is, finally, in the future given the opportunity to settle upon the terms of her association as an independent or reasonably independent state, she is bound to do a great deal of importing of political ideas; as a matter of fact, I believe that will be true of the French and the Dutch and the Italians, once they really come to grips with their problems.

From whom does one import political ideas? One imports them, of course, from those nations that are prominent, that manifest their success. It may be success in military affairs, or it may be the much more complicated success that comes out of the running of an economy like the American economy or the Russian economy. I think that we should remember that the Germans and possibly other European peoples may be enabled to choose the materials for their political organization from Russia as well as from the democratic Western powers.

I feel it is much more important to pay attention, not to Europe, not to the capitalist economies, but to those economies that are not European, that are not capitalist. If Russia has proved anything in the last thirty years, it is that revolution does not come in capitalist communities so much as it comes in noncapitalist communities, in those regions like Russia itself that were predominantly rural and unindustrialized in character. Two such communities are modern China and India. China is already seeking to modernize herself, and undoubtedly China is going to be able to choose between the alternatives presented by Russia and the United States.

There are two alternative methods of proceeding in the direction of modernization, one perhaps more geared to the Western point of view, the other a lot more imperative, more peremptory and abrupt in its procedures. The Russians don't have to create a revolutionary situation; it is there, it is inevitable. Consequently, what we have to pay attention to—and serious attention to—is the manner in which Russia or we may be the beneficiaries or the victims of the decisions that are reached, not through Russian propaganda but by the spontaneous effort of a great people like the Chinese people.

Take two words like "reconversion" and "reconstruction." We talk about reconversion in this country; that was the appropriate word to use after the war, and, of course, it was a very good word to use because it meant simply that industry that had been put to war-time use was now to be reconverted to peacetime use. But the Russians cannot talk about reconversion. They had too many towns shat-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

tered and broken, and therefore they now have a sensation of building anew, of new opportunity, that we cannot have. In a sense we have become the Old World, and the Russians, in that sense at least, have become the New World. They look upon the outside world with much more freshness, much more sense of opportunity than we can. I think American foreign policy must take that into serious account.

MR. HAZARD: I feel quite strongly with you that our policy should not be designed to stop Russia but to improve the rest of the world, from which condition Soviet expansion can be stopped, if it attempts to go far. I am afraid that too often people think in terms of "What do we need to do to stop Russia tomorrow?" and they forget about doing anything in South Africa or in India, which is often ripe for action.

If it is fair to use an analogy from the private world, I am reminded of the conflict between the railroads and the automobile and the airplane. I have no doubt that to many railroad magnates the automobile and the airplane were extremely unpleasant nuisances because their presence required them to think about how they could improve the railroads, for thinking of anything new is often a difficult feat. But as a result of the competition we, the public, have certainly benefited.

I don't see why our private-enterprise system cannot step forward and perhaps produce a better railroad train in competition with this new automobile that the Soviets have; and it may be better ultimately than their automobile, in which case the world which is looking for the best it can have may be ready to snatch it up. I think it is quite certain that we cannot sit where we are, or we shall be trampled on; but in my opinion we have to present something new, which is going to require great imagination; and then, with that new thing, perhaps the rest of the world will go on to what we should like to think of as "democracy." I agree with you that, if we do not do that, the Soviets will. Owen Lattimore makes that clear in his recent book *Solution in Asia*. He says that to China and most of Asia the Soviet system looks rather good because, by comparison with what they have, it is better; and the fact that we think it is much worse is not going to keep it from spreading into China.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

MR. WRIGHT: It seems to me that the important feature of United States-Soviet relations is the fact that these two come near to being,

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

at the moment, the only great powers of the world. Other powers are important. The British Empire in some areas is a major factor. But generally, as DeTocqueville predicted, the initiative seems to belong to Russia and America. In emphasizing the importance of power and expediency in Soviet foreign policy, it seemed to me that Mr. Gurian described the policy of any great power in a condition of world politics dominated by expectations of violence. You would find such an appraisal in almost any writer on world politics from Machiavelli down. The powers have always been suspicious of one another. I don't suppose American suspicion of the Soviet Union today is greater than was the British suspicion of Louis XIV or of Napoleon or of the Kaiser, but in European politics in the last four or five centuries there have been five, six, or seven great powers, and there has been a certain stability in power politics from that fact.

During the last generation there has been an extraordinary reduction in the number of great powers. I think it is a proposition in world politics, as it is in physics, that the smaller the number of forces that are in relation to one another, the less stable the equilibrium. A bipolar equilibrium is in its nature an unstable equilibrium because there are no weights which can be shifted from one side to another to rectify disturbances. If one side in such an equilibrium believes that time is weakening its relative position, it is under a strong compulsion to go to war.

One could discuss several different kinds of factors which affect the present balance of power, apart from the distribution of military power itself. Most important is the degree of apprehension common to all great powers under conditions of power politics; second, there is the Marxian ideology, which adds to mutual suspicion between the Soviet Union and the West; third, there is the factor of the peasant mentality of the Russian people, probably of less importance, though it makes negotiation difficult; and, finally, there is the influence of a world public opinion which, under the influence of the United Nations, may accept some common interests and some common fears, as of the atomic bomb. While the influence of world opinion may in time make it possible to substitute a regime of law for power politics as the means of state security, for the time being we must assume, as Mr. Fox did this afternoon, that states will follow the normal pattern of power politics. We must then ask: How is power politics likely to work when the number of great powers is as reduced as it is today?

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. FOX: Yes. I want to say, first of all, that I don't regard the general statements of position brought forward by Mr. Hazard and Mr. Gurian as necessarily being operationally in conflict. I think it is clear that the focus is quite different; but from the policy-making point of view I should say that the first implication of Mr. Gurian's statement is that we ought to firm up our position, we ought to tidy up our side of the world, we ought to bring about such a condition of stability that the Russians would say: "Oh, well, there is no room for fishing here."

From the policy-making point of view the chief implication of Hazard's statement is that we ought not to feed unnecessarily the Soviet sense of suspicion that there is probably something crooked about what we are doing; that we ought to keep trying and trying again to state what we believe to be our minimum essential goals.

Taking the two together, we have to try to find in the bipolar world a policy which is neither so supine as to invite this fishing nor so provocative as to confirm the worst suspicions of all the Russians that we are really closing in on them and that they have no choice but to lash out. Going one step beyond that, if one takes the position that the bipolar world is inherently unstable, then presumably one ought to have as a long-range goal the working-out of the bipolar situation, and we have not said very much about that.

In that connection I think Mr. Jacob Viner uttered a very felicitously put thought when he said that splitting the Soviet Union and splitting the United States was likely to be a good deal more difficult task than splitting the atom; that the essential condition under which a world government might be created would be that there should not be within the area which the world government was to govern two units so powerful that nowhere else in the world could there be constructed any power to counter them. So that, in a sense, working out of the bipolar situation would involve working back toward the situation which we have only just recently left, where there were sufficient units that the great majority would have preponderant forces over against the small minority.

I must confess that that seems to me to be so dubious at the moment that about all that one can do now is to demonstrate one's orthodoxy by stating that he wishes we could somehow or other bring about a unipolar situation which was not based simply on one power's having conquered all the rest. Meanwhile, one must not neglect the problem of the next generation, which is to make the bipolar

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

system work, while indicating at all times that one wishes that some other kind of system could be made to work.

MR. WRIGHT: If one views our situation as it has developed in the last five centuries and compares it with similar developments in past history, we seem to be ripe for what Arnold Toynbee has called the "universal state," formed by conquest. I suppose that the world federalists would say that, if you are going to have a unipolar state, it would be a good deal better to make it by some system of federation rather than to drift into universal conquest. If the sovereignty of states has to be cracked to accomplish that, we may be comforted if it is no more difficult than cracking the atom. The scientists have done that. The United Nations commissions on human rights and on the atomic bomb are at work on cracking sovereignty.

MR. FOX: But the really critical point comes when you say: "Suppose you can't have that, now do you want your unipolar system if you have to go out and organize the world to get it?" It seems to me the critical question one might ask anybody who comes forward and says, "I have a clear, simple solution" is "What if the world won't agree?"

Mr. Clifton Fadiman, after making a very long speech at a meeting which I attended, when he said that the difference between politicians, on the one hand, and the physicists, on the other, was that the physicists knew there must not be a next war, was asked, "What happens if the Russians don't agree?" He said: "If the struggle must come, let it be over a cause which is simple and clear." Someone said: "Mr. Fadiman, you scared us by all your talk of the atomic bomb, but you scared us a good deal more with that comment."

MR. GURIAN: The issues between Russia and the United States were very clearly brought out in the speech of Secretary Byrnes. The United States will not consent to the delivery of the displaced persons to the place of origin if they have reason to fear that these persons will be put in prison and persecuted. It seems very clear in the Baltic case from the point of view of the United States; whereas, I think from the Russian point of view it is a really vital and important issue, because the Russians, rightly or wrongly, are afraid that these displaced persons—people of Baltic origin, Poles and Ukrainians particularly—could form centers of disintegrating propaganda, perhaps even start some guerrilla warfare.

The Russians are inclined to overestimate because of their own experience. Stalin was for years a member of a group regarded as

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

unimportant. They are inclined to overestimate these comparatively small groups; therefore, what appears to the United States as a humanitarian question appears to Russia as a question of great political importance. Now how can one settle such questions?

I think one has to take the following attitude: If one makes the decision that this displaced-persons problem is a problem of principle, then there can be no agreement and one has to risk the deterioration of relations. If one is not willing to do that, it is very unwise to deliver statements which give the impression that the question is a question of principle. That is, I think, a necessary basis of policy toward Russia.

I would be very sorry if my remarks were interpreted as an expression of a belief that I am opposed to Russia at any price. I demand only a policy that is clear and that does not raise issues which cannot be enforced. As I say, the demand for free elections in Rumania and Bulgaria and Poland may make a very impressive effect on certain groups in the United States, but, unfortunately, such demands cannot be enforced.

Now permit me to make a brief comment on the very important and, I would say, most positive remarks of Professor deKiewiet. I don't believe that a purely negative attitude toward Russia would help. That would only bring about a situation in which Russia is identified with those who are not content with the existing distribution of power, in which Russia is identified with the opposition to the status quo.

If the capitalistic system worked successfully, I have my doubts if the Russian system would be impressive here. I agree with the statement of Fodor in *Life* magazine that in some countries Russian occupation would be the best medicine against favoring or accepting the Russian system. For instance, in Poland we have a most energetic opposition against Russia. I think it would be very dangerous to regard the world problems exclusively as problems of conflict between sovietism and capitalism. I think there are several systems. For the moment attention is focused on the Soviet Union.

If one accepts this world-minded attitude, this long-range attitude which Professor deKiewiet, so far as I can judge, admirably took in his remarks, then one has to go beyond these power-political problems to problems of civilization, of the dignity of mankind. I have my doubts that many peoples would be willing to live under condi-

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

tions such as the peoples of the Soviet Union have endured. I hope that I am not too optimistic.

MR. HAZARD: I take it that it is the sentiment of this group that our foreign policy as it relates to the Soviet Union must be based upon an effort not to stop Russia, because I think most of us do not feel that she is out to conquer the world. Maybe I am wrong in sensing that, but that seems to be the feeling, with some exceptions. The group suggests that our policy must be built on working with the Soviet Union and that, in doing so, we will require, as Dr. Pasvolsky said, the utmost patience.

I think it is also the feeling of most of the group that we have to find positive solutions; and certainly it is my feeling that those can be found best through the Economic and Social Council as the first organization of world coverage to attack this kind of problem.

I think also, although nothing has been said tonight on the subject except in my paper, that we would all agree that United States military force still plays an important part and that in co-operation with other peace-loving nations in the United Nations it can always be a means of restricting anybody, the Russians or others. As can sometimes happen, as you say, when a great power becomes drunk with power, someone may try to make way with force. The military force of the United Nations, to which United States military force will contribute a great deal, might be a means of restricting those individual members of the community which want to risk everything in their effort to extend that power farther.

A WESTERN SECURITY BLOC

MR. FOX: I wonder how much President Roosevelt gave up in not supporting the integration of a Western security group. I would assume that these states would more or less spontaneously pull together in a crisis in any case and that therefore that was an objective which, from the formal point of view, he could very readily put to one side while he was working on his other design, knowing that he still had this line of retreat left open to him.

MR. DEKIEWIET: The answer might lie in considerations of this sort: While the ruling groups in Holland or Belgium or France were still dispersed, disillusioned, and in very considerable measure discredited, there was a flexible situation wherein there was an excellent opportunity for creative political thought and action. Once the war was over, the opportunity was lost. We were indeed disturbed by

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the readiness with which western Europe crystallized back again into pre-war habits of thought.

We have experienced a return to independent nationalism, and the sort of nationalism that helped to provoke disaster in 1940. In eastern Europe there is a notable contrast, for there the Russians have imposed their control over the Balkans and eastern Europe and have compelled the small nations of that area to accept a reduction and limitation of independence and sovereignty. The Eastern bloc is a more cohesive unit than western Europe.

The economic results of our inability to bring about a closer relationship between the western European nations are also unfortunate. At the present moment the need for commodities in Europe is enormous. Yet there is no way in which the resources and the skills of France, Belgium, Great Britain, and industrial western Germany can be adequately mobilized to satisfy prevailing needs. In consequence, an enormous load has been placed upon this country. We are paying heavily for our neglect.

I agree with you that Roosevelt took a risk that was worth taking. I tried to place the emphasis on Roosevelt's efforts to get a wider security system. One cannot blame him, but I feel that some advantage was lost at that moment which could have been capitalized. Now, of course, we are hampered by French stubbornness, Belgian success in achieving a fairly stable internal economy, and Holland's refusal to co-operate, all of which are obstacles which I think we have to overcome.

If I interpret Mr. Fox's convictions correctly, I would say he feels that perhaps the time now has come to try something in western Europe and that the pressures now developing will bring at least the French, English, Dutch, and Belgians into some understanding with one another. Unfortunately, the impression will be created that the United States is setting up a Western bloc to counter the Russian Eastern bloc. Under the conditions of 1941 and 1942, it would be claimed that a Western security bloc was a natural response, as the Russian response was a natural one, to Germany and to her menace. Now, of course, that cannot be used as an argument, and the general diplomatic conditions under which that alternative might be carried out now would be immensely less favorable than they would have been three or four years ago.

Mr. Fox: I agree with the second point but say with respect to the first point that I am not sure that the time has yet come, because I

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

still think that the way always will remain open for the West to pull together. We can afford to try all sorts of efforts to achieve a wider system, knowing that in the security field of the West, we don't have to formalize a defensive alliance narrowly. With regard to the other things, I agree that we ought to push ahead in economic integration and try to work hard to bring back some sort of prosperity and economic stability.

MR. DEKIEWIET: Hasn't our position become immensely more difficult not only because of our unwillingness to offend Russia directly but also because the position of Germany has become so endlessly complex? We really don't know what we are looking at in Germany any more. One aspect of an organization in the West might have been, under certain circumstances, the adhesion of German economy or a part of German economy. Of course, the Russians are disputing that. I think that the quarrel over Germany between Russia and the other powers is really a quarrel over the problem of what part Germany is to play either in the West or in the East; and I think we have lost some of our opportunity.

MR. BRODIE: Isn't it one of the prerequisites of keeping open this second line of retreat, of securing a unity of the Western powers in Europe, that the United States take a somewhat more positive attitude toward internal events in France? I take it, from the point of view of international relations, that a complete victory of the Communist party in France would mean that France would fall definitely outside the orbit of Western organization, not merely outside the orbit but within the orbit of the very integration which we are seeking in some way to resist.

MR. DEKIEWIET: That is a very shrewd question. It fits in with the suggestion I made that in the outer, non-Western world there is an implicit choice to be made between two forms of conduct. That might even be applied to the internal policies of the Western nations. What has disturbed me about France has been not so much the snub that it has administered to the Communists, according to the press, but the fact that it really has not developed a political organization or a statement of domestic policy that is convincing, that really carries with it a promise of stability for the French. In many ways the Western nations still have the choice of following an American leadership, on the one hand, or the Russian leadership, on the other hand. America has, as all the other nations have, considerable interest in the internal events in France.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. BRODIE: I suppose a Western bloc would operate, first of all, toward alleviating the economic desperation in which France now finds itself. Presumably, at least, we are likely to accept the formula too facily that communism thrives on economic difficulties. Such difficulties are extreme not only in France but in several other countries that are also subject to the same kind of internal instability. Economic assistance also has the advantage in that there is nothing clearly offensive to any other power about that kind of aid. I suppose, eventually, or even from the beginning, our interest would have to go beyond economic assistance, but at least that seems to be the first step.

MR. OGBURN: Does not the crux of this lie in the unity of France and England concerning the settlement of territories in the western part of Europe? Therefore, I wonder whether economic aid, although the first step, would really amount to much until the problems of the Ruhr and the Saar are settled. What position does the United States want to take in those problems? Isn't that the question?

MR. DEKIEWIET: Isn't America already indicating that she dislikes, on France's part as well as on Russia's part, the policy of dissociation in regard to Germany?

MR. OGBURN: If that is her policy, how can she follow the role of bringing these nations closer together?

MR. DEKIEWIET: Economic pressure, perhaps. Certainly her diplomatic prestige is very high. I don't think the United States has yet lost diplomatic initiative in western Europe. I don't think England has gained that. I think leadership calls for more definite expression than we have had from the United States so far.

MR. BRODIE: Is the question one of bringing France and England together, or of bringing France and the United States together, or of bringing the three of them together? Or is it really the more elementary one of attempting to support in France the kind of government which we can understand and with which we can reach some kind of *modus vivendi* on particular issues?

It seems to me the question need not be related to any kind of direct alliance, which, as a matter of fact, I would regard as an unhappy circumstance and something to be sought for only as a last resort. One sees in the current negotiations in Paris that we have a good deal easier time getting along with Mr. Bidault than we do with the representatives of the Soviet Union, and it seems to me that that at least is what we should aim to retain as far as France is concerned.

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

MR. HAZARD: I was interested in your statement that we as Americans should have an interest in the internal affairs of a country. Could you give us light on what our attitude might be toward the Social Democratic parties of Europe. I sense a feeling in the United States that there is no difference between Social Democratic parties and Communist parties. It is my opinion that, because of that lack of understanding of the difference, we very often find ourselves opposing something which we need not oppose and, by opposing it, causing the very thing we fear. I was wondering if you felt that the United States always has to support parties like the M.R.P. (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*) or whether it might still be on safe ground if it found a party in power which was a bit to the left of the M.R.P.?

MR. DEKIEWIET: What you are saying is that our public opinion in this country lives behind an opaque screen in contemplating Europe, just as, incidentally, Europe lives behind a pretty opaque screen in contemplating the affairs of the United States—and I don't know which screen is the more opaque. We suffer from that very considerably.

I am convinced, myself, that the creative—and I use that word in a rather special sense—tendencies of Europe lie rather with the Left parties than with the conservative, religiously inspired parties that one finds in Holland, Belgium, and France. What we need—and I think this sort of meeting contributes in a measure to that—is a better type of comment regarding the affairs of Europe than we get. Our public press has performed, I think, an exceedingly useful task in clarifying many issues by at least giving a description of what is going on. Unfortunately, there is not yet a satisfactory relationship between the academic world and the public press. That bridge needs building and needs building badly in this country. American public opinion on these things is grossly misinformed.

MR. HAZARD: Do I take from that, if Americans were better informed they would understand the difference and support the Social Democrats?

MR. DEKIEWIET: The British Labour party would, it seems to me, be a more satisfactory group to support, politically and economically, than their conservative opposites. This is true as regards both the domestic policy of Great Britain and the imperial policy.

MR. DON K. PRICE: I wonder if Mr. deKiewiet feels that it should be our foreign policy to go so far in choosing specific parties to deal with in countries like France or Great Britain. Might we not content

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

ourselves with supporting the general ideas of those governments with which we can deal responsibly. It seems to me that in France the traditional liberals—I use the term very loosely—have such a fear of executive power that it is difficult for them to have a continuous foreign policy. The more conservative parties follow economic policies that are less in our interest. It does not seem to me that in that case we need to support any one as long as there is a possibility of finally working out in France a policy that is something more in the Western tradition.

MR. DEKIEWIET: We would all admit that it is always a mistake in a foreign policy to be in a position where you are identifying yourself with a foreign party or with names. It is rather a tendency to support certain policies identified with parties than the parties themselves, perhaps. There is nothing that we resent more than identification with parties.

MR. BRODIE: Isn't it also a question of which group happens to have the greater degree of influence within the countries concerned?

MR. DEKIEWIET: The best support that the United States could give to any party, of course, comes unspokenly from the conduct of its own internal affairs; in other words, our domestic policy would tend to support comparable policies in other countries. When I talked about that opaque screen which keeps Europeans from seeing clearly into this country, I meant that the ignorance and misinformation about Russia in Europe is even more gross than is ours in America about Europe. If we could only have a clarification of our domestic policy in our own minds and have it translated into the idiom of Europe, then our foreign policy would be understood very much better.

A great disaster befell American foreign policy through the death of Mr. Roosevelt. This was true not so much because his policies lost their spokesman, but because he was a clarifying symbol. He was much less opaque than those who have appeared on the American scene since his death. This is no criticism of Mr. Truman, but there is frankly nobody in American life capable of performing that function of clarification.

MR. FOX: Of looking as if it were clear.

MR. GURIAN: I think the French problem is really one of the key problems of the European situation. The situation in France is very simple. There exists a tremendous distrust of English attempts to rebuild Germany. It may be the case that Germany is really com-

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

pletely smashed, but, unfortunately, France does not believe that; and, on the other hand, there is very little attention paid in the United States to the French demands concerning the Ruhr territory, the Saar Basin, and so on. Therefore, there is the impression that France will be again left alone in the face of an eventual German threat. Until now France has relied upon some support by Russia.

Here I should like to make an objection to the remarks of Mr. Hazard. The party in France which corresponded most to the American point of view in foreign affairs was not the M.R.P. but the French Socialists. The French Socialists made an attempt a few months ago to adjust the foreign policy of France to the foreign policy of England and the United States, but they were blocked by the coalition between the M.R.P. and the French Communists. Therefore, I think that there will be no united Western bloc as long as certain French demands against Germany are not accepted.

The situation has changed radically in the last few days. Until now the French have believed that Russia, as I said, would support her demands; but Russia has completely shifted her attitude. Molotov now demands that German steel production be increased, whereas until now Russia has always opposed English demands to increase German steel production; and Russia blocked the American and English concession to give to France at once exclusive administration of the Saar territory.

Another difficulty which separates France from England and the United States is the attitude toward Spain. Even French Catholics are much more anti-Franco than is the State Department; Bidault is surely much more anti-Franco than official English and American policy is. It is impossible to build up a Western bloc without France, and it is impossible to gain France without a change in our attitude toward the Ruhr problem and also toward Germany and Spain.

MR. R. S. PLATT: Does the policy of a Western bloc look to a hardening and sharpening of the line between Russia and the rest of the world, both with regard to western Europe and with regard to the development of countries throughout the world, with no other alternative than that of joining issue on that basis?

MR. DEKIEWIET: Not, as a matter of choice certainly, but as a matter of what seems to be the indicated result of our relations with Russia at the present moment. I have moved very definitely in the last month from what one might call a Rooseveltian position to one that is a little more critical. I may be deluding myself that I am being

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

more realistic. It does seem that there has been joined a sort of cultural conflict between the two systems. We may find ourselves more compatible with Russia some time from now than at the present moment. Look at the manner in which Russia is organizing an Eastern security system and doing everything she possibly can to disorganize a Western security system.

I rather think we are forced to accept at the moment these hardened relations between these two countries, remembering particularly that the war has not settled some of the greatest problems of the world. I have always thought that we made a mistake in discussing Western security as if the center of the world were western Europe, which it is not. That is why in my paper I devoted some time to India.

INDIA

MR. JOHN WILSON: Would you be willing to comment on present British willingness to negotiate in India? Is that willingness forced upon Great Britain?

MR. DEKIEWIET: Yes, of course it is. It is important to know what forced it upon Great Britain. Was it moral consideration? I think one could honestly answer, No, or certainly not entirely. Was it the specific influence of the United States or of Indian restlessness? I think one would have to accord to each of those some influence. The British are forced to be sensitive to world opinion as they were not forced to be in their greater days. It seems to me, however, that what has forced the situation in India more than anything else is the greater readiness and preparedness of India to assume the necessary obligations of independence. I think we are inclined in the Western world generally, because of the emphasis upon political forms, to overemphasize mere political development or mere political independence. What makes India ready for independence, I think, is to be found in economic conditions in India. The debt relationship between India and England, for example, is very important there. It is to be found in the growth in India of a very sizable and very important group of skilled individuals, skilled not simply in administration but in technical, financial, and other callings that are necessary to a genuinely complicated modern society. I would say that the real preparedness of India for her independence, which I think is substantially enough, lies in the fact that there are those within India—whether they are called scientists or educationists or administrators

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

or engineers or bankers or journalists—who are capable of making a very fair bid to conduct the activities of a modern nation.

AFRICA

MR. FRED EGGAN: Near the beginning of the war there was a good deal of interest as to what our future policy would be, particularly with regard to South Africa, but lately there has been little discussion of that. Has that dropped out of the picture, or do you see that we will ultimately have a policy that will be in conflict with or coextensive with England's policy there?

MR. DEKIEWIET: Well, much as I would like to claim an important place for South Africa, I can't; it isn't an important part of the world. There are important elements about it, no doubt; but, taken as a whole, it is not one of the really critical areas of the world. The populations are small, and their ability to force focus upon themselves is limited. They became important when they passed anti-Indian legislation. In that measure both Great Britain and America became promptly interested. They are important economically, of course, because of gold and the gold standard; and if they have discovered, as they claim, an immense new gold-bearing area, that is, of course, of significance to the United States. Perhaps that is what you are trying to point out.

I have not seen any effort on the part of the United States to exercise a direct influence upon South Africa. One thing that the United States has eschewed at all times is criticism of the race problem there; that is, of course, the greatest problem. Maybe the United States has a little sense of guilt of her own. In 1941 and 1942 there was a good deal of interest. Various committees were publishing papers on what our future policy toward Africa should be. As you point out, there has been relatively little discussion of that since.

MR. EGGAN: Are we not more interested in West Africa than in South Africa?

MR. DEKIEWIET: I think we are, yes.

SPAIN

MR. McMAHON: In discussing Western security, no reference has been made to Spain. I wonder how important you think the role of Spain is in insuring this Western security and how important it would be to bring about in the most advisable manner a democratic Spain to fulfil the desired result.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. DEKIEWIET: I don't know what the answer to that is. Obviously, any society, whether you call that society Belgium or Holland or Spain, that is not assuredly connected with its neighbors is a menace to security. I myself am not impressed by Spain as a menace because of any strength in herself. She is a satellite power now, as she always has been. At the present moment she has not made up her mind officially whether she will accept her satellite relationship to the Western powers. She certainly has rejected a satellite relationship to Russia, and it seems to me logical, whatever the nature of the government within Spain, that she is going to be forced to accept a general direction at the hands of the Western powers. It only remains for them to clarify what that direction is to be. I am not sure that that form of intervention in a country's affairs that dictates what we blithely call "democratic government" is necessarily going to be beneficial. We are not sure ourselves of what a democratic system is.

MR. McMAHON: Probably not, but we are sure of what a dictatorial system is.

POWER POLITICS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

MR. WILLIAM ROGERS: Will this hardening of the line with Russia probably lead to better relations with Russia? In dividing the world into two halves and rejecting temporarily the United Nations solution, are we not giving up our sole chance of bettering relations with Russia?

MR. DEKIEWIET: I would like to feel that we were not rejecting the United Nations organization. We may be compromising it to some extent, yes, just as Russia is herself compromising it to at least an equal extent.

MR. PLATT: If your suggested policy of hardening the line with Russia is a temporary tactical device forced on us at the moment, from which we will hope to go on to "One World" arrangements, it seems to me it ought to be stated as such, instead of as a final policy.

MR. DEKIEWIET: I thought that was implicit in my comment. I am assuming that we are dealing with a situation in flux; we are merely trying to define our relations to parts of it, clarifying them in the hope, as you suggest, that something better will come of it.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CONFLICTS

MR. GURIAN: How are the relations between the United States and Russia and between England and Russia, as well as between all three,

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

going to be improved? Of course, Russia herself is most responsible for the circumstance that the United States and England form today a kind of common front against the Soviet Union. I would like to ask Dr. deKiewiet: Are there not many situations which English foreign policy is interested in maintaining but which are of no importance for American foreign policy? Are there not many issues in the Far East and the Near East in which there is a great difference in the attitudes and demands of the United States and England? And is it not somewhat dangerous to assume that it is necessary to maintain a united front of England and the United States against Russia all the time? Are there not certain traditional disagreements between Russian and English imperialisms which are of no concern for the United States? Would it not be the duty of the United States in working for world peace to become a kind of super-arbiter and, therefore, to avoid siding either with England or with Russia?

MR. DEKIEWIET: I thought I indicated that in saying that in my judgment the initiative has really passed into the hands of the United States, even in questions in which England formerly had an undisputed control. We want, however, to be sure that the implications of some of these limited British objectives are not greater than the objectives themselves. Take the Palestinian problem. There is no doubt at all that what Britain has done in Palestine in recent weeks has not had any degree of American support. There is a very serious difference there. The immigration of a large number of Jews to Palestine brings up the question, In what way do we want the Middle East to develop? What are to be the political associations of these disturbed elements in the Middle East, with Russia on one side and ourselves on the other? We might disagree very strongly with the British on the Palestine question, yet realize that the outcome might be very important to us.

MR. GURIAN: I would agree with you in principle. As I have said, at the present time there must be a united front between the United States and England. But if the present fluid period passes and Russia retreats, realizing that she has gone too far and that her revolutionary hopes will not be fulfilled, then I think it would be dangerous to continue the policy which is necessary today.

MR. OGBURN: I think this points to larger issues. To what extent are the interests of the United States as such or the interests of the United States in a general system of security compatible with the foreign policy of the British Empire?

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Viewing it as a relatively fluid situation over the years, the British interests, as expressed in the Commonwealth of Nations or the Empire, undergo certain changes, and the precipitation of those changes probably flows from rising powers in other parts of the world, partly in Russia and particularly, later on, in the Orient.

The question is: To what extent does the United States want to support the interests of Britain with regard to this changing empire. Our interest arises from the fact that in any world war or in any conflict of interests in the world we need support, alliances, and friendly powers, and we look upon the friendship of Great Britain as important for the American interest. Obviously, the more powerful Britain is, the greater the support she might give to the interests of the United States; but the question turns, it seems to me, on what price we are willing to pay.

The British interests may be divided into three parts. One of them centers in western Europe. It would be fairly clear that American interests would be very much concerned with strengthening the western European bloc. Another British interest centers in the Mediterranean and concerns the line to India. It is not so clear that the interests of the United States as such would support the British interest in Greece, or perhaps in Turkey with regard to the Dardanelles. There are many writers in America at the present time who assume that American interests are the same as the British interests in this particular area.

In regard to the interests of Great Britain in the Orient, the question is even more debatable. We may very well be called upon to support British interests in Australia and New Zealand at some time, particularly if the powers in southeastern Asia rise to considerable importance.

I would therefore think that the basis of the relationships between the United Kingdom and the United States will turn upon determining how much of the interests of the United Kingdom we are prepared or willing to support, and how much it is to our interest and to the interest of a general security system to support.

MR. DEKIEWIET: We have to admit, if we confine ourselves simply to strategic and security issues expressed in naval terms and military terms, that Great Britain remains of great importance to the United States. The United States is at a great disadvantage in the Atlantic in that there are no islands or stepping-stones over which it has outright control. Consequently, if it wants to use any security or strategic

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

system in the Atlantic, the short way would be, of course, through a close understanding with Great Britain—France as well, but Great Britain primarily.

In the Pacific the situation is more flexible. There are already developed areas and there are other points that the United States is going to be able to exploit directly under her own sovereign control to her advantage. I would suggest that probably we shall discover in a little while that Australia and New Zealand have passed into the American orbit, they have left the British orbit strategically and entered the American zone. In two world wars Britain has shown that she has insufficient strength in the Pacific. In the first World War she had to turn over much of the responsibility to Japan, and in the second World War she lost control entirely.

MR. FOX: Do you think one loses the opportunity to make use of the British strategic position off the Continent of Europe by failing to support the British position in the Middle East and southeast Asia and in the Pacific? If the answer is No, then we can proceed to turn to some of these other things.

MR. OGBURN: I would venture to say it was No.

MR. FOX: Yes, I would, too.

MR. DEKIEWIET: The British Mediterranean position is an ambiguous one, anyhow. The British strategic advantage, if you think of the United Kingdom alone, is really confined to western Europe. She no longer can sustain Greece, for example, or get into contact with Bulgaria. Her Mediterranean position was reasonably strong, although even at the end of the nineteenth century she had more of her fleet in the Mediterranean than anywhere else. I feel that she is in a weakened position there and that nothing that America can do, apart from stationing a fleet there, will improve that position. If that is what you mean, Ogburn, I think one can agree quite easily.

MR. OGBURN: Should we station our fleet there? Evidently it has been useful recently.

MR. DEKIEWIET: At the present state of negotiations I suppose the presence of American forces is inevitable, and we certainly have used the American fleet for diplomatic purposes, as gestures.

MR. PRICE: Is the proper question to ask, Should we consider whether it is solely the British or perhaps our own interests that are at stake?

MR. DEKIEWIET: I have tried to lead the question away from purely strategic considerations. In one way we don't know what

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

strategy is any more. There are factors now which make it really a little ridiculous on our part to talk in nineteenth-century terms when we have twentieth-century phenomena that we have not gauged yet. My interest is in the cultural problems that lie in the Middle East, India, and China, and what you have to try to understand is not British interest in Egypt as a base, or the British interest in Haifa as a base, or Cyprus as a base—those seem to be secondary—but what will British policy do to the social, economic, and political development in those areas, and in what measure is the United States entitled to insistence upon one policy rather than another?

In the United States we have focused attention upon the Jewish question, which is natural. It is, in a sense, the first focus; it is the easy focus; it is one about which we know most and about which we are told most. What focus do we have on the Arab question? What do we know about the tendencies toward political union in the Arab world? What do we know about the development of governmental skills, industrial skills, technical skills, among the Arab peoples? To what extent, for example, are we justified in giving economic support to small, concentrated, aggressive groups—I am not speaking now in terms of prejudice or racial distinctions—so as to produce in that area the same sort of limited dominant cultural group that we have sponsored in South Africa, for example, or in British India, and which exist, for example, in the Dutch East Indies?

Those are the questions, I think, to which our interest should be directed more than to the questions of Mediterranean strategy, etc. Those are incidental questions.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

MR. OGBURN: I quite agree that those are important questions; but, if you view it in general terms, does it not become what the anthropologist might call a diffusion of culture traits from the Western world? The diffusion at the present time has been speeded a good deal under the direction of the British in the British interests; but it does not follow, it seems to me, that, if the British had not been a dominant power, these culture traits would not also have been diffused by somebody else—some other country might have diffused them just as well as Great Britain.

But the point is: How much do the interests of the United States synchronize with those of the British Empire? This is the central question of the morning discussion. I might put it this way, perhaps not quite accurately but a little dramatically, and say that to me it

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

seems that the problem of the United States is not so much Russia as the United Kingdom. I would be willing to argue that the direct social conflicts with Russia are relatively slight, although I can see where there would be places of social conflict, but they do not seem to be particularly ominous. If you assume that the interests of the United States, taken in a direct way, are the same as the interests of the United Kingdom and the British, then I would say the national conflicts are very much greater. Since the direct conflict of Great Britain and Russia is much more crucial, therefore our conflict with Great Britain becomes more crucial than that with Russia.

MR. BRODIE: It seems to me that we have to recognize that the primary concern of Great Britain is very different from what it was in the nineteenth century. Then Britain had a surplus of power as regards domestic security and could therefore be concerned with the development of the Empire. Today her primary concern is the security of the United Kingdom. It seems to me quite feasible, if we feel obliged to oppose Britain with respect to her imperial interests, that that need not at all jeopardize basic understanding on greater events concerning Europe, as long as we go about it in a way that is not offensive.

MR. OGBURN: I wonder whether the primary interests of Great Britain are the security of the United Kingdom. Perhaps it ought to be, but I wonder whether the United Kingdom is not very much concerned with the status of the British Empire and its holdings and investments and the power that goes therewith.

MR. DEKIEWIET: It has lost so much of that. I think any realistic policy that considers Great Britain must remember that she is in a secondary position and not in the leading position she was in, in the nineteenth century. She does not have the investments that she formerly had. For example, in India the investments are almost totally gone. Her power has broken down very badly. We have admitted that her strategic power has broken down very badly in western Europe. Therefore, I wonder whether talking about British security was not misleading. She has lost that. That is why I talked about western Europe more than I talked about Great Britain.

The identification of American interest with British interest is, I think, misleading. It ties American interest to something that is smaller. We want to remember that. America is entitled to insist upon the larger interest. That is why, in principle, Roosevelt was certainly right. In practice he turned out not to have been successful.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. FOX: We have been talking as if the British were being very recalcitrant in their liquidation of their far-flung interests; as a matter of fact, they seem to be negotiating in Egypt, they seem to be trying to relieve themselves of some obligations in India and here and there around the globe; there is a far-flung retreat in India, Burma, etc. The question perhaps ought to be rephrased: Are we whipping the British enough as they hurry down the road toward doing the thing which some of us think they ought to be doing?

I think you might take the position that two or three years ago we may not have whipped them hard enough because Mr. Roosevelt was more interested in winning the war; but I wonder whether today one can fairly criticize the Labour government for not moving faster.

MR. OGBURN: It is not a question in my mind of whipping the British along; it is a question, rather, of giving a pretty clear understanding to them as to how much they can count on our support in case they get into difficulty on this and that issue.

What would you say if you chose the issue of the Balkans, or if you chose the issue of Iran? I would not be so sure there. I don't know what the understandings were there, but I would not be so sure that it would be to American interest to try to support the British in the Balkans.

MR. DEKIEWIET: Isn't it already perfectly plain that America has not supported Great Britain in the Balkans to any important extent?

MR. OGBURN: Perhaps "supporting the British" is not quite clear. We did not support Churchill in a military way, but we have supported political activities in Bulgaria and Rumania.

MR. DEKIEWIET: Weren't we trying to express certain political convictions of our own regarding democratic conduct? There probably would be an identification but not a necessary overlapping. I never thought that American policy was conditioned by any attachment to any British conviction at that point. It seemed to me that America expressed herself in favor of the autonomy of the peoples of Bulgaria and Rumania.

MR. BRODIE: Isn't Mr. Ogburn giving the impression that the British position in the Balkans is one of security for the British Empire? It seems to me that one could explain it much more rationally on grounds of security interests for the United Kingdom.

I would support what Mr. Fox has said relative to the attitude of the British government concerning devolution of the British Empire. It seems to be something they are accepting there rather eagerly.

DISCUSSION OF GREAT-POWER RELATIONSHIPS

Certainly, they are not interested in expansion, they appear not to be, at any rate; and I wonder whether their intervention in the Balkans does not represent simply a desire to keep all of Europe from going over into the Russian orbit, for narrow security reasons as well as for economic ones. The British, after all, are also extremely concerned with the welfare of the Balkans. I think they have good reason to believe that any area with which they have considerable trade which falls definitely within the Russian orbit is going to be more or less closed to them for trade purposes.

MR. OGBURN: I suppose it would be a little difficult to disentangle the interests of the British Empire from the defense of the United Kingdom. A strong influence in different parts of the world would certainly react to the defense of the United Kingdom.

MR. FOX: The historical experience has been that constitutional evolution has produced spontaneous disintegration.

MR. CLIFTON UTLEY: Are we perhaps too eager in whipping the British horse down the line? It might possibly be to our interest not to whip the British horse. If it should be true—and I, for one, accept it at the present time as being true—that the major conflict in the visible future does tend to lie between the Soviet Union and ourselves, then it seems to me almost self-evident that these differences between Britain and ourselves, whatever they are, are submerged in the larger issue and that, while differences there certainly are, the elements of differences are less than the elements of identity.

It has been suggested that we occupy a position as mediator or arbitrator between the Russians and the British. To me it seems that the British have lost, and freely recognize that they have lost, the position in which they had a surplus of power, that they are distinctly a junior partner, and that, actually, the major conflict is not going to be between a senior partner and a junior partner. If conflict exists—and I think it does—then it is rather clearly between the Russians and ourselves. To postulate that the real conflict was between Britain and the Soviet Union simply because certain of her imperial territories happen to be near to the Soviet Union, that the real conflict is there more than between the Soviet Union and ourselves, does not recognize the realities of the case.

If we hope to approach an ultimate settlement with the Soviet Union without recourse to war, we must establish the fact that there is a line which can be held over a period of time. With that demonstration, as was put so well by Mr. Gurian, a different Soviet policy might emerge and out of that would arise a settlement.

PART II
GENERAL SECURITY

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

By LEO PASVOLSKY¹

IN THE extremely interesting and challenging address which Professor Fox delivered from this platform yesterday afternoon, he called attention to the fact that in recent years the government of the United States has taken vigorous initiative in international affairs, commensurate with our country's position as one of the world's greatest powers. Today I should like to discuss with you in some detail the initiative taken by our government in one extremely important field—that of the creation of international institutions, particularly in the domain of international peace and security.

I

As early as August, 1941, President Roosevelt joined with Prime Minister Churchill in envisaging, in the document which later became known as the "Atlantic Charter," the establishment of a permanent system of general security. In 1942 and 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in his addresses and other public statements, discussed again and again the need for organized international relations in that field. With increasing emphasis and increasing definiteness, he took up the institutional aspects of the question. This was especially true of the speeches which he delivered in July, 1942, and in September, 1943. In the latter speech, on the eve of his departure for Moscow to attend a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, Mr. Hull presented in considerable detail the views of the government of the United States with regard to the future possibilities and requirements of international organization. He urged the need for speedy action. He said: "The nations that stand for peace and security must now make up their minds and act together—or there will be neither peace nor security." This statement was addressed primarily to the other major nations of the anti-Axis coalition. In it Mr. Hull set forth one of the most crucial problems in the whole field of postwar international organization.

¹ Director of International Studies, Brookings Institution.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

The system of organized international security, created after the first World War through the establishment of the League of Nations, was gravely defective because of the nonparticipation, at one time or another, of some of the major nations of that period. It was particularly defective because of the absence, all through its existence, of the United States. It was clear that if, after the second World War, another attempt was to be made to create international institutions in the field of peace and security, that particular defect of the previous effort at international organization must be eliminated.

So the central problem in the summer and fall of 1943 was whether or not all the nations which would emerge from the war as the major nations of the world would be willing to play their part in the creation of a postwar system of collective security, operating through a general international organization. The Moscow conference of October, 1943, provided an answer to that question, so far as the four major nations—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—were concerned. But the provision of that answer was just the beginning of the story.

It was relatively easy to agree on the general ideas involved. It was obviously a much more difficult matter to agree upon the specific arrangements that would have to be made and the specific responsibilities and obligations that would have to be assumed. Hence, at the Moscow conference, it was agreed that each of the governments signatory to the four-nation declaration negotiated there would, as soon as possible, attempt to formulate concrete ideas as to the kind of international organization which it would be willing to support and in which it would be willing to participate, in preparation for international discussions and negotiations for the establishment of such an organization.

There was an important question as to the manner in which to proceed with those discussions and negotiations. In the joint four-nation declaration the governments signatory to it announced their belief that the international organization of the future should be open to adherence by all peace-loving states, large and small. They thus made clear their acceptance of the proposition that the maintenance of peace and security in the future should not be considered as the responsibility of the four great powers alone but should be recognized as a joint task of all nations able and willing to accept that responsibility. It was evident, however, that the key to successful negotiations lay in the determination of the commitments, the re-

THE UNITED NATIONS

sponsibilities, and the obligations which the larger nations of the world would be willing to undertake.

After all, with the concentration of power in the hands of a small number of nations, which was bound to come about as the result of the war, the conduct in international life of the few nations holding that power would certainly be decisive in determining whether there would be peace or more war in the world. Therefore, rather than adopt the method of calling at once a general conference of a large number of nations and of discussing all matters at that conference, it was thought wiser for the four major nations to meet first by themselves and determine the responsibilities, the duties, and the obligations which they would be willing to assume and then to have a general conference of all the future participants in the projected organization, for final agreement on what should be contained in the charter of such an organization. This was the method followed through the convocation of the Dumbarton Oaks conference.

During the months that elapsed between the Moscow conference and the meetings at Dumbarton Oaks, a great deal of preparatory work was done in the United States. Concrete proposals were developed, under the direction of the Secretary of State, by government officials, with the aid of experts and advisers brought in from outside the government. Secretary Hull held repeated conferences with bipartisan groups of members of both houses of Congress and with other outstanding national leaders. This time, the government of the United States, profiting by the unfortunate experience of twenty-five years earlier, was making every effort to go into negotiations for the creation of an international organization completely prepared technically and with the country united in support of the basic ideas which were being put forward.

This work of preparation was completed by the summer of 1944, and on June 15 of that year President Roosevelt issued a statement which contained a synopsis of the main ideas with which the United States government and its people were going into international negotiations. He reiterated our belief that in an international organization of the future the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security must be exercised jointly by all nations willing to accept that responsibility, irrespective of size and strength. He outlined our government's ideas as to the basic structure of the projected organization. He then said: "We are not thinking of a superstate with its own police forces and other paraphernalia of coercive power."

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

The discussion on the subject of world government, which you hear so much today and about which I shall have something to say a little later, is not a new discussion. It was with us all through the process of the formulation of the United Nations Charter. The President's categorical statement, rejecting the idea, was his and Mr. Hull's reply to the fears, which were widespread in this country at the time, that an organization might be created, endowed with powers so great as to make it, in effect, a system of world government.

II

The Dumbarton Oaks conference lasted from the end of August to the beginning of October, 1944. It produced a document known as the "Dumbarton Oaks Proposals." That document was not a complete draft of a definitive charter of the projected organization. It was a set of proposals as to what such a charter should contain as regards the main structure of the organization; the main duties, responsibilities, and obligations to be accepted by the member-states; and some of the essential procedures.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals represented a basis of agreement among the four major nations on all but a few essential points. The latter were settled, a few months later, at Yalta. It then became possible to call a general conference for the negotiation of a definitive charter.

One of the major problems at Dumbarton Oaks, at Yalta, and at San Francisco was the big-power veto. That whole problem arose out of the fact that an attempt was being made to move away from the type of organization that operates on the basis of unanimity of all its members, as was the case with the League of Nations. What was in contemplation was an organization in which, for the first time, substantive questions would be decided by some sort of majority vote.

At Dumbarton Oaks, agreement was reached that, so far as the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council were concerned, a majority rule—on some questions, a simple majority; on some others, a two-thirds vote—would prevail throughout, not only for procedural questions but also for whatever substantive questions those bodies were to deal with. With regard to the Security Council, the question presented itself differently. To the extent that executive powers were to be given to the new organization, those powers would be concentrated in the Security Council, and there the position of the major powers would necessarily be a decisive factor.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Contrary to what has frequently been said, the discussion at Dumbarton Oaks on the subject of voting arrangements in the Security Council did not bog down on the whole question of veto power, but on only one aspect of it. There was no disagreement there that the major nations, which were to be the permanent members of the Security Council, must operate under an arrangement under which they would have to be unanimous for any substantive action by the Security Council. There was also no disagreement that procedural questions in the Security Council should be settled by a simple majority vote, without the requirement of unanimous agreement by the great powers. The question that caused difficulty related to what the voting arrangements should be if one of the great powers itself should be a party to a dispute before the Security Council.

Two broad fields were envisaged for the Security Council's operations in the maintenance of peace and security. One was the field of peaceful adjustment of disputes, and the other was the field of enforcement action. The agreement finally reached at Yalta was to the effect that no party to a dispute, whether a permanent or a non-permanent member of the Council, would have a vote in the peaceful adjustment of that dispute; but all members of the Security Council would always have a vote in the processes of enforcement.

In connection with this latter point, it is important to bear in mind that there are two sides to the veto problem. The side which has been mostly emphasized is that, by that kind of arrangement, a great power can prevent enforcement action being taken against itself. In my opinion, that is of very little practical importance. I believe that it is impossible to create a world organization on any basis that would, under present conditions, have the power by itself to coerce one of the great powers. There is only one combination of force on the face of the earth that can coerce a great power, and that is the combined forces of the other great powers. Whether they do so through the organization or outside the organization is another story.

But veto power becomes extremely important from the American point of view—and from the point of view of every great power—on the question of whether the armed forces of that power can be set into motion without its consent. That feature of the veto problem is the really significant part of the story, since it is the national forces of the great powers that must be the primary instruments of enforcement.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

It is not necessary for me to dwell in any detail on the San Francisco conference. You have read and heard a great deal about it. Suffice it to say that at San Francisco the Charter of the United Nations was finally formulated in all its details, was negotiated, and was signed. In the winter of 1946, in London, the organization which is to operate under that charter became a going concern.

III

Thus far I have spoken about the field of international peace and security with reference to arrangements embodied in the United Nations Charter for bringing about pacific settlement of disputes, peaceful adjustment of situations and conditions which might lead to conflict among nations, prevention or removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of breaches of the peace—to the extent to which these tasks can be performed by organized institutional international action. I should note, in this connection, that involved in all this is the extremely important problem of regulation of national armaments by general international agreement, provision for which is also contained in the charter.

But there is another side to the story of organized international relations. Unless conditions conducive to peace, stability, and general well-being are created in the world, the instrumentalities to which I have referred would have to operate under so great a strain as to make it extremely difficult for them to be effective. With that in mind, the government of the United States began early to exercise its initiative in another direction—that of creating international institutions and arrangements aimed particularly at the solution of international economic and social problems.

When we come to the intricate and complicated domain of economic, social, cultural, health, and similar problems, we are confronted by such a large variety of fields that it would be extremely difficult to create a single over-all organization to deal with all of them. This has long been recognized. Some efforts were made, before the last war, to create specialized functional agencies in various fields. Those efforts did not get very far.

In the process of thinking and discussion which went into the shaping of the international institutions to follow the second World War, it was fully recognized that such specialized agencies should be created in as many fields as necessary. But it was also recognized that

THE UNITED NATIONS

there should be an over-all agency of co-ordination under which they would operate. Such an agency of co-ordination was finally made a part of the general international organization. However, the specialized agencies had to be created as the circumstances became ripe for that purpose and as the process became possible. In fact, American initiative began to be exercised in this respect long before the United Nations Organization was established. Let me recite briefly some instances of the initiative taken by the government of the United States in these fields.

The International Labour Organization remained active after the machinery of the League of Nations fell into abeyance with the outbreak of the war. The Organization moved to Montreal and was a going concern. On our initiative, at the meetings of the Organization, attempts began to be made to strengthen it as an agency in its particular field.

On our initiative, a conference was called in 1943 looking toward the creation of an international agency in the field of food and agriculture, to handle such questions as nutrition, better food conditions, and so on. This effort subsequently produced the Food and Agriculture Organization.

We took the initiative in the creation of the two financial institutions which resulted from the Bretton Woods conference of July, 1944: the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

I should like to mention the culmination, in connection with the recent Anglo-American loan negotiations, of plans for the establishment of an international trade-agency. These plans began to be developed on our initiative three years earlier.

The initial impulse for the creation of the international relief organization, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—U.N.R.R.A.—did not come from the United States. It came from the countries of Europe. But the entire enterprise did not get very far until the United States began to be active in that field.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the U.N.E.S.C.O., created some time later, was not originally our idea either. Again the initiative came from Europe. But it was in terms of an emergency agency. It was not until we got into the picture that plans began to be developed for a permanent organization in that field.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

IV

Why did we do all this? Why did we work so vigorously to lead the world in the direction of organized international co-operation? I think the simplest answer is that we had learned a number of important lessons.

We had learned the lesson, for example, that—to use the latest parlance of our day—there is a chain reaction in the process of war. Wars have a habit of spreading, particularly when there are in the world nations sufficiently powerful, physically, to challenge world peace.

We had learned the lesson that, unless all nations are willing to renounce the right to use force as a means of settling international disputes or as a means of attaining national aims, there was not going to be peace or security in the world.

We had learned the lesson that, when, in spite of such renunciation, threats to the peace develop or breaches of the peace occur, only joint action by the peace-loving nations is sufficient, in the world of today, to deal with those situations.

And we had learned out of rather bitter experience that, unless there is an orderly system of regulation of armaments by mutual agreement, the world is going to run into one of two very grave difficulties: either there will be an armaments race, which in itself will be an element of instability and disruption; or there will be a situation in which some nations will be arming but others will remain disarmed—and that is an invitation to aggression. This lesson has been, more recently, brought home to us with shattering emphasis by the advent of the atomic bomb.

We had also learned the lesson that economic warfare in time of political peace is a destructive and disrupting process, which paves the way for military conflict. We had plenty of examples of that before us.

Finally, we had learned the lesson that in all these fields international institutions are of the greatest importance.

Since our country had learned all these lessons and had come to a certain realization that there is no insulation for us in the present-day world, it seemed to those who were in charge of the foreign policies of the United States at that time—President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull—that this country, of all countries, must

THE UNITED NATIONS

bring its influence to bear on the task of achieving international agreement on a maximum practicable program of action in all these fields. I have referred to the nonpartisan approach which they used in this country to give expression to a united national will. That in itself was a lesson of bitter experience.

Those who worked on these problems, from the President and the Secretary of State down, were well aware that they were working under great limitations. There were limitations of domestic acceptance, and there were limitations of international agreement. Both were extremely important.

It may well be that the limitations were overestimated and the possibilities underestimated. I suppose that a theoretical case could be worked up in support of both these propositions. It may be that something more could have been accomplished under American leadership by way of a stronger organization than was created. All I have to say is that, as one of those who took part in the process of securing both domestic acceptance and international agreement, I am convinced that we did not overestimate our limitations or underestimate our possibilities.

V

The United Nations Organization, which was set up under the charter negotiated at San Francisco, has been in existence for six months. Some of the important specialized agencies to which I have referred have been in existence for a shorter period than that. It is a very brief span of time in which to judge results.

One thing that stands out in people's minds is that there is apparently something wrong, that there are great difficulties in starting this machine rolling. Those of us who worked on the construction of that machine never had any illusions on that score. In the numerous addresses which I have delivered since the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the question has always been asked of me as to how we thought it was possible to create an international organization when there are so many differences among nations, when there are so many difficult issues. I have always replied that it is precisely because there are all these difficulties in international relations that the world needs institutions of international collaboration.

I would not say that we foresaw all the difficulties that have arisen. But we knew that the process was not going to be an easy one and

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

that it would, under the most favorable circumstances, require time and patience and ingenuity and skill. And, unfortunately, the current circumstances are far from favorable.

I doubt that it would serve any useful purpose for me to attempt at this stage an evaluation of the results to date of the operation of these agencies, particularly of the United Nations Organization. But I do think it is far too early to lose faith in that organization. And loss of faith in it is one of the great dangers, in my opinion, that confront us today in this second effort at international organization.

The loss of faith arises out of two entirely different preoccupations. There are some who say that the United Nations Organization cannot, does not, never could, and never will amount to anything; that the thing for us to do is to rely solely upon our own independent action and our own powers and to be completely free in our choices. This is nothing new. We have heard this said over and over again. I suppose there always will be people who will say this, irrespective of what happens in the world.

Then there are some who say that the organization is inadequate; that we must immediately go further; that we must embark at once upon some form of world government. As I said earlier, this, too, is not a new thought. It has been with us for a long time. It has merely become accentuated in recent months because of the developments in the field of atomic energy.

I am not going to undertake a long discussion on the subject of world government. For one thing, the advocates of the idea have not as yet provided an adequate basis for such a discussion. If you read the literature on world government, you will find generalities, you will find hopes and aspirations, you will find isolated ideas; but you will not find concrete indications of just what is involved in establishing a world organization on a constitutional, rather than on a treaty, basis. There are a great many problems that need to be faced there; and the serious advocates of the idea of world government should certainly feel it incumbent upon them to provide a basis for the discussion of their proposals in those terms.

But there is one aspect of the world-government problem on which I should like to say a word. I am satisfied that the most important claim made by the advocates of world government—their claim that world government is the only method open to us for eliminating war—is completely untenable.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Of course, if war is defined in terms of military conflict between sovereign and independent nations, such war will obviously be eliminated with the elimination of sovereign and independent nations and the conversion of the world into a single nation. Unfortunately, military conflict is not confined to international war. There is such a thing as civil war. Certainly, the American Civil War was the greatest military conflict of the nineteenth century after the Napoleonic era. If you look at the period which elapsed between the two world wars, you will find that there was an international war between Poland and Russia at the beginning of that period; there was an international war between Italy and Ethiopia; there was an international war between China and Japan; and there were two wars down in South America. But you also will note that during that period there was a civil war in Russia; there was a civil war in China; and there was a civil war in Spain. And civil wars have a habit of creating destruction just as much as international wars; of setting up hatreds just as much as international wars, and very often more so; and of being fought with all the weapons that the contending sides can possibly lay their hands on.

Whatever may be said about world government, whatever world government can or cannot do, the elimination of military conflict is one thing, in my opinion, that cannot be achieved merely by the creation of a superstate.

VI

There is a third danger to the United Nations Organization which I think is, perhaps, even more important than the other two. It is the danger which inheres in the view that now that we have a United Nations Organization, let us forget all about national policies. Let us rely on the international organization alone, and if it fails us, that is just too bad!

I suppose that if I had another hour or two, I would plunge at this point into a technical discussion of the United Nations Charter and of the organization established under it. Don't be frightened! I am not going to do this. I think that you have heard enough and read enough about what the charter contains. But let me say a few words on what I think the United Nations Organization is and is not.

The United Nations Organization is not a panacea for all our ills. It is not a panacea for war. The United Nations Organization does not eliminate national responsibility for national policies. It is a new

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

instrument for the conduct of foreign relations in our country and in every country participating in it, but it does not supplant national policies. I think its great importance lies in the fact that it promotes the creation of new and higher standards of national policies. It is an instrument of adjustment of international conflicts; imperfect, of course, but an instrument which, if used with a determination and a will, can be an extremely important factor in international relations. It is also, as the charter itself says, a center for the harmonization of national actions for the attainment of common ends.

What does all this mean? It means that the United Nations Organization cannot rise above the level of the national policies of its member-states. It may make possible the raising of that level; it may lead national policies to a higher level; but it cannot rise above them.

The United Nations Organization is not an instrument of great-power domination. It does not add anything to the power position of any individual major nation. If the great powers wanted to dominate the world, they would have had no need to work for the creation of the United Nations Organization. Either they could have operated as a unit for that purpose or they might have divided the world into spheres, each dominated by one of them.

I think, on the other hand, that the United Nations Organization and its charter provide, in a significant measure, a mechanism for moderating the power position of the great powers. The major nations do accept a number of far-reaching obligations. They accept the obligation to recognize the sovereign equality of the member-states. They accept the obligation to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a way that international peace, security, and justice are not impaired. They accept the correlative obligation not to use force or threat of force for the attainment of those ends. And they accept the obligation to act together for those purposes.

These obligations are assumed by all members of the United Nations Organization, large and small. There are no immunities, so far as the assumption of obligations is concerned, for the large states. Whatever immunities from the processes of the organization the major nations may possess result not from legal enactment but from the realities of power relationships. That is another reason why it is of the utmost importance for us to remember that the United Nations Organization does not supplant national policies.

THE UNITED NATIONS

I believe that the United Nations Organization is capable of growth. In my view the test of growth is the development of new standards of national behavior and national policies—if you like, an extension of the area of international concern and international responsibility. But let us bear in mind that if there are obstacles to growth and development along these lines, those obstacles arise not only from the position of the great powers but also from the position of small powers.

Small powers are tremendously concerned with the problem of intervention in their affairs, and they are right in being so concerned. By the same token, however, you will find that resistance to an extension of the area of international concern and responsibility and the consequent contraction of the area of so-called “domestic” jurisdiction comes from small nations as well as from large nations. If you compare the provision on that score which was written into the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals with the provision which was finally adopted at the San Francisco conference, you will find that the area of international jurisdiction was greatly curtailed at the conference itself and that it was curtailed, in large measure, on the insistence of the smaller nations.

Let me emphasize once more that the United Nations Organization is *an* instrument of foreign policy not *the* instrument of that policy. I think it will grow in importance. But whether or not it grows will depend far less upon its mechanics than upon the willingness of the nations, large and small—in some respects, only the large; in some respects, both the large and the small—to make this particular system grow.

VII

The subject of this Institute is “A Foreign Policy for the United States.” I have spoken for an hour now about this new instrumentality of American foreign policy. In the use of that instrumentality, as well as in the use of all other instrumentalities in the field of foreign relations that are open to us, we must remember the realities of power. We may dislike power as such; we may hate the application of power to evil ends; but we cannot escape the implications of its existence in the world.

In his appearance before the joint committee on the Pearl Harbor investigation, Secretary Hull made an observation which, I think, it would be well for all of us to remember. He said that when he talked

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

to Japanese diplomats or other foreign representatives and told them what the United States wished to see in the world—what our policies were—he thought, at first, that they looked at him when he spoke. Pretty soon, however, he discovered that, while they listened to his words, they looked over his shoulder at the armed forces of the United States. It is well to remember this.

In the conduct of our foreign relations, we must be clear as to what our policy objectives are. We must be sure that our power position—in actual, not merely potential, terms—is commensurate with our relative place in the world power situation. And we must seek the attainment of our policy objectives through all the means at our disposal, within the framework of our solemnly assumed international obligations and both inside and outside the United Nations Organization—that new instrumentality of relations among nations, toward the fashioning of which our nation has made so vast and so decisive a contribution.

THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN THE LIGHT OF ATOMIC ENERGY

By BERNARD BRODIE^{*}

THE last time I had the honor of leading one of the Harris Institute round tables, I was the first speaker in five round tables who turned up with a formal paper. This time I came prepared to give some informal comments, and I find that again, unwillingly, I am making a departure from the normal. Of course I am solaced by the fact that Mr. deKiewiet was able yesterday to do quite as well without a paper as he did with one.

I was also very much taken yesterday with Mr. deKiewiet's remark that there is at present no strategy. I think that is true not only as concerns the literature and doctrine inherited from the past and the political policy based thereon but also as concerns the very goals and purposes of strategy. In other words, strategy seems to have lost its entire reason for being. Certainly, the famous remark of Clausewitz, that "war is a continuation of policy," has now become a complete absurdity.

In a war in which both sides use the atomic bomb it is hardly conceivable that the victor, if there is one, can derive any benefits, even negative ones, at all commensurate with the costs. Whether that was true or not before is arguable; it is now inescapable.

General Walter Bedell Smith in a recent series of articles appearing in the *Saturday Evening Post* pointed out that the American Army in Germany was following the age-old policy, which has always been basic to strategy, of destroying the enemy's armed forces—and there again we see one of the basic tenets of strategy collapsing. Notice, however, that the situation is very different if one side has a monopoly of the bomb or if, by its initiative in using it, that side gains a monopoly of the ability to use it.

That last point illustrates one justification of the effort to conceive of what it is which replaces strategy in the atomic age. We want to know, first of all, whether the atomic bomb does or does not facilitate

^{*} Institute of International Studies, Yale University.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

aggression and what we can do about it. The bomb might under some circumstances facilitate aggression; but if certain adjustments to it are made, it might also have the contrary effect.

We want to know, second, the minimum requirements of any international system for the control of atomic energy. I hope Mr. Fox will be present with us before very long, because he has been doing a lot of work on just that problem.

I think we want to know, third, whether there is any useful course of defense policy left to us in the event of a failure to attain a system possessing those minimum requirements. In that connection it seems to me that the Lilienthal plan, when considered as a sample of human ingenuity applied to a great social and political problem, is not only an admirable achievement but a magnificent one. However, before we lose ourselves in rejoicing, we should consider that many aspects of that plan are of such nature that one can hardly be optimistic concerning acceptance of the plan on the part of certain powers whose co-operation is indispensable.

Last night I was much interested in the discussion concerning the allaying of suspicion in negotiations with Russia. It seems to me that it is one thing to talk in the abstract about allaying suspicion, in which case you do not have a very profound problem; it is quite another thing when you consider that you always have to deal with that problem in connection with the discussion of very vital and crucial issues. And I can think of no issue more likely to provoke suspicion than our proposal that we and a number of other countries send representatives into the Soviet Union to conduct large-scale industrial, exploratory, and even policing operations. And it does not help one bit that while we make that proposal we have in our left hand a sizable quantity of atomic bombs and are also continuing to produce them. I will admit that we could rectify that latter liability if we wanted to and if we felt the circumstances warranted it; but I think you would still have a very grave problem of persuading the Russians that there was not a very serious "Mickey Finn" in there somewhere.

Another problem which we must consider is: What do we do in the event of, and how do we prepare against, the possible collapse of a system which is put into operation? And that includes also the whole question of sanctions, something which Mr. Baruch added to the Lilienthal report when he presented it before the Atomic Energy Commission. A corollary to that question is: How can we by our

THE SECURITY PROBLEM AND ATOMIC ENERGY

domestic policy effectively implement the kind of international system which may be devised? It is clear, for example, that if we can so organize our own defenses that the aggressor needs a large number of bombs in order to achieve a decisive end, and if we achieve a situation also where the secret manufacture of only a few bombs is of rather small consequence, there is a much firmer foundation for an international security system than exists in a situation in which only a few bombs might have decisive effects.

A final question which I think is presented is: What aspects of our present diplomacy are based on tenets inherited from the past and are now clearly obsolete?

These and comparable questions can be answered, if at all, only by a study of the bomb as a weapon of war. To put the issue epigrammatically, war is unthinkable but not impossible, and therefore we must think about it.

Now I turn to a few basic propositions which I have already presented and expatiated on elsewhere and which some of you may be somewhat familiar with already. The first is that in the atomic bomb we have a weapon of which one to ten units is sufficient to destroy any city in the world.

I had a bit of a conversation with Mr. Pasvolsky yesterday afternoon, and he objected to our use of the term the "absolute weapon" in speaking of the atomic bomb, and I think I might take a minute to explain why we use the term.

When you have a weapon as effective as this one is, it does not make much difference whether you succeed in devising one which is more effective. I have been completely unimpressed by the discussion that this bomb is only a beginning and that ten or twenty years from now we shall have one a hundred times more powerful. I do not think the order of difference between that situation and the present one is at all comparable to the difference between the atomic bomb and the preatomic-bomb era. If someone challenged my figures about one to ten bombs—if he said it would take not ten bombs to destroy New York but only two—I would say that that is a matter of indifference militarily. If he said it took not ten but twenty, I would say that that also is a matter of relative indifference militarily, because an enemy could deliver twenty bombs about as easily as he could deliver two, assuming he had a large number of bombs to begin with.

One of the implications of the proposition I have just made about one to ten bombs being sufficient to destroy any city is that, with air

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

forces no greater than those which existed in the recent war, it is at least physically possible for any power to destroy all, or at least most, of the cities of any other great power; and the second implication is that industry as now organized would be the first casualty of such an attack. In other words, the kind of warfare which we have conducted in the past, which relied very heavily on war-expanded industries, would not be possible under such conditions.

The second proposition is that no defense against the atomic bomb is known, and the possibilities of its existence in the future are exceedingly remote. That latter point sounds as though one were putting on the astrologer's cap. We certainly cannot be dogmatic about the future, but what we can say very definitely is that the experience of the past, which superficially leads one to believe that aggressive weapons have always been successfully countered, breaks down under analysis as misleading or irrelevant.

I have in mind Admiral Nimitz' speech before the Washington Monument on last Navy Day, in which he admonished his hearers to remember that there never has been a weapon to which man has been unable to devise a counterweapon. I think, if you look at history very carefully, you will find that, regardless of its relevance to the future, that statement itself is not true. What we have always had in the past is an adjustment to new weapons which tended to qualify those weapons, and such adjustments will not be sufficient in terms of the atomic bomb.

I could give one example. The British congratulated themselves that their defense against the V-1 weapon was, on the whole, quite effective, and I think it was. On the banner day, so far as concerns the British, they succeeded in shooting down 97 out of 101 bombs launched against England. But if the other four had been atomic bombs, then the survivors in London would have had little cause to congratulate themselves.

The third proposition is that superiority neither in numbers of bombs nor in numbers of air forces, let alone armies and navies, is sufficient to guarantee security. We know, for example, that if one side has five hundred bombs and has reasonable expectation of being able to deliver a large part of those five hundred, the opponent is not protected by the fact that he may himself have five thousand. We know also that inferior air forces, if they are willing to pay the cost, can usually penetrate to a target—at least, a certain proportion of their numbers can succeed in penetrating. That was demonstrated over

THE SECURITY PROBLEM AND ATOMIC ENERGY

and over again in the recent war. The concept of command of the air, in other words, breaks down.

Of course, a great many persons have often questioned in the past whether armed forces really guaranteed the security of the country which possessed them, even superior armed forces. Naturally, that is a large problem, with all kinds of ramifications; but I would say that, if we put it in a limited context and take at least one important historical example, namely, Britain, it seems pretty clear that the record there is that her command of the sea protected her territory from invasion from 1066 to the present, during which time she succeeded in invading the Continent a large number of times.

You might say that England was engaged in a lot of wars during that period, which is true. Some of those wars had imperial motives, but others were designed to *maintain on an economical level* those defenses which Britain found sufficient to her security—which is what I conceive to have been the purpose of the balance-of-power principle.

The British experience is certainly relevant to the American case, and I think that this country prior to the atomic bomb could have felt some assurance that, with the armaments it was capable of building, it had a fairly effective guaranty against devastation or invasion of its homeland. That does not mean, of course, that we should have been ready and willing to live in the kind of world that would have existed if we had retired to our own defenses.

The next proposition I want to bring in is the effect of the atomic bomb on the ranges even of existing aircraft, not to mention long-range rockets, which are certain to be developed within the next several decades. For various technical reasons which I do not think it profitable to go into at this point, with ordinary bombs the effective bombing range of an aircraft is about one-quarter or less of its straight-line cruising radius. With the atomic bomb, on the other hand, the effective bombing radius is extended to practically its entire straight-line cruising radius without pay load. In other words, the B-29, for example, to be effective in day-to-day strategic bombing with ordinary bombs, has to be located within at least 1,500 miles of its target. With an atomic bomb I should expect it to be able to deliver the missile at a distance of nearly the 8,000 miles which it has already succeeded in flying. That, of course, would involve sacrifice of the plane and crew; but in the callously utilitarian standards of military bookkeeping, it is not likely that belligerents using the

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

atomic bomb and delivering it by aircraft would be particularly interested in getting back after each mission the particular plane or crew which delivered it. Rear Admiral Parsons, Admiral Blandy's deputy, rejected that idea when it was first suggested to him; but I noticed recently that in a speech in Honolulu, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Mr. Symington, was advancing exactly that idea.

The final proposition, the fifth, scarcely needs discussion at this time. It is pretty clear by now that there is no question at all of world-wide scarcity of the materials for producing the bomb. Relative to the tremendous destructive powers of the bomb, such materials are not scarce, though their distribution is still incompletely known.

Finally, we all know that it is only a matter of time before there is multiple possession of the bomb among the great powers. How much time it will take is still in question, but the estimates range from three to about twenty years.

These propositions have led me to the conclusion that military forces can no longer defend a territory in the sense of offering protection; the only defense possible is of the deterrent type. In other words, defense becomes synonymous with measures to guarantee the ability to retaliate if attacked and also of measures to diminish the ease with which the enemy can overwhelm the country by his attack.

Many people have reacted violently against this suggestion, not least the chancellor of the University of Chicago. It is true that a defense based on deterrence is of less than no value if it fails to deter. It is also true that the reign of mutual fear which such a system implies would unquestionably produce psychoses, which, in turn, would have effects, the direction and magnitude of which are unpredictable, almost unimaginable. On the other hand, I think we should not for those reasons too readily write off the real deterrent value of the ability to retaliate against an aggressor, provided that that ability is somehow maintained.

What, then, are the final effects on policy? Of course, they are numerous, but I have noted down for submission to you only three.

The first of these is that the kind of analysis which the foregoing represents in brief form indicates that in an atomic-bomb war there would be almost no scope whatever for sea power. In that connection the tests at Bikini are completely beside the point. They represent an effort to gauge tactical effects when we are interested in strategic effects. It seems to me that it is a matter of no consequence at all that

THE SECURITY PROBLEM AND ATOMIC ENERGY

a navy is completely immune to the atomic bomb if the whole reason for its existence collapses; and it seems to me also that a navy which is operating from a country which has lost its entire industry will soon lose both its ability to operate and its reason for operating.

That is an issue of tremendous significance for the United States. The United States has just inherited from Great Britain the mantle of leading sea power of the world. I think also, contrary to the opinions of a great many observers, that sea power reached its apogee in the war just ended. It was often spoken of as an obsolescent force, of less importance than other forces, especially air power. I can think of no war in history in which sea power played a greater role. I think there was very little in the way of competition with air force. I would submit merely that the Allied air attack on Germany and the Allied air attack on Japan would both have been impossible without British-American command of the seas. The ability of the three major powers to marshal and combine their forces and choose first one enemy to concentrate against and then the other was also a function of their command of the seas; and, of course, a large amount of the relatively high degree of security which the United States enjoyed was the result of its great sea power.

The second point is that geographical distance loses much of its importance as a barrier against attack. In his book, *The Super Powers*, my colleague Mr. Fox pointed out that the great distance separating the Soviet Union from the United States was such as to render war between them unlikely to achieve decisive results. That fact was itself a considerable impedance or obstacle to any outbreak of conflict. I think that that statement not only was true for the time at which he wrote it but would have remained true indefinitely for as long as we can foresee—if it were not for the development of the atomic bomb. I think also that that proposition is not entirely obliterated by the appearance of the atomic bomb, but I am sure Mr. Fox, who is now with us, would be the first to admit that it has been very vitally affected.

Third, I should like to call your attention to the consequences of the collapse of the threat of war as an instrument of policy on the part of responsible governments. Or, to put it in another way, which is perhaps less offensive to our consciences, the threat of war now becomes a much greater instrument in the hands of irresponsible governments and is an instrument of which responsible governments are practically deprived.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

The threat of war, it seems to me, on the part of responsible governments has had a tremendous utility in the past. It has prevented a lot of instances of rape which would otherwise have occurred. It obviously has not prevented war, though it probably did reduce the frequency of wars. Now we have the situation in which a government comparable to the Hitler government could pursue a line of policy comparable to that pursued by the Hitler government in 1938, and the cards would be stacked even more in its favor than was true in the past. In other words, the war with atomic bombs becomes so unthinkable that a government possessed of its senses and possessed also of some feeling of responsibility both to its own people and to the world could be nothing but appalled at even the thought of using a threat of force, in the knowledge that such a threat, if realized, might provoke an atomic war.

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

THE discussion of the problem of general security centered about the effects of atomic energy in military strategy and world politics and the method for preventing the use of that energy in war. The problem of general security also arose in connection with the discussion of the relations of the great powers and the situation in particular parts of the world, considered in other sections of this volume. There was no detailed discussion of the United Nations, but the role of that organization in channeling, or perhaps eventually superseding, "power politics," in effecting a regulation of armaments, and in contributing to the development of a sense of world community were considered.

The participants varied in the optimism with which they envisaged future security. Some leaned to the view that the atomic bomb had made the power equilibrium less stable but that a system of effective international or world control was not to be anticipated. Others were more confident that the technical problems of atomic energy control could be solved, that the political problem of winning acceptance for a control system was not hopeless, that the germs of world community were to be found and could be stimulated by the exigencies of the present situation, and that, in any case, the increasing destructiveness of war even to a victor made its initiation less probable.

FINANCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

MR. WILLIAM ROGERS: What would be the effect of channeling American wealth into the specialized agencies of the United Nations which would work toward international reconstruction and development as opposed to a policy of using our wealth by granting conditional loans to Great Britain and France and making that wealth an instrument of national policy, supporting the Western world as against Russia or something of that sort? Do we not have those two choices of using our wealth to develop a stable world, which is presumably what the United States desires?

MR. DEKIEWIET: That is a searching question. The answer, I suppose, would have to lie in our lack of assurance—I won't say confi-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

dence as yet—but our lack of assurance in the United Nations, in the lack of compatible policies between the co-operating powers. If, for example—and I think most of us would be very happy to see a development of that sort—the United States were to put considerable amounts of money at the disposal of instrumentalities of the United Nations, it would be necessary, of course, that the Russians and the British, the Russians certainly, make a comparable contribution, not in amount but in spirit. We would also have to have the assurance that the money would be used in a manner generally acceptable to United States policies; and, as long as the United Nations organization is in its critical, unbalanced position, I suppose some doubt would attach to that policy—at least it would in my own mind. I can see very clearly the disadvantage in using American funds and devoting them to policies over which America has only indirect influence.

MR. BRODIE: This is something about which the State Department itself can do extremely little; but it seems to me that, when we talk about the economic role which the United States must play, we always have to keep in mind the very close connection between our foreign policy and economic events in this country. It seems to me, for example, that one of the great dangers to our foreign relations today is the inflation which is now proceeding in this country, which, first of all, makes more acute the threat of future domestic instability—which will have its repercussions abroad—and which also makes it very difficult for this country to offer the kind of assistance that the government as such might be meaning to offer.

POWER POLITICS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

MR. LEO PASVOLSKY: Someone said in one of our sessions that Britain has lost her security. I think that is true. In a sense we have all lost our sense of security, not only Britain. But that raises a question in my mind as to what we mean by the term “security system”—“Eastern security system,” “Western security system,” and things of that sort—and particularly what we mean when we talk about Britain’s having an alternative as between a Western security system and something else.

As I understood the speaker, the thought goes back to Churchill’s proposal to France, to the Smuts plan, and things of that sort as an attempt to build a broader industrial and economic base for British power. I, myself, never put much stock in that. I think that means even less today than it did at that time.

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

There was some mention made in the discussion as to the different status of nationalism in eastern and in western Europe. I think that is rather important. I wonder whether our speaker really thinks that nationalism has evolved in eastern Europe. I am not satisfied that the Russian experiment of forcible abatement of nationalism is really going to go deep.

I would like to suggest that it is not nationalism as such that is our difficulty; it is lack of a concept of responsibility attaching to nationalism. I think our trouble before the war was not that there were national units but that there were too many national units which were irresponsible in their international relations. That was true of the big powers, and it was true of small powers.

If our problem is the channeling of nationalism into terms of international responsibility, then it is a little difficult for me to see how a Western system of security can be created, or how what we call an Eastern system of security is really a system of security. Security for whom? After all, we do have to consider that, when we talk about a group seeking security, it is not merely the big partner in that group that is interested in security but the small partners, too. If we start with the central thesis that even Great Britain, with her still great resources, still great potentiality in the world of today, has lost a feeling of security, I think it is rather easy to see what is happening to the other countries.

MR. DEKIEWIET: Wouldn't you have to admit, Mr. Pasvolsky, that the smaller powers, particularly, have to define their international responsibility in response to clear policies enunciated by the larger powers? If, for example, there has been some awakening of nationalism in eastern Europe, the governments concerned there, on the whole, recognize that they can have no effective foreign policy independent of that of Russia.

My suggestion that we might be interested in a Western security system was not that we should impose the Russian equivalent of an Eastern system in western Europe but that we missed an opportunity during the war of getting a voluntary acceptance of those interests.

MR. PASVOLSKY: You notice what the Swedes have said about joining the United Nations: they want to join the United Nations, but they don't want to join blocs within the United Nations. I think it was a rather enlightening statement.

The whole United Nations idea is based on the proposition that there is no security for anybody except in a general system—and not

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

too much there, unless certain conditions are fulfilled. If the countries of western Europe are to seek their security in Britain, they won't have it; if they are going to go beyond Britain and seek their security in the United States, they may have it only to the extent that the United States and Russia are not in conflict. The same thing is true of the countries of eastern Europe, all due allowance being made for the myth of creating the "security zone."

I think what you said about nineteenth-century conceptions applied to twentieth-century reality ought to be applied to the whole concept of regional security groups. We have a new situation from the security point of view.

I am afraid that the more we talk about the possibility of these balanced systems of security, the more difficulty we are going to get into. Remember that the British and French governments last December signed an agreement, in connection with the Syrian government, in which they used precisely that terminology: that they will withdraw their troops as soon as a regional system of security for the Near East is established by the United Nations. Even the little Syrians and Lebanese came back and said: "You are setting down conditions which are unfulfillable because that concept has no meaning." And from their point of view it certainly had no meaning.

MR. DEKIEWIET: If I may interrupt, aren't you using "security" in two definitions? You are referring to security as an absolute thing, in which case we will agree with you immediately that there is no such thing as security for the United States, Great Britain, or Lebanon. On the other hand, I suppose we are more accustomed to using the term "security" in a more relative sense.

MR. PASVOLSKY: There is no such thing as security in an absolute sense, because we do not have it in our internal relations and we do not have it in the best-governed country in the world. There is always an element of insecurity, of course; it is a question of degree. I think our big problem, Britain's big problem, and Russia's big problem is whether there is going to be more or less insecurity; and I have no doubt in my mind that the more Russia talks about an Eastern system of security and Britain talks about a Western system of security and we talk about a Western Hemisphere system of security and the British and French talk about a Near Eastern system of security, the more we create insecurity because we fail to get to the root of the whole matter.

MR. DEKIEWIET: Which is?

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

MR. PASVOLSKY: Which is that there is going to be security in the world, there is going to be peace in the world, if the "big fellows" behave, and if the "little fellows" do not provide a pretext for the "big fellows" to misbehave. If we can't get that—and we can't legislate it—we just can't get security. We shall just have to live from hand to mouth as we have for a long time.

I was very much interested in the discussion of identity and disparity of our interests with Britain. Somebody said that there are disparities but there are bigger identities. To me that would be very important. Of course, there are going to be disparities. Of course, at every point we shall have to make the judgment, as was brought up here a while ago, as to whether a particular proposition, a particular point, is essential. There is, however, a great danger in carrying that too far, because when you start grading interests you may fall into a very difficult error of underestimating or overestimating, particularly underestimating.

It would not hurt us to say that we are so much involved in everything that happens in the world that we never know what a little spark might do somewhere because there are no longer any divisions, because each country has at least two frontiers, and when something starts at one frontier somebody else is affected on the next frontier. A little war may start a chain of war.

MR. BRODIE: I agree entirely with Mr. Pasvolsky's remark that there is no such condition as absolute security today. I would go further and say that relative security as we have known it in the past no longer exists. I would agree also with Mr. deKiewiet, that there is no longer any such thing as strategy. But, because there is no such thing as strategy, nations are bound, in so far as it does not look too ridiculous to them, to pursue their security in somewhat accustomed paths. I say that, not with approval or disapproval but merely as a statement of fact; but I think there is some justification for it in any case, particularly as we are discussing Great Britain. Britain, I think, is justified in feeling that a domination of the entire European Continent by Russia means less security than she has today, even if what she has today is very little indeed.

Second, it is the very expansionist character of what appears at least to be the Russian policy, or at least certain aspects of it, which prevents the working of the United Nations which Mr. Pasvolsky adduces as the only kind of security we can possibly have.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

So I submit that one way in which to retard or halt that chain reaction to which Mr. Pasvolsky refers is in a large measure by concerning ourselves with the territorial expansion of those nations which seem to be going about it in an aggressive fashion. I should not say it is the only way but that it is the essential ingredient of any policy we might follow.

MR. FOX: I want to clarify my own position, just to indicate how completely I agree with Mr. Pasvolsky. I have said that I regarded a grouping of the Western bloc as something which would spontaneously occur when the other thing had failed—when the time had come that we no longer had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, if that time should come. It is true that our policy vis-à-vis Russia has to be firm enough so that the Russians see the need of coming to some agreement. It may be a very long time before we come to the position where we must say that every other way is closed and we must seek regional security. The only circumstances in which we would make that choice would be when the bigger prize had already been lost.

MR. DEKIEWIET: My remarks were not intended to be identified simply with an interest in a present or future security problem. Had a Western bloc been brought about at an earlier moment, it would not have been brought about as a counter to Russian policies. Now there is that danger, and I would agree with you. There might have been, however, an economic undertaking as well as a political undertaking very much more promising than we could possibly expect now. If there is anything that we need at the present moment it is an increase in production under harmonious conditions, and it was the harmony and productive quality of that association that we have lost, which is my principal regret.

MR. PASVOLSKY: I doubt whether it would have worked. There is a very curious limitation there.

MR. DEKIEWIET: It may well be, although I think the prostration of those elements inclined to resist its working would have favored its success.

MR. PRICE: Did Mr. deKiewiet have in mind the rather elaborate national arrangements, like the combined boards and combined chiefs of staff, as the machinery of the Western group?

MR. DEKIEWIET: I had not thought of it institutionally. I am the sort of person who liked very much the suggestion that France and England join, partly because of my liking of the unusual and partly

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

because I think it is one of the responsibilities of statesmen to be creative, and there was an act of creativeness there that appealed to me very much, although what England would have done with its monarchy and France with its republic I would not attempt to answer.

THE ATOMIC BOMB AND SECURITY

MR. WRIGHT: As I understand, with present airplanes it is possible to launch atomic bombs for attack 8,000 miles from their destination. I believe that in that radius practically every large city in the world would be included from the mainland of the United States; and, reciprocally, practically every large city would be included from the Soviet territory.

MR. BRODIE: Yes, I think so. Practically all the great cities of the world are in the Northern Hemisphere, and especially when you consider that, in a Soviet-American conflict, the United States would probably have bases in northern Canada and the Soviet Union in northern Russia and Siberia, there is no question there. That is true even with planes actually in existence, let alone those now being produced, such as the B-36, which has a longer range and larger carrying capacity than the B-29.

MR. PRICE: I was sorry that Mr. Brodie confined most of his remarks to what I believe Mr. Pasvolsky has called "problems of strategy" rather than of security. It seems to me, perhaps because of the atomic bomb, that we are talking much less aggressively about what kind of world machinery we want to create than we were a year ago, or even two or three years ago, perhaps far less than we were four or five years ago.

I thought Mr. Brodie dismissed the possibility of a real international agency to control the bomb a little bit too casually, when he talked about the suspicion that the Russians would have on admitting inspectors from an atomic energy authority, because the only concession that we would be making would be to quit making atomic bombs. After all, we would be making the parallel concession of admitting inspectors to our properties and we have more atomic energy properties now than they have.

That does not dispose of the psychological points that Mr. Hazard mentioned last night. I think there is undoubtedly suspicion of strangers in Russia, and that is a great handicap; but are we, on that account, ready to give up our hope of an international system by which, especially in the field of atomic energy, some international

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

authority is going to deal, not with the governments concerned but with persons or lesser agencies? That is the question that seems to me the nub of the security problem in the future.

MR. BRODIE: The mere fact that we have evolved this plan does not in itself give us cause for great rejoicing. I think it was a great accomplishment of ingenuity. I think it looks like the kind of plan which would be workable, if accepted. I was simply giving reasons for restraint of optimism for its acceptance.

I would also submit that the Lilienthal plan, which, in substance, is the official American proposal, is only the bare outline of a plan; and in filling in that outline numerous great problems arise which, so far as I can see, we have not even explored in our own minds. I don't know how far the State Department has gone on that. I mean such questions, for example, as those relating to the distribution of the primary production plants. But the basic point is that the plan involves large-scale activities within Russia on the part of an international authority, of a nature which our experience thus far in comparable issues certainly does not lead us to have extravagant hope will be acceptable to them.

MR. PRICE: No more to us.

MR. BRODIE: Right, but I think there is a difference of degree there.

MR. WRIGHT: You have this psychological question: Is it possible that the countries that are members of the United Nations or of the atomic development authority could regard that authority as "us" rather than as a foreigner? I suppose the state of Illinois does not regard it as invasion if the federal government establishes a post office or even maintains federal troops here. I must say that the reaction that some of the inhabitants of western Connecticut had to the invasion of the United Nations is not entirely hopeful on this.

MR. BRODIE: And they are all mild men, too.

ROLE OF RETALIATION IN CONTROL

MR. FOX: Mr. Brodie suggested that defense can be thought of only in terms of deterrents. There has been considerable objection in certain quarters to erecting a system of atomic energy control on the substratum of retaliation. It occurs to me that we might clarify the discussion if we distinguished between a system which, in its first instance, simply depends on a broad distribution of bombs so that if one party shoots them off he will be sure to get a lot of them back

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

that afternoon—what you might call a planned system for retaliation—and a system which sets up a true international control but keeps in the background as an incentive for not permitting the international control to break down the deterrent possibilities of ultimate retaliation if there is a gross violation or if the scheme defaults.

When we are talking about the United Nations in general, we keep saying that, so long as the great powers are in agreement, the scheme will work. We don't always ask why they should agree. One reason why they jointly ought to have an incentive to keep agreeing is that if they don't agree there are certain deterrent possibilities that will be invoked. The penalty for noncollective action is mutual destruction, and it is especially mutual destruction with the invention of the atomic bomb. Any prolonged war would be sure to have it used, whether there were any bombs in existence on the first day or not. Therefore, it seems to me to make some sense, if you are going to set up any effective atomic energy control scheme, to build up incentives along with all the other things one tries to harness up. It is simply another way by which you use the balance of power to underwrite the collective system.

I think it may very well be possible to have a system which permits no bombs anywhere and still is made more likely to work because it was organized so that in the event of its breakdown there would be some swift and effective punitive action against the violator and in the event of its breakdown there would be a stock pile of bombs created on the side of the nonaggressors rather more quickly than on the side of the aggressors.

MR. WILBUR W. WHITE: Wouldn't it be better to have that stock pile in existence under control of, let us say, the United Nations?

MR. FOX: I think that is a real question, one that ought to be discussed. I think I can see certain dangers in having it in existence under the control of the United Nations, the chief one being that the bombs have to be located somewhere; and, since they have to be located somewhere, the phrase "under the control of the United Nations" simply masks the fact that you have set up a system which depends for its operation on a balanced distribution of bombs among the great powers.

MR. GURIAN: Permit me, first, to enumerate some points about which there is, I think, no disagreement.

First, I think that the atomic-bomb weapon has such an enormous destructive power that it cannot be compared with any other weap-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

on. To put it into terms of Hegelian logic, in this case quantity has developed into a change of quality. I think this point is beyond dispute.

The second point, which is perhaps less accepted, is the fact that at the present time only the United States can use atomic bombs. I think that can be taken for granted.

Third, this situation will not continue to exist; after a few years—I don't know whether after three years or after ten years—other powers will be able to produce atomic bombs.

Therefore, the practical question is simple: What must be done in the time between now and the year in which other powers, particularly Russia, will be able to produce atomic bombs? That is the decisive question. How may we use this force for the salvation of humanity?

I am afraid that even the best-worked-out proposals of international control do not have in themselves the guaranty that they will be even accepted. I think it would be somewhat dangerous to assume that all powers will act as "responsible powers." There will perhaps be powers which will believe that they can wait until they have atomic bombs. I don't know whether, for instance, Russia, or perhaps a minor group which would be able to produce atomic bombs, would be impressed by the threat of punitive action. I am afraid that the term "punitive action" has become comparatively meaningless in the age of the atomic bomb.

Could we not make the following calculations? Someone starts an atomic war; the start is so effective that the punitive action would be perhaps impossible, or at least would become extremely difficult. Therefore, we are in a most serious situation unless one makes the optimistic assumption that all powers must necessarily agree and that all men will act like reasonable beings.

What can be done about this situation? It is extremely unlikely, I think, that the Baruch plan will be accepted in its decisive parts, and how will you compel those powers which are not willing to accept this plan? Will you start against them in a public war in order to impose upon them acceptance of such a plan? Therefore, would it not be necessary to create something to be popularly known as world government? Is it not the single possible solution? I personally do not believe that, but I ask the question.

Mr. Brodie mentioned in his remarks the book review which Chancellor Hutchins published in the *New York Times* and which is

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

written from the point of view of world government. The Chancellor championed the argument that only world government can help. I cannot see how that would help very much, because, in order to establish world government, one has to compel the powers which are not willing to accept the authority of world government to accept this authority; therefore world government would be nothing else than, to use a historical term, *Pax Romana*. World government would be possible only if the power which has the monopoly of the atomic bomb would really use this monopoly, or would threaten to use this monopoly, against governments which would not accept world government.

Therefore, I think the question by which we are faced is simple. From a reasonable point of view it would be ideal for all powers to agree; but, unfortunately, the reasonable point of view does not prevail, and I cannot see any other solution than the very precarious and dangerous solution of the balance-of-power system. The atomic bomb has not changed the basic features of the world policies. The balance-of-power system is nothing particularly new, and I cannot see any other way out than the application of that system, perhaps with some pious sentences, with some application of collective security in order to impress public opinion, which likes such statements.

STABILITY OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

MR. WRIGHT: May I ask Mr. Gurian whether he thinks the invention of the atomic bomb has rendered the balance of power more stable or less stable than it was before?

MR. GURIAN: I would say less stable, more precarious; but at least I can see the working of the balance-of-power system. I cannot say that this balance-of-power system will guarantee eternal peace; it has not guaranteed lasting peace in the past. But I cannot see, on the other hand, how the Baruch plan will work; and I cannot see, if one accepts the criticism of Chancellor Hutchins, how his belief in world government can be realized. As I wrote to him, I believe that humanity will rather destroy itself than accept world government.

MR. BRODIE: I would like to take up some of your points in inverse order. First, about balance of power, I would add that it is not only likely to be less stable but that it has become a much more ambiguous concept; that is, the old calculus of what constitutes power largely falls to the ground. Certainly, industrial strength does not mean a great deal if you assume that the industry of a nation will be the first

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

thing to go, that is, if that assumption is valid. Size of population ceases to have the importance it had before. Various other factors which it has lately become fashionable to add up in a calculus of power have to be considered completely anew.

About world government, I think a great deal can be said against the idea. I will confine myself to only one remark. I think that the preaching of world government as a solution to the problem is really a rejection of the problem, because even the proponents concede, as Mr. Hutchins did in that article you mentioned, that this is, after all, a long-term proposal, not a short-term one. I am not interested in whether or not it is valid even for the long term. I am thinking only of the proposition which I think the late Lord Keynes originated, that in the long term we are all dead. I would now add to that: In the short term we may all be killed. So it seems to me much more profitable to consider solutions which, if possible at all, can be attained within the next two decades, let us say.

In connection with your remarks that a world government could be attained at present only by conquest, I would say that at present only two powers appear to have anything like the strength necessary to effect such conquest, and of those two only one appears prepared to carry through with the administration and policing of conquered territories, especially if those territories are world-wide. It is prepared and to some degree equipped to do so. I obviously do not have in mind the United States, which is having trouble enough staffing its occupation armies in Germany and Japan.

Finally, your initial remark about the necessity of finding some kind of solution before other countries, especially Russia, have the bomb. I think that Mr. Fox observed yesterday in his speech that the possession of the bomb by us, so long as we are obviously not ready to use it, is the reverse of an advantage in bargaining relative to a security system.

MR. WHITE: Mr. Brodie, you were talking about the balance of power. Isn't it true that what you said about the balance of power is the case only if there is a monopoly of the bombs? If the bombs are fairly equally distributed among the great powers, won't they tend to offset each other in terms of destruction of each other's cities, populations, and so on, much as high-powered air power has done?

MR. BRODIE: Except that under the old system you could always depend on a certain duration of time, a rather long time, before your instruments could take decisive effect. Even if you had a monopoly

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

of air power, you could not depend on bringing a great power to its knees within a term of weeks; you would need a lot more time, during which all sorts of other things could happen.

MR. WHITE: No, but some people said you did have a monopoly of air power.

MR. BRODIE: At present we have the testimony of experience. In the latter stages of the war the Allied superiority in the air over Germany was so extreme that one could almost speak of monopoly of air power. You could never expect a war to begin with a greater monopoly. Yet it took a pretty long time to destroy her industry, even if we consider only the period during which the most effective bombing was carried on—which was the last year. During that year a nation might conceivably, if it had the resources, be able to marshal those resources and resist the attack. Where you have a situation in which the decisive phases of the war may take only days or hours, you have something new and almost completely unknown. I don't think I would approach a solution of what would happen under such circumstances by a study of past situations. One would have to start anew to think it through.

MR. WHITE: My question was this: If both sides have the power to do that, aren't you on Monday of the second week of a war starting with two states that are still of relatively equal strength even as they were the week before; though, of course, at the later date all cities and all industries are gone in both states?

MR. BRODIE: That would perhaps be true if you assume that the power which is the first one hit will nevertheless retain the ability to hit back. Of course, that itself is in some question; in fact, it is one of the basic questions. I was saying, even if you imagine a situation in which both sides have, let us say, their cities wiped out, you certainly don't have equality. You have all kinds of factors entering into the situation, such as relative degrees of panic and disintegration. In one case, you might have a readiness to capitulate on the part of those who remain who have the authority to do so; on the other side, you may have a readiness to conduct guerrilla warfare, which would require an invasion.

MR. WRIGHT: Is Mr. White suggesting that we have a stable balance of power, because it would be a stable balance of power after all the cities of the world had been wiped out? A peace that contemplated that presently all the cities of the world were going to be wiped out would not be a very satisfactory peace.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

I was very much interested in Mr. Brodie's introduction of the time element, which seems to me the crucial thing. The problem is to make it impossible for any government to prepare for atomic war without giving unequivocal evidence of its intentions and to prolong to a maximum the period of time prior to the possible outbreak of an atomic war after that unequivocal signal of its intentions. If you can create conditions so that it would be absolutely impossible for any government to start an atomic war until at least a year after there had been some unequivocal signal that the government intended to start such a war, measures could probably be devised to prevent the war altogether. On the other hand, if that period of time is something on the order of ten minutes or an hour, the world will be in a continuous state of jitters, very hazardous to peace.

It seems to me that that consideration is a major argument for trying to eliminate all atomic bombs in being. If atomic bombs, as Mr. Fox said, are in being anywhere, they are in some country, and that always presents the possibility of that country's seizing them, whatever its obligations may be, and starting an atomic-bomb war immediately. In other words, if atomic bombs are in being, that period of time is reduced to the minimum. If, however, you can assure that there are no such bombs and, consequently, that a long process of mining uranium, developing plants, manufacturing fissionable materials, and assembling bombs is necessary before an atomic-bomb attack could be launched, then you've got a fairly long period of time.

That seems to me the center of the Baruch report. If the operations all over the world which have anything to do with atomic energy, including mining uranium and operating plants which produce fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, are in the hands of an international authority, there could be no preparation for atomic war without a seizure of mines or plants from that international authority, and such seizure would give the unequivocal signal which I referred to. Even if some country did seize all the plants of the international authority in its territory, still it would be a considerable time before it could make atomic bombs.

MR. CHARLES E. MERRIAM: What is this unequivocal signal they would flash? How could you be sure they would flash it until the day after?

MR. WRIGHT: I would say it would be impossible for any government to seize a plant or a mine which was owned and operated by an

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

international authority with personnel largely foreigners and keep it dark for any length of time. If it were a plant operated in the middle of Russia by American and other non-Soviet citizens, I would think that the news of the seizure of that plant by the Russian government would leak out very rapidly.

MR. JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE: There is another problem in connection with this distribution. If you had bombs distributed in equal quantities among the powers as a means of insuring a balance of power, you would put a disproportionate advantage on a power that would be ruthless, that has a disregard for life, that has a disregard for property, that would be willing to take action the way Germany did in invading Russia or as Japan did in attacking Pearl Harbor. The more responsible governments would be at a disadvantage compared with a country that is ruthless.

MR. FOX: I simply want to add a footnote to your remark. There are two kinds of violations. One would be the seizure of the primary plutonium plants, in which case the technical problem would be to try to figure out whether the plutonium that was in the pipeline of production was enough to produce quickly a stock pile of bombs to cause real trouble. The other would be the illicit development of completely independent production from uranium extraction to plutonium production, which would not involve seizure of the atomic development authority's plutonium plants. The period of grace which might be vouchsafed us after the unmistakable warning signal had been given might be different in those two cases, but I think we ought to keep them separated.

MR. WRIGHT: You mean in the second case that there has been an evasion—illegitimate mining and manufacture.

MR. FOX: Yes. It seems to me an admirable feature of the Lilienthal-Baruch proposals that it gives to the atomic development authority a monopoly of all kinds of atomic energy activities. Mere performance of uranium extraction and any of these other things convicts the power.

MR. BRODIE: I think you can put that another way and say that the great merit of the plan is that it minimizes the inspection problem, which otherwise appeared to a great many persons, especially some of the physical scientists, as an insuperable one. However, it does not by any means obliterate the inspection problem. A very sizable inspection function remains, which has to be considered when we attempt to evaluate its acceptability. Also, the minimizing of the

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

inspection problem is at the cost of requiring nations to permit foreign agencies—call them “international” if you will, but nevertheless looked upon as foreign—to carry on large exploratory, industrial, and even policing activities within its country, which is an enormous abatement of sovereignty. However desirable such abatement may appear in the abstract, the question is: Is a nation like Russia prepared to relinquish that much of its authority?

MR. WRIGHT: Would a nation resent more having an industrial operation carried on by an international authority in its territory than having a corps of inspectors in all its plants, factories, and mines?

MR. BRODIE: I think not. I think that is why the plan has such merit. Obviously, an agency whose sole job is inspection has saddled upon it a function which is bound to result in innumerable frictions and dissatisfactions on the part of both sides, and, as I say, the great merit of the plan is that it minimizes those sources of friction.

RELIABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

MR. HAZARD: Mr. Brodie and most commentators talk about the atomic bomb in terms of production and refer to inspection and what not. Up until the atomic bomb, there was some reliance upon what we used to call “international law.” All conferences after the last war that discussed problems of armament talked in terms of limitation of armament and nonuse of armaments. Have we entirely passed beyond that stage?

MR. BRODIE: I believe the best observation on that was contained in a recent article of the *London Economist*, which, unfortunately, I do not have here, but it ran something like this: It is not that nations can be expected to violate their word. In this case they would probably keep their word, but in an issue so critical the probability is not enough. Each nation has to be sure, or as sure as human ingenuity permits it to be, that there is no violation or evasion. In other words, the evasion or violation has to be practically *impossible*, not merely *improbable*, and that is a very different situation from what we have had before.

Incidentally, as far as I can recall, the only really effective disarmament programs of the past have pertained to naval disarmaments, and those, of course, are units which are extremely difficult to hide, battleships especially.

MR. HAZARD: There have been some relatively effective agreements not to use bacteriological warfare.

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

MR. BRODIE: Or gas. I think there is another issue there, especially in relation to gas. You have a very different order of military utility between gas and atomic bombs. I know there happens to be a very marked difference of opinion in respect to gas within the armed services themselves. There are officers who believe that, if gas had been used in the recent war, it would have been a decisive weapon, particularly if used by us against the Japanese. On the other hand, I also know that the policy-makers were persuaded that they had other instruments which were not barred by law, such as tanks of gelatinized gasoline, etc., which were at least as effective on the weight-for-weight basis. That is, an airplane would be just as effective carrying so many pounds of that material as it would be carrying an equal number of pounds of gas. Also, we know that in the case of gas you have such things as gas masks and decontamination units, etc. In other words, you have not only the ability to retaliate but also actual protection.

I am not discounting the value of the convention which prohibited gas. I think that was decisive in the sense that it was the element which crystallized the existing balance arguing against its use; but without that balance I don't think the convention would have been observed, because, after all, a good many legal requirements were not observed when they did not fall under that character of equality.

MR. WRIGHT: I think experience with disarmament conventions emphasizes the time element which I referred to. A capital ship takes several years to make, and it is very difficult to conceal the fact that one has been started. Consequently, there is a signal that the convention is being violated long before the capital ship is constructed, a period of a year or two. With such a long lag between the known violation and the maturing of the results of violation, there probably won't be any violation at all. On the other hand, when it was a question of disarmament affecting size of contingents, budgetary expenditures, small arms, airplanes, the lag would be less; and the disarmament conferences recognized that an effective system of inspection was necessary before they could expect such limitations to be accepted. There was a great deal of discussion at the disarmament conference of 1932 in regard to setting up a system of inspection which would prolong as much as possible that period of time.

MR. HAZARD: I take it from what you both have said that there is no possibility whatever in the Soviet proposal, which is just this: disarmament plus agreement not to use.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. BRODIE: It seems pretty transparent that that proposal, and I think it is reasonable on their part, is, in effect, a proposal that we disarm ourselves of bombs before we go on with this negotiating.

MR. HAZARD: We have to agree at the same time never to use them.

MR. BRODIE: May I add a footnote to what Mr. Wright said: rumors before the war that Japan was secretly building a lot of naval vessels turned out not to be true.

MR. GURIAN: The atomic bomb is a deadly weapon, but previous struggles among nations for power continue, even in an intensified degree. Would it, therefore, not be somewhat dangerous (though I think Mr. Brodie proved his point) to accept simply as a consequence of the atomic weapon the fact that other weapons, sea power and so on, are less important today than they ever were before? Such observations are surely correct from the point of view of atomic war, but from the point of view of continuation of traditional policies which you observe today, I think such observations cannot be completely proved. Therefore, we observe that traditional power policies continue, even intensified and poisoned by the threat of atomic war.

A second question: What would happen if we should, for instance, hear tomorrow or in a few months a radio broadcast in which it would be said, "Stalin has received a group of physicists and has given them five million rubles for discovery of a new, improved method for production of atomic bombs"? Would our whole discussion here be somewhat out of date? Are not all these proposals based on the assumption that we have time, that we have a monopoly?

MR. BRODIE: I think in regard to the latter question that it is likely that a radical change in thinking would take place in this country. I think there would be an even greater feeling of urgency and even of desperation.

In regard to your first point, however, I think there are two things to be said. One is that, even if the world happily finds some way of actually prohibiting production of the atomic bomb, that in itself does not necessarily furnish a guaranty that there will be no more war. In other words, you have an isolation, an insulation, a sealing-off of the bomb, and other things remain pretty much as they are. It seems to me that the military leader today has to worry himself about two extremely different kinds of military activities.

In line also with that point, I think it was in 1794 that the Earl of Stanhope pointed out in a letter to one of Pitt's friends that the

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

recent invention of the steamship—notice that that was considerably before Fulton produced his “Clermont,” although Stanhope also had been experimenting with steam—had nullified the purpose of Britain’s concern with who possessed the Low Countries, because the possession of the Low Countries had meant one thing under sail and they meant something entirely different under steam. Notice, also, that Britain did not for over a hundred years abandon the policy of being concerned with who possessed the Low Countries. I am not implying that her policy was backward or stupid; it had some justification even after steam had progressed not only into the merchant marine but also into the navy. But, nevertheless, you do have that tendency for pursuit of security to follow traditional paths, whether or not they become absurd. This suggests that we might take stock of our foreign policy in respect to distant bases and see what it is that we are striving for which means a lot of friction with other countries but which may have no intrinsic benefit in terms of strategic use for the future.

THE LILIENTHAL-BARUCH PLAN

MR. PRICE: Regarding this time period that Mr. Wright and Mr. Brodie both talked about, it seems to me it is worth remarking that, as long as there is going to be any peaceful use of atomic energy on a national basis, the time limit for conversion of plutonium or U-235 to use as weapons is very short indeed. If, however, you have the international authority, as proposed in the Lilienthal-Baruch report, with this denaturing process, which scientists set great store by, you very greatly increase the time limit and decrease the danger.

There are a lot of arguments about this. There are those who are in favor of an international authority if you can get it effected. How many share Mr. Gurian’s belief that you cannot get it effected? It is difficult not only in Russia but also in the United States. After all, we have had one senator say that this is a gift from God to the only peace-loving nation of the world, and we have had one or two other congressmen introduce measures that would provide that, even if we had a United Nations agreement, we would go on letting the Army control our atomic bombs. Obviously, that is a temporary political tactic, but I can imagine how that would look to Russia, even if they weren’t suspicious.

Do other people here think the hope is utterly past for getting acceptance in, say, the next two or three years? Is there any hope of getting an interchange of scientists between countries? Mr. Hazard

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

set considerable store last night on increasing the possibilities of peace by not attacking the problems directly but by collateral means. I was going to add U.N.E.S.C.O. If you have an understanding among physical scientists and atomic physicists, I think you considerably increase the possibility of an international administration that would let a mixed personnel in different countries increase this time limit to a point where it would become practicable to put some reliance on it.

MR. WRIGHT: Atomic scientists have given major consideration to this question of increasing the time lag, and many of them have reached the conclusion that, with a system such as the Lilienthal-Baruch report contemplates, a lag of nine months or a year could be assured, but without international operation the lag would be very short.

They do not attach too much importance to the denaturing process. The statement on that in the Lilienthal report received exaggerated attention in the press and a modifying explanation was subsequently issued by the State Department.

It seems to me that the potentialities of atomic energy for peaceful power purposes is the crux of the technical problem. If atomic energy did not have such potentialities, the technical problem would be much simpler. If a large number of power plants based on atomic energy exist throughout the world, there is bound to be a certain danger; but atomic scientists think that, even in that situation, a time of nine months to a year could be assured after an illegal seizure before bombs could be made.

That technical question is, of course, distinct from the question of the political possibility of successful negotiation. That is the really serious problem. One difficulty of negotiation inheres in this, that no matter what is agreed on, the Soviet Union and other states can only rely upon the good faith of the United States for disclosing what we already have. A system of operation and inspection is possible, so that we would not have to rely on the good faith of the Soviet Union at all, but the Soviet Union would always have to rely on our good faith that we had not stored away a hundred or so atomic bombs in some mine or cave which could never be discovered by any inspection. We have the job of making the Soviet people believe that we are not lying when we say we have actually given over all the atomic bombs we have to the international authority.

MR. FOX: I don't know that it is so, but I think it is quite possible, that the use of standard accounting techniques at these various

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

plants may be such that we could demonstrate even to the most suspicious that we have accounted for all the fissionable materials. I have heard rather responsible scientists, who had important policy-making positions in connection with the production of U-235 and plutonium, say that they thought that, with the opening of the books, with the showing of where the material is by not only quantitative bookkeeping but also financial bookkeeping, and by the combination, you could demonstrate that, within a handful of bombs, they were all accounted for and that you might be able to get over that hump.

But then there is another hump that I think might be even more difficult and that is that the plan has to begin by having the Soviet Union permit the world to find out whether or not they have any large uranium or thorium deposits. They know that we have adequate deposits; it does not make any difference whether any more are discovered or not; within our territory there are adequate deposits. The world does not know whether or not within Soviet territory there are adequate deposits. We ask them to make their greatest contribution first by telling us, perhaps, that they don't have anything, that they are helpless.

MR. WRIGHT: The geologists think that it would be possible to discover the opening of any new mines by periodic aerial survey. Of course, each country would have to admit the international authority to examine all existing mines.

MR. McMAHON: I am inclined to agree with Mr. Gurian and Mr. Brodie that world government is not a relevant solution to our immediate problem. The world is not ready for it today. I doubt also that the Baruch proposal would find universal acceptance. The proposal involves a sacrifice of national sovereignty. Are the Russians ready for such a sacrifice?

In addition to conflicts of nationalism today, we have conflicts of internationalism. We are not one world in the sense of having a community of ideals. The differences between Russia and the West at the political and ideological levels are serious obstacles to the formulation of a truly international order.

Should we therefore abandon support of the Baruch proposal? I do not think so, but we should not attempt to put all our eggs in one basket. We should keep other alternatives in mind, alternatives which admittedly are not so good in theory.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

I disagree with Mr. Gurian over the impossibility of retaliation. It seems to me that, even if cities are destroyed through atomic bombing, retaliation can be effected through installations outside of these cities. And this power of retaliation may have some weight as a deterrent to the potential aggressor.

We might effect an agreement with all other nations not to use the bomb, including the commitment to act in concert against the nation which violates the pact. This is admittedly not a perfect solution to the problem of the atomic bomb, but it is about the best possible in this era of power politics.

MR. BRODIE: In all the remarks which have been made concerning what to do with the Lilienthal plan now that we have it, I don't think anyone would suppose for a moment that we should not try earnestly and patiently to secure its adoption. Of course, we have to analyze the minimum requirements inherent in that plan and decide what we can afford to yield without yielding the essence of the plan.

I think it is heartening, first, that the reception in this country, including the reception on the part of Congress, has been, on the whole, distinctly favorable. I think it is also heartening that thus far we have no categorical rejection on the part of the Russians; as a matter of fact, we have certain comments of positive value. But one other point arises in connection with that plan, which Professor Wright referred to briefly, and that is the denaturing process. Mr. Baruch in his speech before the Atomic Energy Commission stated that the effectiveness of denaturing has been somewhat exaggerated in the public press. I think that, if it has been exaggerated, the fault is not of the press but of government releases and of the Lilienthal report itself. I would say that the denaturing idea is basic in that report, and what we do not now know is how effective it really is. If it should turn out that the Lilienthal committee was too optimistic about it, then we should have to reconsider the question that has apparently been abandoned, namely, the question of whether the world can afford to use atomic energy at all. In other words, if denaturing is not effective, then no activity is safe. The Lilienthal plan has as its basic component the distinction between safe and dangerous activity, dangerous activity being devoted exclusively to the international authority and safe ones to private agencies.

MR. WRIGHT: Shortly after the Lilienthal report was published the State Department put out a statement by several scientists, giving a more correct appraisal of the value of denaturing. It takes longer to

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

make an atom bomb from denatured material than it does to make it from pure U-235 or plutonium, but it takes less time to make an atom bomb from denatured material than from natural uranium. This report indicated that no denaturing process could be safe in an absolute sense. The material could always be "un-denatured."

WORLD UNITY

MR. MERRIAM: The discussion of the Lilienthal-Baruch report seemed to display a negative attitude, as if by some mechanisms, tricks, or skills you are going to drive war out of the world through the atomic bomb. There is another factor—certainly in line with Lilienthal's view and probably also with Baruch's—of a positive and constructive nature. That is to say, if you have control over atomic energy, which you are developing all the time, then it is also possible to consider its peacetime uses.

A world group, which knows more about atomic energy than any other group and which is disposed to favor not the destruction of fissionable material but its development, could be a tremendous agency for world government. They could become, if they had the facilities for research and were promoting peacetime uses instead of trying to eliminate nuclear energies altogether, a center of human interest, rather than expressing the negative desire to prevent the use of a destructive weapon. Everyone knows that the nuclear energies are only in the making. Here we have a group working together: it is our agency, it is a common agency, it is a common instrument through which we not only prevent war but promote human happiness and tend to elevate the standards of living. They have the knowledge, and they could be given the power through licensing authority and through other encouraging devices to build up a positive peacetime program. That would give you an element without which I don't see how you will ever get security, namely, some notion of community, of common interest, of common purpose.

I don't see how you will ever guarantee security in the world on the negative basis of getting such an elaborate system of nets that nobody can break through. There must be certain common ideals and common interests in the minds of all. You tie this all in, in an unprecedented way, first with the negative establishment of difficulties against the making of destructive war but also with the positive promotion of the welfare of man. I think perhaps that is not the common view of the Lilienthal-Baruch plan, but it is implicit in it; and it pro-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

vides a basis by and through which we might develop not a world government but a form of desirable common world action.

MR. WRIGHT: What are the conditions under which the people of each country will regard the world community as an "in-group"?

MR. FARIS: What is gained in the world if you say to a country going to war—and there would always be some conditions under which some country would be willing to do that—"You must not use the atomic bomb"? We have plenty of other weapons, and you can be just as dead with one weapon as with another. The United Nations, at the present moment, is like an attempt to unite the Catholic church with the Fundamentalist Baptists. You might get a paper union, but you would have no real common purpose. The motive of fear of destruction has never seemed to be very effective. It seems to me you have this much longer task of trying to get a common attitude toward the world.

MR. BRODIE: I think there would be at least one gain, and that is that under the atomic bomb, assuming reciprocal use on the part of at least two belligerents, you have a condition which you have never had before, namely, that even the victor would suffer far greater destruction and devastation than any defeated country has ever suffered in recorded history. We have just passed through the most terrible war in history, and certainly the picture of appalling destruction is very vivid in our minds. On the other hand, we know that various great nations which participated in that war were practically untouched, especially our own country; and not only is that a benefit to ourselves, but it enables us to help our less fortunate allies and even to help the defeated. I grant you, the ability does not necessarily argue that it will be done, but I think it is there and that some measure of assistance will undoubtedly be forthcoming.

With the atomic bomb you have a condition under which war becomes universally destructive. You might say that that margin of difference is not enough to give you great anxiety concerning the elimination of the bomb, but I think it is an important margin of difference.

DISARMAMENT

MR. FARIS: It seemed to me that doing away with the atomic bomb is just one rather big factor of the problem of disarmament. Why don't you talk about disarmament in general and see what the difficulties are there?

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

MR. BRODIE: I would fall back on the argument that, in general, and I think especially in this case, you have a greater promise of success if you press for limited objectives. Our history of the pursuit of disarmament in general has not been an especially fortunate one. It was to me very interesting to see how the idea was more or less evaded in the United Nations Charter. They speak of limitation of armaments and so on, but with nothing like the fervor that was present in the League Covenant. Some of the nations which disarmed were stung by that experience, or at least felt they were, which is the important thing.

In the case of the atomic bomb we have not only a limited objective but a new and cosmic force which we have reason to suppose will cause nations to feel differently concerning its limitation from the way they have felt concerning the limitation of more orthodox arms, and I think the reception, at least in this country, is indicative of that fact. In other words, our problem is "merely" that of making the Russians see it as we do.

MR. WRIGHT: I would go further and suggest that an effective elimination of the atomic bomb would be an elimination of war. The atomic bomb is a decisive weapon. With the knowledge of atomic weapons general, any country that starts a war by traditional methods will know that the war will probably develop into an atomic war. If the anxiety to avoid atomic war has been sufficient to achieve effective measures to prevent a sudden use of atomic weapons, it might be sufficient to induce measures adequate to prevent war altogether.

MR. BRODIE: I think that is true, and I think that what you have there is the case of being able to have your cake and eat it, too; that is, if we succeeded in eliminating the production of the atomic bomb universally, we would have that benefit, namely, the removal of immediate fear plus the benefit that the deterrent value of the bomb is still there.

MR. WRIGHT: Everybody today will recognize that any war which starts is very likely to develop into an atomic war. No one can hope to eliminate the use of atomic bombs after war has started, and that thought may have deterrent influence upon the starting of wars. One can hope to prevent a war's beginning as an atomic war. One can create that time lag so that countries are not beset with the anxiety that an atomic war will spring up overnight; and that will be, I think, a great achievement. But statesmen must examine all the conditions of peace and must create the positive conditions of co-opera-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

tion which Professor Merriam referred to if they want to eliminate the danger of war. Only by success in that enterprise can atomic war be surely eliminated.

MR. PASVOLSKY: That's right; but let's emphasize that distinction you have just made. I think it is a tremendously important distinction. A war started with pitchforks can end in an atomic war. The elimination of the use of atomic energy as a weapon is not going to eliminate war. Control over the use of atomic energy as a weapon may, if the control is sufficiently drastic—and on that score I have some doubts—prevent the beginning of an atomic war, may prevent an atomic war at the outset. That distinction, I think, is terribly important and ought to be emphasized over and over again.

MR. WRIGHT: I think it is very important because if you had no control, so that there was a general fear that an atomic war might begin at any moment, that general fear would itself be a factor that would tend to begin this war. If you create such a state of anxiety in the world, then at every international tension that arises, one power or another will think: "Well, the country with which I am having a dispute is likely tomorrow morning to start bombing me. Whoever starts an atomic war has a certain advantage, and therefore I had better start it now."

I think if you relied on nothing but the fear of retaliation with no international control, the invention of the atomic bomb would have greatly increased the probability of a war's starting.

MR. PASVOLSKY: You may even have the situation which happened in Japan, when certain irresponsible elements in Japan forced the war because they thought they had something with which they could finish it quickly.

STRATEGIC INFLUENCE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB

MR. WHITE: It seems to me that the quantity, especially the time, in this matter is so important. I have seen the statement somewhere that the United States is now able to manufacture bombs at the rate of one a week at the cost of ten million dollars a bomb. If this is the case it would be some time before there would be any danger of general atomic war. I have heard scientists say that the cost of destroying a city with atomic bombs is about one-fifth what it was with T.N.T. bombs. It seems to me the whole problem is overdramatized. Why can't we find out something about these time-and-cost questions?

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

MR. WRIGHT: General Arnold in his contribution to *One World or None* (p. 26) put the figure about one-sixth, with the high cost of the first atomic bombs. He figured that the man-hours of labor in making planes and T.N.T. "blockbusters" were about one-fiftieth of the man-hours in the enemy assets destroyed, or one-sixth of the man-hours in military assets destroyed. With the atomic bomb, those ratios would be less than one-sixth as great. In other words, with each man-hour of labor in making planes and atomic bombs you could destroy over three hundred man-hours of labor, over thirty-six man-hours of which would be of direct military importance.

I may say that prior to the T.N.T. blockbuster that ratio between the man-hours of cost and the man-hours of destruction very seldom exceeded one to one. With the decreasing cost of making atomic bombs, the figure may go up to the order of one to a thousand. That indicates the difference that the atomic bomb has brought in the relative power of the offensive and the defensive.

MR. BRODIE: Even assuming that the statement is correct, that we can make them at the rate of one a week, the United States, after all, has not devoted any great part of its industrial manpower resources to the production of those bombs. So far as I can see, the only limiting factor after raw materials, in which we have an advantage, is the amount of resources the country is willing to devote to that. The bombs can be stock-piled indefinitely, so I think one has to consider the situation which occurs at the end of, say, a twenty-year accumulation period; and then, when one considers the disparity, not so much in terms of cost as in terms of the airplanes and their trained crews necessary to do the job, I think we come out with a very different kind of answer.

As I recall, the Army Air Forces have stated that it would take something on the order of 210 B-29's to do with T.N.T. bombs what 1 B-29 did with an atomic bomb at Hiroshima. That suggests ruling out certain tactical considerations, that suggests that the 210 planes—and I think that is a very conservative figure—which would have been necessary to do that job with T.N.T. bombs, if armed with atomic bombs would be able to do that to 210 Hiroshimas in the same element of time.

MR. PRICE: Plus the guided-missile possibility, instead of airplanes.

MR. BRODIE: The Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy has developed some so-called guided missiles, some of which depend on infra-red

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

rays and some on radar, which are used for short-range bombing. It is no secret now. Hansen Baldwin had an article describing several types. Possibly that kind of technique might be devoted to very long-range rockets. And also we have to consider the fact, which I did not mention, that, with the atomic bomb, you have a premium on the development of long-range rockets such as you have never had before—and from the point of view of physics it is theoretically possible to build, even with existing fuel, a rocket capable of a few thousand miles' range.

That brings up a question that is related to what Mr. Pasvolsky was saying, though in a more direct way; that is: How much can you isolate the atomic bomb from other weapons? Mr. Baruch and Mr. Gromyko both referred also to other weapons of mass destruction; but, in terms of the atomic bomb itself, one of the distinctions we always have to bear in mind is the distinction between multilateral use and monopoly use or multilateral possession and monopoly possession. One of the factors which enter into that calculation and that distinction is not only who possesses the bombs but who possesses the best instruments for delivering them. I should imagine a nation which had, let's say, four thousand-mile rockets which had the capacity of being guided accurately would be in a somewhat better position than a nation which depended on aircraft. How much better depends on all kinds of variables.

In connection with the distinction between monopoly as against multilateral possession, it seems to me that in one case you have a clear instance not only of lack of deterrent value but also of a positive incentive to aggression; and that is something we always have to bear in mind in relation to any minimum requirements for an international system. The worst kind of system—one which would be worse than no system—would be one in which an aggressive state could by evasion gain a monopoly; and in such a case aggression would be far cheaper than it has ever been in the past, and the kind of calculation which Mr. Pasvolsky referred to on the part of the Japanese war lords would be not only much more likely to be made but also would be accurate.

I would like to say one more word on the Lilienthal report. Not only the board in its report but also various people who set themselves up as its protagonists have argued that the great merit of the plan is that it also combines with the inspection function the positive function of research and distribution of the benefits of peacetime use.

DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SECURITY

It seems to me we are justified in solacing ourselves with the fact that atomic energy does furnish promise of peacetime uses, but I think we should not deceive ourselves by it. It seems to me, if we accept the most optimistic predictions on what it will mean in welfare, in terms of combating disease as well as in producing energy, power, and heat, that the whole sum total of it is unimportant compared to the fact that we have the material of which a few pounds can blow up a whole city. I agree with Mr. Pasvolsky that we've got to consider the security angle first and the welfare angle only as it fits into it.

MR. WRIGHT: The economic value of atomic energy would vary greatly in different sections of the world. At present costs it is quite unlikely that atomic energy could compete against coal and hydroelectric power in the United States. There are other sections of the world, such as central Brazil and Siberia, which are lacking in coal and hydroelectric power, where it is quite possible that it could compete.

That would undoubtedly raise an important question of the balance of power, if you allowed an international authority to operate nuclear power installations only where they are most economical. These nuclear power installations are somewhat dangerous; they could be seized, and perhaps within a year or so enough material could be extracted to make atomic bombs. So the question of economic utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is inevitably linked up with the security and balance-of-power situation.

PART III
REGIONAL POLICIES

THE FAR EAST

By JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE¹

THE United States was brought into World War II through its having been attacked in the Pacific; it bore the brunt of carrying the war in the Pacific to a hard-won victory; and the American people were brought to realize that their future national security and prosperity require that henceforth the United States must assume a major responsibility for establishing and maintaining peace, order, and stability in the Pacific area.

Many of those responsibilities have arisen out of specific commitments into which we entered during the course of the war or at the time of the Japanese surrender. Our commitments include those of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and our promise to the Chinese government to assist it in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops in China. In the ten months and more which have elapsed since the surrender, some of our commitments have been fulfilled, and favorable progress has been made toward the carrying-out of others. China has become repossessed of its territory which had been under Japanese control, including Formosa; the task of disarming and evacuating Japanese forces from China is well in hand; an excellent beginning has been made toward effecting the military and moral disarmament of Japan; only in Korea, owing to factors beyond our control, has progress toward the goal of an independent Korea been slow.

The carrying-out of American policy in the Far East will involve for many years a heavy commitment of American military and naval forces in that area, as well as in the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii. We are about to conclude military assistance and base agreements with the Philippine Republic. American forces will continue to garrison Japan until the purposes of the Allied occupation are achieved; they will remain in Korea until arrangements are reached for ultimate Korean independence and in China until the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese forces are effected. Japan's surrender has left

¹ Department of State.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the United States and Russia the strongest military powers in the Far East.

The carrying-out of American policy will also involve a heavy commitment in the economic field. Until the people of the Far East are assured a reasonable livelihood, there can be no hope of developing among them democratic institutions and well-ordered and stable societies capable of contributing to world peace. This is essential to our national security. Prosperity in the Far East will enhance our own prosperity. In the past, commercial relations between the United States and eastern Asia were largely complementary rather than competitive.

The ravages of the war have been enormous, and the Far East is economically in a sad plight. Most of Japan's cities and thousands of industrial plants lie in ruins. Until a part at least of her factories begin turning their wheels again, Japan will not be able to buy enough food to feed her people. There is now an acute food shortage in the country, which is causing actual starvation among many. This may lead to serious unrest and disturbances and the spread of disease, which would menace the safety of the occupation forces. There is in Japan the fundamental problem of providing a living for over 70,000,000 people on 150,000 square miles of land, of which only some 16 per cent is arable, an area less than one-half that of the farm acreage of Illinois. This problem can be solved only through industrialization and through nondiscriminatory access for the Japanese to the raw materials and markets of the world, even though Japan continues to be denied the revival of enterprises likely to contribute to her military potential.

All Japanese foreign trade is handled by a Japanese government agency operating in conjunction with an agency of the occupation authorities. Japan will be opened to private trade only when it is possible to do so without prejudicing the security of the occupation and without discriminating among business or national groups. It probably will be some years before the Japanese will be allowed much freedom in choosing their most advantageous sources of supply and markets.

The policy has been adopted of eliminating from Japan, either by destruction or by removal in reparations transfers, industrial capacity in excess of peaceful needs. Peaceful needs will be defined initially in terms of pre-war Japanese standards of living.

THE FAR EAST

Reparations will be exacted from Japan to include at least the confiscation or transfer of Japanese external assets and the transfer of goods or capital equipment and facilities now in Japan not required for a peaceful Japanese economy or for the occupying forces. A major point of difference between the Soviet government and the other Allies has arisen over Soviet insistence that Japanese industrial properties can be removed by the Soviet authorities from Manchuria as "war booty" and are not chargeable against the country's reparations claims.

The proposed program for the dissolution of the large combines of economic power known as the Zaibatsu raises the broad policy question of how far it is necessary to take active steps toward developing independent business leadership in Japan. The assets of twenty-six Zaibatsu holding companies have been frozen, thus limiting their activities and giving some competitive advantage to other firms. It has been recommended that Zaibatsu holdings be liquidated through sales to other entrepreneurs and to co-operatives and labor unions.

The occupation authorities have directed the Japanese government to institute fundamental reforms in such fields as land tenure and farm credits. Such a program is, of course, desirable from the point of correcting inequities in the distribution of land and income. However, no amount of reshuffling of landownership will solve the basic difficulty in the Japanese agrarian problem, which is to provide a minimum standard of living for 6,000,000 agricultural households on 16,000,000 acres of land.

Southern Korea is suffering from severe inflation due both to shortages of goods and to increase of money in circulation. This occurred largely during the last few months of Japanese rule. Labor difficulties are numerous. Capital is moving into speculative, rather than productive, channels, and hoarding is widespread. The division of Korea into two zones, which will be discussed later, has greatly hindered her economic recovery, as economic activities in the two zones before the war were complementary. Restoration of the normal flow of goods and services throughout the country has remained a major objective of the United States, but efforts so far to arrange with the Russians exchanges of goods between the two zones have met with little success.

In China political disunity and maladministration coupled with eight years of devastating war are responsible for the prevailing

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

chaotic and crippled economic conditions. As China moves toward peace and unity, the United States can in appropriate ways assist the Chinese to rehabilitate their national economy. Commitments for credits for specific purposes may be approved when warranted by future political and economic developments in China. There must be reasonable assurances that such credits will serve a purpose beneficial both to the United States and to China. Moreover, China would have to adopt certain specific measures and policies essential to affording adequate protection and opportunity for American business.

The United States has consistently supported U.N.R.R.A. in its efforts to make adequate provision for its relief program in China. The program for the period through June, 1946, called for an outlay of \$407,000,000. A principal obstacle to full-scale relief measures for China arises from the utter inadequacy of facilities for internal transport in China.

The pending economic questions between the governments of the United States and China are related to the negotiation of a new commercial treaty, a bilateral air transport agreement, and a trade-agreement which will form a part of the multilateral approach in connection with the "Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment." Other matters include an evaluation of the new Chinese company law and regulations governing the registration of foreign firms, the impact of the recently constituted import and exchange control measures on American trade and banking activities, and Chinese requests for extensive credits.

Throughout the Far East economic recovery in the foreseeable future can be accomplished only through generous American aid and co-operation in the form of credits, direct investments, trade-promotion, and scientific and technical assistance.

The Far East cannot, however, move toward sound economic recovery except *pari passu* with administrative and political progress, for which American guidance and aid also are requisite.

The fundamental political policy of the United States in regard to Japan was originally stated in the Potsdam Declaration. Ultimate American objectives are two: (a) to prevent Japan from again becoming a menace to world security and (b) to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government, based upon the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, which will respect the rights of other nations and support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the charter of the United Nations.

THE FAR EAST

A military occupation of Japan under General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, operates in behalf of the principal Allied powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan. General MacArthur exercises his authority so far as practicable through Japanese governmental agencies. A Far Eastern Commission, in which the principal Allied powers having interests in the Far East are represented, has been set up at Washington. It formulates policies affecting the carrying-out of the Japanese surrender terms, and it reviews directives issued to or action taken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on policy matters within the jurisdiction of the commission. There is also an Allied Council for Japan, on which sit representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, and China. This is a consultative and advisory body to General MacArthur on questions of implementation of policy directives.

The Japanese government has, on the whole, shown great willingness to comply with directives of the Supreme Commander. It has also shown a corresponding lack of initiative in dealing with pressing domestic problems, as, for example, failure to collect this year's rice quotas from the farmers. The Supreme Commander has issued numerous directives to the Japanese government calling for reforms looking toward the fulfilment of United States objectives. The Shinto religion has been divorced from the state; political prisoners have been released; special police units such as the "thought control" police have been dissolved; and orders have been issued for the establishment of freedom of speech and of the press. Japanese armed forces in the homeland have been completely disarmed and demobilized, and active proponents of militarism and ultra-nationalism have been declared ineligible to hold public office. The Japanese government has shown readiness to establish the outward forms of democracy, and the response of the press and the public has been spontaneous and widespread. The Emperor has officially condemned the concept of imperial divinity; political parties have been formed; women have been enfranchised; and on April 10, 1946, national elections were held which resulted in an overwhelming victory for conservative elements. There is before the newly elected Diet for consideration a draft of a new constitution, submitted by the cabinet. This instrument places the government under the complete control of the elected representatives of the people, makes the Emperor simply a "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people," provides for a

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

“bill of rights,” and renounces war as a sovereign right. In these several ways a good start has been made toward the achievement of American political and military objectives.

The evolution of a people from a communality to a society of individuals is an arduous process. It would, therefore, be illusory to expect that a people such as the Japanese, who have barely emerged from feudalism, can within a few years transform themselves into a self-sustaining, full-fledged democracy. There is danger that, unless wise and sympathetic guidance is exercised, there may be backsliding—or perhaps what is worse—conversion to communism, a much easier process than evolution to democracy.

War criminals are being apprehended, and some have already been tried, convicted, and punished. The International War Crimes Tribunal in the Far East convened in Tokyo on May 3 and is proceeding with the trial of 27 major Japanese war criminals. The trial has an importance far transcending the fate of the 27 men before the bar. The purpose of the trial is to seek to establish a principle in international law, namely, that political leaders shall hereafter have to answer for violations of international law and treaties. The trial can contribute toward making the Japanese people peace-minded if they are convinced of the justice of the verdict on the basis of the facts established.

Korea at present is divided into two occupational zones separated by the thirty-eighth parallel, the northern zone being held by the forces of the Soviet Union and the southern zone by the American forces. The demarcation of zones was fixed for the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese troops, but this government contemplated an early removal of the barrier and dealing with Korea as an administrative and economic whole. The United States has envisaged an international trusteeship for the country, following a limited period of military government, as the best means of preparing the Koreans for independence. We hope to see established there a democratic government, representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people and eligible for membership in the United Nations. So far no substantial results have been achieved toward implementation, as the Soviet government has refused to co-operate even in facilitating exchange and co-ordination between the two zones.

In March, 1946, there met a joint Soviet-American Commission provided for in the Moscow agreement of December, 1945, to assist in the formation of a provisional Korean government. The commission

THE FAR EAST

finally adjourned *sine die* on May 8 without having accomplished anything, owing to the unacceptability to the American side of the Soviet proposal that any Korean individual representatives selected by Korean parties who had expressed opposition to the Moscow decision should be declared ineligible for consultation with the joint commission. The American contention was that such exclusion constituted a violation of the principle of freedom of speech.

In the American zone, elections are to be held as a means of helping the Koreans prepare themselves for independence. One serious problem is the inadequate number of Koreans with administrative experience other than those who were collaborationists with the Japanese regime and who therefore have no standing with the Korean people.

The problem of China must be approached with detachment but sympathetically. Undiscriminating admiration of China can but lead to eventual disappointment; but one cannot afford to ignore China's great potentialities. In her efforts toward modernization China has been handicapped not only by foreign aggression, principally Japanese, but also by the difficulty of building a new house while the crumbling remains of the old still stood in the way. Her progress toward modernization has been slow and halting but perceptible over the years. Time must be allowed to China to fight her way through, as she was successfully doing in the period immediately preceding Japan's attack of 1937.

If China is to develop into a strong and stable power the national government must move ahead toward efficient and clean administration and toward progressive economic and social reforms which will commend themselves to the Chinese people; all parties must accept the leadership of the government and each contribute its part; and the nationalism of the Kuomintang and the socialism of the Communists must be brought together under democratic forms and principles to co-operate instead of fighting each other and destroying the hope of democracy.

The Chinese government is a one-party government, but it is believed that peace, unity, and democratic reform can be furthered if the base of the government is broadened to include other political elements and if autonomous armies, such as those of the Communists, are effectively integrated into a new and modernized national army and navy. The American government has fostered the holding of a conference of representatives of the major Chinese elements to develop a solution, along such lines, of China's internal

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

strife. This is, however, fundamentally a Chinese question, in which the United States should not take sides between the opposing factions. It must, therefore, primarily devolve upon the Chinese themselves to work out the detailed steps essential to the achievement of national unity.

The United States can lend its support to the recognized Chinese government and can use its influence in appropriate ways toward bringing about China's reconstruction along democratic political and progressive economic lines. It can give encouragement to, and strengthen the hands of, the Chinese liberal leaders. We can help them by making it clear that our financial assistance and other aid, for which the Chinese are insistently asking, will be forthcoming only when and as the Chinese give practical evidence of their earnest purpose to effect essential reforms.

Any program of internal reform would also be impeded by external threats to China's integrity or by courses such as those pursued by the Soviet Union in Manchuria in co-operation with the Chinese Communists, which operate to deny China the full use of essential economic resources and facilities within her own territory. Consequently, it is to the interest of the United States to use its influence toward supporting China against any such encroachment.

National government reoccupation in North China and Inner Mongolia led to clashes with the Communists. General Marshall arranged a truce between the two parties, which went into effect on January 14, 1946, and which brought about a suspension of armed hostilities. The agreement provided for the establishment of a commission, composed of government, Communist, and American representatives, to supervise the execution of the truce agreement. The activities of the commission have also been directed toward the resumption of communications and the repatriation of Japanese armed forces from the affected areas.

Notwithstanding the truce agreement, there have been serious armed clashes in Manchuria between the forces of the National government and of the Communists. These clashes probably would not have taken place if the Soviets had co-operated in good faith toward a peaceful solution of the problem.

It is believed that Soviet military forces, which accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, have now been entirely withdrawn, except forces at Port Arthur and Dairen. These remain by virtue of agreements entered into between the Soviet and the

THE FAR EAST

Chinese governments at the time of the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945. In pursuance of the provisions of those agreements, Port Arthur has become a naval base for the exclusive use of Soviet and Chinese naval and commercial vessels. The Soviet government assumes responsibility for the defense of the base. Dairen remains a free port open to the commerce of all nations, but the Soviet Union acquires one half of its port facilities and equipment, the other half remaining in Chinese hands. The two main trunk lines in Manchuria, namely, the Manchuli-Suifenhao line across Manchuria from west to east and the Harbin-Dairen line from north to south, are to be jointly owned and operated by the two governments. These lines are to be united into one railway system known as the "Chinese Changchun Railway." All other railways in Manchuria are to be completely owned by the Chinese government. It is provided that the statutes for the Chinese Changchun Railway shall be worked out within two months of the signing of the agreement, but this has apparently not yet been done. So far as is known here, the railways are being entirely operated at present by the Chinese. The agreements covering Port Arthur, Dairen, and the railways in Manchuria are to run for a period of thirty years. It is too early to tell how these arrangements will affect future American commercial interests in Manchuria.

By an exchange of notes accompanying the aforementioned Sino-Soviet treaty, the Chinese government agreed to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, should a plebiscite of the Mongolian people confirm that such was their desire. The plebiscite was held, and China has recognized the independence of that country. Thus a *de jure* status has been given to a situation which has long existed.

There are many issues facing the United States in the Far East which cannot be resolved locally between the United States and the Soviet Union and are therefore directly related to the general problem of United States-Soviet relations. Reference has already been made to some of these problems.

The conflict of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Far East is not one arising from economic rivalry or from direct threats to each other's national security. It is a conflict of ideologies and of methods. It is the declared policy of the United States to foster in China, in Korea, and in Japan the development of free political institutions. While the Soviet Union professes similar objectives, its actions in these areas appear to indicate that its real

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

objective is Soviet dominance, if not control. We seek to gain our ends through constructive efforts to promote economic and political stability and progress everywhere. The Russians follow policies which seem to us to be largely obstructive, and they appear to believe that the weakening of the smaller, more backward nations which they do not already control will facilitate the spread of communism and of Soviet influence. If our course is right, we may be confident that in the end by perseverance and firmness we can make it prevail.

We have been obliged, in order to insure victory and a durable peace, to assume responsibilities in the Far East of a magnitude that ten years ago no one would have dreamed of our ever assuming. We are also participating in collective action with other powers to an extent that American public opinion before the war would probably never have supported. We are giving our full backing to the United Nations Organization. It is our earnest hope that it will grow to be a powerful influence for world peace and stability. In this way we may hope to have alleviated the burden of responsibility of any one nation or of a few nations for maintaining peace in the Pacific area.

These manifestations of policy are in no way out of harmony with our traditional principles; rather, they represent means through which, in the light of the practical considerations of today, we may move more effectively toward the realization of our fundamental objectives and the firm establishment of our principles.

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

THE discussion of Far Eastern policy dealt more with Japan than with other Far Eastern countries. Attention was given to the occupation problems, the prospects of leadership and democracy, and the economic conditions in Japan. Pacific Island bases, Chinese factions, and policies in Southeastern Asia were also discussed. The importance of Soviet-United States relations in the Far East was generally recognized.

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

MR. PASVOLSKY: Mr. Ballantine, could you give us some idea of the probable duration of the occupation of Japan?

MR. BALLANTINE: The military disarmament of Japan will be effected very soon. The moral disarmament of Japan is not such an easy matter. We must conceive of the Japanese people as a very impressionable people; they are rather volatile; they will jump from one extreme to another. Today, of course, the Japanese people admire success; they hero-worship General MacArthur; the people, by and large, like the G.I.'s very much. The G.I.'s go around without any strutting or displaying of bayonets, and they make friends with the children and make friends with the people generally, and the occupation is very popular with most people in Japan. But that does not mean that the past has been eradicated or can be eradicated in a short time. It is very difficult for a country like Japan, with its traditions, to get away from feudalistic and militaristic concepts. Japanese political philosophy is the political philosophy of Confucius: the government by men rather than government by laws; the hero-worship type rather than convictions on questions of principles; lack of individual conscience. These ideas can be modified only by a long process of education.

MR. ROWE: Might military occupation, if continued for a fairly long time, lose its effectiveness in the field of political change? That is to say that the friendliness of the Japanese might wear out as time goes on.

We might be able to end the military occupation and still carry on our efforts to secure political change in Japan through the influence

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

of organizations of a nonmilitary character, such as supervising boards in the field of education. Civil agencies of that kind might well exist for some time after the period of military occupation.

MR. BALLANTINE: I think that that is very much in General MacArthur's mind. Of course, as civilian agencies took over, there would be a large reduction not only in the military force but in the total personnel over Japan. I think we should envisage a diminishing scale.

MR. FARIS: Is there any historical precedent for an army of occupation ever changing a people's fundamental way of life in the history of the world?

MR. BALLANTINE: If we try to change Japan into American democratic forms, that is an absolutely impossible thing to accomplish. The only hope is that we will give enough start so that some Japanese adaptation of democracy which would suit their traditions and needs could be evolved largely by themselves. Furthermore, the Japanese occupation differs from all past occupations in the friendly relations that exist between the occupationary authorities and the people of the occupied area.

MR. ALBERT PARRY: Will the duration of our occupation be influenced by our fear or lack of fear that the Russians will move into the vacuum if we withdraw?

MR. BALLANTINE: I don't know. I think that the plans for our occupation of Japan were made entirely independently of any question as to whether Russia was going into the war or not, so that I don't think that you can say that we were influenced in any way by the thought that Russia might move in if we did not go in there.

MR. PARRY: But in view of the somewhat changed situation since V-J Day and in view of the fact that we make allowances for a possible pressure of American public opinion upon the length of our occupation there, wouldn't you say that the pressure of another kind, from Russia may also influence the length of the occupation?

MR. BALLANTINE: I should not think so, because the duration of the occupation would be determined by agreement with all the major powers, including the Soviet Union.

JAPANESE LEADERSHIP

MR. PASVOLSKY: You suggest that the Japanese people are not yet ready to be self-reliant individuals in a democratic regime. There-

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

fore, the primary problem in Japan is the problem of leadership; the problem of what kind of leaders the Japanese people will have.

That would seem to me to mean that it is not necessary for us to reform Japanese schools by sending teachers there and supervising Japanese schools or anything of that sort. What is important for us is to see that the leadership of Japan, the people who run Japan, are the right kind of people, if they can be found. That is a very different problem from an occupation problem which would set as its objective a transformation of the eighty million Japanese from the kind of people that they were before the end of the war into the kind of people that we would like to see them. That might take hundreds of years.

MR. BALLANTINE: I think all we can do in the last analysis is to go into Japan and open the windows and let the fresh air in and expose them.

MR. PASVOLSKY: Yes, but we can do more than that.

MR. BALLANTINE: We can do more, but that is the start. We cannot convert them into our ways of life.

MR. WRIGHT: Has there been a manifestation of a developing leadership in Japan of the kind we would like?

MR. BALLANTINE: I don't think we can say that to date there has been, because the Japanese government shows a complete lack of initiative in taking up problems except as they are given directives by S.C.A.P. (Supreme Command for the Allied Powers). People like Yoshida are throwbacks from the Old School, and I doubt whether any popular election among people trained to express their thoughts would return such people.

MR. PASVOLSKY: That is the darkest part of the picture you have painted so far. Where is this leadership coming from, the leadership through which Japan can be regenerated?

MR. BALLANTINE: I think the leadership can come only from the groups of people who have suffered from the war but not while they are still benumbed by defeat. It will take four or five years before you can get any articulation among the Japanese people.

MR. WRIGHT: Will the leaders have to come from new classes of people that did not provide leaders before? I suppose the leadership of Japan, to a considerable extent, has been from the nobility and the Zaibatsu. Those classes, I suppose, are considered incapable of leading Japan in the direction of democracy, or is that true?

MR. BALLANTINE: There is no class stratification in Japan or in China, as there is in Continental European countries, where a son tends to follow the occupation of his father. Traditionally, the educa-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

tional system, both in Japan and in China, was the old classical system. Advancement in public life came from passing the classical examinations. In Japan they took over the spirit, but they changed the subject matter of the examinations. In any case, a poor man's son had the opportunity to pass examinations and get advancement in the official hierarchy or in big business. A university degree was an open sesame to a position in the hierarchy or in big business, and in no other way could people qualify for those positions. The result was that the lower classes were continually denuded of potential elements of leadership who gradually filtered into their proper intellectual level. The peasantry in Japan is really a repository of all that is archaic in Japanese traditions. Most of the radical element in Japan in the last twenty years were university graduates. They were not people that represented any particular class or the peasantry. They might have come from some of the highest classes.

MR. PASVOLSKY: What kind of people were elected to the new Diet? After all, the Diet will probably have to be one of the principal educational institutions for political leadership.

MR. BALLANTINE: Generally, the people elected to the Diet represented the ordinary conservative elements that have been elected in the past several years.

According to an analysis by Kyodo News Service, the occupational distribution of the new Diet is as follows:

Out of 464, 82 are company directors, 52 are lawyers, 49 are farmers, 42 no occupation, 36 organization leaders, 32 educators, 31 company employees, 22 authors, 21 government officials and only one factory employee.

You can see that they do represent the conservative and middle-class levels of Japanese society.

MR. PARRY: It seems to me that it is not so much the occupation of the deputy that counts; it is what group, socially or economically, he claims to represent; not his occupation but the occupation of his constituents or the interests that he represents.

MR. ROWE: Isn't it a mistake to consider the Diet members as the leaders of political reform in Japan today? It is clear that the new constitution has been handed down from on top. The old leadership has vanished, and for the old structure of government we have the substitution of a constitution, God-given like that of Meiji, except that this time it is not Meiji, it is General MacArthur who has handed it down. There is your political leadership in Japan today.

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

In other words, we are not doing anything in the way of arousing spontaneous leadership for basic political reform in Japan.

MR. PARRY: There seems to be an organized movement on the extreme left. When I said that the pressure from the Russian direction may have a certain influence upon American plans, I had in mind the presence of these new leftist sentiments that have made demonstrations and demands.

MR. BALLANTINE: I think that the left movement in Japan is very small. In a free election only 5 Communists out of 464 were elected.

MR. PARRY: I would say small but well organized. It has potentialities. Not that it is right in its demands, not that it is right in its philosophy, but it seems to be going somewhere and in a more organized fashion than any other political movement that could be organized by us or is being organized by us.

MR. BALLANTINE: One thing I have noticed about that leftist movement in Japan is that the election expenses per member elected were several times as high as the average cost of election per member elected. I would judge from that that the leftist movement is better organized; otherwise, they would not have the funds for expenditures for election.

MR. BRODIE: One can always take for granted that the Communist party is well organized. Whatever else they are, they have that.

MR. LEEDS GULICK: I think Mr. Ballantine has left us in a rather pessimistic mood regarding the new leadership. I have a slightly different explanation. The Japanese have so long been under Confucian subservience to old age that they have naturally let Count Ito, in the first place, who helped draw up the first constitution, and other leaders on down through the years carry them along the way that they felt should be followed because of the imperial rescripts.

Now we find that for the last fifteen years, at least since 1931, the Old School politicians have been swamped by the New School military leaders, who have set themselves up as political leaders and have carried on the war with their new propaganda; but now they are in disrepute, and the old political leaders that had very little to do with carrying on the war and yet went along with the militarists are also in disrepute, but we try to dig them out again. Yoshida is one of these men, so, of course, the leadership in Japan is very poor.

But there is hope in this matter, as we found from the experience of China. In China there was grafting and illegal political leadership by the war lords, until thousands of Chinese trained in this country,

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

taken into the Chinese government, began to make their influence toward honest leadership felt. They have given some new hope of leadership in that land, although it is still far from sufficient.

In Japan, also, I suspect that can happen. The Japanese government has, up to now, taken mostly Tokyo Imperial University graduates as the top men in government, and they have been on the conservative side; but they have always been subservient to the leaders who got them into the government and therefore have not made their influence felt. If, however, beginning with our occupation and continuing for a number of years, protection is guaranteed of freedom of speech and freedom of action, then young men will have a chance to come into politics and take real leadership in that country. And if men who have been trained in our way of democracy filter back to that land, I think they will finally build up the new leadership that we are seeking; but, unless that protection is given to them for a number of years against the reactionary and the military elements, we cannot have any new leadership. They will simply go back to the ways of having the older heads, who take the responsibilities, carry on as best they can with old ideas.

MR. BALLANTINE: I don't consider my attitude toward new leadership emerging in Japan as pessimistic, because I think it would be a miracle if, within the short course of the ten months which have elapsed since Japan's surrender, there should be an adequate leadership developing.

Neither Yoshida nor Shidehara ever was a leader in the sense that either one could control a political situation in Japan. I doubt whether Yoshida could ever have been prime minister of Japan in any of the old regimes.

MR. WRIGHT: In reference to Mr. Gulick's suggestion, I am thinking of the three or four thousand Japanese that we expatriated. Many of them will be going back to Japan. I am wondering whether they will have the kind of attitudes that we would consider suitable for leaders of the new Japan.

MR. BALLANTINE: I feel that neither in China nor in Japan is the leadership going to be an American-educated leadership, any more than is the political leadership in the United States going to be an English-educated leadership. You have to have people in a democratic country who are of the people and whose fundamental education and fundamental processes of thought are in keeping with the thought of the people whom they expect to lead. In China, although

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

American-educated people have had important positions, especially in technical positions, yet most of the political leaders have been people who have only a Chinese background.

MR. GULICK: It is not only the education that you get; it is the opportunity of following out that choice. Matsuoka, though American-educated, did not have that chance and is, therefore, a poor example of what education in a democracy will do to develop the right kind of leadership.

IMPOSING DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN

MR. ROWE: Won't we have to reverse the trend away from political spoon-feeding of the Japanese if we are going to evoke democratic or individualistic responses in Japan? As it is now, the changes that we are getting are changes that are produced by methods which are directly nondemocratic in type. We are trying to produce democratic changes through gifts of new institutions.

MR. BALLANTINE: Even though your intentions are the best in the world toward not spoon-feeding them, toward letting them find their own way, you cannot move too fast with a people that have been completely dazed by what they have gone through. After the Japanese earthquake of 1923—and I was there during that period—it took them months to recover from that, and what they have been through here is much more catastrophic than the earthquake.

MR. ROWE: Don't you think it would have been a good idea to allow some time to elapse, so that this new framework of government, under which we expect them to operate permanently, would have been an evocation from the Japanese people rather than a hand-down from S.C.A.P.?

MR. BALLANTINE: There is an honest difference of opinion on that. One argument in favor of the course followed was that you could always have a constitution amended under the new setup, but it was considered desirable to get an election started, to give them something to shoot at, to get them thinking about new things.

MR. ROWE: But it is unfortunate that the process of constitutional revision should have so many points of resemblance with previous precedents in Japanese history where a fundamental change of this kind has been handed down from on top with very little real attention to the basic democratic processes.

MR. BALLANTINE: The fundamental principle which you bring out is very important. After all, history shows that people earn their

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

freedom, earn their liberty; it is not something that is handed to them.

MR. CREEL: Isn't it necessary, though, to recognize that, after all, there was here a system of despotism which was very well dug in and at the moment something had to be done to break that up? It is all very well to say, "Well, we will just let the Japanese evolve their own form of democracy," but so long as you have a system of "thought police" and so long as you have a system of education which is designed to reproduce what they have had for centuries, it is a question just how long you would sit back to watch democracy evolve. It might never come. It seems to me that on that basis there is some justification for an alteration of the framework to free things, leaving a possibility of development. That seems to me what they have been trying to do.

MR. ROWE: You have the destructive aspect of this occupation, such as the elimination of the "thought police." I certainly would not criticize that for a moment. But I doubt the desirability of getting positive changes for the better by the same dictatorial methods. I don't use the word "dictatorial" in a bad sense. On the other hand, political change in Japan today is certainly being handed down pretty much intact, following the same undemocratic method that the Japanese have always been used to.

RESTORING JAPANESE ECONOMY

MR. WRIGHT: How are we going to enable the Japanese to re-establish a viable economy in Japan? Mr. Ballantine referred to the necessity of industrialization. That involves international trade in industrial products. Is the United States likely to open its markets to a larger extent than heretofore to Japanese manufacturers?

MR. BALLANTINE: There is a general tendency in the United States—certainly a policy of the government—to encourage a freer flow of trade, and I can only hope that we will adopt a policy of freer trade so that Japan will have access to raw materials and markets.

Before the war, colonial trade was one of the causes of difficulty. French Indo-China's trade, for example, was channeled to France. French Indo-China produced large quantities of rice and other essential products that Japan needed. Japan was manufacturing cheap goods suitable to a people on the low standard of living of the Annamese; yet, in spite of that natural opportunity for development

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

of a profitable two-way trade, most of that trade was siphoned to France.

I hope that some of those situations can be corrected. One of the problems of the future will arise from China's industrialization and its competition with products which Japan formerly exported.

MR. WRIGHT: Is this problem of developing manufacturers and finding markets in the planning of the MacArthur administration at all?

MR. BALLANTINE: I think that the fundamental economic ideas are that it is up to Japan; we assume no responsibility for providing Japan with a viable economy. Our action in this respect is not likely to go further than doing nothing to obstruct their having means of increasing their economy.

The question of resumption of private trade must await decisions on the question of reparations. The general outline of reparations has been drawn up, but the details have not been worked out.

MR. WRIGHT: As I recall, the Atlantic Charter, in referring to freer and less discriminatory access to trade and raw materials, especially said that that policy was to apply to both victor and vanquished.

MR. PASVOLSKY: It has yet to be applied.

MR. ISAAC J. COX: Aren't we dealing there with the difficult question of Japan's coming back as a powerful nation? It is clear that we cannot hope that Japan can take care of her present population on the land. She must look to the sea, she must look to commerce and manufacturing.

Presumably, in order to get the trade she will continue to manufacture cheap goods and to deal with countries like southeastern Asia, the Dutch possessions, British Malaysia, and India; but the moment that begins, you at once run into all the interested powers. I happened to be in Java when Japanese trade doubled itself in four years, and almost at once restrictive measures began to be taken. One of the most difficult things we are up against is some sort of United Nations agreement which would allow for that type of trade.

MR. BALLANTINE: There are two factors that I would like to bring up in this connection. After the restoration of 1868, Japan rapidly developed her economic strength to a point where she had a productive capacity which compared favorably with many advanced Western nations. But her production was not distributed to increase appreciably the standard of living of the people, because Japan devoted a great deal of her profits to building up armaments; and, in spite of

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

her relative poverty, she made herself into a first-class military, as well as naval, power, a feat which no other country had attempted. If Japan had devoted the products of her industry to increasing the standard of living of her people, she could have made a significant improvement in that standard.

Another factor is this: Often in connection with Japan's trade-expansion the trouble that arose in other countries was not so much economic competition as military apprehension. It was Japan's habit to put her army and navy in charge when she went to trade with Manchuria. The Chinese feared that economic penetration meant political and military domination. In her movements in southeastern Asia there was always a suspicion that with her fishing vessels there were naval spies to take soundings of the bays. The Dutch East Indies feared that Japanese economic activity was a forerunner to military and political domination. If those factors are eliminated, I think it will help toward a solution.

MR. BRODIE: Those factors of suspicion did help to raise the opposition to Japanese trade, but it was at the time when the Japanese began to undersell at such a tremendous rate and take over the trade.

MR. BALLANTINE: I am not trying to minimize that factor at all. I simply say that here are two factors that have to be taken account of in the situation.

MR. PARRY: But you suggest that in the future, under better conditions and better leadership, there will be a bigger domestic market for Japanese industries and a chance for Japanese industries to deal with certain neighboring countries, such as Indo-China, on a fair-and-square basis. In this connection it is interesting to note that in Indo-China the Nationalists now don't want a customs union with France and don't want to be pegged down to the French franc; they want a currency of their own. They do need manufactured goods of a cheaper kind which France does not produce and which Japan may be able to produce again for Indo-China.

MR. BALLANTINE: The commercial policy of Indo-China was not directed toward the benefit of the people of Indo-China but to the benefit of France.

MR. PARRY: That is right; so there may be a national exchange of goods, especially since Japan does need the rice of Indo-China and Siam.

MR. BRODIE: Can Mr. Ballantine say whether our present tariff schedule is such as to be discriminatory against the goods of Japan?

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

MR. WRIGHT: When the Smoot-Hawley tariff, which, apart from the trade-agreements, is still the basic tariff act, was in process of passage there was a communication from thirty or forty Japanese business firms pointing out that certain of the schedules would be particularly discriminatory against Japan and would practically bar certain manufactures, such as certain toys, rugs, and potteries which were Japanese specialties and which had begun to gain a market in the United States. Little or no attention was paid to this representation by Congress. That was in 1929 and certainly did not improve the attitude of Japan toward the United States.

MR. PASVOLSKY: On the trade-agreement reclassification, I recall that in the process of negotiating some of the agreements there was some effort to prevent Japan from getting the benefit of a particular reduction; but I think that those cases were very few. I mean that only in a small proportion of the cases was reclassification made in such a way that Japan would not get the major benefit. That was a part of the bargaining strategy in the application of the Trade Agreements Act. The only way that we could negotiate with a country successfully, we thought, would be on the basis of the so-called principal supplier; that is, we made a reduction on those products of which the particular country with which we were negotiating was, if possible, a predominant supplier. We asked for a reduction of trade-barriers in other countries on the same basis, that is, as to those goods of which we were the principal supplier.

The way that worked was that, after we had completed the round of negotiations, duties would have been reduced, if they were going to be reduced, on all the products in which the countries with which we were to negotiate were particularly interested, but in the end all countries would be on the same basis through the application of the "most-favored-nation" principle. In many cases it was necessary to split the schedules, because some of our classifications were very broad and the general reduction on the whole classification would be worth very little to a particular country with which we were negotiating.

We were preparing to negotiate a trade-agreement with Japan, and schedules had already been drawn up in such a way as to make the agreement fit all the classifications and reclassifications in which Japan was interested. That was not a discriminatory practice as long as there was a program of negotiation with all countries and as long as the most-favored-nation principle applied.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

The way the thing worked on the other side may be illustrated this way: When we negotiated an agreement with Belgium, we were interested in the export of automobiles to Belgium. The Belgium tariff law distinguished between three weights of automobiles. As I recall it, we happened to be interested in the middle weight and not too much interested in the others, so we said to the Belgians that we would pay much more by way of reduction in our tariff for a reduction only in one, that middle category, than we would for all three, because the other two were of very little significance to us. We concluded an agreement on that basis.

It so happened that Germany was interested in one of the remaining categories and France was interested in the other. They negotiated agreements with Belgium, and, as a result, within a very short time the whole automobile tariff was reduced, and all gained thereby. More tariff barriers were reduced by that method than would have been reduced if we had attempted to bargain for a reduction in the whole category. Moreover, as a result of the three sets of negotiations, there were reductions of trade-barriers not only in the United States and Belgium but also in France and in Germany, and, through the operation of the most-favored-nations clause, everybody benefited by that process.

MR. WRIGHT: Was this negotiation of the trade-agreement with Japan in process at the time of Pearl Harbor?

MR. BALLANTINE: We were studying the matter, but we had to drop it because, through the establishment of exchange control, Japan was channeling trade in such a way that a trade-agreement with Japan would have been meaningless. It would only operate to their benefit, not to ours.

MR. BRODIE: Then the situation was one in which Japan was not benefiting even from the very modest reductions in general tariffs brought about by the trade-agreements program.

MR. PASVOLSKY: She had most-favored-nation treatment.

MR. BRODIE: Except for those close specifications in every case.

MR. PASVOLSKY: Only in some cases where we were holding back bargaining power for negotiations with Japan. The reductions which Japan would have given us under those circumstances would have been general reductions with other countries, so that everybody would have benefited by that. It is just a technique.

MR. BALLANTINE: There were certain gentlemen's agreements—which, of course, lapsed—whereby there were voluntary restrictions

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

on the part of Japan on quotas that they would export to the United States.

MR. BRODIE: What prompts me to ask these questions is this: Would it not be rather hypocritical of us to belabor ourselves about finding markets for Japan when the most obvious market is shut off by our own legislation?

JAPANESE ISLAND BASES

MR. WRIGHT: Has a policy been decided upon as to the permanence of American occupation of Okinawa and other Japanese islands?

MR. BALLANTINE: Our thinking about Okinawa was that if the people of Okinawa—who were racially somewhat different from the Japanese—wanted to be separated from Japan, it could be determined by plebiscite or some other way. Okinawa and all those islands were extremely overpopulated and would be a liability rather than an asset to any other country, except that perhaps our military and naval authorities may want a base on the islands. From a nonmilitary point of view, I cannot see any advantage to any disposition other than to allow Japan to retain them.

MR. WRIGHT: Has there been any desire on the part of China to reacquire the Ryukyus?

MR. BALLANTINE: I don't believe there is any active interest in the subject. Of course, the people of Okinawa have no racial affinities with the Chinese; they have close racial affinities with the Japanese.

MR. BRODIE: It seems to me we cannot say that *perhaps* the military have some interest. I have the impression that they have a very keen interest in some of those places, and I imagine that Okinawa would be high on the list.

MR. BALLANTINE: Okinawa is a fairly big island. Whether they have any interest in more than having a strategic base at some points in this large island, I don't know. It may be that they want a base now or they want the whole island now, but that might not be true twenty years from now. What would happen if we felt we needed a base there and twenty years from now it was a white elephant on our hands? What would be the graceful way to unload?

MR. BRODIE: I think it is always more graceful to unload than it is to demand. It seems to me pertinent in that connection that the situation of Japan in respect to control of recurrence of aggressive tendencies is very different from Germany. Japan is much more easily

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

controlled from outside; one does not have to occupy Japan to be certain that she is not going to commit aggression again. The question involved there is: How close do we have to be in order to have that guaranty? I am not prepared, myself, to offer any estimate, but it seems to me that that consideration should enter into any appraisal of the value to us, or to the United Nations, presumably with ourselves as trustees, of particular islands of the Pacific.

MR. BALLANTINE: Iwo Jima is in a very strategic position. It is exactly halfway on a direct line between Guam and Tokyo, and it is of no commercial value to Japan. There are no Japanese inhabitants there, and it is now completely covered with American military facilities.

MR. WRIGHT: Maybe Mr. Brodie could tell us something about current naval thinking in regard to the Japanese mandated islands.

MR. BRODIE: All I know is that the intentions of the Navy were extremely ambitious the last time I was associated with them. How much they have been moderated since, I don't know. The Navy, incidentally, or at least the General Board, had a surprisingly generous attitude concerning the Japanese merchant marine, which I think is tied to this problem. The reason I say that is because, if Japan has no merchant marine, she cannot invade. You have this kind of simple tool which enables you to keep a tight control of the country from the military point of view, which is lacking in the case of a country like Germany.

If one accepts as a fundamental tenet that such control is necessary, it seems to me obviously desirable to limit it to the minimum that would be effective. It perhaps makes more sense to let Japan have a merchant marine that is of commercial and economic value to her, if we have certain strategic islands not too distant and sufficiently large so that they could house a considerable force if it appeared necessary at some future date. I should presume it would be desirable, if there is a choice, to choose for strategic areas islands which are not heavily populated, except that it so happens that usually the areas which are populated are, for very good reasons, also areas which are more likely to be suitable bases. That is why I feel that Okinawa is probably an area that will be of military interest.

MR. BALLANTINE: Okinawa is a very peculiarly shaped island, as you know. It is a long island with lots of peninsulas jetting out here and there. It is the southern one-third that is densely populated. The soil is a sort of coral formation, and it is highly cultivated, where-

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

as the northern part of the island has a very sparse population. The total population on that island was, I believe, about 400,000. The people have a very low standard of living and have been the chief emigrants to the mandated islands, to Saipan, and to Hawaii.

MR. BRODIE: There is nothing incompatible with having a military reservation on the island, as in the leased Caribbean bases, and leaving the major part of it under the sovereignty of Japan.

MR. WRIGHT: In so far as there is a naval interest in these islands nearest Japan, is it entirely vis-à-vis the control of Japan, or is there any thought that they might be useful in possible contingencies with Russia?

MR. BRODIE: I am not aware of any precise statements in that connection. My guess is that Japan was not the major power under consideration.

MR. PARRY: I think that is the basis which motivates certain commentators in saying we should not hold Okinawa, not to displease Russia.

MR. HUTH: Has it any bearing on the problem of whether Okinawa should be taken over as a base that last week it was reported that the island will be turned over to the Marines and the Navy pulled out?

MR. BRODIE: It is traditional in the Navy Department that, at least during peacetime, the Marines occupy rather than the Navy. The Marines, of course, are a part of the Navy, and I don't think there is any significance in that change.

MR. WRIGHT: Is it the understanding now, so far as these islands are taken as bases, it would be as strategic trusteeship areas? That was implied by the President's statement of January 15, wasn't it?

MR. BRODIE: The Navy was at one time adamant on the issue of sovereignty rather than trusteeship, but finally the idea of trusteeship was sold to them on the basis that they would have what they wanted anyway, so why worry about whether it is sovereignty or trusteeship; that is, they would have complete control and complete freedom to exercise what they regard as security. But the Navy then insisted that, if so, the allocation of strategic areas under trusteeship should be by the Security Council rather than by the Assembly. That was written into the Charter, and the presumption at the time was that it would be much easier to reach a deal in the more intimate circle of the Security Council than in the General Assembly. Mr. Byrnes's desire to put the peace treaties before the Assembly rather

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

than before the Big Four indicates that some lessons have been learned since.

MR. PASVOLSKY: The Security Council has no power to allocate; it only has power to approve. The allocation is on the basis of agreement among the countries concerned. Who the countries concerned are is another story.

MR. BRODIE: Your point is, then, that that same problem of reaching a *modus vivendi* would have operated even had the strategic areas remained under the General Assembly?

MR. PASVOLSKY: Territories are placed under the trusteeship system as a result of two processes: first, agreement among the countries concerned on the character of the trusteeship, as to the designation of administrative power, and all the rest of it; and, second, approval of these agreements and acceptance of responsibility by the Security Council in the case of strategic areas and by the General Assembly in the case of nonstrategic areas. So that the real problem is going to be: Who are going to be the parties in our negotiations as regards the mandated islands and as regards the islands that were taken away from Japan.

MR. BRODIE: Can you offer some enlightenment on that? Do you think it is something we shall have to negotiate with the Russians?

MR. PASVOLSKY: That is an open question. We have operated on the theory that the mandated islands were the property of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. All the mandated territories were ceded by Germany and Turkey to those powers. Those powers then delegated certain functions to the League. There were several theories on that, but we operated on the basis of a dictum laid down by Secretary Hughes that the ownership and title vested in the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The complication arises out of the fact that two of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are Japan and Italy. Now, presumably, by the treaties of peace, Japan and Italy will relinquish all their privileges and prerogatives as Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Who inherits that? Do their rights lapse and only the three powers remain, United States, Great Britain, and France; or do the principal allies in this war inherit the rights and prerogatives of Italy and Japan? In that case not only Russia, but China, gets into the picture.

MR. WRIGHT: Of course, in the case of the islands which may be taken from Japan, such as Okinawa, I suppose that Russia might

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

make an argument that the surrender of Japan was received by General MacArthur "for the Allied Powers," which included Russia. Consequently, Russia might claim that she was one of the powers directly concerned.

MR. PASVOLSKY: The same way with the Italian colonies.

MR. BRODIE: It seems to me that the need of Russian consent in respect to strategic area trusteeship cannot be circumvented because, obviously, if we are going to be high-handed about it we are not going to get the approval of the Security Council; whereas we might have insisted that, after all, this was our concern and we might have gotten the approval of the Assembly.

MR. PASVOLSKY: That is not very dangerous. If the Security Council refuses approval, then the situation remains in *statu quo*, in exactly the same position in which the Italian colony situation remains under the projected peace treaty with Italy. It is just in abeyance, with the occupying forces in control.

MR. BRODIE: May I make this observation for the sake of the record? There are voices within the Navy itself which are opposed to a too broad expansion of bases, not for political reasons but because they feel that a navy can weaken itself by spending its resources on fixed bases. So, from the point of view of the political scientist who is trying to restrain that particular effort, I think it is well worth knowing that he can find support within naval circles itself.

COMPROMISE BETWEEN PARTIES IN CHINA

MR. ROWE: I should like to comment on the possibility of using American financial help to China as a means of securing compromise and unity among Chinese political parties. I rather doubt whether that is going to have a great deal of influence.

The Communists will not have very much of a motive to get together with the Nationalists on account of the possibility of financial help being given to China by us, because they will assume that we are pledged to give all our support to the National government of China, and that if political unity is established on the basis of a coalition government, the Nationalist element will still have a strong majority and will be able to set the policies under which these funds will be used.

The Nationalists will analyze the situation in some such way as this: "How can the United States help but give aid to us?" Since, from their point of view, China is likely to be the battle ground of the

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

next war between the United States and the Soviet Union, they will accept it as a fact that we are bound to help them all that we possibly can. Hence our talk about credits only as a result of political compromise on their part is not likely to impress them.

I don't think that we can influence China very strongly toward political unity from the outside or that we can buy political unity in China with our funds. The issues are much too deep-seated for that. We will not settle many of the basic issues in China even if we get all that General Marshall stands for in the way of a coalition government. The issues would then have to be fought out inside this government.

MR. BALLANTINE: I think that your observations are very shrewd.

MR. GULICK: I wonder if you can tell what, if any, aid we have given to China in relation to their problems with the Soviets.

MR. BALLANTINE: We can aid China by using influence with the Soviet Union. We may have an opportunity to help China in connection with Russian demands in Manchuria, the interpretation of the agreement between China and the Soviet Union in regard to the operation of the railways. In the past we have given China substantial diplomatic aid in connection with her difficulties with Japan, and I think that similarly there may be opportunities for us to do the same thing in regard to her relations with the Soviet Union.

MR. GULICK: That would not be economic aid but diplomatic aid, moral support.

MR. CREEL: I should like to put a question which the Chinese themselves put—Chinese who are neither Communists nor Kuomintang in the sense of being members of the so-called reactionary clique in the Kuomintang, but Chinese who do represent the democratic element which many people in this country think we should support. It seems to be commonly assumed that compromise between the Communists and the Kuomintang is what this country wants. These Chinese would raise this question: What will be the result of such compromise? They would point, for instance, to the fact that during the course of the war, whereas the Communists have constantly claimed that the Kuomintang armies were attacking them, if you examine the map which registers the changes in area between that held by the Kuomintang and that held by the Communists, the growth has been almost exclusively on the part of Communist areas. Communist areas have grown, Kuomintang areas have shrunk, and that has not been merely at the expense of Japanese-held areas; it

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

has been primarily at the expense of Kuomintang-held areas. So that these Chinese would say that when you force a compromise you are favoring the Communists. When you speak of the Kuomintang you are speaking of at least two different elements, that is, the group that we call the "reactionaries," who control it at the top, and the much larger group, which is not powerful but which is more democratic. The reactionary group which is in power is not very skilful politically, and the group which favors democracy on the American plan is not experienced politically and is not very powerful. The Communists, on the other hand, are very skilful and aggressive, and it is certainly clear now, since the developments in Manchuria, that they have Russian backing, although that was denied for a long time.

The history of compromise in China over the last fifteen years or more has been that an agreement has been taken by the Communists as establishing a base from which they may advance farther, whereas the Kuomintang people have supposed that it was a place where they would stay. It is claimed that the Kuomintang has never been able to get the Communists to agree to demarcate a line and say, "There will be no deviation either way from this."

So the question becomes: If, on the one hand, Russia is powerfully backing the Communists and if, on the other hand, the United States is powerfully backing compromise, what will be the outcome? And particularly what will be the outcome for what this country would probably like to see in China, which I take to be neither a Soviet type of dictatorship based on Communist ideology nor any other sort of dictatorship based on a reactionary ideology?

MR. BALLANTINE: I don't conceive of a compromise as a long-run solution of the Chinese problem. It seems to me that the traditional political instincts of the great majority of the Chinese people are democratic and Nationalistic, not Communistic. A great many people in China have become disgusted with the nepotism, corruption, mal-administration of the Kuomintang regime, and that is why the Kuomintang party—the National government party—is weak in its efforts to unite the country.

It seems to me that when and as China moves toward cleaning its own house, toward administrative reform, toward a clean administration, then the natural support of the Chinese people will spontaneously go to that Chinese government, and that in itself will provide the eventual solution of the problem.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

We are trying to use our influence toward a long-run solution; not a short-run *modus vivendi* of compromise but toward fundamental measures of introducing better government and more efficient and honest administration in China.

MR. CREEL: That seems obviously what would be desirable; but, actually, American policy during the course of the war has seemed to be posited on the theory that we cannot do anything about supporting and strengthening the elements and the type of government which we would like to see but, rather, that we have here two going concerns, on the one hand, a Kuomintang government "as is" and, on the other hand, the Communists; that we must either choose between these two or bring these two together. The question is whether any of those choices is a happy choice and whether any of those choices will bring about in China the kind of situation in which the great mass of the people can express the sentiments which you have mentioned.

MR. BALLANTINE: I think you have to make a clear distinction between short-term war objectives and the long-range objectives. We were trying to win the war as quickly and with as little sacrifice as possible. The problems to which I have addressed myself here are the long-range problems. I agree that the differences between the Communists and the Kuomintang are very deep-seated and that there is no easy solution to that problem. The only solution I can see is this patient, slow movement toward a better government which will clean house in China.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Creel referred to the tendency of the Communists to expand at the expense of the Kuomintang areas. Has that been by sheer conquest, or has it proved acceptable to the people who live in the areas?

MR. CREEL: In the first instance, by conquest. The situation has been clouded by the fact that people who are more in contact with the Kuomintang like the Communists, and people more in contact with the Communists like the Kuomintang. You talk to a man who has spent a great deal of time back in the Communist areas—not a man who has just gone to Yen-an and taken a conducted tour for two or six weeks but a man who has gotten all around the country—and ask him: How democratic are the Communists? He replies: "Well, around Yen-an it is pretty democratic, but you get back in the country and it is not so much so. You hear about the officials in these border areas being one-third Communist, one-third Kuomintang, and one-third nonparty. Candidates in the elections are one-third each.

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

As to who is elected, that is another question. There is a growing tendency for the young organizers sent out from Yen-an to be elected as officials in these areas away from the centers."

The whole situation is clouded, on the one hand, by the nepotism and corruption within the Kuomintang to which Mr. Ballantine has referred, and, on the other, by the fact that, if the Communists go in and lower the rents and correct certain obvious abuses, the people naturally like it for a time. On the other hand, the people get tired of going to meetings all the time, as is required in Communist areas. As for their actual attitude toward the Communists, there aren't the facilities to make public opinion surveys in those areas.

I don't speak, please understand, as one having authority or special knowledge but merely as one who has tried to learn the facts from every person whom he could come in contact with who has been there. But I do find it significant that even very strong backers of the Communists and those who laud their democratic principles will cite the twenty-five basic tenets on which the Chin-Ch'i-Ch'a border area government was founded, of which one article called for complete freedom of thought, speech, press, etc., while another says: "Suppress and confiscate the property of all followers of Wang Ching-wei, Trotskyites, and other traitorous cliques."

MR. PARRY: It is like the Soviet constitution of 1936. One clause says that they have freedom of the press and freedom of speech, and another clause says that no other party except the Communist party is being allowed to exist. The latter clause nullifies the former.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS IN RESPECT TO CHINA

MR. BRODIE: It seems to me that there is one fundamental question regarding our policy toward China. The Russians not only entertain suspicion but have expressed it that the purpose of our military missions in China and certainly the avidity with which our Army sends military missions to China concern matters other than that of Chinese integrity alone. They think we are attempting to build up China as a military alliance against Russia.

I have the distinct impression that that suspicion is justified. If it is justified, I am wondering how much freedom the State Department is permitting the Army in that very important matter, because I think, if it is true—and I say I have only the impression that it is justified—I think it is a very mistaken, as well as a very dangerous, policy. It seems to me that China is not for a long time going to be

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

strong enough to be worth anything as an ally and that if we pursue that policy we are really "sticking our necks out."

MR. BALLANTINE: I agree with what you say about China's strength. I think we would be doing a marked disservice to China, not only to our relations with Russia, if we attempted to build her up as a sort of buffer against Russia. Not only do you have the Russian suspicions, but you have an expectation that cannot be realized. I don't think that anybody in the State Department has any such conception in its plans in connection with military aid to China.

MR. BRODIE: Does the Army have anything which one might call a free hand respecting military missions to China? Doesn't the State Department insist on some kind of intervention in that policy?

MR. BALLANTINE: I think so, yes.

MR. ROWE: Isn't it true that the projected missions are not actual missions yet? The aviation mission and the naval mission to China are merely projected and will have to be approved by specific act of Congress before they can actually become a part of our policy. We are going ahead now on a temporary basis. We, for instance, are giving China Lend-Lease materials; in fact, we are building up in Shantung Province what is, in effect, an advanced American naval base on a small scale, using it for the purpose of training Chinese crews in the use of American vessels, and so on. The aviation mission, the scope of which has not yet been indicated at all, is in the planning stage. But the question of just what the military are trying to do there, apart from providing the government of China with an adjunct to its internal police system, is yet to be seen.

There are altogether too many ways in which the apparent American interest in the North China coast bears a resemblance to the British interest in the same area in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Instead of Britain's having an advance naval base in Weihai-wei on the northern part of the Shantung Peninsula to confront the Russian base on Port Arthur, we have what is, in effect, an American base in the same general area to confront the Russian position in southern Manchuria. The parallel is too obvious for the Russians to miss. I should think that we might well ask ourselves in what direction we are going.

MR. CREEL: It certainly is true that a very large number of Army officers are under no more illusion about the military potential of China for a long time to come than Mr. Brodie is.

MR. BRODIE: I don't doubt it for a minute, but I have heard of Army officers' being interested in military assistance to China for the

DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EAST

purpose of opposing Russia. You may say the ideas are incompatible, but the Army has had incompatible ideas before.

POLICY IN SOUTHEASTERN ASIA

MR. WRIGHT: What is our attitude toward independence movements in southeastern Asia?

MR. BALLANTINE: Our policy should take into account a number of factors. We want the good will of Asiatic people as a whole, and we want the good will of the people that are independent at the present time, China, the Philippines, and Siam. I think that we should not take any steps—and I think that is the policy of the State Department—which would aid the colonial powers in retaining their military and political control over the so-called “independence” movement.

We have to think not only of our relations with Asiatic peoples but of our relations with the Europeans. There is a balance that we have to strike there. We need the good will of France and the Netherlands and Great Britain. So I think that we have to be very circumspect.

MR. WRIGHT: As I recall, at San Francisco, in discussing the phraseology of the chapter dealing with dependent peoples, the Russians and the Chinese were favorable to self-determination movements and the British and the French were rather unfavorable. We took an intermediate position. I suppose that is likely to be our continuing position.

MR. PARRY: What is our position in regard to Siam's boundary disputes with France and Great Britain?

MR. BALLANTINE: There is no boundary dispute with Great Britain. With regard to the French situation the issue is fairly clear. That change was effected in 1941 with Japanese aid. I feel that the territories in question should be given back to France and then any question of changing the pre-war border should be discussed on its merits through orderly and peaceful processes. If Siam wants an adjustment of the old border and presents the question to the United Nations, we ought to take a sympathetic attitude toward a fair adjudication of the situation. Siam is the only independent country at the present time in southeastern Asia. The Siamese people have been traditionally friendly to the United States and have looked up to us, and we would like to have that situation continue. For that reason, when controversies arose between Siam and stronger powers, such as in regard to the economic agreements of last January which gave Great Britain special privileges in Siam, we did render Siam substantial diplomatic aid.

THE NEAR EAST

By JOHN A. WILSON¹

THE Near East, like other parts of the world, is the scene of conflicting aims and ambitions. The quest for sovereignty, or the desire to be master of one's own destiny, comes into competition with the quest for security, or the desire to maintain an older system, which memory has vested with order and prosperity. Thus the smaller, local states of the Near East are seeking a change toward greater individual integrity, whereas such powers as Great Britain and France are reluctant to see change from a world in which they have exercised a measure of supervisory control.

To be sure, this contest between the Western power and the Oriental state has been a phenomenon of the last two generations, with a long history in such countries as Algeria, Egypt, and Iran. However, there are now a number of new factors, or factors that have new weight, and these elements sharpen the situation to a point where the Near East has acquired greater world importance than it has had since the Crusades.

In the first place, the great powers concerned have changed. Italy is now only a former power, remaining in North Africa on the tolerance of other nations. France is a lesser figure, as she has evacuated Lebanon and Syria, her former mandates in the eastern Mediterranean and thus is inclined to hold all the tighter to her territory in northwestern Africa. With Italy and France thus cut down, Great Britain appears as the chief proponent of the older imperialism and thus as the chief target for the demands of local peoples for sovereignty.

There are, however, other new forces in the Near East. The United States is now more formally concerned with the local situation, for at least four reasons: (*a*) the greater strategic importance of oil and the high potential of the American oil concessions in Arabia are a definite concern of our government; (*b*) the problem of holding or expanding world markets for our goods appeals more definitely to our govern-

¹ The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.

THE NEAR EAST

ment; (c) a number of our political figures have expressed a formal concern about the future of the Jewish national home in Palestine; and (d) our general political alignment in world affairs has been with Great Britain. This alignment has affected our policy with regard to Palestine, the evacuation of Lebanon and Syria by the French, Russian ambitions in Tripolitania or the Dodecanese, and the alleged Russian intervention in Iran. To the locals of the Near East it appears that the United States has no policy of her own with respect to their countries but that she simply follows the British lead without question.

There are two other factors of accentuated force in the area. Russia has appeared on the scene with a lengthening shadow, which has reached as far as North Africa and is sharpest in the territory closest to the Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Turkey. Further, the Zionist claims to Palestine have been intensified by the tragic fate of Jews in Europe and their sense that greater security can be gained in a land which they may call their own. This Zionist claim, in turn, is responsible for the chief solidarity of Near Eastern peoples, the Arab League, which has united nations that otherwise express themselves in terms of rather parochial nationalism. The ambitions for change—ambitions held by Arabs, Zionists, or Russians—confront the chief holding power, Great Britain, and her sympathetic partner, the United States.

In the several years in which the local peoples have sought for sovereignty, they have witnessed some successes. Even this witness is not always inspiring. The notable successes have been gained by individuals wielding absolute power rather than through the setting-up of a democracy supported by a wide electorate. Such separate standing was won in Turkey by Ataturk, in Iran by Reza Shah, in Arabia by Ibn Sa'ud, and in Ethiopia by Haile Selassie. Ethiopia fell to the ambition of Italy; the exigencies of war forced a controlled situation in Iran; and Turkey now finds her separatism a weakness when faced by the claims made by her powerful neighbor Russia. It seems that independence does not win security for a small nation threatened by large forces. Nevertheless, the search for independence continues. Elements in Iraq seized the opportunity of the war to attempt a revolt against British control. Egypt is still clamoring for revision of her treaty with Great Britain. Transjordan has just been conceded a nominal independence, under terms which permit Great Britain to use the land as a military base. Lebanon and Syria, with

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the assistance of the British, have emerged from under the French mandate. And Near Eastern eyes rest with interest on the negotiations between the British and the Indians. There is an element of unrest and change all through the area, from India to Morocco.

Great Britain and France, having made so many concessions and being confronted with ever new demands, are reluctant to retreat much further. It is a hard thing to change a way of life and an attitude toward the world. Even the Labour government in England finds itself conservative on foreign policy and unwilling to make such drastic changes that British world standing will seem to have suffered a defeat.

The major shift of weight in the area is the appearance on the scene of Russia, whose desire for security to her south threatens the status quo and thus promotes a British desire for countermeasures of security. Russia's attitude and procedure are quite consistent with her methods elsewhere. She has suffered in the past from vulnerability and wishes to protect herself against such dangers in the future. In eastern Europe she has taken measures in the Baltic and Balkan states to set up a protective zone, so that she may proceed toward peaceful internal reconstruction and development. She desires similar protection to her south, whether in the Near East, in central Asia, or in the Far East. Further, her major ports are northern, and she would like an outlet into warmer waters. Her attitude is thus understandable and leads directly to her methods. At present her activity is most visible with relation to Iran and Turkey, since she no longer claims consideration for a trusteeship in Tripolitania. But the Arab states have looked hopefully toward Russia for the furtherance of their claims against Britain, and Russia has not rebuffed them, although her attitude has thus far been one of disinterested friendliness.

Great Britain, almost inevitably operating in old-fashioned terms, therefore feels it necessary to take countermeasures against the possible advance of Russia into a new region. The logic of such countermeasures is not always convincing, at a time when the older imperialism is on the wane, when Great Britain is giving way in Egypt and India, and when future wars may be fought in new ways. But clinging to a status quo in a time of uncertainty and transition is perfectly natural. If Great Britain gives up bases in Egypt and India, she will seek new bases in Palestine and Transjordan. If the Arabs

THE NEAR EAST

show a tendency to look toward Russia for support, Great Britain will be careful not to affront the Arabs by any drastic action.

The states of the Near East have sought for greater strength through various treaties and alliances. This does not express itself as a Pan-Islamic movement in any effective way. The North African states are poorly articulated with those of the Near East; Turkey and Iran take security measures without essential reference to Islam; and the Near Eastern sympathy for a Pakistan carved out of India is sentimental rather than politically effective. The Arab League, however, is a group of real potential, in or out of the United Nations Organization. Small nations find independence a matter of frightening isolation. If they reject the patronage of one of the powers and if they find the United Nations an agency of limited efficacy, their chief resource will be to band together in a federation of small states of similar kind. The Arab League has overcome its internal strains and jealousies chiefly because of the strong common opposition to Zionism in Palestine.

Palestine is a special problem because of Zionism. It is not essentially a problem of the Near East but rather a problem of the world in general or of Europe in particular. Superimposed upon the search of local Arabs for larger self-expression are the minor problem of the international character of a land sacred to three great world religions and the major problem of the refuge of European Jews from anti-Semitism. This is not the place for a review of the conflicting promises and claims with regard to Palestine. The problem has been oversimplified by each of the contesting parties. For a generation the opportunity for peaceful settlement has lost ground because no long-range solution was offered to meet competing claims. Now there is no solution possible in terms of orderly and peaceful negotiation. A solution must be hammered out and nailed down, but no compromise at this late date will satisfy any of the parties, and no solution at this time can prevent bloodshed. That means a problem of policing Palestine for some time to come.

The United States has been interested in the problem of Palestine since the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Our interest has intensified within the last year or two. It was the initiative of President Truman in suggesting the establishment of 100,000 refugee Jewish immigrants in Palestine that led to the creation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The recommendations of that committee have pleased no one, and yet it is difficult to see how a group could have reported

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

in terms much different. The first and most important recommendation recognized that Palestine alone provided an insufficient solution to the needs of displaced Jews and therefore laid upon the world additional obligations, "that our Governments together, and in association with other countries, should endeavor immediately to find new homes for all such 'displaced persons,' irrespective of creed or nationality" and "that our Governments endeavor to secure that immediate effect is given to the provision of the United Nations Charter calling for 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.' " In other words, the chief recommendation is for the combating of anti-Semitism throughout the world. It is a measure of the cynicism of our times that these basic proposals should have been left out of account in most of the discussions of the report. The current demands are for property or legal rights and not for a better world spiritually.

The two recommendations of the committee that have received the most comment are that 100,000 Jewish immigrants be admitted into Palestine immediately—"as rapidly as conditions will permit"—and that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state. As the Zionists had claimed their right to a Jewish state as the logic of a "national home," with the corollary of unlimited immigration, and as the Arabs had opposed any further Jewish immigration, these recommendations pleased neither of the claimants. The Arabs were the first to voice a protest, the Jews were the first to take action.

One of the recommendations of the committee was that it be made clear to Jews and Arabs that any attempt to oppose the carrying-out of the proposed measures "by threats of violence, by terrorism, or by the organization or use of illegal armies" would be resolutely suppressed. Prime Minister Attlee went beyond this recommendation in setting the disarming of the illegal Jewish armies, such as the Haganah, as a prerequisite to the admission of the 100,000 immigrants, and he set the additional condition that the United States participate in the policing problem. These conditions of postponement inflamed Jewish opinion. The joint chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council cabled encouragement to the Haganah, which they naturally did not call an "illegal army" but, rather, "the organized and responsible resistance forces of the Jews of Palestine," and called upon the Haganah to fight against "tyranny and injus-

THE NEAR EAST

tice" in the spirit of "the Revolutionaries of 1776."² Thereafter, when there was renewed violence against the British army in Palestine and when the British responded with a widespread series of arrests, the American Zionist Emergency Council branded the British action as "nothing less than an act of war against the Jewish people" and appealed to President Truman and the Department of State to make it clear that the arrests were "an affront to the Government of the United States, and calculated to annul the objectives with regard to Palestine to which it is committed."³ Our government was thus, on June 25, faced with the situation of American citizens calling upon the people of another country to revolt, and on June 29, it received an appeal from the same citizens to protest the suppression of potential acts of revolt. Within that paradox lies a goodly portion of the dilemma of our foreign policy with regard to the Near East. We have also assured the Arabs that any changes in Palestine would be preceded by "consultation" with the governments of the Arab states. Like Great Britain, our government has given such encouragement to parties with a grievance that we are now faced with irreconcilable appeals.

The standing of the United States has never been so low among the several peoples of the Near East as it is at present. In part, that is a relative matter, as the smaller nations had looked up to our country with hope and admiration when we were more remote and detached from the scene. Formerly our economic interests were relatively slight, and our strategic interests did not penetrate so far as the Near East. But it is no longer possible for our country to maintain that disinterested friendliness. Now it is clear that we have the most definite interest in the oil of the Persian Gulf. Now it is clear that the strategic concerns of any great power extend all over the globe. We can no longer enjoy the reputation of being the great democracy which had no expansionist ambitions and could therefore be the champion of small peoples.

Nor have we benefited by our initiative in the matter of Palestine, because we have committed ourselves to so great a concern there that it entails further obligations. We are in the position of urging Great Britain insistently to do her duty, of aiding in establishing what that duty may be, and then of withdrawing loftily and leaving her to undertake the unpleasant task of carrying out that duty. Our ideal-

² American Zionist Emergency Council press release for June 25, 1946.

³ Press release for June 29, 1946.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

ism must appear as officious or hypocritical unless we follow up our initiative and assist in establishing a new order in Palestine.

It is impossible to sit back and enjoy a pose of Olympian benevolence with regard to the Near East. We are definitely in the region. We now seem to have no foreign policy toward that area, because our policy coincides roughly with that of Great Britain and because we have issued no statement on aims and objectives.

The needs of our foreign policy are consistency, sincerity, and clarity. We need a pronouncement from our government making it clear where we stand with relation to the problems of the Near East. This will not be satisfactory to all parties, but it will dispel some of the current distrust. We should make it clear that we are a conservative nation in foreign affairs, interested in working within a known status quo and normally opposed to violent or sudden change, but that we are still formally committed to progress through slow change toward wider political and economic democracy. Inasmuch as most of the Moslem countries have a more basic social democracy than we have, we might expose some of our difficulties in working toward an equality of peoples within our own nation and state that we have never renounced the goal of equality despite the difficulties. Since Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination is still credited to us, we should clarify the terms in which we still believe in that principle and the terms in which we believe that its application must be limited. We should admit frankly our interest in oil, freedom of airways, and other economic objectives. This will be understood, as most of the countries involved are eager for American loans or investment. A statement of this general kind will be the best offset to the potential advance of communism in the Near East, and it will be accepted by Russia as the political atmosphere of our relations in that region.

Any over-all policy statement about Palestine will be difficult because of political pressures. However, we cannot continue the hypocrisy of urging Great Britain to carry out all the disagreeable activities of the problem. We should express our readiness to participate as far as possible in enforcing a solution. We should lend our efforts toward the building-up of a greater potential for Palestine through the more effective use of water by a Jordan Valley Authority. But, above all, we could restore some of our former standing among the nations by reverting to the first recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine: that we take into our

THE NEAR EAST

own country displaced refugees over and above immigration quotas, thus exhibiting the good faith of our concern for world Judaism, and that we state ourselves convincingly as opposed to racial, religious, or color prejudice throughout the world. I am aware that such commitments are difficult in this world and that it is easy for an academician to give advice from the safe retreat of his study, but I can see no constructive statesmanship which leaves out of account the logical implications of our former actions and pronouncements.

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

PALESTINE proved to be the center of interest in the discussion of Near Eastern problems. Its demographic trends; the political and religious oppositions in and concerning it; and the proposals for solving its problems were examined. Strategic and economic interests in the Near East generally were also considered, and in this connection oil was given due attention. The discussion of British, American, and Soviet interests in this area and of the influence of these countries upon the Arabs throws light upon the Truman declaration, offering aid to Greece and Turkey, made in March, 1947, several months after the Institute.

BRITISH INTERESTS

MR. BALLANTINE: What would be the effects of British withdrawal from India upon British interests in the Near East? One of the factors which developed British interest in the Near East was the need of communication with India. If that need disappears, will the new interests which Great Britain has acquired in the Near East, including oil interests and the need of increased security against Russia, be of equal importance? Are there any other factors which would add to Great Britain's interest in this area?

MR. WILSON: There is a question there which faces strategists all over the world: Are bases in old-fashioned terms still necessary in a world of potential conflict such as we guess the future may provide? Certainly, there is need for some local protection of oil interests. That oil situation is intensified, but the British interest is not very recent; it is over forty years old.

I have been a little surprised at the British readiness to negotiate both in India and in Egypt and to look forward to a relatively rapid transfer of force. There is, in the old-fashioned terms, no base in the eastern Mediterranean anything like Egypt, chiefly because of the ports. There is no alternative so satisfactory as Alexandria for a naval base. Haifa cannot be made so good as that, though it may be improved.

When you consider bases in Palestine, you have another problem. One of the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry on Palestine was that the British continue the mandate until conditions

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

might permit a trusteeship under the United Nations. What, then, happens to the strictly British interest in a base? They have a treaty arrangement with Transjordan permitting a base there, but Transjordan is certainly not comparable with Palestine or Egypt for that purpose. So there is change here in the weight of British interests.

CULTURAL LEADERSHIP

MR. BALLANTINE: I was not thinking of the matter in terms of military and naval bases, because they are outmoded. For instance, Malta cannot possibly be the use that it was; the Mediterranean cannot be a British lake, for it cannot be protected by naval power in modern times. I was thinking more in terms of British political and cultural influence in the countries of the Near East as possibly the best means of counteracting the influence of Soviet Russia.

MR. WILSON: There is cultural transition there. Egypt and Iran had in the past looked to France, and Egypt secondarily to Italy, for cultural leadership. On the other hand, they are highly respectful of power, and the decline of France has made them somewhat uncertain as to where they may turn for cultural leadership. In the transition period the British are active through the British Institute and the British Council. The Russians are probably active, although, as far as I am concerned, this is a matter of rumor. I have been through the area in recent months, and the greatest subject of talk is about what the Russians are doing; but if I tried to get any facts on it, it was extremely difficult. It is alleged that they finance certain newspapers; it is alleged that they are thinking of setting up a university in Baghdad or Damascus; it is alleged that next Easter will see thousands of Russian pilgrims permitted again to go to Palestine. The only fact one can gather is that they have a great many more people formally and officially in the area than there used to be.

Another element in this cultural transition is the looking of some of these countries toward the United States for cultural assistance. The state of Syria asked the American University of Beirut to set up a college in Damascus, and the president of the Republic and the minister of education both stated formally that they had made such a request and had given assistance in land and a small amount of money toward setting up such a college. It is unofficially stated that informal preliminary questions have come from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and even indirectly in the past from Morocco, with

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

relation to American educational institutions to be set up in their countries. They are looking for assistance. They think rather in terms of applied education—engineering and medicine—but they would welcome an American university in any one of those countries. That is a change in attitude. Iran, for example, only a short time before the war took measures to move foreign educational institutions out of the country.

My general answer is that there is a cultural transition which is moving away from a French pattern, and an uncertainty as to where they will turn for a pattern in the future. There is admiration for Russian effective power, but the states of the Near East are run by large landlords, and they are reluctant to invite the Russians in too definitely. They would like to use the Russians up to a certain point but not to invite them in, because any spread of communism throughout the area might affect the holdings of the governing class.

Communism does not seem to have made any philosophical advance into the Arab states. I did not get into Iran or Turkey. There are slight evidences of it in some of the cities in the Near East. One sees the hammer and cycle whitewashed on the outside of a factory in Damascus, for example. But it is not clear that it has moved in a missionary sense into the area as yet. It is a rather slow process and has not moved south from the area immediately below the Caucasus.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS

MR. BALLANTINE: There is another point that I would like to bring out in defense of the State Department. It is difficult for a country like the United States to conduct a foreign policy in a vacuum. Our foreign policy derives largely from the people of the United States in terms of vital interests which are interests of security and interests of opportunity. If there is no urge on the part of public opinion that something be done, it is very difficult for the State Department to move ahead and formulate and carry out a foreign policy that is going to be the wise policy for a long-term period.

In the Far East we had a tremendous volume of trade, investments, and cultural enterprises, and our security interests were very vitally affected by developments. That seems to be absent in the Near East. Therefore, it is difficult to conduct a foreign policy there which you can sell to the American people.

MR. WILSON: I would agree with that. Our economic interests in relative terms are slight. Our trade with the Near East has not been

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

comparable with that of the Far East. Even in petroleum it is mainly a potential interest. The Saudi Arabian field has a high known and expected potential, which is the reason why it interested Mr. Ickes and our Navy. That is not an actuality but may become an interest of importance.

OPINIONS ON THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

MR. WRIGHT: I have been struck by the contrast between British and American policy in connection with Palestine. The British, since they received the mandate, have had an extremely cautious and flexible policy, responding with moderation to increased pressures of the Jews or increased pressures of the Arabs. This has given an appearance of inconsistency during the last twenty-five years. They have cut off Jewish immigration when there was extreme Arab pressure, and then, when the Arab pressure was relaxed, they have allowed more Jewish immigration. Their policy has been criticized by both sides, but it has always been cautious and moderate.

It seems to me that the United States has given encouragement to both sides. President Roosevelt met with several Arab rulers after the Teheran conference. The United States seems to have had a part in bringing five Arab states into the United Nations, tremendously increasing their political importance. It has had a friendly attitude toward the Arab League. So the Arabs might well suppose that the United States was encouraging their position.

At the same time, there has been a very great response in this country to the Jewish demands. President Truman came out with the insistence that 100,000 Jews be permitted to migrate to Palestine. There has been a great deal of expression of sympathy for the Jewish remnant in Europe. Resolutions have been introduced in the Congress. Consequently, there seemed a good reason for the Jews to believe that the United States government was going to support their position more strongly than it has.

These somewhat inconsistent positions may give us a degree of responsibility for the augmentation of the bitterness between the two groups in Palestine which Mr. Wilson called to our attention and which he said he thought was insoluble without bloodshed at the present time. I wonder if you think that that contrast is too much overstated.

MR. WILSON: No, I don't think that contrast between British and American policy is overstated. The point in my statement was that

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the peoples of the Near East—and in so phrasing it I am thinking essentially of the Arabs, although it does apply also to the Jews in Palestine—in general terms see no difference between the two policies. To them, with Britain as the chief factor, American policy seems only to follow British policy. It could be pointed out to them that there are differences, but it appeals to them that we are—as one man phrased it to me—simply the dummy sitting on the knee of Great Britain.

MR. PRICE: It seems to me that perhaps Mr. Wright's statement put a little too much emphasis on the difference between the British and the American approach. After all, it is probably only the change in party control in Great Britain that has kept the Labour party in Great Britain from appearing against the government in support of Zionism. It took a pretty severe struggle at the recent Labour party meeting to keep Mr. Laski and his Labour party colleagues from going against Bevin on the Zionist issue. In our own country we hear mainly of the official British policy, which is concerned with strategy and security and which therefore makes the Labour party policy, now that that party is in power, seem no different essentially from the conservative policy. Our own foreign policy concerned with security would be the same. In the very nature of things our Army does not make public statements about foreign policy, while members of Congress are doing so. I think it not improbable that our own Army would have exactly the same position as the British government as to an unwillingness to admit more Jews into Palestine for fear of offending the Arabs, but it does not come out in the public press.

MR. WRIGHT: Interests in the United States that are looking at the matter from the point of view of strategy, and perhaps also those that are looking at it from the point of view of the general principles of self-determination which we have espoused, tend to favor the Arab position. On the other hand, the only political values to be gained in this country are for the Jewish position. The Jews are politically powerful, the Arabs have no influence at all. The condition of the Jews also makes a tremendous humanitarian appeal. That situation may account for this tendency to move in both directions without complete appreciation of their inconsistency.

MR. PRICE: You did not have to be a Greek to agree with Lord Byron about freeing the Greeks; so you don't have to be a Jew to be sympathetic with the Zionists. That type of sympathy makes great political capital in both countries.

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

ECONOMIC POTENTIALITIES OF PALESTINE

MR. WILSON: Dr. Lowdermilk, an officer of our Department of Agriculture but outside his capacity as such, was in Palestine at the time of one of those tragedies of the foundering of a refugee ship. He was outraged at such loss of human life and has been a warm advocate of the Zionist cause. He is an expert on soil erosion. In his book, *Palestine, Land of Promise*, he says it is impossible to estimate how many additional persons Palestine might take in, but he thinks that, if the waters were properly handled, it might go into the millions.

Inevitably, one agrees in part. The potential of Palestine through the proper use of its waters and its general resources has not been reached. But three problems must be considered. One is that that potential is a matter of development, whereas the need is now. A Jordan Valley Authority, using water more wisely, would provide for an unknown additional number of residents in Palestine as it was put into operation. But there are 391,000 displaced refugee Jews in central Europe now.

The second problem is: What does that additional population do? If it is to be large in numbers, say two millions, it will be essentially industrial rather than agricultural. The region to the south of Palestine has an annual rainfall of about seven inches. It is a question as to how far you can push the agricultural potential in Palestine, whereas, if one leaves out of account the factor of markets, the use of the fall in the Jordan Valley, the potential power element, would provide for a very great industrial population. But you have to consider the factor of markets. The neighboring countries, the Arab countries, would have to increase their buying potential to absorb the goods of an industrialized Palestine. I am leaving out of account any factor of hostility or boycott—otherwise, the markets would have to be at a distance. Then there is the cost of carriage. You would have to have quite cheap manufacture of goods in Palestine in order to compete in distant markets.

There is still a third problem, that of resources. Industries in Palestine thus far include the citrus fruit industry—oranges, lemons, and grapefruit sold as luxury products in England. At the end of the growing season the surplus is dumped on the market, so that in 1935 you could buy a dozen beautiful grapefruit in Palestine for five cents. There is the chemical industry of the Dead Sea plain, and a certain production of cement. Those use local resources. A near-by resource

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

is the cotton supply in Egypt, which depends on satisfactory textile tariffs with the United States and England.

So you have difficult problems in industrializing Palestine, and it is possible that if Palestine were to be industrialized it would have to manufacture very cheaply to compete, in which case you would have the problem of the standard of living there. That is my own view, and I am not an economist.

I come back to the point that there is no solution of the refugee problem in the sending to Palestine of Jews not welcome in other countries. They have to be welcome in other countries because Palestine cannot take them all.

MR. FRANK H. KNIGHT: I have wondered how much Palestine has been subsidized.

MR. WILSON: In 1935, which was the last normal year before riots and other disturbances began in Palestine, exports were about one-quarter of imports in money value. That means that British and American money has been poured into the country.

MR. WRIGHT: I am interested in that statement because I have heard the Zionist people say that Palestine made a great contribution to the war and that Britain is in debt to Palestine now. That would suggest that at least during the war years the exports had considerably exceeded the imports.

MR. BRODIE: That would not necessarily be true, if the imports were more or less gifts, which I think was largely the case. There was Lend-Lease and gifts of Zionists to the Jews in Palestine. Also there was considerable inflation in Palestine during the war, and still is; wage rates have gone up exceedingly high. I should imagine that Great Britain would have to pay very steeply for what she got.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN PALESTINE

MR. BRODIE: The promise that might eventuate from development of water resources and so on has very little bearing on one of the crucial questions in Palestine policy, which is: Who is going to be in the majority in Palestine? If I interpret the speaker's estimate correctly, he said that 300,000-400,000 additional persons, perhaps as many as 2,000,000 additional persons, might conceivably be supported by the development of the water resources.

MR. WILSON: The Committee of Inquiry used the figure of 391,000 displaced refugees in central Europe. That excludes Poland and

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

Russia, I believe. The ultimate potential of Palestine is certainly enough to upset the present majority of the Arabs.

MR. BRODIE: On that point, Professor Notestein, of Princeton, who has studied the situation very closely and who was cited in the report itself, is of the opinion, even if the doors were thrown wide open, that it would be impossible for the Jews to get a majority in Palestine. One reason is that the Jews have touched off a very rapid increase of Arab population. Measures of sanitation, which were the first measures taken, immediately caused a drop in the Arab death rate, and, of course, the Arab birth rate is a great deal higher than that of the Jews. His point was that the Jews are aiming for something which is, in effect, physically impossible, namely, a Jewish majority in Palestine.

MR. WILSON: Furthermore, illegal Arab immigration is much easier than Jewish illegal immigration. The Arabs can go across unguarded lines, whereas the Jews have to come from a distance.

MR. BRODIE: That report indicated that the proportionate growth of the Jews was much higher than that of the Arabs over the period covered but that the absolute growth was much higher on the part of the Arabs and that, from now on, the disparity in proportionate growth would tend to level out. There is every indication, with even a complete open door, that the population of the Arabs in Palestine would increase faster than that of the Jews.

MR. WRIGHT: If my memory is correct, the Jews have increased from under a hundred thousand to nearly half a million since the first World War, and the Arabs from about six hundred thousand to twice that number.

MR. BRODIE: By far the greater part of the Jewish growth has been in immigration; whereas in the Arab growth only a minute proportion—I think only about 5 per cent—has been in immigration, the rest is all natural increase.

MR. WRIGHT: Then take the question from the Arab point of view of land purchases. The Zionist organizations have acquired land, and one of their main objects is the acquisition of more lands. The Arabs think, if this process goes on, that eventually there will be an exodus of Arabs.

MR. WILSON: The Arabs have sold their lands to the Jews at very good prices. They object to it, but financially they have benefited very greatly in individual terms.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. WRIGHT: That is true, but it does mean that, when they sell, the lands are used by Jews and not by Arabs. If a substantial proportion of all the land of Palestine comes into Jewish hands, it is hard to see how the Arabs could continue to maintain a majority there.

MR. BRODIE: The relinquishment of Arab lands has not resulted in an exodus of Arab peoples but in a more acute danger—a landless population who formerly had the land and in short order forgot the fact that they were paid for it; always threatened by unemployment, because, in so far as Palestine becomes industrialized, it will be industrialized by the Jews who favor giving employment to the Jews. If you have any kind of cyclical variation, which seems to me inevitable, it will be the Arabs who suffer first.

MR. WRIGHT: The landless Arab is not the Arab who sells the land. There is extensive absentee landlordism. The Arab owner will sell the land, and the Arab tenants will then be pushed off.

MR. WILSON: The Arabs have benefited not only in health but also financially by Zionism. The normal situation up to and through the war has been plenty of employment at good wages. Up to the present, because of the presence in Palestine of British forces, there is still a good deal of money in circulation and a good deal of employment.

SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

MR. LEONHARDT: It is clear that a firm solution must be found. That means a solution which satisfies neither party but which is somewhat assisted by military force.

It seems to me, if only England and America deal with the problem and leave Russia out, that the Arabs may look to the Soviet Union, and then no permanent pacification of the region will be possible. Of course, this applies in all those areas that lie between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American sphere. Perhaps there should be Anglo-American-Russian negotiations preliminary to intervention by the Security Council of the United Nations.

MR. WILSON: Russia benefits, as long as she is not formally in this situation, through the friendliness toward her of the other Arab states. She maintains in a full sense diplomatic aloofness, but articles in such organs as *Pravda* may be friendly toward the Arab side and thus please the Arab states.

Whether she would be willing to leave that aloofness and go into such negotiation I don't know. Let's assume that she was. There might be a practical solution. Would it in strict terms be a legal solu-

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

tion, since Palestine is a mandate and should remain so until it changes to a trusteeship under the United Nations? For the United States and Great Britain to invite Russia to come in on it in advance of United Nations action seems to me somewhat unusual legalistically.

MR. WRIGHT: Great Britain as the mandatory has primary legal authority. The United States, though not a member of the League of Nations, has an interest by virtue of its treaty of 1924 with Great Britain. I suppose, if it were felt politically desirable to bring Russia in, Russia could similarly acquire a legal interest by making a treaty with Great Britain.

MR. LEONHARDT: Particularly if mandates are to be transferred into trusteeships.

MR. WRIGHT: The British announced in the London General Assembly that all their mandates would be placed under trusteeships with the exception of Palestine. They stated that Palestine was a special situation under discussion in the commission. Hence no formal declaration with regard to the future status of Palestine was made at that time.

MR. WILSON: But the Committee of Inquiry recommended that it remain a mandate until there had been consideration of its being changed to a trusteeship. One of Prime Minister Attlee's conditions was that the recommendations of the committee be treated as a whole.

MR. FARIS: Weren't the mandates when they were set up supposed to concern people in transition and looking forward to independence when they were able to manage their own affairs?

MR. WRIGHT: Precisely! The Permanent Mandates Commission called attention to the inherent contradiction in the Palestine mandate. All the mandates, and particularly the Near Eastern mandates, were designed to be transitional. The Covenant of the League of Nations and also the mandates required the mandatory to encourage institutions of self-government in order to facilitate self-determination. That has taken place in the cases of Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, and Transjordan, which, formerly mandates, are now independent states.

But, in the Palestine mandate, the mandatory was also required to establish a national home for the Jewish people. It was quite clear that if self-government were developed on the basis of control by the majority of the population there, in view of the known attitude of the

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Arabs, it would end the Jewish national home. If Palestine with its present population ratios became an independent state, Jewish immigration would be ended and probably things would not go very well with the Jews that are there.

MR. WHITE: Is Islamic culture a very fertile ground for Soviet ideology? Is the coup d'état experienced in Iran an exceptional development, the kind of thing that one might expect along Soviet frontiers, rather than a development possible in Egypt or other Moslem countries farther away from the Soviet Union?

MR. WILSON: I think you have to distinguish between Islam and the home of Islam, Arabia. Islam grew out of certain desert conditions, with two elements. One element was a certain kind of social democracy that, under Allah, people were equal. It was true that one individual was the leader of a tribe, but he was so in part by an accident, which did not make him in any essential spiritual or social way greater than his warriors. So there is a basic social democracy which has broken down in Arab agricultural areas and in Arab cities. That is part of Islam coming out of the desert.

The other element coming out of the desert is a kind of individualism of persons and of tribes. They are not easily subject to co-ordination and control from above. Again that heritage from the homeland of Islam breaks down when they become settled in agricultural areas and in cities, but it remains a basic tenet of Islam that they are socially equal and individualistic. So that the answer seems to be clouded. As you get away from the desert homeland of Islam, some of the elements do not continue in practice. As to whether communism would be acceptable to desert Moslems, those two factors would be somewhat conflicting. Communism claims to favor equality but not individualism.

MR. G. E. VON GRUNEBaum: From a practical viewpoint, it seems to me that as things look now the Arab countries will get communism if Russian influence prevails, even if only 10 per cent of the Arabs are Communists, and they would not get it if American interests prevail, even if the Arab inhabitants were 90 per cent Communist.

Would it not be a feasible purpose of United States policy, without committing ourselves too loudly and openly, to make both the Jewish side and the Arab side see their essential unity of interest. In all the discussions about the Palestine problem, both in Arabic and in English, which I have been able to follow, the Arab League has always been opposed to the Jewish interest and to British imperialism. The

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

West is going to get tired of financing the Jewish experiment, and the Arabs ought to get tired of missing out on the opportunity for a more general rise in living standards possible by industrialization of certain areas through such projects as the Jordan Valley Authority. Similar things are possible in Iraq if someone gave the money.

Leaving aside the unfortunate tradition of those last twenty-five years of political antagonism, I don't quite see why the Arabs could not view the amelioration of their country in the wider context of the Near East, or at least of a unit which would stretch from the Egyptian border to the Iraqi border. That is the only way in the ensuing future that they could attain to something approximating economic independence. Once such a shift of group viewpoint was accomplished, most of the controversial elements in the Palestinian situation would lapse, because it would not be very important whether there were 50,000 more Jews or 50,000 more Arabs in a certain place if their economies were sufficiently integrated.

Such a policy, if successful, would save a lot of money, of which a greater part comes from private sources but still is a drain on British and American economy; it would probably safeguard somewhat better, whether necessary or not, our strategic position in the Near East; and it would counteract that basic cause for the spread of communism which Mr. Hazard described, that is, the oppressed and miserable state of the masses in any given area.

To the outsider it seems to be the attraction of the Palestine problem as a political asset to whomever takes it up in the Near East which prevents such a shift of point of view. The Jews seem to me to have made the mistake of not allowing certain Arab circles to cut in on the industrialization of Palestine while there was time. I don't want to suggest that the Jews should bribe the Arabs, but emphasis upon economic possibilities might be helpful. Every Arab politician who has fought against Jewish immigration has been sure of a favorable reception. On the other hand, the conspicuous common sense of the Arabs prevented them from attaching too much blame for his failure to get anything. If he could not keep out the Jews in Palestine, they argued, it was not his failure but was due to the fact that British and Americans were too strong for him. So the politician was safe, politically speaking, whichever way it turned.

Such a shift in orientation is not to be expected, but it may be asked tentatively whether the need for American loans, whether the desire for a certain amount of American cultural help, might not be

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

strong enough inducements for leading Arab circles to reconsider the matter in terms of a larger Near East union. The Jews are under so much pressure anyway that I think they could be made to consider this reorientation themselves, and I understand that there are certain groups within Hebrew Palestine who are looking this way.

MR. WRIGHT: No one can doubt the political asset which the Arabs have in their opposition to Zionism. It is something like the political asset that Hitler had in his anti-Semitism, although the Arabs always point out that their opposition is not based on anti-Semitism because they, themselves, are Semitic. They also have a very much better principle for their policy—the commonly accepted principle of self-determination, that is, the right of the people who live in a given territory to run their own affairs and not to be invaded by alien elements.

From the political point of view, the opposition to Zionism assists the Arab states in keeping together internally, and it contributes greatly to maintaining the Arab League. If that opposition ended, the Arab League might break up, and, very possibly, internal disunity would develop in many of the Arab states. From the economic point of view, there are many advantages to each in co-operation between Arab and Jew; but such economic co-operation would probably promote political disunity in the Arab world.

MR. VON GRUNEBaum: This moment, when the immigration question has made tempers rise to a pitch, may not be the moment to initiate the policy I suggested. But we might attach an unofficial understanding to the loan to Syria that the government should do its part in toning down propaganda. On the other hand, if I were an Arab politician, I would run on a platform of keeping Western, including Russian, intervention to a minimum. I would point out that as long as the Arabs do not reach a reasonable understanding with the Jews, which is to the self-interest of both parties and would make for a more integrated and stronger Near East, the Arabs will always be subjected to more and more interference but that, once the entering wedge of the Palestine problem is taken away, Western powers and imperialists in general will find it much more difficult to endanger the sovereignty of those states.

I don't know whether that would have popular appeal. You are quite right it would have no popular appeal right now, but it might have some appeal behind the scenes.

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

MR. CLARENCE BERDAHL: Hasn't the issue become serious because of the insistence of a certain group of Jews, the Zionists, upon a national *state*, rather than upon a national *home*?

I have understood that the Arabs and the Jews had no difficulty in getting along within the state, but that trouble arose from the increasing pressure for what looks to the Arabs like a Jewish state instead of an Arab state. If, somehow, certain local autonomies could be arranged within Palestine, a solution might be found.

MR. WRIGHT: There have been sporadic outbreaks of violence in Palestine since the mandate was established. That violence has been roughly proportioned to the amount of immigration, and the British have considered this political factor in regulating immigration. In the early 1920's there was strong pressure for immigration, and a lot of immigration went in. The Arab temper went up until it almost reached the boiling-over point. The British limited the amount of immigration and the Arab temper quieted until, with renewed immigration, disturbances arose again in 1929. With the advent of Hitler, there was again a large Jewish immigration, and the Arab temper boiled up in open violence in 1936. The proportion of Jews in the country has increased, and each successive outburst of Arab temper has been more intense.

MR. BERDAHL: I have been informed by Jewish friends, some of whom have visited Palestine, that reports have been greatly exaggerated and that personal relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine have been friendly.

MR. WRIGHT: I visited Palestine in 1925, and our guide took great pleasure in showing how in certain Jewish and Arab villages adjacent to each other, there was personal friendship and co-operation. But there has always been political opposition. The Jewish parties, of which there are a number, have all of them sought to maintain the autonomy of the Jewish community, and the Arab parties have existed largely because of their opposition to Zionism. The party setup has been one of opposition between the two groups.

MR. WILSON: There have been proposals for co-operation. This morning's paper gives the rumor of another proposal of the same kind, a federation in which the Arab and Jewish areas shall be delimited. Such proposals have been in the air for years.

MR. BERDAHL: It seemed to me that the British proposal of a tripartite division was a sensible solution.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. WILSON: It made sense on the map, but it was not politically acceptable to the parties who had committed themselves in terms of a national state.

MR. BERDAHL: It seems to me also that the change from the mandate system to the trusteeship system has worsened the possibility of a solution, in view of the uncertainty as to what is meant by the "interested states and peoples" referred to in Articles 79 and 80 of the charter. This makes it possible for almost any group to block a solution through an appropriate trusteeship.

RELIGIOUS OPPOSITIONS

MR. PRICE: How effective is Islam as a unifying political force? I heard an officer serving in India suggest that the next world war would be the Moslems against the Christians.

MR. WILSON: I don't think that any religion is now effective in those terms. This is just a yarn. In 1935 the largest single group of Jewish immigrants into Palestine came from Poland. The Polish consul in Jerusalem said that Jewish immigrants came to Palestine for three reasons, social, economic, and religious, but that he did not know any who came for religious reasons.

The Palestine controversy is in nationalistic terms and not in religious terms, although religious terms are definitely used as the slogans. But what they are interested in is statehood, and while they are so interested it does not make much difference whether an Arab is a Moslem or a Christian. The Christian Arabs in Palestine are together with the others.

MR. WRIGHT: It is worth emphasis, that in much of the Near East there is solidarity between the Moslems and the Christians, most of them opposed to the Zionists. The Catholic church owns many properties in Palestine, and, in view of the fact that the Catholic church was fighting Islam for four centuries, one may be surprised at the present harmony of the Catholic church and the other Christian groups in Palestine with the Moslems in opposition to Zionism.

In Lebanon there is a different situation. The hostility between the Maronites, a Roman Catholic group, and the Druse, a Moslem sect, is the underlying political division.

MR. WILSON: Lebanon has welcomed thousands of Polish displaced persons—not Polish Jews but Polish Catholics—has welcomed them and has given them very easy citizenship. The Maro-

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

nites, being the largest single group in the Lebanon, want them as Lebanese citizens.

MR. VON GRUNEBaum: I think there is a *sub rosa* tension between the Christians and the Moslems in most of the Arab countries. The Christian Arabs want real independence and conditions so that the Moslem majority will not squeeze them out of government positions.

In Egypt in the late 1930's and in their recent elections nobody contested the right of Christians to vote, but there was some argument as to whether they could be elected to Parliament. A certain feeling identifying a Moslem, a member of the ruling class, and an Arab still lingers. The much-spoken-of tolerance of the early Moslems toward the people of Christian and Jewish faith, aside from the fact that it is somewhat overadvertised, never applied to Christians of Arab descent. In the eighth and ninth centuries some peaceable and not too disadvantageous arrangements were arrived at between Christians and Moslems in Iraq. The Christians of Arab descent, Bedouins of Christian faith, were usually excepted from such arrangement, not in theory but in practice. They were massacred wherever possible because it was felt to be a blemish on the escutcheon of the Moslems that some fellow-Arabs should be Christians.

While, of course, I am far from drawing a complete parallel between those days and ours, there is no doubt that, once Moslem Arab states are completely established under their own sovereignty, the Christians will find themselves discriminated against in certain ways. That even goes for Iraq. It applies to those Moslems who do not happen to belong to the ruling Moslem sect, such as the Shiites, or are not of Arab blood, such as the Kurds and the Persians. These groups are very badly discriminated against in respect to government positions.

MR. WRIGHT: There are always many potential oppositions. The art of politics always makes use of the technique of tempering particular oppositions by emphasis upon other oppositions. For the time being, the main parties and leaders in Palestine, and, I think, in the Near East generally, emphasize the cleavage between the Arabs, both Christians and Moslems, on the one side, and the Jews, on the other. If that emphasis were withdrawn, as some political leaders would like, the opposition between the Moslems and the Christians might come to the front. It might become the major cleavage.

MR. VON GRUNEBaum: The literature of the revolutionary committee that directed the civil war of 1936 and later used old anti-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Jewish material—material which supposedly or actually goes back to the early centuries of Islam, to show that the Jews are timber for hell, that the Jews are this and that, based on statements alleged to be from the Prophet and his early companions. There are parallel Moslem traditions which say exactly the same thing with respect to the Christians. You could pull these out of the drawer and put them in another brochure at a moment's notice. It seems quite important to stress that, while national sovereignty is the aim of the leading classes, one of the most effective tools to get collaboration of the lower classes is this religious handle.

PALESTINE COMMITTEE REPORT

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Berdahl referred to the distinction which had been made in this controversy between a Jewish national home *in* Palestine and a Jewish national home *of* Palestine, a distinction which was emphasized in the so-called Churchill White Paper of 1922. The British policy since that time has not favored a Jewish state of Palestine; the British have interpreted the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate, and all the other documents as meaning a Jewish national home *in* Palestine, that is, a cultural home in which the Jews would be able to maintain their educational and religious institutions and their communities under full protection, but not a Jewish state. I think that was formally accepted by the Zionist organization earlier. In the recent Zionist propaganda, however, they are making a great deal of certain statements of Lloyd George, of Balfour, and others, which they now say give clear evidence that the intention of the Jewish national home always was a Jewish state of Palestine, and that, I think, is now the official position of the Zionist organization. That change has greatly increased the alarm of the Arabs. I think that the British always had the hope—I know it was expressed by British officials in 1925—that a system could be worked out so that the Christian community, the Moslem community, and the Jewish community would all feel complete security in Palestine, and the government would be of impartial character but not under the control of any one of the groups.

That is the recommendation of the recent commission report, that Palestine will be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state but that all three faiths will be protected under international guaranty. It has always seemed to me that the only hope of peaceful solution was along that line. Palestine should be made a permanently internation-

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

al state, a sort of cultural and religious preserve, an exception to the normal principle of self-determination. Because of the interest of a considerable proportion of the world's population from a religious point of view in that little country, the prime purpose of the international state would be to guarantee the security, the autonomy, and the cultural opportunity of each of the religious communities there. All one can say is that the attitude of both factions seems to have become less amenable to such a solution. The Arabs are demanding in louder tones that it must be an Arab state; the Jews are demanding in louder tones that it must be a Jewish state. We seem to be further from that kind of solution, although it was formally recommended by the commission.

There was a contradiction in the commission's report in coupling this recommendation with that for the admission of 100,000 Jews. Possibly if the report had left that out and merely referred in less precise terms to facilitating Jewish immigration, it would have been less of a red flag to the Arab bull; it perhaps would have given less encouragement to the Zionists to think that the real intention was to facilitate the creation of a Jewish state.

MR. BRODIE: There is no logical connection between that proposal and the rest of the report that I can see.

MR. WRIGHT: I agree.

MR. WILSON: It does have a relationship to paragraph 6 of the report that the mandatory should facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions.

MR. BRODIE: The people of the Committee visited the camps of the displaced persons in Europe, and that obviously made a very profound impression upon them.

In that connection I would like to relate an anecdote that was told me. It said that a questionnaire was distributed among the people in one of the displaced-persons camps in Europe asking them to give the order of preference of the three places to which they would like to go, and the great majority of the questionnaires came back, "Palestine, Palestine, Palestine." The questionnaire was returned to them with the statement that they could name any one country only once, whereupon a great majority came back with Palestine first, and, "if not, then the gas chambers." If true, that is an indication of the kind of attitude of the people who, after all, have to be transferred.

MR. WRIGHT: There is no doubt of that. There is also no doubt of the great importance of the public statement which President Tru-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

man made in response to this situation which exists in Europe, using the figure 100,000. I suppose that a political situation had developed so that the support of the United States could hardly be expected unless that proposal were included.

MR. BRODIE: Some of the members of that committee later came out very forcefully saying that those 100,000 should be sent immediately and that the Arabs were only bluffing. Apparently, there were members on the commission who felt quite strongly about it more than merely for political reasons.

MR. WILSON: I don't see how they could avoid a sense of urgency and a sense of compassion. There is the political element that Truman had said 100,000 and that American acceptance would be greater if 100,000 or some specific figure were in, but because some members of the commission had gone to Europe and seen the urgency, I can fully understand their putting that in.

WORLD ASPECTS OF NEAR EASTERN PROBLEMS

MR. WHITE: Considering the economic and political difficulties which have been referred to, I doubt the capacity of Palestine to absorb a large additional Jewish immigration. I think it is the worst example of "buck-passing" that I know anything about for the United States and the British Commonwealth to talk about putting the refugee problem of the Jewish people in Europe on top of the Palestine problem. We could take the 100,000 Jews we are talking about sending to Palestine and absorb them in the United States far more easily, far more economically, and with a far greater future than they can find in Palestine.

Our discussion has been typical of most Near East discussions in concentrating on Palestine. Most Near Eastern problems might better be considered from a world point of view. If we could come to any conclusion in regard to the world oil supply, I think the temperature that we run over Persian oil would tend to go down. I think the refugee problem is the same. If we would really attack that problem on a world-wide basis, a lot of friction might be reduced in the Palestine situation.

We may have to come to some conclusions about narrow waterways on a world-wide basis. We are inclined not to talk about any canals because we have one, but it may be that we shall have to consider the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal. We cannot deny the interest of Russia in these and other Near Eastern problems.

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

Thus, in considering our foreign policy, if we can reach some conclusions about general problems which apply in the Near East, it will reduce the necessity of handling the Near East as a specific area. Outside of those general problems which are larger than the Near East, the Near East does not rank very high on our priority list of areas in which we have national interests. Latin America is above it, the Far East is above it, and Europe is above it.

MR. BRODIE: I agree with what Mr. White just said, particularly with reference to the ability of the United States to absorb the populations which need to be transferred from Europe. A few years ago I was traveling through that part of southern Arizona which lies near California, and I saw there not merely in prospect but already under way one of the greatest irrigation projects in the world. These areas had all the attributes necessary for successful irrigation, one of which is generally overlooked, namely, the requirement of a lot of flat land below the mountains from which the water is drawn. Those lands were being held, presumably, for the settlement of veterans from the wars. I wonder how many veterans would want to go out into that God-forsaken land—it is extremely hot and away out in the desert—and convert themselves into farmers. There, it seemed to me, was an area available for refugees if we wanted to make it such.

OIL PROBLEM

MR. BRODIE: On the other hand, I cannot quite agree with Mr. White's comment on the relative unimportance of the Near East. I think we generally are inclined to underestimate the enormous importance of the Near and Middle East in terms of petroleum resources, and especially in relation to the resources of the United States. There is a lot of controversy among oil geologists in this country, but it is pretty clear that the United States is facing diminishing opportunities of oil exploitation. In late years we have just about managed to keep up in terms of new discoveries with current consumption, and most oil men feel that cannot continue much longer. On the other hand, the Middle East is by all odds the greatest reservoir of oil in the world. All that is important to the Iran question. In other words, you cannot quite separate international crises from their local aspects.

I could give you one figure which indicates in the rough the oil potentialities of the Middle East. Mr. de Gollyer, an oil geologist, who was sent there by the United States government, stated that the

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

present proved and indicated reserves of the Middle East are approximately those of the United States, but those reserves were proved or indicated on the basis of about 135 wells, whereas in this country ten times that number of "wild-cat" wells are drilled every year.

So you begin to get an idea of how great is the disparity between the petroleum reserves of this country and the resources of the Middle East, which are relatively unclaimed because political instability has thus far prevented their development. That is one of the big problems in terms of a very vital and, unfortunately, also strategic raw material.

MR. WHITE: How much good is a strategic reserve that far away from home?

MR. BRODIE: When I say "strategic reserve," I don't say necessarily that we are interested in it because of its utility to us during wartime. We are interested in it because we don't want our own reserves to diminish too rapidly, that is, if we are looking at it from a purely strategic angle. I think the commercial angle looms much larger than the strategic angle, but that is one aspect of it. The Russians apparently don't want to see American and British capital go in and take over there, which would be a normal sequence of events if the resources were left open to exploitation in the traditional manner. The Russians look upon it as a necessary strategic resource from their point of view.

MR. FEIS: I do not think one can say that the oil resources in the Middle East are unclaimed. Almost, if not quite, all the areas that are genuinely promising are held under concession. The chief exceptions are these five northern provinces of Iran to which the Russians have just now obtained title, so that you have a situation of vested ownership there that you have to deal with in any joint program.

The size of the oil reserves does not mean of itself that it is advisable for the American government to take steps to establish those reserves as an effective strategic reserve. We are now drawing on the American-controlled oil fields of the Middle East rather extensively. Our Navy is buying a substantial amount of its currently consumed oil from Saudi Arabia, which is part of the general development. * The proportionate use of Middle Eastern reserves in total world use in the last twenty-four months has risen very decidedly.

There has been a conjunction of relationship between the American and the British efforts to get concessions in the area and the Russian efforts. Southern Iran, according to the geologists is the important

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

oil area in that country and most of the oil in southern Iran is under Anglo-Iranian concession. The potentialities of the rest of Iran did not arouse sustained interest until 1943 and 1944, mainly because of their uncertain commercial values. There were sporadic discussions of concessions in the early 1920's with foreign companies. Then in 1943-44 American enterprises particularly became active in an attempt to get concessions in the still unassigned areas. Two large companies began negotiations. My own impression was, and is, that they were stimulated to do so by the emerging danger of exhaustion of reserves in this hemisphere and by the fact that the American government seemed to be taking measures which would help other American oil companies already in possession of concessions in the Middle East. There are many American oil companies. Four or five of them could see a future in what the American government was doing. Several that were left out of any part in the Near Eastern fields said, "We had better make a place for ourselves"; just as in any newly discovered field in the American states, which is a really big one, the companies pile in, one after another, because each has a vast distribution system and wants to make sure that its future commercial position is as good as any other company. So two American companies went in. They were followed almost simultaneously by Shell oil; in fact, Shell slid in between them, so you had three companies discussing concessions with the Iranian government. None of those three companies was negotiating for concessions in the five northern provinces; they were negotiating for concessions north and east of the present Anglo-Iranian concession. Then came the Russian Petroleum Mission, and then came the Iranian action saying, "No concessions during the war."

That is what happened in 1943-44. But it would have been quite possible, and I think that it remains quite possible to grant the Soviet Union its concessions in the northern provinces and to grant those two American oil companies that have no concessions in the Middle East the assignment of the concessions that they sought.

MR. WRIGHT: If I understood Mr. Brodie, he suggested that the "proved and indicated" reserves in the Middle East were greater than those in the United States.

MR. FEIS: Personally, I think that will turn out to be so. At the same time that De Gollyer brought home this report, there was another government report which was never published and that mentioned figures far higher than those of the De Gollyer report.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. WRIGHT: In speaking of the Middle East as being comparable to the United States, is it not assumed that the reserves in Saudi Arabia are larger than those in Iran?

MR. FEIS: Yes. Estimates of oil reserves are compounded in peculiar and rather human ways. There are no figures in the world which you can play with more easily than with oil reserves. However, I think it is almost certain that these estimates of De Gollyer and others of the Middle East are in their general dimensions reliable. The underground reserves may be twenty millions at a certain depth, or they may be thirty millions; but that it is comparable to the whole of the United States no one who has looked at those structures or has engaged in testing or drilling denies.

MR. WHITE: The pressure that Near Eastern oil will take off the United States will be very considerable, but up until the present, this has been felt only in consumption outside the United States. We are much the largest consumers of oil in the world, but our naval use, that Mr. Feis mentioned, is very much less than our domestic use. If the oil companies put up refineries in Saudi Arabia, refined products can be brought into the United States profitably in spite of the tariff, but crude oil cannot. I believe no oil or oil products are being imported as yet. Moreover, only a small number of American oil companies are established in the Near East, and if they attempted to import into the United States, they would be opposed by other American companies who don't want the competition. Should we allow this opposition to prevent the use of Near Eastern oil for our enormous domestic consumption?

MR. FEIS: The big new Saudi Arabian refinery is just about to be completed. In another three months it ought to be in operation.

MR. WRIGHT: May I ask what the present status is of the pipeline that was discussed two years ago?

MR. FEIS: The companies themselves have gone ahead and have completed their preliminary talks with all the governments whose permission they might have to seek, and all of them said, "Sure!" Any time they want to put up the cash, they are in the position to build the pipeline and put up the terminal facilities. They are not doing it for several rather obvious reasons—chiefly, political uncertainties of the Middle East, and certainly the competitive situation just mentioned by Mr. White. They don't know where their markets are, especially in view of the fact that the total output in the Middle East has almost tripled in the last five years. The present outflow of

DISCUSSION OF THE NEAR EAST

Middle East oil, without this pipeline, is greater than the prospective markets for the immediate future. It would be greater than present markets if it were not for the several large naval contracts. That is not a very good immediate prospect for investment in that pipeline, which probably would require also extensive local refining and terminal facilities, which are costly.

IMPORTANCE OF NEAR EAST IN AMERICAN POLICY

MR. WRIGHT: I agree with Mr. White that from the American point of view, the Middle East is less important than other areas of the world. The striking feature of the Middle East, however, is the very rapid increase of American political interest and responsibility, due largely to Palestine and oil. During most of the nineteenth century, we regarded the Near East as an area of European imperial conflict, which we should keep out of politically. There were, it is true, certain American religious and educational institutions there, but there was hardly any political interest. There is no section of the world in which American political interest has been developing faster during the last decades.

MR. WHITE: I would like to add, though I don't know whether it is a "cause-and-effect" relation, that our reputation in the Near East has gone down almost in direct proportion to our poking our nose into the area. Our Palestine interest might in the future become cultural rather than political. Oil, on the other hand, I think will be a matter of increasing importance, though, if I am not mistaken, part of the reason for American companies getting the oil concessions in Saudi Arabia was because they were not backed politically.

My feeling has always been one of skepticism as to whether we do ourselves any good by putting a lot of political pressure in an area like the Near East. We enjoyed a reputation there which I think was better than in most of the areas of the world at the time when our political interference was certainly less than that of any other major power.

MR. WRIGHT: Isn't that inevitable? The assumption of political interest and responsibility is bound to be characterized by the word "imperialism" by a very large number of people.

MR. WHITE: I think we have some political responsibility in Palestine over the short run. In the longer run I think that should be changed to an international responsibility.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

In the matter of oil, we have escaped criticism for "imperialism" because the oil companies have gone in on a business basis and have not been strongly backed diplomatically. I should prefer to see that continue, but I am afraid that a pipeline will lead to demands for "measures of security" backed by the government, a thing which we have not demanded up until now.

MR. WILSON: It would be ideal if our interest in Palestine were of the same cultural character as our interest in the American University of Beirut, but it seems to me that our interest in Palestine is inevitably political and presupposes activism on our part. I would, however, like to agree that Near Eastern problems be treated in the larger scene of world concern, whether it be oil, anti-Semitism, or other political interest.

EASTERN EUROPE

By ALEX N. DRAGNICH¹

THE term "eastern Europe" has in recent years acquired considerable elasticity, for, traditionally, the Balkans have not been considered a part of eastern Europe, nor have Germany and Czechoslovakia, which belong to central Europe. For the purposes of this discussion, however, "eastern Europe" may be viewed as a politicogeographic term to describe that part of Europe in which the policies and influences of the United States and those of the Soviet Union meet. But it is necessary to point out that, as political-strategic area problems, there are important differences between eastern Europe and Germany. Eastern Europe is *not* an intermediate zone between the areas of predominance of Russia, on the one hand, and the Western powers, on the other; but Germany is. Eastern Europe is, *in fact*, a Russian security zone, in which the Russians believe that Teheran and Yalta gave them predominance. They make no similar claim to a concession of predominance in Germany, nor are we likely seriously to consider any such concession. Consequently, let us first turn to eastern Europe and then to Germany.

EASTERN EUROPE

To discuss the formulation of a United States policy toward eastern Europe requires treatment of two basic considerations: (1) the geographic proximity of eastern Europe and its strategic importance to the Soviet Union and (2) the political complexion of the new regimes in the states of eastern Europe.

Geographic proximity has in the past frequently been associated with regional influences. We have our Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere, and the British their imperial lifeline, which extends through the Mediterranean and elsewhere. But to compare the present Anglo-American implementation of regional influences with current Russian methods would be erroneous. To be sure, at times in the past we have used force in Latin America to determine

¹ Assistant professor of history, Western Reserve University.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the complexion of internal regimes. At present, however, while we possess, and at times make known, our preferences, we have discarded our previous techniques. And, while we may employ economic and moral weapons, even Argentina need not fear our military intervention. While we recognize the strategic importance of eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, we object to what appears, on the surface at least, an attempt at complete domination of this area. To the Russians, however, our discarding of former methods in dealing with Latin America stems not from any changed attitude on our part but from the simple fact that they are no longer necessary. Moreover, the Russians are not likely to debate the moral justification of any means capable of eliminating the employment of eastern Europe as a springboard of invasion. And in the minds of the men in the Kremlin there is a close association between the kinds of regimes which in the past prevailed in this area and the invasion of their homeland. Soviet leaders have stated openly that anti-Soviet regimes in eastern Europe will not be tolerated.

That eastern Europe is strategically important to the Soviet Union we have not denied. But we are in considerable disagreement as to just what constitutes an anti-Soviet regime. Presumably, a democratic regime would not be anti-Soviet, but the Russians and we also differ on the meaning of democracy. To us democracy has a basically political connotation, while in the minds of the Soviet leaders democracy is identified with economic opportunity. In recent years to the latter concept has been added a generous dash of antifascism. Add to this concept the fact that Soviet influence has not been a factor in this area during the last thirty years, and it is not difficult to conclude that the Soviet Union is attempting to establish—by superior force—the kinds of regimes in eastern Europe that it wants. On the other hand, our interest in eastern Europe, and particularly our hostility toward regimes which Moscow regards as democratic, are interpreted by Moscow as calculated maneuvers which encourage anti-Soviet elements.

The second major consideration—the political complexion of the regimes in the states of eastern Europe—is perhaps least understood. During the war we failed to appreciate the fact that eastern Europe was not only going through a war but also a revolution, and there is little evidence that we comprehend it even now. There is little likelihood that regimes such as prevailed in these states during the twenties and thirties, with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia,

EASTERN EUROPE

would return, even if Moscow were completely neutral. Nor is the trend away from capitalism, evident in nearly every one of these states, likely to deviate materially. These facts, I believe, are appreciated. What seems to escape our comprehension, however, is the role of the Communist parties in these states. We tend to judge their strength and influence in accordance with the percentage of the votes polled by them. This, it seems to me, is a misleading approach.

To be sure, we need to employ voting strength as a criterion, but in the case of Communists it reflects their true strength and influence only when their vote represents but a small percentage of the total. When their voting strength approaches or surpasses the point where, by obstructive tactics of various sorts, government without their participation is impossible, or at best unstable and temporary, we must take other factors into consideration. Among these are (1) the Communist devotion to political action, (2) the Communist expectation that a fair share of their policies will be accepted in return for participation in the government, and (3) the fact that the Communists are supported by Moscow.

Given this last element—and there is no indication that Moscow's support of Communists will evaporate—it seems to me that in all the Balkan and eastern European states the Communists have reached or soon will reach a point where it would be difficult for coalitions excluding them to survive for long. Their willingness to sacrifice personal comfort for political action cannot but serve, up to a point at least, to increase their strength. And, while Communist strength may for a time decline with the withdrawal of occupation forces, the Communists are still likely to retain this advantage for some time to come. Equally important is the determination on their part, unless they are already in possession of political power, to exploit to the utmost those situations which require their assent if government is to function at all. Domestically, this will mean more socialization. In the realm of foreign policy the Communists will insist on looking to Moscow, but there is little likelihood of any comparable element which will insist on a preference for Washington or London. Even the anti-Communist parties, in view of the geographic proximity of their states to the Soviet Union, would not be likely to advocate such a preference, which could with considerable justification be interpreted as anti-Soviet.

By and large, these are the circumstances in which our foreign policy toward eastern Europe must be conceived. Short of war with

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the Soviet Union and the imposition of our military rule over these areas, we are not likely to reverse the trend of this revolution. I assume that we do not want war and that, even if we did, we would not be prepared to impose for a long time to come our military government over a considerable part of the globe. Essentially, therefore, our policy toward eastern Europe must rest upon the assumption that coexistence of our two systems is within the realm of reality. In practice, this can have but one meaning: unless the United Nations is able to wield considerably more authority, which means that unless both the United States and Russia are willing to endow it with more power, we must be prepared to have Russia's views prevail in crucial problems affecting Eastern Europe.

OUR PAST POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE

In the past our interest in the states of eastern Europe has been small. It is true that at the time of the first World War we aided in the creation of Czechoslovakia and of Poland and, to a lesser extent, of Yugoslavia. Our postwar withdrawal from Europe, however, and our failure to participate in European security arrangements served to dissipate most of our wartime interest in these states. There was no common religious or cultural heritage to attract us. Moreover, on the economic side, none of these states, including Germany, was to be found among the top ten nations with whom the bulk of our trade was carried on. For some years prior to World War II, democracy was, with the exception of Czechoslovakia and possibly Finland, in eclipse in eastern Europe. For our part, while we often despised these despots, we nonetheless all too frequently found them and their supporting aristocrats to be "nice people," whose education and culture we found enjoyable. Our contacts also included various liberal-democratic elements who, for the most part, were excluded from the respective governments. Unfortunately for us, members of the first group, especially the business people, engaged in large numbers in collaboration with Hitler and his satellites. And among the liberal-democratic elements few took part in the resistance to the Fascists. The Communists and those willing to collaborate with them gained ascendancy largely by default. The liberal-democratic elements, in the end, were hopelessly divided into three general groups. The one group joined in co-operation with the Communists, another remained inactive in watchful waiting, and a third formed an opposition to the leftist regimes. This last group has been largely ineffective. One of

EASTERN EUROPE

their greatest difficulties stemmed from their inability or unwillingness to dissociate themselves from pro-Fascist elements who have since flocked to their banners.

THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY

Unlike eastern Europe, where Soviet predominance is a fact, whether we like it or not, Germany is a crucial intermediate zone, where neither we nor the Russians can afford to yield a predominant influence to the other. While the extent of our disagreement on Germany is not yet fully clear, it should be noted that there have been areas of agreement. We have agreed that Austria should be independent, that East Prussia should no longer be a part of Germany, that Germany is never again to become a threat to peace. Beyond this, our policy toward Germany has been of a largely negative nature. We want neither fascism nor communism in Germany. We speak of the necessity of somehow uniting the four zones for certain purposes, but we do not make clear what type of Germany we wish finally to emerge from these transitional measures. Our inability to develop a more positive program for Germany, as in the case of eastern Europe generally, would seem to stem from our inability or unwillingness to look facts in the face. All the parties now functioning in Germany which command some appreciable support favor considerable socialization. If, therefore, Germany is not to be a Fascist state, neither is it likely to be a liberal-capitalist state. We must narrow our considerations to those alternative solutions which give some promise of possibility of realization.

There is also another consideration. Our views on Germany will need to be reconciled not only with Soviet views but also with the outlook of the British and the French. The problem of the Ruhr, Germany's western boundary, and reparations, not to speak of the problem of German internal reconstruction, have produced divergent plans and policies. Moscow's recently announced plans foresee a united Germany under a central government, whose democratic character will be tested by its ability to extirpate the remnants of fascism and its responsibility in fulfilling all its obligations to the Allies, including the payment of reparations. What part of the \$10,000,000,000 demanded in reparations by Moscow would need to be paid before the test would be met is not clear. Nor is it evident what type of government would be capable of extirpating Fascist elements. On neither of these points is agreement likely to be easy among the four powers.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Moscow will, no doubt, continue to promote a leftist, or an outright Communist, Germany—certainly, a Germany favorably inclined toward Moscow. Such a Germany, from the Kremlin's point of view, would provide the greatest degree of security. The French, for their part, have been insisting on severing certain regions from Germany and have continued in opposing a central German administration, although recently they have evidenced some inclination to compromise on the latter.

It is out of these only partially stated divergent views that a solution for Germany must emerge. De-Nazification; a unified and complementary arrangement for the control of the economy; strict joint supervision and control over large-scale industry which will remain; just reparations for Russia and the other victims of German plunder; free operation of trade-unions and of non-Nazi political parties in all zones; policies with regard to German education—these are the basic points on which agreement should be sought and may be possible with the Russians. But it should always be kept in mind that the Russians will not agree to the establishment of a German regime in which the partisans of the Soviet Union do not have an influence at least equal to our own. We must be ready, it seems to me, to foster a policy, probably against considerable overt and covert British opposition, which will permit the Russians access to complete observation of industrial management in Germany, on the basis of equality, of course, for all zones.

THE FUTURE

In the light of the above facts and in view of our past policies, what ought our future policy to be? Politically, it seems to me, there is little that we can do, except perhaps in Germany. Our wartime opportunities for giving direction to the revolutions in eastern Europe were lost in the erroneous belief that political decisions could wait until the conclusion of hostilities. There is no suggestion here that criticism of these regimes should cease; but as a nation we ought to ask ourselves what benefit such criticism will produce. What, it might be asked, can we expect to gain by continued intervention in eastern Europe? Political hostility at this time can do little more than destroy whatever good will America may still have in these nations. This is particularly true when our hostility seems to be devoid of consistency. We insist when rightist or center parties abstain from voting that there is no freedom, but we fail to censure the conduct of elections

EASTERN EUROPE

which have been boycotted in far greater numbers by leftist or liberal parties. Moreover, there is little doubt that our continued intervention in eastern Europe is interpreted by the Russians as a reversal of Roosevelt's policy and, consequently, as an attempt to deprive them of a legitimate sphere once explicitly or implicitly conceded to them.

Economically, if we are to judge by current reports, eastern Europe will trade much more with the Soviet Union than before. Moreover, there is a tendency for these states to create state monopolies to handle imports and exports. We shall have to be prepared to adjust our trade-practices to meet this development. If we make loans to these states, they should be made on the basis of ability to pay, reciprocal trade-arrangements—or, if we want, even gratis. But if we attempt to use them as weapons of political pressure we shall reap only ill will.

Finally, the problem of a foreign policy for eastern Europe cannot be divorced from the question of the United Nations. Regional defense arrangements, properly understood and set up, can and should be pillars of the United Nations. They can be transitional vehicles which will travel in the direction of ultimate world unity. But current Soviet and American regional defense plans, born of mutual suspicions, can only add to the existing distrust which will certainly weaken the United Nations. If we fail in the United Nations, if we fail in controlling effectively atomic energy, no policy for eastern Europe can have any hope of success.

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

THE discussion of eastern Europe dealt in part with the political, economic, and cultural situation within the countries of that area, but more attention was given to American and Soviet policies in respect to those countries. The possibilities of conflict were not overlooked. Concern was expressed by some at the alleged development of military influence in the Department of State, and by others at alleged evidences of Pan-Slavism, economic expansionism, and security expansionism in Soviet foreign policy. Possibilities were suggested for ameliorating tensions by the development of Germany as a buffer zone, by mutual reduction of suspicions through careful negotiation, or by development of the United Nations.

PAN-SLAVISM

MR. HANS ROTHFELS: Pan-Slavism was discarded by the Soviet Union but was revived during the war and was one of the attractive factors, it seems to me, in the policy which Russia has carried out in the eastern and central region. It offered possibilities for a voice in the region beyond those offered by a merely national or geographical emphasis.

The agrarian character of the area and the fact that the problem of land distribution had been practically unsolved during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries opened to the Soviet Union a field of influence which is not one of power politics only, or of strategic or material domination, but is of an ideological and social character. The concept of nationality in eastern Europe differs from the middle-class conception of the nineteenth century. The fixing of national frontiers and the building-up of states, particularly in the area of mixed nationalities, offers opportunities for Russian influence on the basis of Soviet concepts of nationality and of agricultural communism.

MR. DRAGNICH: Certainly, the Slavic nature of most of the states of eastern Europe is significant. I think, however, that the primary consideration in Soviet eyes is the strategic element. The fact that this area happens to be Slavic makes it that much easier for the Russians to make it an effective security zone. The chances are that the

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

Russians would be following a somewhat similar policy even if the area were not Slavic, in view of the relationship of that area to previous invasions of Russia. The fact that the area is basically agrarian and may, in turn, provide the Soviets with a market for manufactures is an additional consideration which would simply make it easier for the Russians.

MR. ROTHFELS: And also affect the point of view and policy of the Western nations.

MR. WRIGHT: Is there any marked difference in the Soviet policy in regard to the Slavic and the non-Slavic nations in its zone?

MR. DRAGNICH: I cannot see much differentiation in policy of the Soviet Union toward Bulgaria, which is Slavic and probably closer to Russia in kinship than is any other Slavic nation, and the policy toward Rumania, which is non-Slavic. I think that, when Soviet occupation troops finally withdraw from the satellite nations, the Russians will be able to trust the Bulgarians more than the Rumanians and the Hungarians. The local Communist party is likely to be much stronger in Bulgaria than in Rumania.

MR. WRIGHT: The Soviet government has sought to eliminate the conception that even the Soviet Union itself is a Slavic state.

MR. DRAGNICH: That is true. Any Marxists to whom you might have talked in the past few years would have denied, even during the war, that there was anything like a revival of Pan-Slavism.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN EASTERN EUROPE

MR. BALLANTINE: I wonder whether it is true that we lost an opportunity in the countries of eastern Europe in an erroneous belief that political arrangements could be made after the war. Did we not postpone political arrangements until after the war because we felt that the winning of the war was so supremely important that we could not take any chances at a most critical time on something that was less important and that might prejudice victory at the earliest possible moment?

MR. DRAGNICH: I think actually there was a general belief that we could postpone decisions on boundaries and on internal regimes. Under the Atlantic Charter we talked about a free choice, but the Atlantic Charter did not tell us how to form a provisional government.

The other element that you mention was present. In talking to politicians of eastern European states, we said, "Forget your differ-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

ences; let us all unite in getting the war over, and then we will talk about the settlement of these problems." I think that that could have been avoided in part. There was some opportunity to deal with governments-in-exile and other groups. I think we lost some opportunities.

MR. HOSELITZ: I don't think our contacts with the Polish government-in-exile changed the situation in Poland very much. I think the situation in Poland at present is comparable with that in Rumania. Whether it is going to be so in the future, I don't know.

MR. DRAGNICH: I don't know that our policy was any different toward Poland than toward some of the other states. We were inclined to say, "Let's leave the Polish government-in-exile as the official representative; we will wait until they get back to the country and then they can hold elections."

The struggle for power did not wait until the exiled governments got back, even in Czechoslovakia, although the situation was very much better there because the policy followed by Mr. Beneš was more enlightened; there was a strong democratic heritage, and his own reputation in Czechoslovakia was much better than, let's say, some of the Yugoslav politicians' or some of the Polish politicians'.

MR. WRIGHT: Wouldn't there be danger of serious embarrassment if the government had allowed itself to get too closely attached to any of the parties in these countries during the war?

MR. DRAGNICH: Yes, that is entirely possible. But, assuming that we wanted to do something with this area—that we wanted to assist regimes of a liberal-democratic nature—certainly our general attitude did not offer very much hope.

MR. WRIGHT: Might you not do the regime you favor more harm than good by giving them a certain support and encouragement when you really haven't the power in the area to help them effectively?

MR. DRAGNICH: I don't mean to be arguing that we should have encouraged every element, but what I am saying is we should stop squawking now. We have injured American prestige considerably, partly because you cannot run a democracy any differently.

The American political representative in Bulgaria, for example, was constantly visited by so-called liberal-democratic groups, who asked advice. Sometimes these groups were encouraged not to compromise with the Communists; and then, later on, representatives of the group came to us and said, "You encouraged us not to com-

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

promise with the Communists, but, look, the Communists are winning; aren't you going to do anything?"

MR. MERRIAM: Do you attribute that to the inherent nature of democracy? You don't mean to say that democracy could not organize a positive foreign policy or world policy, do you?

MR. DRAGNICH: What I am suggesting is that in our foreign relations, when we send out a diplomatic representative somewhere, we don't tie him down with iron-clad rules as the Soviets do.

MR. WRIGHT: I thought the idea you had in mind was that democracy could not utilize certain methods for building up parties in their favor that might be utilized in these countries by the Soviets.

MR. DRAGNICH: That is correct; you can't.

MR. LEONHARDT: I thought you meant originally that democracy by its very nature would lend a certain amount of support to the various parties of nontotalitarian nature, which I think would be logically true. That is to say, the American envoy would, *prima facie*, have a certain sympathy for a multiparty system and, following that general idea, might get in contact with these various parties and lend them a certain degree of support.

MR. DRAGNICH: Our general inclination has been to let them organize as many parties as they wish. Those of a democratic nature have certainly in the past looked to the United States for at least moral leadership in their fight for democracy.

MR. LEONHARDT: Each regime by its very nature carries into foreign affairs some of the aspects of its domestic program. Consequently, there is a danger that Europe might fall under a totalitarian party. It was normal that an American diplomat, without any specific instruction, would entertain contacts to a certain degree with the so-called democratic parties.

MR. BRODIE: Mr. Dragnich, your comment might be interpreted in quite another fashion having little relation to democracy. Isn't it true that there is a certain residual isolationism in this country? Consequently, our diplomats in eastern Europe hesitate to be very forward in pursuing a policy because they fear they will not be supported. That element of isolationism may have a great deal more to do with that particular problem than democracy.

MR. DRAGNICH: Our diplomatic representatives in their contacts with various people in these countries do, of course, rely on certain instructions from Washington. But often in drafting a policy statement, a group like this sits in the State Department, and they express many divergent views of what the instructions ought to be.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. BRODIE: Yes, but somebody has to resolve those divergent views; presumably, the Secretary of State or whomever he delegates that authority to. That is no reason why the man in the field should get a mass of divergent views as his instructions.

MR. DRAGNICH: The result of these divergent views is that the instructions are either so broad as to be indefinite or so specific on a point as to commit us and get us into hot water later on.

MR. MERRIAM: That might happen with any government, even the Kremlin. Life is not so simple.

MR. ROTHFELS: In Germany in the American zone a definitely democratic policy is being pursued. This policy takes no definite stand regarding the existing parties but is willing to recognize them all under certain general equal conditions. The British, on the other hand, favor one definite party, the Social Democrats, which are more on the same line as their government. The Russians, of course, favor a unity party with a Communist orientation.

This policy may have a chance in Germany in the American zone because the social and natural conditions may favor it or may give it an opening at least; whereas in eastern Europe the preconditions do not exist for a multiparty system. Consequently, the attempts which were made with some groups were bound to fail. This would not affect the problem of democratic foreign policy in general, but it would affect that problem in eastern Europe.

MR. WRIGHT: Do you mean that the policy, set forth in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, of having free elections in eastern European countries, was inappropriate to this part of the world?

MR. ROTHFELS: I would say, for one thing, that it neglected the fact that there had been so-called plebiscites before in eastern Europe which did not give satisfactory results. There is a technique of voting established in eastern Europe which may appear democratic on the surface but certainly is not. This was a "face-saving" device which nobody in the countries themselves takes very seriously.

MR. DRAGNICH: That illustrates the difference between the Americans and the Russians on German policy. We feel that the Germans ought to have freedom of the press and speech and association now and that by using these freedoms they will learn democracy. The Russian attitude is almost the reverse. They say that free press should be permitted to a people once it shows that it is democratic. In other words, the Germans ought to build themselves up to be

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

democratic by doing away with the Nazis and living up to their obligations to the Allies. Once they have done that and have started running their country smoothly, then freedom of speech and press can be extended to them.

MR. MERRIAM: Are things running smoothly in Russia? They do not seem to have freedom of the press.

MR. DRAGNICH: Whichever way you look at the Russian concept of freedom of the press, we are still faced by this practical problem: What are you going to do to the Germans? Are you going to let them start their printing presses and go ahead, or are you going to exercise some kind of censorship?

In Italy when the democratic freedoms were proclaimed, the anti-democrats simply used these freedoms to attack democracy. The Russians say they don't want that kind of thing. We say that is the way to learn democracy.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMY

MR. ARNOLD E. BERGSTRAESSER: I would like to say something with regard to the economic problem, particularly in regard to eastern Europe, not so much in Germany. There are two facts: the one an agricultural revolution, particularly in Poland, to some extent in Czechoslovakia; and the other, the possibility of the inclusion of these territories in an eastern international trade system.

I do not know to what extent the commercial treaties concluded between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia already give an indication that the economic orientation of Czechoslovakia is going to be predominantly Russian, but I should not be surprised if this were the case. On these presuppositions I want to raise a few questions.

What is the impact of such a Russian orientation of eastern Europe's economic production and trade to be on the rest of Europe? In the times of the most-favored-nations clause or similar institutions tending toward a maximum possible amount of free trade, the whole European continent, to the exclusion of Russia, was to some extent a trade-unit, the agricultural eastern territories trading regularly and in increasing amount with the industrial heart of Europe, which I would understand to be the old German industrial territories, Belgium, and northern France. If the present demarcation line through the eastern boundaries of Germany, including the German-Czechoslovakian boundary, is to establish a new economic boundary, then very serious economic changes will be necessary in the rest of Europe.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Would such changes have a repercussion, or wouldn't they? Would they force American foreign policy to take them into consideration or not?

MR. DRAGNICH: I think you are basically correct in the observation that the nature of the production of Czechoslovakia will shift some; that is, Czechoslovakia will no longer produce, to the extent it did before, porcelain and other things which were bought by the West, but it will produce, at least for the time being, primarily products which can be sold to Russia. There is some indication of that.

Assume that that happens in some of the other states, what effect does that have on the rest of the European economy? In 1938-39 countries like Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria had the bulk of their trade in the Nazi area, that is, with Germany and Italy. What will be the effect of this change on the economy of western Europe?

It depends partly on what Germany is going to be. Is Germany going to be primarily industrial, exporting manufactured goods, or is she going to revert to a semiagricultural economy?

What effect that will have on the United States, I don't know. Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, or even Scandinavia—none of them fell within the first top ten countries with whom the bulk of our pre-war trade (approximately 70 per cent) was conducted. However, while in particular countries trade with the United States might not have bulked large in the over-all United States trade, that trade might have been fairly large in the countries' own economy.

MR. BERGSTRAESSER: The effect of occupation and political domination of Germany by the four Allies involves a certain amount of economic responsibility for Germany. The German trade, not because of the Nazis but in the time of the Nazis as well as earlier, was closely connected with these eastern European countries by exchange of agricultural products against industrial products. The inclusion of these eastern European countries and perhaps eastern Germany in a more or less Sovietized economic system would have the consequence that the agricultural products of these countries would not be consumed in western Germany and other Western countries as they were previously.

Furthermore, if the industrial revival of Germany in peaceful products turns out to be the only possibility of a self-sustaining economic system which exists, then this question comes up: Where is the outlet for these German industrial products? To a lesser extent this is true for Austria and northern Italy, and to an even lesser extent for Bel-

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

gium. This involves a problem for the United States because, if the European economic system remains altered in this way because of historical decisions of policy, then the occupying powers may have to continue the burden of providing for economic reconstruction in Germany, particularly the importation of the necessary raw materials and foodstuffs. This may be a very urgent problem as soon as the present transitional state of affairs is over.

Finally, the problem of reparations will raise the question which was in a minor way connected with the reparations problem after the first World War: How are these reparation payments to be transferred? This may, I think, constitute a very serious problem for American foreign policy.

MR. HOSELITZ: I doubt whether the reparations problem in this particular case is going to be a problem of transfer at all. After the First World War the reparations problem was a transfer problem, because Germany had to finance reparations out of export surpluses. It did not have such surpluses because no one wanted to receive sufficient imports from Germany. This time export surpluses will be very welcome to the Soviet Union. The other countries wanted to have reparations in money or foreign exchange, but Russia will take reparations in kind. To the extent that Germany is able to reduce its already reduced standard of living, I don't think the reparations problem is going to be serious.

The other problem concerns the relationship of Germany and the five or six southeastern European agrarian countries: Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Albania. My data are taken from the Book by Antonin Basch, *The Danubian Basin and the German Economic Sphere*. Germany's imports from these agricultural countries in 1929 amounted to 4 per cent of the total German imports, and amounted in 1937 to almost 11 per cent of the total German imports.

It is true that in the period between 1929 and 1937 the proportion of German imports which came from the southeastern European countries increased, and I think that it increased because of the particular conditions which the Nazis managed to impose upon those southeastern European countries. In other words, I don't think it is correct to say that this greater dependence of southeastern European countries on German markets developed *at the time of* the Nazis; I think it developed *because of* the Nazis.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. WRIGHT: Whom did they export to before they exported 11 per cent to Germany?

MR. HOSELITZ: Principally to northwestern and central Europe; not to Russia.

MR. ROTHFELS: But they exported very little; that is the problem.

MR. HOSELITZ: That is not true. Before 1929 the total dollar value of exports of these countries was greater than it was in 1937.

MR. BERGSTRAESSER: Isn't the change in the figures to some extent the effect of the depression of 1929?

MR. HOSELITZ: It is in part accountable to falling prices, but, even if you deflated the money values, I would say that there would be no increase, possibly a reduction, in volume of trade.

The thing I want to stress here is that, up to 1929, Germany got a surprising amount of its foreign agricultural imports from overseas sources such as Argentina, Australia, and Canada. In 1929 the total German imports from six southeastern European agrarian countries amounted to about 400,000,000 marks out of a total of some 13,000,000,000 marks. They must have imported a lot of food from elsewhere, and they must have paid for that food through exports elsewhere, because their exports to those countries did not exceed about 600,000,000 marks. So the trade between Germany and the southeastern European agrarian states up to 1931 was relatively insignificant for Germany. It was more significant for those countries, but it was not of too great an order of importance, certainly not of the same order of importance as it was after 1933 and 1934.

Where will German exports go? Well, it certainly will affect the United States foreign policy. If we can induce the world to reduce trade-barriers without setting up discriminatory measures against Germany as was done after the last war, I think the Germans, if they are industrially in position to export at all, will have no disadvantage in competing in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere. They may be able to obtain foodstuffs from those countries, may trade much as they did before 1929; at least, theoretically it could be that way.

Concerning the trade of eastern European countries, Czechoslovakia, which is predominantly an industrial country, will probably trade more with Russia. I agree that the type of trade will probably shift from the light goods—cotton goods, glassware, and porcelain—to heavy materials—chemicals, steel. Czechoslovakia will probably adjust its foreign trade to Russian demands.

As to the agricultural countries, let me give you some figures.

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

Those six countries in southeastern Europe in the period from 1927 to 1934—I took that average because trade was reasonably undistorted except by the depression—imported about 70 per cent of finished industrial commodities and about 30 per cent of raw materials and semifinished products. On the other hand, they exported about 50 per cent of foodstuffs, unmanufactured and semimanufactured; 40 per cent of other unmanufactured and semimanufactured industrial raw materials, minerals, fibers, oil; and 10 per cent finished products. In other words, 50 per cent was foodstuffs, and 50 per cent was industrial raw materials and finished products.

This 50 per cent of minerals, oil, and finished products would probably find a reasonably ready market in Russia, certainly within the next few years. As far as the 50 per cent of foodstuffs is concerned, most of those went to central and northwestern Europe. I think in the next two or three years the Russians will be glad to take all the food they can get. If they don't want to use it themselves, they can use it for distribution in areas where they think it is necessary to distribute food. After that time the situation might become different. However, considering the rate at which Russia is industrializing and is likely to continue to industrialize, it will soon be in the position in which the United States is now.

There are economists who maintain that the United States has no business to export such commodities as, for instance, wheat, lard, and certain other forms of raw food. Russia is getting itself more and more in the position where it will have a food deficit. One must not forget the large, dry areas of Russia, which look big on the map but which are not very fertile.

Two years ago, at the Harris Foundation Institute, when the problem of "Food for the World" was discussed, several of the speakers pointed out that the possibility within the next two or three decades that Russia will be a food-importing country rather than a food-exporting country was quite generally held. If this opinion is true, then within twenty years the Russians will have no difficulty in absorbing the food surpluses which the southeastern European countries produce.

Will the Russians be able or willing to give in exchange the types of industrial finished products which those countries formerly imported from Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, and so on? Personally, I would express grave doubts; Russia will use all the agricultural machinery and ice boxes she can produce. Even the more simple

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

tools will continue scarce in Russia. These countries won't have any difficulty in finding markets in Russia, but they won't have a chance of getting imports.

These countries are not in the fortunate position in which we are that we can sell our exports for gold. They can only sell their exports for real things; and, unless the Russians find it possible to set up a multilateral system of trade, I think that they are going to encounter tremendous difficulties in supplying those countries with the things those countries need.

MR. BRODIE: Why couldn't they receive gold and buy commodities from us, for example.

MR. HOSELITZ: That is a possibility.

MR. BERGSTRAESSER: What about the future of the Polish and Silesian industries? Might they not produce the tools, particularly agricultural machinery, which the southeastern agricultural countries want?

MR. HOSELITZ: It may be possible for Russia to establish some sort of triangular trade in those areas. That is to say, the Russians may send something which they don't need, possibly minerals, to Poland or Czechoslovakia; and those countries will produce industrial machinery, which will go to southeastern Europe. But, as you know, the German populations of Silesia are being removed. The Poles, if they carry this through to the end, will do themselves the greatest disfavor because they are robbing themselves of a number of very highly skilled men that will be very difficult to replace. You may have read in the papers of the quite substantial decline in coal mining. I don't think the upper Silesian coal mines and plants are going to be very productive if the German skilled workmen are moved out and if a few Polish skilled and many unskilled Polish workmen are moved in.

MR. DRAGNICH: In the case of Silesia, weren't the Germans generally in positions of management while the technical workmen were Poles?

MR. HOSELITZ: I think mostly unskilled. There were relatively few skilled Polish workmen.

MR. LEONHARDT: After the plebiscite in Upper Silesia the main part of the coal region was given to Poland, and there was very little German influence left. The Poles ran those mines rather successfully, even conquered the Scandinavian market from England and exported Upper Silesian coal to Spain, France, Italy, North Africa, and even

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

South America. I doubt whether that particular problem will exist in the case of Polandized Upper Silesia.

MR. ALLEN HADEN: What did the exports of the southeastern European countries to Germany amount to in proportion to their total exports?

MR. HOSELITZ: That varies from country to country, but the 1929 proportion varied between 9 per cent in Yugoslavia and 29 per cent in Bulgaria; in 1937 it varied from 19 per cent in Rumania to 43 per cent in Bulgaria; the other countries were in between.

MR. HADEN: Isn't it true that the alteration in the Balkan economies will be more important than the problem of the alteration of the German economy? Isn't there more flexibility in the German balance of agriculture to industry?

MR. HOSELITZ: Under present conditions there is much less flexibility because Germany has lost a large proportion of what were before the war her agricultural lands. With the exception of Bavaria and certain regions in northwestern Germany, very little valuable agricultural land is left. On the other hand, the Balkan countries will probably not produce many finished industrial products for export. I do not think that the Russians would stimulate, at any great expense to themselves, industries in those countries, except possibly in some strategic materials. Before the war, in spite of the fact that most of the export trade of those countries was in agricultural and industrial raw materials, they were rather protectionist and tried to build up domestic industries. I believe that the Russians will tend to discontinue the growth of those industries, except in materials which they deem strategically important.

SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE

MR. MERRIAM: Is the Russian policy in these border states directed toward military security, or is it directed toward building up more favorable trade relations, or is it directed toward some other end?

MR. DRAGNICH: I would say that the primary question is security.

MR. MERRIAM: You mean in spite of modern warfare?

MR. DRAGNICH: I think we are still thinking in preatomic terms, and the Russians may be doing so even more.

MR. WRIGHT: I wonder whether Russia will have any particular interest in cultivating trade in these countries. At an earlier round table somebody suggested that Czechoslovakia was attempting to

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

expand trade with Western countries. While it may be that Czechoslovakia will develop certain special products that can be traded with Russia, is it certain that Russia will object to Czechoslovakia's developing trade with Western countries?

Before the war Russian foreign trade amounted to a very small percentage of the world's foreign trade. Apparently, in the plan for lowering commercial barriers and avoiding discrimination which the State Department has embarked upon, it hopes to bring 95 per cent, or over, of the total world trade into a relatively free trading system, even if Russia does not come in.

Economists have recognized the natural tendency of a planned economy to be self-contained. A lot of awkward factors arise if a planned economy becomes dependent upon external trade. It may be that Russia, with a growing population, will tend to become a food-importing country, but I should think she would seek to avoid it because it would complicate her planning and reduce her strategic security.

Of course, Russia wants to get reparations. She wants the enemy countries to give her for nothing materials that she can use. But apart from reparations, may she not seek to have a self-contained economy? She will, of course, seek to influence the governments of all neighboring states. Soviet policy prefers encirclement by friendly communistically inclined countries to a *cordon sanitaire* of capitalistic countries. One can expect that. She would want the small countries on her borders to pursue foreign policies that are satisfactory to her. She will try to exercise a political influence over all the smaller countries of eastern Europe. But can one deduce from that that she will attempt to exercise any particular influence on their trade?

MR. MERRIAM: I listened to the bland statement that a planned economy would naturally be autarchistic. You may argue as well that a planned economy will be aggressive outside its own boundaries.

MR. REUBEN FRODIN: I think none of the extremes would be likely. I think we can assume that Russia would not attempt to monopolize the trade of those countries because she would want most of the products that those countries produced to be used in return for products of countries outside the Soviet orbit.

MR. DRAGNICH: But some of the trade-agreements seem to indicate that Russia is interested in, and is somehow frustrating, the attempts of these countries to trade with the outside, I don't know for what reason. Perhaps the Soviet leaders might feel that in order to

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

influence politically these countries they might have to give them something in return and that economic connections of these countries with the capitalistic world might tend to make them capitalistic in outlook and foreign policy.

MR. LEONHARDT: At the moment, Russia is busy establishing a security zone and using all means, political and economic, to draw the border countries to her. If we ever come to a general and global agreement with the Russians, the sense of security may grow in the political field and Russia may be more willing to make concessions in the economic field. Having the assurance that there won't be intervention in the eastern European security belt, trade with the West of the countries in that belt might be reconciled with Soviet policy. But that would presuppose that the atmosphere of political tension that prevails now was abating.

MR. MERRIAM: What would prevent Russia from making a deal with Argentina or with the United States or with Canada? Why should they favor the autarchistic idea? They don't want to get caught on food supply or on coal or on steel or other essential elements that go to the carrying-on of present wars.

MR. WRIGHT: Might not the Soviets be less certain that their agreements with foreign countries would be carried out over a long period of time than that their orders will be carried out in the region where they have administrative control? If a planned economy becomes dependent on trade with a distant country and that country finds it can make a better bargain and stops the trade, the whole plan is thrown out of gear. Consequently, if a government wants to make a plan that it can surely carry on for as long as five years, it wants to have all the elements that are necessary to realize the plan within its administrative control.

MR. MERRIAM: Mr. Wilcox was arguing two ways. On the one hand, he was arguing that planned economies are autarchic but, on the other hand, that it is very difficult for an individual trader all by himself to compete with a national state of the Russian type. They can't both be true.

MR. WRIGHT: Why not? Russia might wish to avoid permanent dependence on international trade and on the observance of commercial agreements, and yet be glad to get a good bargain in a particular transaction, as illustrated in her willingness to take reparations. Individual traders, however, could not make good bargains with Russia so would not want to trade without agreements which

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

would assure them fair conditions. So you would not have much trade going on between the two. Of course, if a state with a planned economy lacks essential elements of its plan in its territory, it will have to go outside, as Germany did, but it will prefer to do so by expanding its political and administrative control in neighboring regions, as Germany did, rather than by relying on trade-agreements with distant areas. Russia will doubtless trade with the border areas if she finds that essential materials are lacking in her present territory.

MR. HOSELITZ: Don't forget that Russia has set up mixed commodity corporations with mixed ownership in various countries. I don't think this is a short-run enterprise. I further believe that Russia is willing to exploit or to buy all the oil and many of the minerals which those Balkan countries produce. Even if Russia did not interfere with their trading relations with other countries in regard to other portions of their production, I still think Russia would get the lion's share.

MR. BRODIE: Where a nation's economy is as closely controlled by the state as that of Russia, that trade tends to be bilateral instead of multilateral, and that presents certain aspects approaching autarchy. That is, it extends its trade-frontiers rather than engage in multilateral trade.

MR. HOSELITZ: I would remind you that in 1930, possibly in 1937 and 1938, Berlin was the center of a rather extensive trade, which flourished in the orbit which Germany controlled but was, nevertheless, multilateral.

MR. BRODIE: A very peculiar kind.

MR. HOSELITZ: That is right.

MR. PLATT: Would it be more difficult for Russia to provide for multilateral trade than for other countries to do so?

MR. HOSELITZ: As far as the United States is concerned, there is no difficulty for us to trade with the rest of the world on any multilateral basis. The Russians could organize a group of countries, including eastern Europe, maybe Iran, maybe some countries in eastern Asia, which would find a place in a multilateral exchange system controlled in Moscow; just as Germany controlled multilateral trade which embraced Austria, Italy, all the Balkan countries, Turkey. Those countries did trade with other outside countries, but the bulk of the trade was within this net.

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

MR. MERRIAM: What is the national policy of Russia toward Germany at this time?

MR. DRAGNICH: It seems to me that primarily it is a question of seeing to it that Germany never again gets to be a military power. Second, whatever happens in Germany, the Russians want to be sure that those Germans who are friendly to them have at least an equal share in the kind of regime which is set up. I think the Russians are primarily concerned with security as far as Germany is concerned.

MR. MERRIAM: Wouldn't they be secure with a Communist Germany?

MR. DRAGNICH: If they were interested in selling communism to the Germans, would they be insisting on \$10,000,000,000 reparations?

MR. WRIGHT: What do you think of Walter Lippmann's interpretation of Molotov's speech: that Russia is telling Germany if she will be good, Russia will let her get back some of the territory given to Poland?

MR. DRAGNICH: I agree with Mr. Lippmann in most of his comments on foreign affairs, but on this I cannot go along with him.

MR. LEONHARDT: Isn't the Russian policy toward Germany dependent upon the Russian policy toward the United States. The relations with the West are Russia's primary concern; the worse relations with the West are, the more will Russia try to do something with Germany of a unilateral kind; and this propagandistic effort to draw Germany on her side would be one of the means. If the relations with the West should improve, if the West and East could agree on the middle-of-the-road status of Germany, such endeavors might disappear.

MR. DRAGNICH: That certainly is true in part, but I think what Russia is thinking of in the case of Germany is Russia first. She is much more interested in getting goods and reparations from Germany to rebuild what was destroyed in Russia than she is in selling communism to the Germans. You can see that in Rumania, for example. There they have exacted large reparations, oil, machinery, and so on. If they were interested in building up local Rumanian support for a pro-Communist government, they would not discredit that pro-Communist government by taking such large reparations.

I think there is ample indication from several sources that Russia is interested, first of all, in rebuilding her own country with whatever

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

she can get from Germany and these other countries, and if she can sell them a bit of communism, all right. She is probably aware, however, that she can't do that, and the next best thing is to get them lined up in a pro-Soviet security zone so that they at least are not hostile to her.

SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

MR. MERRIAM: If they are primarily interested in rehabilitating Russia, why do they pursue a sort of pin-pricking policy in regard to the Western powers? It would seem that they would be interested in getting loans or help or a wide spread of commercial good will, if they want to rehabilitate the country industrially.

MR. DRAGNICH: Some of us have wondered for a long time why the Russians weren't building good will among Americans. There are a lot of friends of the Soviet Union in the United States, and, if Russia would avoid some of this pin-pricking, it would make their position of defending the Soviet Union much easier. But there are a number of indications that the Russians don't care what we think.

MR. WRIGHT: May they not follow the Machiavellian theory that it is better to have people fear you than love you? Maybe the Russians think we are more likely to make a loan if they make themselves so obnoxious and obstructive that we will want to try to buy their good will.

MR. HADEN: For the past few months the prevailing tone in the State Department, overshadowing every other thing, has been a conviction of inevitability of war with Russia. That atmosphere in the State Department today stems right out of the War Department, and the War Department today has more influence in the shaping of State Department policy than it has had since the Civil War.

The successive failures of Mr. Byrnes's trips abroad until the rather moderate success of the last Paris Conference preceded the change in front that the Russians have announced. Before, they were all for the removal of German industries, but you recall the recent Molotov statement, "We want a strong Germany." Stalin, I believe, said it first and then Molotov. It was a Russian counterpart to the attitude of the State Department. That agrees with the hypothesis that Russia puts security first.

Mr. Byrnes is said to have refused to support the continued demand of the regular State Department career officers on Perón in

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

Argentina—that he liquidate the Nazi organization there—with the comment, “The next time, Germany is going to be on our side.”

On “our side” against whom? Of course, the Russians want the Germans on their side, too—against us. The central problem of American policy now is avoidance of war with Russia. As Balkan policy affects either the promotion of a war with Russia or avoidance of a war with Russia, it becomes important. As Russian policy shapes itself into either the promotion of a war with us or the avoidance of a war with us, that policy becomes important.

In my view the peacemakers have been too much occupied in distinguishing minutiae in the nationalisms which the social revolutions have sought to destroy. The Communist revolution and the Nazi revolution have sought to eliminate the very nationalisms which are today being reconstructed by the Big Four, with Mr. Byrnes in the lead. In my opinion, the reconstruction of those nationalisms is going to do nothing except promote the war.

MR. MERRIAM: Wouldn't you say the Russian policy now is primarily nationalism?

MR. HADEN: Of course, so long as it promotes her satellites. I believe the nationalism of Russia is looking toward imperial expansion. But if that kind of nationalism is going to be promoted and allowed to develop as it is developing in these buffers—after all, Germany and the Balkan states and France are practically buffers between the United States and Russia today—if peace negotiations amount to reconstructing the nationalisms of Europe, we are merely promoting a situation already found faulty, which contributed very largely to the wars of the nineteenth century and to the two large wars of this one. I think we should get back to some of our principles and see where American policy is going to be affected by our own thinking on the central European area.

MR. DRAGNICH: Do you consider the Trieste problem important?

MR. HADEN: Our favoring of the Italian position in Trieste looks very much like an attempt to bottle up Russia again. Russia has been fighting all these centuries, trying to get to water; has managed to develop a satellite in Tito; and Tito argues for Trieste. I have seen some excellent arguments for internationalization of Trieste as a free port. People do get along. Whether or not they speak the same language, whether or not they get married under the same rules and buried by the same rites, they do manage to get along, and Trieste looks like a Russian effort to get to water. From my standpoint, by

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

frustration of Russia's arrival at a port, we are irritating a sore which does not need to be irritated.

MR. BRODIE: Has anyone a comment to make on the charge that the War Department is dominating our foreign policy. I think that is a very serious charge.

MR. BALLANTINE: I don't think it is justified.

MR. HADEN: It is not that the War Department is actually dictating State Department policy, though you can make a case for that, too. But the defeatism that I find in the State Department, the hysteria in a number of the divisions on relations with Russia, is appalling. In the War Department plans and studies are being made today for the next war with Russia.

MR. BRODIE: The Army's business is always to prepare plans for not merely the most likely enemy but the most dangerous enemy. What I am interested in is how much influence the War Department has had on foreign policy.

MR. HADEN: Very much influence. Aren't there a number of generals in the State Department?

MR. BALLANTINE: General Hilldring, of course; he has charge of policy in relation to occupation in Germany and in Japan. He is the only one, as far as I know. I can say categorically that I have not heard any person in the State Department suggest that he considered war with Russia inevitable.

MR. LEONHARDT: Mr. Pasvolsky seemed to make a case here that we have to continue negotiating with the Russians. He seemed to suggest patience, and once more patience, in dealing with Russia.

MR. HADEN: Certainly! That is the official position, and it certainly is the position of the wiser heads, but a very defeatist one at that.

MR. LEONHARDT: The most important problem now in my opinion is an agreement with the Russians which will improve their feeling of national security and remove the frustration which they feel all the time. We are haggling over all details such as the Trieste matter, which I agree is insignificant. If we don't succeed in coming to an agreement with the Russians by a global negotiation, they will continue to react to our policy of strong arms against them. They think we have used the United Nations to put them in the minority in every case, but they will continue in the United Nations because they fear the atomic bomb. They are determined, however, to put all the energies they can muster, all their military research, their atomic

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

research, into the process of military rearmament, until after several years they are in a better position.

That is the kind of world we live in. Whether the American orientation is the result of the influence of the War Department or whether it is the result of general nationalism, I don't know; but it seems clear to me that the American public is too suspicious of Russia and, because of that, supports too much which justifies Russia's suspicions of us. We try to keep Russia in a land-locked situation, monopolize control in Japan, extend ourselves over both oceans, intervene in China, and deal with the whole world as if it were the sole preserve of the Western world.

If that is allowed to continue, I am afraid we will not come to terms with Russia; Europe will be split into two parts. We are at the end of negotiations in Korea. Wherever we look, we shift into an atmosphere of increasing tension. It should be the endeavor of students and scholars to see that an honest effort is made to get out of that situation.

In spite of ideological differences between the totalitarian regime and ours, I think a *modus vivendi* can be found, but it must be approached with a greater degree of magnanimity and understanding, and the feelings of insecurity and suspicion, in which both have moved historically, must be removed.

MR. WRIGHT: Our discussions in this Institute have amply sustained the thesis that the great problem in the world is American relations with Russia. That has always come up, no matter what subject we are discussing, and has tended to dominate the discussion.

I was recently at a conference where a Norwegian representative, looking at Soviet-American relations from the outside, said that during the preceding nine months he had been noticing the deterioration of those relations. America would give Russia a kick, and Russia would give America two kicks, then America would give Russia three. That deterioration of relations has gone on until it has reached a stage where some people on both sides think war is inevitable; and, once that conviction grows in important circles on both sides, it makes war inevitable.

Mr. Leonhardt raises the question as to whether we cannot make the spiral move in the direction of peace instead of war; e.g., when Russia gives two kicks, we should give one, maybe she would then give us only half a kick, until a point might be reached where there were no kicks at all. That may be too much to expect.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

CENTRAL EUROPE AS A BUFFER ZONE

MR. DRAGNICH: Eastern Europe is in the Soviet zone, whether we like it or not. It is not the intermediate zone between Russian predominance, on the one hand, and Western predominance, on the other. The intermediate or buffer zone has shifted westward; it is more in Germany.

If we get tough with Russia, we ought, first, to know what we are getting tough about; and, second, if we feel that the two systems cannot coexist, then we ought to be intellectually honest and recognize that the time to sock them is now.

MR. WRIGHT: Isn't the trend likely to be disclosed in the negotiations concerning Germany and China? They are really the buffer zones. No agreement on policy between the Soviet Union and the United States in the case of Germany has been reached. Half is occupied by each. It is unlikely that the Soviets will withdraw from their zone and allow the Western powers to move in. It is equally unlikely that the Western powers will withdraw from their zones and let the Soviets move in.

Columnists have been speculating on this and saying that whether war with Russia is inevitable will be determined by the capacity of the powers to agree on German policy. Some of them have suggested that, while neither the West nor Russia can occupy the whole of Germany, a peaceful solution may be found in allowing the Germans to occupy Germany, creating a unified buffer-state of Germany between the two great systems.

The question of China is very much the same. The Communists and the Nationalists in China represent, respectively, zones of Soviet and American control. Neither will leave all China to the other. Can China become a unified national state that might be a buffer zone between them?

MR. BERGSTRAESSER: Does there exist a well-considered interest of this nation in keeping Russian influence from expanding farther West in Europe? Does this country really have a stake in Europe, something to defend, something to consider as its own interest, or doesn't it?

MR. WRIGHT: Our policy seems to have been directed toward preventing Russia from expanding its influence into Italy or into western Germany. It is undoubtedly dangerous when international politics become conceptualized in terms of definite boundaries be-

DISCUSSION OF EASTERN EUROPE

tween the spheres of influence of two great powers. We have an extremely unstable equilibrium because there are so few great powers in the world. I think it will continue unstable, unless perhaps the atomic-bomb negotiations are successful and a new system emerges through development of a world public opinion which will strengthen the United Nations and give it certain effective powers within all countries.

MR. WHITE: But the fact is that that line exists. Perhaps our most acute question at present is to decide whether the line is to run through Germany or whether Germany is to be a buffer-state in the sense of being neutral as between the West and the East.

MR. WRIGHT: That is the question. We want a united Germany that will be dominated by neither. It may be the Russians think that they can arrange things so that Germany will become as a whole within their province. I think we would resist that. But perhaps the Russians will also accept a neutral Germany.

MR. BRODIE: The discussion of basic issues in broad generalities is rather quickly exhausted. It seems to me the problems with which the State Department is faced and out of which international frictions develop are the day-to-day problems which come along, and not the grand conceptions.

MR. WRIGHT: But public opinion is influenced by, and may become committed to, "grand conceptions." The handling of day-to-day problems cannot, at least in this country, ignore public opinion.

LATIN AMERICA

By ALLEN HADEN¹

I

TO MANY of us who in 1933 concerned ourselves with foreign policy, President Roosevelt's first inaugural speech seemed to herald the dawn of a new era. Others, however—and I am one of them—believe that Mr. Roosevelt's enunciation of the Good Neighbor Policy was the "naming" or putting into words of a trend which was already evident. The debate as to whether or not United States relations with Latin America really took a completely new turn with Mr. Roosevelt's first administration is relatively useful only for snaring of votes or Ph.D. degrees. But the incident is important in this respect: it illustrates excellently the means by which foreign policy becomes known.

Policy can be decided in advance of action—as, for example, *Mein Kampf*—and announced or not. But policy can also be decided by unrelated, sometimes unpremeditated and isolated, occurrences. Was not the British Empire the outgrowth of piracy on the part of Hawkins, Drake, Raleigh, and their fellows? By the time of Clive, piracy had acquired the purple of imperial dignity, and in Kipling it had become the moral duty of enlightened Britons toward lesser breeds without the law.

When a policy is announced, observers crowd about to see whether it will be carried out in action. I submit that the irritations of press and commentators with the State Department, in recent years particularly, has been due to state and diplomatic action being at variance with announced intention. No matter how hard one tries to explain it, the United States government's attitude during the crucial 1936–39 years of the Spanish Civil War was at variance with pre-action assurances of democratic policy. Such examples can be marshaled in large number from recent history.

After the formulation of the Good Neighbor Policy, it was of utmost interest to both North and South America to see whether action

¹ Editor, Press Service of the Farmer's Educational Fund, Washington, D.C.

LATIN AMERICA

in tune with the statement would be accelerated. I think no one will quarrel with the statement that relations between the United States and the other American republics from 1933 to almost the end of the war were active, and mostly friendly. In some respects it had the flavor of a honeymoon. Everybody loved everybody else, and occasional spats made reconciliations more binding. We willingly bought whatever Latin America strove to sell, though after Pearl Harbor we not quite so willingly supplied what Latin America strove to buy.

Whether these active relations would have been possible without the threat of war in the offing, I do not know. Certainly, the records of the 1936 Maintenance of Peace Conference in Buenos Aires and the Lima conference of 1938 demonstrate that the United States was mending its fences. The active and friendly inter-American relations of the Good Neighbor era were fertilized by the common danger of war.

II

Throughout the years, relations between the countries of the double American continent have roughly consisted of a coalition of the non-English-speaking countries at loggerheads with the United States. The fact that, after 1933, relations were in high proportion friendly does not alter the relationship. The tenor of Pan-American conferences before and during the war was invariably: "Will the Latinos come along on such-and-such a proposition? How many will come along?" The basic fact of inter-American relations is the immense preponderance of the United States in wealth, power, and population compared with any single Latin-American country or all twenty together. There is no use in blinding one's self to the *fact* that the Americas were, are now, and probably for some time to come will be, divided into two areas: the United States and the rest of the continent.

I used the word "area" just now. I could have said "bloc" or "forces," but the word doesn't matter. What matters is that in the flood of partisan political propaganda during the Good Neighbor era many people, including some of the better political reporters, have lost sight of the many differences between the United States and the balance of the continent.

To begin with, the United States is a unit, territorially and politically; the Latin states are not. English has a different structure from

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Spanish, Portuguese, and French. American law, derived from English common law, contrasts with the Spanish code. Despite superficial similarities, the political systems have different roots and results. Today manufacturing is the dominant economic factor in the United States, with agrarian workers reduced to less than 18,000,000. In Latin America an agrarian economy still predominates. Psychologically speaking, fractionalization in the United States of organized religion into a multitude of denominations has promoted a scientific and materialistic approach to life. A relatively high regard for science manifests itself in a willingness to examine the facts and results in a fair amount of self-criticism, looking to improvement. In Latin America the domination of the Roman Catholic church with its anti-scientific bias has considerably retarded scientific progress, with a consequent lag in remedying the remediable: living conditions, health, literacy, etc. As a result, when the Latin-American sees outside his own country what can be done in the way of material civilization, his frustrations are real. Lacking, however, a scientific grounding, his self-criticism is masochistic, and, as a reaction, he demands to be accepted not for what he is but for what he would like to be. The Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, has minutely examined this trait of character.

Not all divides us, however, only most. An examination of the United States and the other Americas does not yield only a catalogue of differences. There are bonds. Of these the Negro is perhaps the most dynamic. A recent monograph by Frank Tannenbaum discusses this topic admirably. The Negro contrasts with the Indian, for with all due respect to my friend Haya de la Torre, the Indian has contributed almost nothing to modern civilization in either North or South America. The Negro's sinew has built cotton, tobacco, sugar, cocoa, coffee fields. He has enriched painting, music, and dancing, and his scientific contributions are of the finest.

Another bond is the pattern of changes occurring in landholdings. Whereas United States agrarian policy was originally the establishment of family-owned and -operated farms, the South American system was to grant extensive holdings to Spanish colonists. But today the trend in both North and South America is in opposite directions. In South America, especially, the trend is to break up the huge *estancias* into farms running up to about 300 acres, while in the United States, despite lip service to the idea of family-owned farms,

LATIN AMERICA

government agrarian policy fosters absentee ownership and larger units than can be farmed by a single family.

In contrast to professional scholars in the United States, American reporters, politicians, tourists, and State Department publicists, whether in or out of office, have largely failed to appreciate the differences of structure between North and South America. (These differences are neither good nor bad but facts.) Americans have too often been annoyed when conditions which superficially seemed similar to conditions in the United States turned out to mean something quite different. The misunderstanding of the role of the "president," for example, or of the "revolution" in Latin-American politics has caused endless trouble for ourselves.

Against the background of our differences, the last few years' production of speeches emphasizing the solidarity and unity of the Americas is little short of wonderful. To the cynic these speeches have seemed insincere. To the semanticist they have been singularly hollow. To an anthropologist they partake of word magic. These speeches have been similar to the incantations of a primitive, seeking to conciliate a foul-tempered weather god. Heaven, I have been assured, is created by faith; but no amount of wishing on the part of my little boy can create Santa Claus, unless I do something about it. The high-flown political incantations describing the unity and solidarity of the Americas fell flat because the facts behind the wish insisted on rearing their ugly heads. To mitigate this harsh judgment, a more charitable explanation is that they were the Latin's persistent habit of wanting certain conditions to be seen not as they are but as he would like them to be.

In this wonderland of rhetoric the Good Neighbor Policy has unfortunately become confused with the Christian principle of loving one's neighbor. But the question is not whether we love the Cubans or the Cubans love us. The question is whether the United States will consume so much Cuban sugar, alcohol, and bagass that Cuban canefield peons will have work in Cuban politics, in consequence, will stay attuned to Washington and not feel forced to find political friends elsewhere in order to sell sugar.

The question is not whether we love Costa Riqueños, Guatemaltecos, or Nicaraguenses. The question is whether United States government policy reinforces or mitigates absentee banana landlordism, whose agents manipulate Central American politics, banking, and general income.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

III

The confusion concerning the realities of North and South American relationships has been fed by the intentionally low level of readership maintained by our press. Also, too many American reporters, travelogue writers, and junior diplomats have carelessly repeated each other's platitudes and generalities to the detriment of their own thinking and the thinking of their readers.

Here are a few examples. Until Roland Hall Sharp's recent book, few students had gone beyond saying "South America is large." Few added that, though large, South America is doubly crippled by the Andes and the Amazon Basin, the one growing in some places as much as 16 inches per year and the other a quite adequate example of antediluvian slime. These are two fantastic barriers to settlement, travel, and agriculture, and hence to civilization.

South America has been described as "rich in undeveloped resources." This sounds wonderful and may be true; but only the development of those resources can prove the statement. What we do know, however, is that the continent has been systematically plundered for centuries of its surface wealth, including top soil.

On the cultural front, reporters have hopefully noted that San Marco University was founded before Harvard; that a book was printed in Mexico before any were printed in the English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard. But amid the oh-ing and ah-ing, the meaning has been lost. Chinese invention of gunpowder did not make China a warlike country. Mr. Cyrus Brady wrote a little book some years ago pointing out that only one Latin-American had ever received the Nobel Prize—and it was for peace, *not* for any of the exact sciences. In all the huzzaing about culture, the fact is that Latin America is culturally backward in modern terms, largely owing to the anti-scientific bias of the Roman Catholic church, a bias which has served a feudal oligarchy whose interest lay in the preservation of ignorance and superstition. As a footnote to this indictment, it should be recalled that every significant social revolution—the Wars of Independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Brazilian revolution of 1889, the Uruguayan Batllista revolution of 1911, and the Mexican revolution of 1910—was distinctly anticlerical.

General obfuscation, however, has not been confined to hack reporters, travelogue writers, and junior diplomats. Since leaving the

LATIN AMERICA

undersecretaryship, Mr. Sumner Welles has heavily contributed to the reigning confusion by his endless diatribes against the State Department. Mr. Welles has a phenomenal capacity for chasing semantic blanks. He is at his most phenomenal when skirmishing in, over, around, under, and through the word "intervention." By a two-valued orientation (this phrase is lifted from Hayakawa) "intervention" is "bad" and "nonintervention" is "good." More accurate thinking would show that there is no such thing as intervention as distinguishable by definition from nonintervention. The United States is so overwhelmingly powerful when compared to individual countries in South and Central America that any action or absence of action will influence the individual countries and the continent. Action or non-action can therefore with equal validity, depending on your point of view, be called "intervention." Only in the rarefied complacency shared by Mr. Welles and his editors is there room for such a dilemma. The fact, of course, is that in some cases intervention (by action or nonaction) is required to obtain the results being sought. Whether it is good or bad depends a good deal on the individual case.

IV

Let's get back to a few palpable realities. Foreign policy is always defined by an abstraction. With these abstractions we are all in agreement: We are all for heaven, we are all for loving our neighbors, and we are all against sin, preferably somebody else's. But we cannot live by generalities alone, and policy becomes translated into action. Policy must be applied.

Now I assume that it is to the interest of the United States to have equal opportunity with other countries to buy and sell in Latin America and to have the diplomatic support of the Latin-American countries when broad world principles are being debated and applied. I do not assume it to be to the advantage or interest of the United States to form a Pan-American bloc in opposition to the supposed formation of a Communist bloc led by Soviet Russia.

The high-voltage generalization of foreign policy is reduced in practice to (1) multiple contacts while exchanging (export and import) American technical specialties for Latin-American specialties and (2) intellectual and social exchanges designed for the moment to reduce intolerance, promote more accurate understanding, and extend a scientific approach to life.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

There are certain well-defined areas where the application of these two types of multiple contacts varies in quantity and intensity. Less cultural exchange is possible with Bolivia than with Brazil; there will be less trade with Costa Rica than with Argentina. And the effectiveness of policy will depend on whether, with due regard to our national interests, we shall also spare a little thought for those we deal with. The areas suggested are as follows:

1. *Canada*.—The anomaly of having the country largest in area on the American double continent outside the Pan-American Union grows year by year. Second in manufacturing importance in the Americas, Canada's absence can only be explained on the ground of United States fears of competition. Somehow, the United States figures that its position in the Pan American Union as the dominant manufacturer might be reduced if Canada had a seat also. This remnant of autarchic thinking will not stand up under examination and is absurd in view of the strides that Canadian exports are making anyway and outside the Pan American Union.

2. *The Caribbean, including Mexico, Central America, and Venezuela*.—Here, by and large, is an agrarian, single- or double-crop economy. These countries will prosper or decline as American consuming markets absorb or reject their sugar derivatives, fibers, fruits, and oil. It would be well to recall at this point in the hullabaloo about "government regulations," that the operation of the Sugar Quota Act forces sugar-producing countries into "government regulation" and managed economies. This is not to say that government regulation is bad but merely to call attention to our monumental hypocrisy.

3. *Puerto Rico*.—The little island of Puerto Rico located in the Caribbean is a problem all by itself, spilling over into foreign policy, though primarily a part of American colonial policy. The Puerto Rican problem is of extraordinary complexity and cannot be discussed in full here. It must be emphasized, however, that even the first step toward a practical disposition of Puerto Rico has not been taken by the United States Senate. The Tydings bill, drafted by the Senior Senator from Maryland after prolonged consultation with Puerto Rican leaders, gathers dust in his office on Capitol Hill. The bill is the United States government's assurance to the Puerto Rican people that we will accept their verdict expressed by plebiscite. The four alternatives of the Tydings bill—if ever passed by Congress—are (a) independence, (b) statehood, (c) continued colonial status

with more local self-government, and (d) a dominion status, whose meaning is still somewhat obscure.

The reason the Tydings bill has not been introduced to the Senate is, I understand, Senator Tydings' personal fear that the Puerto Ricans might vote for statehood. Leaving the Puerto Rican problem up in the air, however, is not going to solve it. These fears are unscientific, anyway. The results of the Puerto Rican plebiscite could be approximated by a scientific public opinion survey of the island. I might add that I have made repeated personal efforts to persuade certain leading Puerto Ricans to finance such a survey but have had no success. I have even gone so far as to have a sample questionnaire prepared by a friend of mine in the business, but it is evident that some of our leaders still prefer to act on supposition rather than on scientific findings.

4. *Brazil*.—The second largest and most populous country in the Americas is a unit in itself. Wartime relations between the United States and Brazil underscored United States–British rivalry. Furthermore, in view of the comparatively large trade and military concession made to Brazil, a fair amount of impatience has been expressed at Brazilian reluctance to go all the way with us on such questions as Argentina. I have myself occasionally been in that impatient camp. But it should be recalled that what may seem to us an inconsequential point at issue between Brazil and, for instance, Argentina, may be, from both the Brazilian and the Argentine point of view, extremely important to themselves. We should start adjusting our focuses. The long-range development of United States–Brazilian relations should not be sacrificed to the temporary and immediate. Since it is a continent in itself, few generalities concerning Brazil are valid. But, broadly speaking, the Brazilian problem is to bring the immense area of the Amazon, the western forests, and the northeast into bearing fruit through the statesmanlike use of resources more readily available in the mineral-rich mountains of Minas Geraes and the fertile lands of São Paulo and the south. In that Brazilian task, *and as called upon by the Brazilians*, we have multiple trade and cultural opportunities of contact. Furthermore, the strength in Brazil of positivism derived from the philosophy of Auguste Comte, permits a readier understanding of our scientific attitude than is possible in the countries whose intellectual life is overwhelmingly dominated by the Roman Catholic church.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

5. *Mediterranean America, consisting of Paraguay and Bolivia.*—Paraguay and Bolivia are stepchildren of the continent. Anything that can be done for this area is cheap at any price, as the Chaco war demonstrated.

6. *Spanish America, consisting of Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile.*—With the exception of San Paulo city, these countries are the most advanced in manufacturing. In this area is the finest opportunity of demonstrating that American government policy and American business policy have finally understood that the foreign-trade interests of Great Britain and of the United States are not identical. England's peculiar position, manufacturing conditions, and supply of raw materials force her—or so the British apparently believe—into the maintenance of a colonial system of enforcing low standards of living in countries producing raw materials. Britain's interest in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile is therefore to impede in so far as possible the industrialization of this area. The interest of the United States is precisely the opposite. The abundance of United States raw materials makes it advantageous to us to promote industrialization, with a consequent rise in standards of living and national incomes, thus affording continuously increasing markets for American specialties for export.

7. *The Andean countries of Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.*—The Andean countries form Indo-America, and they suffer from the dead weight of their Indian population. The emphasis as between exporting and importing should be on United States importing, in order that such prosperity as may be caused in these three countries may be used to incorporate the Indians into active participation in the country's life. How this will be done is not the concern of United States foreign policy. But up to the present I have seen no program—that is, no generalization—better than that of Haya de la Torre, whose program is in the words: “schooling, schooling, schooling.”

V

I mentioned earlier that I didn't assume it to be to the interest of the United States to form a bloc of nations in opposition to the Communist bloc of nations dominated by the Soviet Union.

I cannot deprecate too much the narrow thinking which has led to this type of action on the part of the Russians; I cannot deprecate too much the narrow thinking of the Big Four and their piecemeal

LATIN AMERICA

reconstruction of outworn nationalism in Europe, which contributed largely to the wars of the nineteenth century and this one.

I see no necessity for a bloc—not even a Pan-American one. The security of the United States will not be enhanced by captaining a bloc of agrarian states.

The trade of the United States will rather be enhanced by allowing our people to wear the fibers grown all over the world; allowign our people to eat the food produced all over the world; allowing our people to enjoy the specialties made by people all over the world.

The political prestige of the United States will be enhanced when our own democracy has been so improved and perfected within our borders that when we throw stones we shall not be in danger of breaking our own house. For when our own democracy is rid of some of its more glaring flaws, I believe we shall be so adult as to rid ourselves of any desire to throw stones.

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

THE discussion of Latin America concerned mainly the differences between these countries and the United States and among themselves and their internal opinions and policies. Consideration was given to the influence of the Catholic church; the interest of the younger generation in industrialization; attitudes on immigration; and the roles of labor, government, and the universities. The effect of American policies concerning trade, finance, and cultural relations was discussed, and the importance of popular, as distinct from official, contacts was stressed if good neighborliness is to develop. The roots of American foreign policy and the qualifications of the foreign service were considered incidentally. In this discussion the Soviet Union figured very little.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA

MR. FARIS: Has not the mixed-blood, who, particularly in Mexico, is not called "Indian" but "mestizo," been of the highest importance in the social and political leadership?

On another point, I think the Catholic church, to which I do not belong, deserves great credit for its method of emancipating the slaves in Brazil. The Brazilians emancipated their slaves gradually. They passed a law that emancipated all the children born thereafter and all the slaves over a certain age, sixty or seventy. The government slaves were freed all at once, and then in 1888 the complete emancipation was enacted, with the result that the lack of racial conflict between Negroes and whites in Brazil is a model for the whole world.

MR. HADEN: The history of the Roman Catholic church in South America—which I know a good deal better than I know its position in Mexico—has been a charitable one. They have stood up for the Indian. The history of the Jesuits is one of repeated conflicts with autocratic government in efforts to protect the individual and the poor and the downtrodden. That isn't my criticism. The Roman Catholic church, however, has maintained an antiscientific position and has controlled education. The almost scholastic tradition which they have enforced in primary schools, secondary schools, and the

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

universities has prevented the development of science and the scientific approach to knowledge. This is less true in Brazil. The proof is to be found, I believe, in the contributions that Brazilians have made to medicine and to rural and social health. The Roman Catholic church, however, is very weak in Brazil; it is very strong in Colombia and Peru, which remain backward.

I doubt whether either the Indian or the mestizo in Mexico have made a fruitful contribution to civilization. The feudal land economy and the oligarchy that wants to keep them down accounts, in part, for this. The Mexican revolution in 1910, after all, trails the others. Should we allow ourselves to say that it is the mestizo or the Indian which has prevented more rapid progress? I don't think so. I would only put it negatively and say that the Indian has not contributed to modern civilization any dynamic and productive force.

MR. FARIS: In this country if a man has one thirty-second Negro blood he is a Negro. If we had the mulattoes in an entirely separate class, as the mestizos are in Mexico, the story might be different.

MR. HADEN: The color bar is, I am happy to say, not present. That is one of the great strengths for the future in Latin America, even though there is a second-class citizenship.

MR. GEORGE B. MASSEY: I have had opportunity to observe the activity or inactivity of the Catholic church in various parts of Latin America, and my conclusion is that one of the great sins of the Catholic church is a sin of omission.

One of my friends in El Salvador was an Irish Catholic from the United States. She expressed the opinion that the Catholic church in Salvador, and she had the impression that it was similar in the rest of Latin America, was totally different from the church in the United States. She thought it was geared to the church in Europe and that its idea was less to contribute to the education or moral uplift of the parishioners than to extract as much money as possible to be shipped to the other side. In this country the Catholic church—as I am not a Catholic I can speak more or less impartially—is in competition with the Protestant churches. The Catholic church here is a dynamic influence, and I believe it is doing a good job along lines of education. It has to on account of this competition.

So I agree that one of the great obstacles to development in Latin America is the present attitude of the Catholic church.

MR. HADEN: It refuses to promote the scientific approach to social problems. Every time I think of that poor continent which I have

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

traveled over so much, I come back to the questions of health and feeding. The difference between the Roman Catholic church North and South is amazing, and for that the best witnesses are American priests who have gone to South America and have found themselves ostracized. The church in the United States has had to admit at least some of the sciences and scientific inquiry, whereas the church in Latin America is still close to the medieval Spanish conception. When I was in Buenos Aires immediately after France was liberated, two French priests flew to South America and started to lecture. They lectured for exactly three weeks and then were shut off by the hierarchy.

MR. PLATT: Are you suggesting that we ought to form a bloc against the Catholic church or join the church and reform it or what?

MR. HADEN: We should emphasize our own culture, which is more or less scientific, I should say more rather than less. It is a question of continuing to present our point of view of a scientific approach to the solution of the social problems. Bad health is not a visitation from God, from our standpoint. We say that bad health is due to intestinal parasites or to malfeeding or to communicable diseases. Little by little the scientific approach must predominate in the world. There is, however, no use taking the church head-on, because that might destroy some of the values that people cherish in religion.

MR. PLATT: Would you do that by trying to influence the Roman Catholic church in Latin America or by opposing the church in Latin America?

MR. HADEN: Every time that an American-Brazilian, United States-Argentinean, Chilean-American cultural institute and library is opened, it incurs the opposition and enmity of the local church. The opposition is automatic because the hierarchy recognizes immediately the danger of instilling the scientific approach. We must take opposition for granted. There are a few churchmen in Latin America, however, who are quite as alive as we are to these problems and would like to do something about it.

MR. COX: Some twenty years ago a little Protestant ecclesia in Lima, Peru, had a young Catholic teacher from the United States as one of its guests. I asked him about his attitude, and he said, "Why, I cannot affiliate here with the Roman Catholic church; I am a good Catholic in the United States, but down here I cannot accept many of the superstitions and practices of the church; I don't believe that they are religious at all."

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

About the same time, I called on a bishop in Cochabamba, Bolivia, and had a long interview with him—an interview that was arranged through the Methodist worker in that vicinity. The bishop complained that the law of Bolivia restricted him so closely to national clerics that he could not get among the native clergy of Bolivia enough men of sufficiently high character and training to meet the needs of his church. He was a native of Bolivia, and yet he regretted that he could not call on clergy from other countries to come to the assistance of the clergy of Bolivia. That seems to illustrate the opposite tendency.

Four or five years ago in Santiago I was very much pleased to note that, in connection with the educational work that was being carried on in that country, there was a special committee on which the head of the leading American school for girls in the city, a school that was in part supported by the Methodists, was associated with a young Catholic worker who had come from a special training school in Maryland. The committee was taking up the question of cultural relations between Chile and the United States and at the same time was entering wholeheartedly into the policy of bringing about a new point of view among some of the better classes in Chile, a point of view which was scientific but which did not leave out the idea of religion, but religion receptive to ideas from the outside.

MR. PLATT: Your impression is that there is some chance for change within the Roman Catholic church in Latin America?

MR. COX: Yes, I think so. In the Pan American Congress of 1938, the then head of Notre Dame University was one of the members of the commission from the United States. He was freely invited to speak and did speak in the cathedral at Lima. He and a number of his associates illustrated a principle which ought to be definitely emphasized by the Catholic church, namely, that the Catholics of the United States should not wash their hands of the situation in Latin America but should introduce into the work of the church there, with as much tact as possible, the more progressive ideas of the church here.

MR. PLATT: This seems to resolve itself into the same kind of question as that about Russia, whether to keep on patiently negotiating or whether to come out in direct opposition.

MRS. LOUISE LEONARD WRIGHT: Mr. Cox spoke of Father O'Hara, who was a member of the delegation of the United States at Lima in 1938. I was on that delegation and often talked with Father O'Hara.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

He was very much pleased with his reception. I would like to ask whether, among the ruling groups, the Catholic church is very strong.

MR. HADEN: You can only determine the governments which are consistently anticlerical by taking them country by country. Venezuela I would say is not anticlerical. Brazil is anticlerical. Uruguay is anticlerical. Argentina is not anticlerical. Chile is anticlerical under the Popular Front governments. Peru—well, I am surprised if Father O'Hara noticed anything anticlerical in Peru. It is completely dominated by the church, and Colombia also. In Ecuador there is nothing anticlerical. Paraguay and Bolivia—always worried about where they are going to get the next plate of food—are neither one nor the other. If anything, the church is strong in Bolivia. There is so little intellectual life in Paraguay that it is neither one thing nor the other, therefore the church would be strong.

I would like to call to your attention a singular fact in this scientific and elementalistic balance that I have suggested—that is, the number of physicians who achieve positions of importance in government and diplomacy in South America.

I submit that the explanation is this: The lad goes to college and becomes a doctor. He starts to practice, and as he practices, his training in science causes him to want to apply those principles of science to a wider area. He abandons his practice and goes into politics, usually first into public health. Then he raises all kinds of Cain as a public health officer, and pretty soon he is shifted to the ministry of the interior or the ministry of agriculture and becomes a diplomat. The leadership of scientific thought in Latin America has been the physician's, and, I might add, all that I know are anticlerical.

There is a difference between being antireligious and being anticlerical. A man may be a communicant and yet be anticlerical. "Anticlerical" means being against the activity of the organized church in government and usually in education. I don't know why Father O'Hara should be so appalled at anticlerical movements. I should suspect that he, himself, would be anticlerical.

LATIN-AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION

MR. DRAGNICH: Who is behind the Latin-American bloc; and particularly to what extent is the church supporting that bloc?

MR. HADEN: There has been a good deal of talk recently about a bloc headed by Argentina. I feel that the role of the church in that is

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

small. It derives more from a desire to achieve a measure of industrialization, to achieve a measure of independence from their colonial economy. The bloc is ostensibly directed against the United States, but as an enforcer of colonial economies. With the exception of the Caribbean, the United States is not the first sinner. The first sinner is England, and that bloc is really directed against England. Their slogan is, "Break the chains that bind us to foreign markets." That is the slogan of the Nationalists in Argentina, and it means "Break the chains that bind us to the consumption of meat in Britain and to the export of huge quantities of corn and wheat to Europe." The young Nationalists of Argentina have realized that the suction of those huge markets imposes on the country the continuance of the system of the large estate, of extensive agriculture, and of dependence on imports of manufactured specialties, not only heavy but also light.

The expense of living in a colonial economy are phenomenal. Here is an example. Five pounds of Chilean copper are worth about 25 cents in their raw state and will be enough to make a table lamp. These 5 pounds go to England, where they are melted, cast, turned, polished, a wire stuck through, a lamp bulb put in, and a 75-cent shade put on. It is then sent back to Chile and sells for \$25. That is the cost of living in a colonial colony.

MR. BRODIE: You don't seem to believe in the benefits of international trade. The United States does precisely that in a great many commodities.

MR. HADEN: Certainly, and it is to our advantage to keep on producing better and better lamps, cheaper and cheaper lamps, and to export them. But if we are going to have a free-enterprise system, the Chileans have a perfect right to say, "We want to establish our own lamp-manufacturing if we can."

MR. BRODIE: Their export of copper is certainly the only channel available to them for reaching that more advanced stage.

MR. HADEN: Copper is of tremendous importance to Chile, but you can take any other item, such as wool or cotton or leather.

MR. WHITE: But then you are nearing the end of the list? Is there enough iron, steel, and coal there to make the machinery that makes the light globes, copper wire, etc.? Can they industrialize to the extent of the United States or Great Britain?

MR. HADEN: They lack raw materials for heavy industry, but there is a vast amount of iron magnetite and limonite sands both on the Pacific and on the southern Atlantic coasts. There are hematite

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

deposits in Colombia, in Chile, in Brazil, and in northern Argentina, but of inferior grade.

The lack of coal is important under the present methods of reduction of iron ores to pig iron and to steel; but if ever a process is developed for the reduction of iron ore by the use of charcoal in rotary kilns or in electric furnaces, heavy industry can be made in South America because of the immense resources of their forests and the rapid growing season for new plantings.

MR. BRODIE: That does not say that they would benefit more from having their own heavy industry than from having the ability to import the products of heavy industry from abroad. It is an elementary proposition that every country benefits by trade, provided there is sufficient freedom of trade to permit each country to specialize in that which it can do best. Your example of the copper runs counter to those basic tenets first advanced systematically by Adam Smith.

MR. HADEN: I will answer you by giving you the argument of the young Chilean in whatever party he happens to be, and the young Nationalists of Argentina, and the Uruguayan or Brazilian young men in any party. They have heard your argument, especially from the British, and their answer has always been, "The production of raw materials always makes a depressed population. As long as we compare the cost of our raw materials and the cost of the imported manufactured articles that we need, we are going to try to make some of those articles ourselves. There are specialties that we will never make, but we are going to try to make some of them."

MR. BRODIE: One laborer in the mine can produce many tons per day of copper ore, and that means a considerable sum at 5 cents per pound. Compare that with the number of days of work required to make the lamp. Even at \$25 a lamp they might not get excessive wages.

I agree that economies which export raw material are vulnerable, but that is usually because they export only one or two commodities: Chile, for example, copper and nitrates and very little else; Brazil, chiefly coffee. By depending on one major export they make themselves vulnerable to the fluctuation in the markets for that particular commodity. Copper, especially, fluctuates very greatly in terms of the trade-cycle. But that is a very different thing from saying that a country is necessarily better off if it processes its own raw materials.

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

MR. HADEN: The Latin-Americans will not suffer hunger for the sake of an abstract principle. Latin America has a very low standard of living. People are poorly fed in a continent that produces huge quantities of food. Millions of people don't have shoes, although they want shoes, and millions of tons of hide are sent abroad every year.

Despite the claim that every country should produce its specialties, and the specialty in Argentina may be fine beef, they observe that those countries which have a measure of industrial production plus a measure of agricultural production are more prosperous than they are.

MR. BRODIE: It is true that industrial countries are generally better off, but I would ask why they are industrialized before I ask why they are better off.

MR. WHITE: Is it necessarily true that the industrialized countries have such a superior standard of living? Are factory workers better off than farmers?

MR. HADEN: Throughout Latin America they put a tremendous reliance on the hope of industrialization. That hope is probably misplaced, as some of the slums of Santiago, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires demonstrate. I am merely reporting that young men who are working in government and in business are convinced that that is the salvation of the continent.

MR. BALLANTINE: What is keeping them from being industrialized?

MR. HADEN: First is the lack of scientific training; second is the lack of capital; and third is a misunderstanding of the functions of bureaucracy. They exaggerate the value of centralized government machinery.

MR. BALLANTINE: Does that lack of scientific understanding include an unsound idea of economic principles?

MR. HADEN: Yes, that may be part of it, but it goes further back than that; it goes back to lack of training in mathematics.

MR. BALLANTINE: A number of years ago the Japanese government noticed shiploads of condensed milk were coming into Japan and said, "Let's start a condensed milk industry and save the money we are paying to foreign countries for this imported condensed milk." In order to develop the condensed-milk industry they had to give it very heavy subsidies and tax exemptions. They succeeded in getting a lot of land that might have been more profitably employed growing mulberries for increasing their silkworm production, and they started

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

competing with the cheap lands of the northwest Pacific Coast, where "contented" cattle were fed and produced milk very cheaply. They lost more than they gained. I am wondering whether the Latin-Americans have gone into this subject very carefully from an economic point of view.

MR. MASSEY: I was manufacturing Quaker Oats in Mexico for a number of years and had many contacts with Mexican business. This is how it happens, at least in my observation. A man owns a big farm. He has four or five sons. In the Spanish tradition, the elder son would take over the management of the farm, one of the boys would study medicine, another one might study to become a lawyer, and a third might come up to the United States and study mechanical or industrial engineering. He comes back to Mexico filled with enthusiasm, now he is scientifically trained. He wants to set up a little factory to make something that is not made in the country. Perhaps the import duties are against him. He has a friend in politics who says to the President: "Mr. President, I have a friend who wants to make shoes for the poor people here who don't have any shoes; he can make them, I calculate, to sell for \$2.00 a pair. But he is going to need a little tariff protection." So the President arranges, and the Congress rubber-stamps. They have tariff protection and the young man sets up his shoe factory. But, instead of selling his shoes to the public at \$2.00, he finds he has to sell them for \$3.00 or \$4.00—more than they had to pay before.

MR. HADEN: The local manufacturing is not always more expensive. There sometimes is favoritism, and, of course, there is a fair body of opinion in Latin America which does not believe in internal manufacture but in continuing to export raw materials and buy industrial goods.

MR. BRODIE: Successful industrialization takes skilled labor, which takes a long time to build up; it takes a large population to permit specialization within the area; it takes fuel resources and transportation, much of which Latin America does not have. These things can be built up, but it is a long pull and would be at extreme cost if attempted too rapidly.

IMMIGRATION POLICIES

MR. HADEN: The principal objection which one can make to the present Nationalist dreams of industrialization is that it is absurd to seek industrialization and at the same time have restrictive immigra-

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

tion policies. In Argentina immigration was cut off almost entirely in 1928. The argument was made that the influx of cheap Italian and Spanish labor was going to depress the wages of the Argentinean. The same argument has been made in this country by the American Federation of Labor. In 1930 there was a revolution by the conservative elements of Argentina and the army, broadly representing the landowning classes. That revolution of 1930 has been explained to me by a number of Argentineans as a reinforcement of the immigration legislation of 1928. They wanted to make quite sure that there would be no large influx of people, who might cause the *estancias* to break up even faster than they were doing.

The Brazilian immigration policy is also restrictive. There they say, "We want the higher types of European immigrants." It is a racial argument. They want the Poles and the Norwegians and the Swedes.

Chile is not very friendly to immigration today. None of the northern countries are friendly to immigration today. Various factors are involved. There is a question of pressure of population, which would cause land to be broken up. The church is a little afraid of the influx of new thought. The status quo is very profitable to many. The governments are, by and large, still representative of the landowning Spanish families, which are opposed to any upsetting of the status quo profitable to themselves.

MR. PLATT: There was an item in today's newspaper that Brazil was ready to take 100,000 displaced persons from camps in Europe. That seems to imply European Jews.

MR. HADEN: If they do, it is a change from their attitude when I was there in 1944. I would be delighted to see them do it. That would give them an influx of skilled industrial people.

MR. HUTH: From what you said, it seems that the opposition to immigration comes chiefly from the landowning group. You also mentioned the church. Is not its opposition important?

MR. HADEN: The landowning classes also have the support of benighted labor leaders in their opposition to immigration.

MR. HUTH: Are not these groups the chief supporters of the conservative types of Catholicism?

MR. HADEN: That's right.

POSITION OF LABOR

MR. WHITE: How much of a figure does labor cut? Is there any widespread organization? What is their political and social position?

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. HADEN: Chile has a large salaried labor population, working in many trades and in copper. They are highly organized in labor unions and usually belong to either the Socialist or the Communist parties. They take an active vocal part in politics, and the long-standing tradition of the purchase of votes is dying out rapidly. They are voting according to their party lines. In Chile the Radical party is also attractive to the working class. That does not mean "radical" in our sense; radical means "roots"—it is rooted in a country. The location of these workers in Chile is near the copper and nitrate deposits. The Communist party is strong in the nitrate field and strong in Santiago near the copper.

In Uruguay one city includes one-third of the population of the country. Montevideo has a population of about 800,000, and in Montevideo you have a great labor force and they are usually members of the Batllista party (Social Democrats) or of the Socialist party. The Communist party is not very strong in Uruguay, probably because of the strength of the moderate position of the *Colorado* party.

In Argentina the laboring population is concentrated in La Plata, which is the center of the meat-packing industry, and Buenos Aires, which has close to 4,000,000 population in its metropolitan area. There are a few towns outside. Rosario has quite a lot of labor because of the dock workers. Mendoza has very little. There is a fair organization of the laborers in the oil fields of the south. The laboring population in Argentina is usually enrolled in strong labor unions, voting the Radical party and, in Buenos Aires, the Socialist party. Both parties are moderate. The Communist party in Argentina rose to a membership of around 50,000 in 1944. Out of a population of 14,000,000 that isn't a great deal.

MR. WHITE: I suppose their anticlericalism increases as they approach the extreme left.

MR. HADEN: Rather, the more they live in cities, the more anticlerical they are.

GOVERNMENT

MR. VON GRUNEBaum: What comparison is there between the function of the president in Argentina and in the United States?

MR. HADEN: That is a pet theory of mine, and I have tested it out with a number of South Americans and they have confirmed me in it. The president in South America is a much more direct-action person

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

than he is in the United States. That is why a president can take action toward his Congress which would be considered overstepping the bounds here. Though there may be some outcries against the suspension of the Constitution, the dictation of a new Constitution, the dissolution of Congress, the calling of a new Congress, his function is still that of the leader very little removed from the strong dictator of olden times.

Revolution is in some cases the only democratic recourse. If you have had a government which has arrogated to itself powers which are not in the Constitution; if taxes go up, the mails become filled, the treasury is always empty because too many hands are dipping into it; if the government, by the use of the police and the modern methods of control of mass opinion, is preventing any effort to relieve the oppression of the regime—when you have arrived at that point, “popular revolution” is the only democratic means of getting rid of the oppressor, of the dictator, of the pilferage, the only way the people can express themselves. In Spanish *revolución popular* is a revolt of the people, upsetting the tyrant, and is no longer an illegitimate tool. It is “popular” both because it is in the interest of the people and because it is well received.

MR. WHITE: “Popular revolution” is a part of the unwritten constitution?

MR. HADEN: That’s right, at a certain point it is.

UNIVERSITIES

MR. VON GRUNEBaum: In connection with the statement that part of the backwardness of Latin America is the lack of scientific approach, I would like to know whether any generalized statements can be made concerning the level of Latin-American universities, the level rather than the purposes.

MR. HADEN: I will give you an example. A friend of mine was teaching at San Marco. He had been there two years. His contract was up, and he was not going to renew it. He was not an American. He said to me, “I need the money but I just can’t teach there any more. Scholarship is not scholarship; the boys learn or they don’t learn; some of them read, most of them don’t read; but they will expect to pass their examinations if they have the proper recommendations.”

He said that he had two classes and about twenty in each. Out of those forty with whom he had direct contact, one, a girl, was actually

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

working. He had to pass all forty of them, however, because of the recommendations that they brought him. On the first examination that he gave, the boys and girls all came up and handed him envelopes. He opened them and there it was! "I recommend very highly that the son of my dear friend Dr. So-and-So pass his examinations on such-and-such a date. (*Signed*) John Smith, Councilman, Lima."

When he had all these recommendations on his desk he was baffled, but decided, "This is a custom I shall not respect," and passed only the one who deserved it.

The dean called him a few days later and said, "You made a mistake; you must not flunk Joe Doaks."

"But Joe Doaks is the biggest dumbbell!"

"I can't help that; he is the son of the brother of the vice-president's wife; you have to pass him."

He passed!

That is not everywhere the same way, but the general attitude and the general level is a nonscientific one. The traditions are scholastic except in the science schools, such as pharmacy, dentistry, and medicine, and also in some of the government agricultural schools, where they work like beavers and do some excellent experimenting. But that is on a lower level; it is not university level.

MR. FARIS: I could add a little footnote. One swallow does not make a summer, but this has just happened: We sent one of our men to Bahia to study the race question. He studied for two years and a half and wrote a book that was a best seller in the academic sense. Pretty soon we got a letter asking for a sociologist who could handle Spanish or preferably Portuguese, in the University of São Paulo. He went there, and later he got two more men to go there in the sociology department.

MR. HADEN: I know both of the men you are talking about, and one of them got into difficulties. There was a terrific row about the sociology books he was translating. Pressure was brought to stop these translations. The implication was that these books showed that bodily ills are not the visitations of God but are social diseases and social problems. The sociologist said, "If you interfere with my translation of these books I am leaving tomorrow." He took it over to the Ministry of Education and had to fight it all the way up to Vargas, but he won. But that was Brazil. He said, "These books have got to be translated; these are basic and we have got to do it."

MR. HUTN: Latin-American "scholars" write on many subjects.

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

They have bibliographies including topics remote from their field. No standard of performance seems to be required. A man may have two hundred titles of which only a few would pass muster here. Is there a low level of demand for scholarship? Or is a university man expected to express himself on all manner of things, whether he has a scholar's knowledge about it or not?

MR. HADEN: I don't know that I can answer that, but I can give you some signposts. You recall the writings of the *Encyclopédistes*. Do you recall the versatility of some of our own Founding Fathers? Mr. Jefferson, for example. Here was versatility—a man who was an architect, a cattle-breeder, a tobacco planter, a writer of legal commentaries, and so on. There is something of that complex in Latin America. Latin America is so deficient in specialized expertness that any man who emerges from the mass is looked to as a versatile person and wants to prove it. Some of it is not his own fault. Some of it is demanded of him. A cancer specialist must write on mathematics, if he is called upon to do so. Again, a physician is expected to be ambassador in Washington. He may be a good one, he may not. There is also an economic drive. After all, one book will bring him about \$500; and, if he has two hundred titles, that is just that much more money.

MR. COX: In many cases one learned man wants to be able to repay a gift of books from some learned man outside of the country; consequently, he strives to get something within the covers of the book, perhaps at his own expense, and the larger part of that edition may be disposed of as personal gifts.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

MR. PLATT: It seems to me that what has been said about education and scholarship as well as about industry and government illustrates the Latin-American culture pattern. That culture pattern is different from ours. We should not say, "I wonder why these people do these queer things" but should recognize the characteristics of that culture pattern in all its amplifications. If an instructor is asked to pass people by recommendation, the fact that he is surprised and disturbed shows that he was not prepared to fit into the situation. Only after a person is prepared to fit into a situation which is different from his own can he decide whether to try to change it, whether to try to move the Catholic church a little, whether to try to argue people out of national industrialization, whether to raise standards in education.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. HADEN: I agree with that entirely. The differences are neither good nor bad; they are facts.

MR. MASSEY: One of the great deficiencies in Latin-American psychology is the lack of intellectual honesty. My own wife was born of British parents in Mexico City and went to English-speaking schools and Spanish-speaking schools in Mexico. She was educated partly in England and Scotland. Seven or eight years ago she told me that she did not want our children to grow up in Latin America and attend the schools there because in her experience the students, the teachers, and the parents placed a premium on cleverness, not on honesty. Ever since she told me that, I have observed that characteristic hundreds of times in my dealings with Latin Americans.

MR. HADEN: May I read a sentence I have here?

In Latin America the domination of the Roman Catholic Church with its anti-scientific bias has considerably retarded scientific progress, with consequent lag in remedying the remediable: living conditions, health, literacy, etc. As a result, when the Latin American sees outside his own country what can be done in the way of material civilization, his frustrations are real. Lacking, however, a scientific grounding, his self-criticism is masochistic and as a reaction he demands to be accepted not for what he is but for what he would like to be.

That means if you are clever enough you can get by. It all goes back to the process of thought. There are differences, for instance, between ourselves and the French, but the French have a long tradition of scientific thought, and somehow I don't think we could say that about the French.

MR. PLATT: I wish we could free ourselves from the tone of moral disapproval of these differences.

MR. HADEN: Quite so; and yet the language of science is probably the most universal language there is.

MR. PLATT: We approve of science, and we think they ought to understand it.

MR. HADEN: In the purest form of mathematics I should imagine that two mathematicians could communicate without knowing a single word of the other man's language by merely writing down their equations.

In my paper almost all that I said concerned relations of government to government. I said very little about contacts between people, except as I mentioned the multiple contacts possible under a cultural-intellectual-social program. That gap is very real.

We have tried to fill it by the naming of cultural relations attached to our various embassies and legations. It has been a matter of

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

astonishment to me during the number of years that I have been in South America, as it has to the men who have been assigned as cultural relations attachés, to observe the friendly attitude of the people. I do not mean only scholars but students, people that you meet at parties, motormen, chauffeurs, farmers at whose inns you stop to have a beefsteak.

I once visited a tin-reduction plant in Bolivia. It was $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours by car away from Oruro, and we crossed one whole range of mountains and one smaller one to get there. Here were 6,000 people in a village, and I went through the reduction plant, where I got into an argument with the American manager. He said, "I'll bet you a dollar that none of these people here ever heard of Roosevelt."

So, as we were going through the plant, I said, "I'll bet you a dollar that two out of any six that I ask will have heard about Roosevelt and will know who he is."

The first man that was called up was just an Indian peon. I was introduced as a correspondent from the United States just visiting, and so I said to him, "Do you know who Señor Roosevelt is?" He said, "Ah, Roosevelt; the President of the United States."

I failed on Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5; we saved the foreman for the last and asked the foreman, "Who is Roosevelt?"

Immediately he replied, "He is the President of the United States," and then added, "What a great man!"

There is no place in the United States that is quite so isolated as this tin-reduction mine, $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours out of Ururo. It was phenomenal. I was so overcome, we tested them again on some of the other names. I asked them who Churchill was and tried them on Hitler. The foreman knew Hitler, none of them knew Churchill.

I don't know whether it is a fair example, but there is an amazing feeling among the people of Latin America for the United States, and one which manages to live despite some of the curious things that go on, despite the American manager working for a Bolivian company, who therefore becomes identified with the exploiter and is described by the labor organizers as an exploiter. It is amazing how often the American manager, though identified with the exploiter, will be much more trusted than the Bolivian agent.

There are possibilities of popular understanding between the United States and the Latin-American people which fall into the classification of cultural relations and which certainly should not be overlooked by any scholar or by any government.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

I spent three days with an Indian, 25 miles outside of Pernambuco in Brazil. I wanted to know what kind of plants he grew. He was thoroughly informed, knew about the United States, knew what we were doing, knew all about the war; he was a beautiful rich brown, a swell guy. I would say that he had a little Negro in him but was mostly Indian. I am sure they are still talking about the Americano who came to stay with them in that area. I was received immediately, automatically, with a friendliness which is extraordinary. I was very much touched by that experience.

That can be repeated thousands of times around the continent, so that when we hear of the Argentine government kicking us in the shins at Pan-American conferences it does not make very much impression on me any more. I always remember some of the things that have happened to me over the last nine years and the wealth of contacts, the multiple and friendly and real contacts that can be made.

MR. HUTH: How can we activate that good feeling toward ourselves in the face of controls from above that may not be friendly?

MR. HADEN: To activate it, every individual must share in it. The Pan American Council seeks to prepare people before they go abroad to look for and appreciate these contacts as they come. Officially speaking, it is in the cultural relations program, the spreading of books, of magazines, and of moving pictures. Of all the cultural contacts, the one I prefer is the moving picture. It has the faculty of bringing people together with a sense of solidarity. Newspaper and radio are also important.

OFFICIAL CONTACTS

MR. PLATT: Are you advocating more emphasis on mutual understandings of the common people than on formal contacts between governments?

MR. MASSEY: I was attached to two embassies during the war. I had the feeling that people in our embassies were snowed under by paper work and that the State Department did not sufficiently insist that the foreign-service men and women go out into the small towns and get next to the people. If you are so constituted that you can go out and eat in the little open-air *jacales*, you can become completely anonymous. They will, of course, know you are a *gringo*, but if they don't know you are from the embassy they will take off their veneer.

I have tried it. I was able to go around a good deal without my uniform, and I was able to speak the language fluently enough so they

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

were not too sure whether I was an American or not. The result was that the people "let down their hair" to me and did not dream that I was a member of the embassy. The residents in the hinterland appeared to be appreciative of the little gesture. When I made official calls on the officers of the military posts, I did not tell them about our foreign policy, military exploits, and so on. I told them how we lived in the United States. Most of them never dreamed that 95 per cent of the American housewives do their own housework. They thought all of us had servants.

MR. HADEN: I know of no body of men and women anywhere in any service in the world that are a more earnest crowd and a more honest crowd than those in our foreign service. Time and time again I have known of foreign-service officers and clerks and their wives, who have gone out of their way in completely unpublicized ventures to do precisely what Mr. Massey was talking about, and they have been amazingly successful and very effective.

The foreign service as a body is highly trained, sometimes over-trained, but, by and large, it is amazingly effective and usually liberal. They are astonishingly ready and receptive to some of the more tenuous contacts and inferences.

MR. BALLANTINE: I have never served in Latin America, but it has been my experience, largely in the Far East, that most of our foreign-service officers spend two years intensively learning the language and institutions of the area. They become familiar with native life and with the native peoples. I doubt whether you could find any body of people who generally have so wide a knowledge of what the people are thinking. The missionaries do in certain fields, but foreign-service officers meet people in industry and government as well as the common people. They are required and expected to spend a considerable portion of their time in travel. The criticism is not justified that foreign-service officers fail to become acquainted with the people of the countries where they are assigned and to know what they are thinking about.

MR. WHITE: We ought to look into the possibility of paying more and increasing staffs and taking some of the load off these foreign-service people.

In the British Embassy in Washington there are an ambassador and two or three ministers. This spreads out the official top-level responsibilities, so that the ambassador can take a barnstorming trip across the country now and then and have a "hot-dog" dinner with

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Cleveland. If we limit our personnel as strictly as we have in most cases, that is not possible.

MR. BALLANTINE: Every American abroad thinks he is as good as everybody else. When he wants to make a contact with the American Mission he wants to see the ambassador or the minister. Adequate provision is not made for the large staff necessary to make up an embassy or a legation or a consulate-general. It isn't adequate for just the top man to be able to make those contacts. The entire staff should do so.

MR. HADEN: The appointment of cultural relations staffs has been extremely effective. Keniston had two men with him, and they were always going out and lecturing by invitation at this college, that university, this school, this function; and it was amazingly effective. Those three men multiplied the contacts of the embassy several times.

MR. HUTH: I assume that our representatives abroad often confront this South American attitude in favor of industrialization for reasons as they see them, reasons which are obviously emotionally reinforced and are not on what we would call either an academic or a scientific level. Would the representatives of our State Department in such circumstances try to take the people they meet as they are and to understand their culture and ideas, or would they talk and argue with them from the point of view of our culture and ideas.

MR. HADEN: I would say that the junior diplomat in his contacts with nonofficial persons in the country in which he is accredited would no more try to teach than in any social contact in the United States one would try to teach in a conversation.

MR. HUTH: In talking to the young Nationalists in South America, do our representatives take them as they are, or do they try to teach them what is supposedly accepted economics?

MR. HADEN: If there were agreement generally as to the truths of economic science, it would be fairly easy to establish a policy, but since that is impossible there usually is disagreement as to the official line. Whether to support or not to support a given industrialization project depends on the recommendation of the ambassador, the approval of the State Department officer, the availability of funds in the Export-Import Bank, the willingness of Congress to appropriate money, and a host of other factors.

The foreign-service officer usually reports, and the urgency of his recommendation for action depends on his own capacity and under-

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

standing. In the junior ranges, certainly, the men try to report what they find and, if they report the existence of a body of thought in favor of industrialization, give the reasons. The decision as to whether the Export-Import Bank would actually help out in such a matter would depend on discussion in Washington and would be resolved in each individual case.

MR. HUTH: We are committed to making people over as a matter of principle in Europe. How effective are we going to be in the State Department with the notion that it will take two or three years, maybe twenty-five years, to make a people over?

MR. PLATT: Doesn't this bring out one of our great unsolved problems: How, if in any way, to bring the mutual good feeling of common people into relation with our national and international policy? Whether the State Department officials are good fraternizers or not is not going to settle that question. This isn't just a Latin-American problem. The common people of China manifest good will to our people in their country, and the same has been true in Russia, even though we can't go there and wander around now as we once did.

MR. MASSEY: One of my best friends in El Salvador was a young man who had gone to prep school on the West Coast and to the University of California and later to Oxford. He was one of the staunchest friends of the United States in that Republic, but he was also one of our strongest critics. We talked as a couple of boys would talk in a locker-room. He was not sent up here on a scholarship since his family was wealthy and could afford to send him.

If we think that our ideas and our way of living and our way of thinking are a little better than they are in other parts of the world and if we are going to attempt to disseminate our ideas, inviting foreigners to study here is one of the best ways of doing it. Young men will go back to their home country, understanding our way of living and thinking. They will be continually striving to do something about conditions in their own country and will eventually become leaders in politics, in business, or in social improvement.

MR. HADEN: Nelson Rockefeller persuaded some of his friends to put up some money to bring Latin-American boys to learn trades in the United States, such as the operation of power lathes, the repair and maintenance of telephone lines and switchboards, the operation of mechanical shoe machinery. During the first few months 179 boys came, and the project has been going on since. These boys stay five or six months and then go back, often into their own businesses. Those

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

lads are taking back the very best that we have to offer by actual contact.

I have always ascribed a great deal of the American-Chinese friendliness over the years to the operation of the Boxer scholarships. Each one of those scholars has been a caster of seed in China. Similarly, these Latin-American boys, not only those who study at the universities and go back with a doctorate but these lads who learn how to operate a telephone switchboard will be casters of seeds. Frankly, I think it is better to have more operators of switchboards than to have more doctors of philosophy.

POLICY DETERMINATION

MR. MASSEY: Who are the men who determine our foreign policy?

MR. BALLANTINE: In the last analysis it is the American people that determine the foreign policy of the United States. The President, who is an elected officer of the people, is chiefly responsible for that foreign policy. The general direction and the general framework of the foreign policy is made up by the President, and he is probably better qualified than anybody else to make it because he represents the electorate more than any other person. The people in the State Department, the technical people, the foreign-service people, get their general directives and prepare programs for submission to the Secretary of State. So I would say that the President and the Secretary of State are the two principal makers of foreign policy, and they do it in the light of their judgment as to what the American people want. They have contacts with the representatives of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate. Permanent officials of the State Department have an extremely limited role in determining foreign policy, and it should be so in any democratic country.

MR. MASSEY: You state the formal side. My question went further: Does the President of the United States consult the people? Does the Secretary of State consult the people?

MR. HADEN: If you've got Henrik Shipstead, Bert Wheeler, and Gerald Nye on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the tone of that committee is going to be very different from what it would be if La Follette, Wayne Morse, and Lucas are substituted. William Randolph Hearst used to claim that he caused the War of 1898. Well, in a sense he did. I am way off from the formal thing now.

For instance, steel influences foreign policy. And what was the influence of the deal that Krupp for many years had with Vickers-

DISCUSSION OF LATIN AMERICA

Armstrong, and the friendly gentlemen's understanding that both Krupp and Vickers-Armstrong had with United States Steel? The failure to establish heavy industry in South America may be largely due to policy—in that respect—having been dictated by Krupp, Vickers-Armstrong, and United States Steel.

Similarly, I would say the American Sugar Institute is the most powerful single formulator of policy regarding Cuba.

MR. PLATT: I think the State Department is doing its job as well as could be expected. Its officers are to be upheld and commended, and this matter of getting along with the common people likewise is worth while, and we make progress in it; but we must continue to struggle with the problem of bringing personal contacts into relation with official policy.

PART IV

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

THE EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT

By CLAIR WILCOX¹

MANY months have passed since the war ended. But the world we live in is not, as yet, a world at peace. Its peoples are not one. They do not speak the same language. They do not attach the same meanings to the same words. They are divided in their beliefs and in their practices—with respect to economic and political organization, with respect to human rights, with respect to freedom and democracy. They are still suspicious of one another, distrustful and afraid. They are still in arms, and they still seek their ultimate security in military might. Whether these divergent views can soon—or ever—be reconciled, these suspicions dispelled, and these arms laid away, no man can now say. The real test will come, again and again and again, when the nations are asked to take smaller risks for greater gains, to sacrifice smaller advantages for the greater good. And no one knows whether they will do it—or when.

This is not to say that another world war is probable or even possible. In fact, the division of power in the world today, the total destructiveness of modern warfare, and the obvious unattainability of victory are such that the likelihood of another major war appears now to be very small indeed. But that does not mean that we shall soon know tranquillity, a real sense of security, or an abiding peace. The prospect, as far ahead as one can see it, is for continuing irritation, recurring crises, a protracted truce.

In such an atmosphere the task of rebuilding a stable world order must seem to be impossibly difficult. But the obstacles before us, serious as they may be, should not be permitted to obscure the very great progress that has already been made. And that progress has been great. The United States has taken the lead in canceling past debts and making new contributions to relief and reconstruction. Our Congress has increased the authority of the President to reduce tariffs under the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act. We have

¹ Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

made a bold and heartening proposal for the international control of atomic energy. We have played our part in binding the world together in a network of organizations for international co-operation. Just call the roll: the United Nations, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and the organizations now in the process of establishment for refugees and for world health. We are developing the programs and organizing the institutions through which the nations can work together, side by side, to reconstruct a shattered world. For so much in the way of concrete achievement in so short a time, there is no precedent in history. Much has been done; much still remains to be done.

World organization for security is essential; but, if it is to succeed, it must rest upon continuous international co-operation in economic affairs. The provision of relief, the stabilization of currencies, and the extension of credits are necessary and desirable; but if the peoples who now depend upon relief are eventually to become self-supporting, if those who now must borrow are eventually to repay, the world must be freed, in large measure, of the barriers that now obstruct the flow of goods and services. If political and economic order are to be rebuilt, we must provide, in our trade program, the solid foundation upon which the superstructure of international co-operation is to stand.

The barriers which obstruct the flow of trade were raised higher and higher in the years between the two world wars. Governments interfered increasingly with the movement of goods and services across their borders. They sought to curb imports by increasing customs formalities, by raising tariffs, by imposing quotas and embargoes, and by controlling the supplies of foreign exchange. They sought to force exports by depreciating their currencies, by paying subsidies, and by bartering goods for goods. They sought to gain at the expense of their rivals by entering into exclusive deals and by setting up preferential systems which discriminated among their suppliers and their customers. At the same time, they permitted their private traders to seek higher profits through cartel arrangements that curtailed output, raised prices, and divided up the markets of

EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT

the world. And, upon occasion, nations themselves entered into agreements that were designed to benefit their producers by cutting output and boosting prices to the detriment of those outsiders who consumed their goods.

The existence of these devices is well known. Their consequences are less fully understood. When one nation raises its tariff and when it imposes quotas on imports, it prevents the producers of other nations from selling in its markets. When it depreciates its currency and when it subsidizes its exports, it gives its own producers an artificial advantage over the producers of other nations in the markets of the world. When it enters into an exclusive treaty with another nation, under which each of them agrees to discriminate against the goods produced by everybody else, it obtains a favored position which bars the producers of other nations from the markets concerned. When a nation sets up, within its own sphere of influence, a preferential trading system which discriminates against the other nations of the world, it denies to producers outside the system an equal opportunity to sell their goods. When a nation blocks its exchanges and compels those who have sold to it to accept payment, on a quasi-barter basis, in its own goods, it forces its products into their markets and keeps other products out. In all these ways nations prevent other nations from obtaining the foreign exchange which they must have if they are to import the materials and the machines which are essential to their industrial development. Moreover, when an industrial nation permits its manufacturers to enter into cartel agreements which restrict the output and raise the prices of manufactured goods and when a raw-material-producing nation itself enters into arrangements which are designed permanently to restrict the output and raise the prices of raw materials, it makes these goods and these materials scarce and costly and, to that extent, denies them to the other peoples of the world. All these measures operate to limit the purchasing-power of the nations against which they are directed and thus to make it more difficult for such nations to expand their industry and to raise the plane of living of their peoples.

This was the unhappy story of international economic relationships between the two world wars. The war, with its necessities and its compulsions, tightened the hold of governments on the world's trade. The channels of trade were broken by hostilities. Where they were not broken, they were altered to meet the requirements of war. The United States, like other countries, engaged in economic warfare

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

as a supplement to military warfare. We bought goods that we did not need to keep our enemies from getting them. We supplied goods to some countries to obtain from them the things we did need and to insure ourselves of their support. We denied goods to other countries to penalize them for not co-operating with us and to prevent them from aiding our enemies. The vast quantities of goods that moved across our borders were designed, in large part, for military use. In short, international trade became an instrument of war. The question that we now must answer is whether it is to be a casualty of war.

These years have spawned a multitude of new controls. Exchange restrictions have become world wide. Persons selling abroad have been required to turn their foreign moneys over to their governments. Persons buying abroad have been forbidden to make payments without the express permission of their governments. Import quotas and export quotas have governed the movement of goods across national frontiers. Persons desiring to import or to export have been compelled to obtain licenses from the control authorities. In many cases, instead of licensing private traders, governments have set up public agencies to handle a large part of their foreign trade. Agreements to barter goods for goods have taken the place of free markets. The regimentation of the world's commerce has become virtually complete.

Where do we go from here? The immediate prospect is not a pleasant one. The sad fact is that the world is geared, right now, to continue economic warfare, using the full arsenal of weapons developed in the 1930's and sharpened during the war. Neither we nor our neighbors have to learn the game; we know how to play it; we are organized to play it. The larger countries, especially the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, have merely to tighten their hold on the regions to which they have easy access and, perhaps, to capture other areas, through exclusive contracts, discriminatory arrangements, and barter deals. If this were to happen—as it easily might—the world, instead of being drawn together through economic intercourse, would be split asunder into competing economic blocs.

A world of economic blocs would be a sorry place in which to do business. Export and import programs would have to be made out in advance and negotiated with other countries. Export and import allocations would have to be assigned to individual traders. Licenses would have to be obtained for individual transactions. A vast bu-

EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT

reaucracy would have to be set up to keep the records and police the regulations. The businessman, instead of buying and selling whatever he chose, at the time and the place and the price that he chose, would have to fight his way through a maze of controls. If we desire to stimulate individual initiative, if we seek to realize the advantages of private enterprise, we shall not entangle the nation's traders in red tape.

A world of economic blocs, moreover, would be an unhappy world for the consumer. Restrictionism, even on a regional basis, could contribute little to planes of living. To the extent that the countries within a bloc might specialize, according to their particular capacities, and engage in trade with one another, they would be better off than they would have been without any trade at all. But they would be worse off than would have been the case if all had traded freely with the other nations of the world. It is likely, too, that the dominant country in any bloc would seek to drive hard bargains, keeping the terms of trade in its favor and requiring its satellites to produce according to its advantage rather than to their own. Output and income would thus be lower than they otherwise might be.

What is the alternative? It is economic freedom, in the best sense of the word. Economic freedom in international relations means the unhampered transfer of money between countries. It means stable exchange rates. It means that barriers to the movement of goods across national boundaries will be few and small. It means that nations will not discriminate among their neighbors when they control their trade. We can hardly expect, in a world so long and so tightly bound by restrictions, that the elements of economic freedom can be realized over night. But we can move toward freedom. And every step that we take in that direction will be a gain.

The benefits of economic freedom are clear. It stimulates individual initiative and lets down the barriers to private enterprise. It promotes the geographic division of labor, permitting each country to produce those goods for which it is best fitted, thus increasing the output of industry and raising planes of living throughout the world. It brings the peoples of different lands together, gives them an opportunity to know one another, and encourages them to co-operate for the common good. Stability and security are manifestly more attainable in a world united in plenty than in a world divided in want.

What is needed, and needed now, is the stabilization of exchanges, the removal of exchange controls, the reduction of tariffs and other

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

barriers to trade, the elimination of discriminations, and the uprooting of restrictive arrangements, private as well as public, so that people everywhere can begin to reap the harvest of increased world trade.

If these steps are to be taken, the United States must seek the co-operation of the other nations of the world. It would avail little for this country to conduct her own trade according to liberal principles, if others among the major trading nations did not do likewise. But if we act in time, they may well be persuaded to do likewise. The political and economic structure of the world has been shaken by war. It is obvious to everyone today that international relationships in industry, finance, and commerce must be rebuilt. The opportunity for making major alterations in this structure is now at hand. But time is short. Our power as social architects is greater this year and next than it will be a few years hence. If we delay until the international economy has hardened into a new mold, our greatest opportunity to shape it in the patterns of peace and prosperity will have been lost. The time for action is now.

This is the background of the American *Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and Employment* which our government published on December 6, 1945, and submitted for consideration to the American people and to other governments of the world. These proposals are based upon the conviction that human energies can best be directed toward the improvement of standards of living, if the world, instead of regimenting its trade, will seek to restore the greatest possible measure of economic freedom. They are designed to reverse the pre-war trend toward economic isolationism and to resist the present tendency to fasten the pattern of wartime controls upon a world at peace. Their provisions may be outlined in a few words.

We have proposed, first, that the devices by which governments have distorted the natural flow of private trade, whether through the restriction of imports or through the artificial stimulation of exports, be modified or abandoned. To this end we have proposed that customs formalities be simplified; that discriminatory taxes, transit charges, and other regulations be removed; that trade boycotts be outlawed; that common principles be adopted to govern tariff valuation and the application of antidumping and countervailing duties; that full publicity be given to laws and regulations affecting trade; that tariffs be substantially reduced and that tariff preferences be

EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT

eliminated; that duties on exports be imposed without discrimination; that exchange controls be governed by the principles established by the International Monetary Fund; that import quotas be limited to a few really necessary cases; that exchange controls and import quotas both be administered without discrimination; that subsidies, in general, should be the subject of international consultation; and that subsidies on exports should be confined to exceptional cases, under general rules.

All the foregoing proposals relate to cases of public interference with private trade. In many cases, however, governments themselves have established enterprises to buy and sell abroad. And, in a few cases, governments have assumed a complete monopoly of their foreign trade. Here we have proposed that governments conducting such enterprises should agree to give equal treatment to the commerce of all friendly states; that they should make their purchases and sales on purely economic grounds; and that governments whose enterprises are completely socialized should commit themselves as to the quantities of goods which they propose to import. It is the purpose of these proposals to apply common principles of fair dealing to the trade of capitalist and socialist economies, so that the two systems may meet in the market place without conflict, thus to contribute each to the other's prosperity and welfare.

International trade has been restrained by governments. It has also been restrained by the restrictive practices of private business: price-fixing, market-sharing, curtailment of output or exports, suppression of technology, and discrimination against competitors. We have therefore proposed that nations commit themselves to act, individually and co-operatively, to curb such practices when they interfere with the objectives of increased production and trade and high levels of employment and real income. As one means of carrying out this commitment, it is proposed that a special agency be established, within an International Trade Organization, to receive complaints concerning restrictive practices of international combines and cartels, to obtain and examine the facts which are relevant to such cases, and to recommend the remedies that may be required. Enforcement against private violators necessarily rests with sovereign states.

If trade is thus to be freed from the fetters that have bound it, we must give assurance to the many small producers of the great pri-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

mary commodities that necessary adjustments to shifting demands will be gradual rather than sudden and that these producers will be protected, during the period required for such adjustments, against the impact of violent change. But we must be sure that the measures adopted to this end are temporary rather than permanent and that they are not administered at the expense of the consumers involved. It is therefore proposed: that action with respect to the special problem of surplus commodities, in world trade, be international rather than national; that the solution of this problem be sought by measures that would remove the basic causes of the difficulty, not by measures that would perpetuate it; that the solution be sought, in particular, by methods that would expand consumption; that measures restricting exports or fixing prices, where they are necessary, be limited in duration; that they be so administered as to provide increasing opportunities to satisfy requirements from the most economic sources; that they be attended, at every stage, by full publicity; and that consuming countries be given an equal voice with producing countries in their formulation and administration.

We have proposed, further, that all these commitments be embodied in a World Trade Charter and that they be carried out through an International Trade Organization, established under the charter, in appropriate relationship to the Economic and Social Council, as an integral part of the structure of the United Nations. Final authority in this organization would be vested in a conference of member-states; continuing oversight would be delegated to an executive board; daily operations would be conducted by three commissions of experts dealing, respectively, with commercial policy, business practices, and commodity problems; and all these organs would be served by a central secretariat. It would be the function of the organization to collect, analyze, and publish data on the operation of the charter and to develop common technical standards and provide technical assistance to governments; to review and advise on treaties, agreements, practices, and policies affecting international trade; to interpret the provisions of international agreements and grant exceptions to such agreements in accordance with established rules; to hear complaints and make recommendations to member-states; and to provide a medium for consultation and for the settlement of disputes. The organization would thus afford a permanent mechanism for international collaboration on all matters affecting world trade.

EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT

All these proposals point toward an increasing volume of trade. But increasing trade involves increasing interdependence, and increasing interdependence involves, in turn, the risk of increasing instability. If our proposals are to gain acceptance, therefore, assurance must be given that nations will seek, through measures that are not inconsistent with them, to achieve and maintain high and stable levels of production and employment. For this reason it is proposed, finally, that each nation should agree to take action designed to provide full and regular employment within its own jurisdiction; that no nation should seek to serve this end by adopting measures which would export its unemployment to its neighbors; and that all nations should co-operate in an effort to stabilize production by exchanging information and participating in consultations with respect to anti-depression policies.

These proposals were not prepared in haste; they have been developed by a series of interdepartmental committees which have met in Washington continuously since the spring of 1943. They are not utopian or visionary; they have been hammered out in great detail to meet the actual situation that exists in the world today. They do not impinge on sovereign independence; they merely recognize that measures adopted by any country may have effects abroad, and they suggest, for general adoption, fair rules of mutual tolerance. They are distinctively American: in substance, if not in detail, they parallel the programs that have been recommended independently by such representative bodies as the Committee on International Economic Policy of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Planning Association, the National Foreign Trade Council, and the Committee on Economic Development. The world that is pictured in these proposals is the kind of world that Americans want.

The international economic policy of the United States today stands in sharp contrast to the policy adopted in the years that followed the first World War. Then our people made new loans to the rest of the world. Now, again, we are making such loans. But then the victors sought to collect reparations in cash, and our government attempted to recover, with interest, the sums that we had advanced to our Allies to finance the prosecution of the war. And, at the same time, we raised our tariff so fast and so far as to make it difficult, if not impossible, for any of these debts to be paid. Now, however, the victors are agreed to the collection of reparations in kind; our govern-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

ment is writing off the wartime balance of the Lend-Lease account; and we are proposing to take the lead in reducing barriers to trade. We have come at last to recognize the requirements of our position as the world's greatest creditor. We are demonstrating that we can learn from history.

At the suggestion of our government, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has called a World Conference on Trade and Employment. This Conference, of some fifty nations, will probably be held in the late summer or early fall of 1947. It will be its task to adopt the World Trade Charter and to establish the International Trade Organization. To prepare for this Conference, the Council has set up a committee of eighteen nations—the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, and China; the British Dominions and India; Belgium, Holland, Norway, Czechoslovakia, and Lebanon; Brazil, Chile, and Cuba. This committee will hold its first meeting in London on October 15, 1946. Its agenda, adopted by the unanimous vote of the Council, is identical with the headings in the American *Proposals*. During the course of this preparatory work, our government intends to go forward, collaterally, with definitive negotiations for the reduction of barriers to trade under the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act. Fourteen nations, all members of the preparatory committee, have accepted our invitation to negotiate to this end. If all goes well, we should emerge from these protracted and complicated negotiations, sometime before the end of 1947, with a protocol embodying the new trade-agreements completed and signed by the President and with the World Trade Charter ready for presentation to the Congress. The International Trade Organization, upon the adherence of a sufficient number of states, should be established and in operation before the end of 1948.

What are the prospects for the success of this program? There will be some opposition, of course, within the United States. It will doubtless be said that the concessions that we would make, in return for concessions made by others, would be prejudicial to the interests of particular economic groups or hazardous to our security. The philosophy of restrictionism, inappropriate as it may be to our present position in world affairs, is still alive among us. And, in particular instances, we have adopted policies that are inconsistent with those that we now advocate. But the balance of our national interest should be clear. That interest lies in an expansion of world trade. The major

EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT

obstacles to our program will be encountered not at home but abroad.

Collectivism, public planning, and centralized control now govern an increasing fraction of the world's work. And none of these policies is really congenial to the liberation of international markets. State trading and bulk purchasing, by mixed economies, are quantitatively even more significant. And neither of them is easily to be fitted into the pattern of multilateralism and nondiscrimination. Relatively undeveloped countries will doubtless insist that infant industries be given increased protection, not through outright subsidization but through higher tariffs and import quotas. Some countries, distrusting the determination and the capacity of the United States to prevent violent fluctuations in the volume of industrial activity and foreign trade, will argue that they cannot achieve security unless they insulate themselves against us. Others are frankly skeptical that we, ourselves, will conform in particular cases or that we will adhere, for many years, to the principles that we have espoused.

It is clear, however, that our proposals have made a profound impression on the other nations of the world. They have been translated into many languages and are now undergoing intensive study in every capital on earth. From a number of countries we already have informal assurances of interest and support. From Great Britain and from France we have even more. The British government, in connection with the Financial Agreement which was approved by our Congress in July, 1946, has formally expressed its full agreement with the American *Proposals*, has pledged itself to enter into negotiations for the reduction of barriers to trade, and has undertaken to support the American program at the World Conference. The French government, as a part of the economic understandings recently concluded in Washington, has made a similar declaration. These commitments are highly significant. With Great Britain and France thus resolved to join hands with us in this enterprise, the prospects appear to be very good indeed.

It is impossible, at this stage, to predict how much of the American program will finally be incorporated into the Charter of the International Trade Organization. There will be conflicts in interest; there will be compromises; and we shall probably have to content ourselves, in the end, with something less than we desire. But, at the very least, we shall have turned men's minds away from restriction toward expansion, away from conflict toward co-operation, away

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

from the past toward the future, and from despair toward hope. And we shall have constructed another in the growing group of institutions that promise to bind the world more tightly together in the common service of a common cause.

In the words of the *Proposals*:

The purpose is to make real the principle of equal access to the markets and the raw materials of the world, so that the varied gifts of many peoples may exert themselves more fully for the common good. The larger purpose is to contribute to the effective partnership of the United Nations, to the growth of international confidence and solidarity, and thus to the preservation of the peace.

FREE ENTERPRISE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY

By HERBERT FEIS¹

I COME before you with subject assigned. It is "Free Enterprise and Commercial Policy." Let freedom ring, our national anthem enjoins. It is ringing. Each individual branch of free enterprise has a hand upon the bell rope, eagerly seeking to sound out its own particular version of freedom, while wandering acolytes from the government in Washington chant the litany—in which the phrases, "bigger and better exports, equality of treatment, a world redeemed," repeat themselves. As peal resounds on peal and clang on clump and boom on echo (or should I say, echo after boom?), I have the impression that free enterprise has, in fact, established its offices in a belfry. Was that a bat that just flew past, or possibly a messenger bearing the latest issue of the *Congressional Record*?

To clear my head of such deranged notions I shall revert to first principles—by route of definition. What is the system of free enterprise? I believe the essentials are expressed in the aphorism of Gratian that "many make ladders to attain their ends out of the wants of others." But a more professional definition is wanted to aid reasoning—such as that of Adam Smith, who viewed free enterprise as an arrangement wherein "every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interests in his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital in competition with those of any other man, or order of man."

Now Adam Smith (and many eminent economists and statesmen after him) had a firm conviction in regard to the form and substance of the commercial policy which would best enable free enterprise, so defined, to fulfil its magnificent promise. There is no need for me to expound that doctrine in detail. Its main conclusions were to the effect that governments would be well advised to leave men free to move their products and capital across national frontiers according to their private estimates of gain or opportunity and to permit the formation and rhythm of economic life within national borders to

¹ Formerly Economic Adviser, Department of State.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

adjust itself to the pattern etched by international competition. This commercial policy, according to the faith of men in the free-trade school, would improve the condition of all; it would end the need and want of nations to envy or oppose one another's growth or treasure or to war against one another for opportunity. This vision of vigorous international private rivalry without protection or privilege the men of Adam Smith's school did not believe to be inhuman. In contrast to the almost perpetual fight for advantages between the great trading empires of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it seemed a vision of beneficence, a prospect of utopia, a philosopher's dream of fruitful order without organization. It was advocated as an ideal commercial policy for free enterprise; but Adam Smith did not expect that the economic groups which controlled the conduct of nations would permit it to become an actuality.

For a century or so, however, the argument persuaded and the dream attracted. Historical circumstance disposed the main European states toward them. Britain's loss of the American colonies had taught that monopolistic restraint could be self-defeating. The blockades of the Napoleonic Wars had roused appreciation of the rewards of trade. The rapid development of the rich and broad lands of the new world and the improvement in methods of production provided startling prospects of expansion, which British industry, in particular, came to believe could be best realized if free enterprise were left free to trade; and it gradually impelled the British and other governments toward that end. The acceptance of the large "cosmopolitical" conception brought about the extinction of a multitude of restraints, privileges, and barriers. Governments and the ruling economic groups trusted in sequences which they could not closely trace and found themselves enriched.

As the nineteenth century drew toward its close, this conception of commercial policy faded. Economic circumstances no longer so greatly favored it; the ambitions of strong nationalism swept all other measurements of purpose aside; historic change increased the number of national states that felt themselves rivals; and economic groups became more insistent upon the defense of their own particular positions.

Thus there came about a widespread rebellion against a commercial policy that so largely subjected productive activity within each country to foreign competition and external circumstance. Many branches of enterprise rebelled against the extension and relentless-

FREE ENTERPRISE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY

ness of competition; the working masses, possessed of no security and no reserves, rebelled against the heedless tides of change that brought displacement; the rising new industrial countries resisted the established strength of the older, and the older objected to the innovating vigor of the new; the agricultural regions of Europe opposed the cheaper products of the more fertile sections of the Western Hemisphere. This disorderly rebellion was one element in the restless struggle between nations that produced the first World War. And after that conflict the pattern of policy that Adam Smith conceived raveled out; and all the needles of all the devoted seamstresses of international economic co-operation have not since been able to repair it.

It would be pleasant to believe that all branches of free enterprise everywhere sought to prevent this course of change; that the private interests of each national retained a tolerant regard for their rivals in other countries and were ready to share opportunity with them; that they abstained from demands that would result in economic injury abroad; that they stubbornly resisted this trend toward the wrathful separation of nations. But the belief is not permissible. Many of the contending branches of free enterprise in this country (and others) contributed, and in some ways forced, the outcome. They showed themselves primarily concerned with what they thought to be their own immediate interests and were overready to use national power in their personal service. They showed themselves only distantly concerned with the preservation of an international system of trading open to all.

Do not mistake me. I am not among those who think that the war resulted from a decline of international commerce or that any commercial policy, no matter how balanced and generous, could have prevented it; for two ruthless, resentful, and misled nations were determined to gain a dominant place in the world's affairs—as soon as they felt strong enough to try. But the faults in American commercial policy, as shaped under a regime of free enterprise, did weaken the bonds of interest and feeling between those countries that might have combined to preserve peace, as well as weakened the moral basis of international behavior.

The future may grant us less allowance for faultiness than in the past, a smaller margin for error. An improvement in the commercial policy of those nations devoted to free enterprise has become imperative. This will not come about merely by a repetition of slogans that we believe express our faith and virtue. It requires severe self-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

examination. This I intend to undertake—to the extent that brief time permits—and to begin by scrutinizing those various and often canceling demands of free enterprise that confront the government when it sets about shaping commercial policy, free enterprise—I pause to make clear—as it has formed itself into a multitude of organized groups, each of which stubbornly seeks a good measure of advantage for itself.

The attitude of each branch of enterprise toward those powers of the government (I will not call them “higher” powers) which may restrain or serve them is, in the language of the day, ambivalent. Each group is impelled by the urge of its desires simultaneously to fear and to mistrust the government, to long to dominate it, to respect it, to crave its aid and protection, and to serve it. Whether it will assume one or another of these attitudes, whether it acts one way or another on any particular issue, is likely to be decided by an appraisal of the effect upon itself. This appraisal may be swayed by greediness or shortsightedness or by contentment with just dues, with the understanding that other interests are at stake besides its own. Since in many issues the interests and views of different groups are divergent, it will ordinarily be found that some groups are urging the government to do one thing, while others are urging the opposite; and combinations between several groups to obtain what each does not separately merit are not unusual.

Each segment of enterprise wants not only the dry crust of principle but the loaf of advantage. The ideal government, which each seeks to create out of its desires, is one that would dispense freedom, protection, and aid in the exact proportions most needed by it at any time. The members of the queue that may be found standing before the bakeshop of government at any time hold a ration book in one hand and a brick in the other. (I am afraid my reference to this old-fashioned weapon dates me—as belonging to the era when bricks were cheaper than atomic bombs.)

What—to look at the matter more analytically—are the various desires shared between the groups that participate in private enterprise in the field of commercial policy?

1. Freedom to sell goods and services to foreign peoples and to lend or invest capital abroad.
2. A title to good (and favorably distributed) opportunity to do these things—with the resolute aid of the government in finding and

FREE ENTERPRISE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY

keeping that opportunity. In times past, the title sought was often for exclusive or monopolistic opportunity, but this has become unusual now.

3. Freedom to enter into contracts or agreements with foreign groups or governments.

4. Aid in opposing or overcoming restrictions imposed by foreign authorities on access to markets, raw materials, or investment opportunities.

5. Protection against disturbance of their position and prospects in the domestic market by foreign competition.

6. Support in foreign ventures against oppression and dispossession.

All these wishes are natural to the pursuit of the ends of free enterprise. But only a heavenly bakeshop could satisfy them all, each and every one. Inspired and courageous government that will compose them into a balanced and rational menu of desire! Intelligent and admirable elements of enterprise that will manage to compromise their own wishes with those of others and learn to live well off the portion that fairly corresponds to their economic and social merits! For these are the terms, and the only terms, under which free enterprise will achieve an enduring growth in the international field. Unless they are observed, the gains acquired by each and all may well prove to be only a passing boon acquired in a lull between disasters.

I return to the task of inspection. What are the chief characteristics of the American commercial policy that emerged in the recent past out of the several wishes of free enterprise that I have reviewed? In reflecting upon the record, it is essential to be mindful of the fact that the policy pursued was formed not only by internal pressures and purposes but by external as well. What the United States did in this sphere was often deflected by the conduct of other nations or by fear of what other nations would do if we acted differently.

Despite the cheapening of transport, the growth of our foreign commerce lagged behind that of domestic production and commerce. Its contribution to our welfare was substantial but tended proportionately to decline—whether measured either by the volume of goods obtained or by employment provided. Our opportunity to draw upon the production effort and resources of other countries was subordinated to our wish to protect our producers against foreign competition.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

The policy to which we held made it possible for vast changes to take place in the composition of our exports and imports (in accordance with changes in the scale of comparative advantage). These were achieved without grave internal dissension and without dangerous disputes or differences with other countries, though a sense of strain and reciprocal animosity between ourselves and other countries was common.

The policy was costly to the American buyers of foreign securities. Our purchases of these securities have been careless and indiscriminating; and the deterioration in the affairs of many foreign countries caused by the shadow of war would, no matter what our commercial policy had been, have caused some of this investment to be lost. But our policy increased the wrecks and made salvage difficult.

The foreign investments of American enterprises survived better; and that now represents the beneficial extension of American activities abroad, engaged in the operation of branch manufacturing plants and public utilities, the development of new sources of foodstuffs and raw materials, the improvement of communication and transport. These foreign extensions of American enterprise give us a profitable stake in the advancement and welfare of other nations and should be a good heritage for the future. That so many did survive, despite the buffets of unfriendly nationalism and the persistent scarcity of dollars, would seem to prove both their vitality and their usefulness to other nations.

Throughout almost all the interwar period the United States underbought and oversold. The measures by which the gap was reduced in the years before the war were unsatisfactory—debt default, gold imports, and rigorous foreign restriction upon imports from the United States. The failure of imports to provide sufficient means of sustaining the export trade which we sought meant loss to the United States and deprivation to others.

This was not due solely to our mistakes. Many foreign countries fell behind in the arts of production; were not able or willing to meet the test of competition; in some, social and political divisions hindered working effort, ruined organization, and made capital sterile; in others programs of self-sufficiency made costs high; in still others the menace of war took the sense out of ordinary industrious occupation. In other words, we dealt with a wretched and upset world whose need exceeded its capacity. But our own refusal to recognize that

FREE ENTERPRISE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY

trade is not a vent with only one opening made the ultimate distortion of our commercial relations inevitable.

We underbought even in good times as a consequence of the high and comprehensive tariff that we maintained. The depression, with the resultant collapse of demand and in the prices of many of our chief imports, brought the dollar income of foreign countries far below the level required to maintain our export trade. Commerce was confined in a dark pit like that of Poe's imagination, while the pendulum of events with sharpened edge brought extinction closer.

The overselling, as I have said, reflected the superiority and diversity of American production. We were overeager sellers—lending to make sales that were better unmade and directly contesting in foreign markets for every export opportunity.

Again I must plead not to be misunderstood. Exports should be valued and encouraged; they are essential to the recipients and can provide beneficial occupation and reward to the sellers, but only to the extent that their movement is in healthy correspondence with the import movement and only if they are obtained without creating discord and animosity. International commercial relations will be in a sound state only when balance is achievable by each participant without too great strain; otherwise, the excess of exports maintained by some countries is vulnerable and likely to prove to be a gift—a gift unintended, begrudged, and unappreciated.

Lastly, it must be observed that American trade, under the policies fashioned out of the wishes of free enterprise was unsteady. There were no brakes upon it in time of boom and only faint support in time of depression. Thus it failed to contribute toward the stabilization of American economic life; and its irregular impulses upset the life of other nations. No country and no branch of enterprise possessed the prospect of an assured market of some duration, on which it might count and calculate. International trade was in the pre-war period a venture not only in competition and an act of trust in the moderation of foreign governments but also a gamble upon the level of economic activity, particularly within the United States. The dimensions it maintained despite these hazards is a proof of its importance to the welfare and economic development of peoples.

Such, in summary, were the ways in which American commercial policy operated during the interwar period. I have been, I know, sparing in my recognition of the good it yielded and unsparing in my presentation of its faults and lost opportunities. I know that I have

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

given the black features of the picture two coats of paint and economized on the white. But that, I think, is the correct palette for the times, since complacency is the foe of both free enterprise and peace in the international economic field.

How, keeping the essentials of free enterprise, can we make our commercial policy more coherent and more productive of steady good than in the recent past? My own prescription must, of necessity, be brief—merely a few symbols of thought.

The first essential is that the United States so manage its own economic affairs within the country that a high and steady level of productive activity is maintained, with favorable opportunities for employment and the creation of new enterprise. Then, secure in our own condition, we would purchase more foreign goods and services. Then, also, it may be hoped that American free enterprise would be more willing to share the American market with foreign producers.

Thereby and by selective reduction of our trade restrictions, a healthier balance between our exports and our imports could be maintained, even while both moved upward.

These measures I would supplement by long-term arrangements for the exchange of essential goods between ourselves and other countries. I have in mind, primarily, long-term buying contracts for which government might supply insurance and, if necessary, finance. These seem to me to be a promising means of stabilizing prices and the movement of trade. Therefore, I believe that their possibilities should be studied with an eager wish to find whether they can be put to use and should not be rejected summarily as a form of state trading or bilateralism.

These measures in combination would make it easier for both the government and private capital to invest in a more measured and steady way than in the past. Once the present crisis of foreign need is over and as far as other pertinent purposes may permit, this investment should be modulated to the state of employment and trade. Its flow should be restricted during the periods of great activity here and abroad and its greater force reserved for times of threatened or actual depression. The achievement of such a program as this will be among the tasks of the financial institutions of the American government and even more particularly of the new international financial organizations.

These are the essentials for the improvement of American commercial policy. They will require a great measure of foresight and

FREE ENTERPRISE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY

self-restraint on the part of those groups that exercise dominant influence on the operation of our free-enterprise system and a recognition of limits and of the necessity for compromise and adjustment. It will be impossible to bring them about if each group seeks its own self-interest with unrestrained tenacity.

There can be no substitute for the improvement of our behavior and the elongation of our vision and, lest I seem to slight the faults of others, an equivalent improvement in the behavior of foreign countries. I confess to fatigue when I consider those who, ignoring the habits and pressures that have made international economic relations unsatisfactory, seem to think that all problems can be solved merely by creating new international organizations. It is congenial to paint panoramas of purpose and to draft constitutions, and painful to expose conflicts or propound obligations. But international institutions, like national, are shadows of the men that live within them. All the preambles of intention that may be engraved around cornices of new structures, all the assemblies of officials and their expert attendants, will be only wasted aspiration unless each of the great nations shows generous regard for the others in action, where it counts.

We face the task of improving our commercial policy in the midst of a world still in spasm. It contains states whose present thought is to use the processes of economic interchange to acquire greater ultimate national independence. It contains states that have rejected the conception of free enterprise as too unplanned to be a satisfactory basis for their productive effort or for social justice.

We shall confront other forms and systems of commercial policy far different from our own; and we shall have to live with them. It is to the problem of reconciliation between our own trading system and those of other kinds that now, in conclusion, I turn.

There will be governments that use commodity boards to direct or control their import and export activity in certain products and services, and there will be others that will conduct all their foreign-trade relations as a branch of a state-owned and state-organized system of production and distribution. Governments using these methods are likely to buy and sell in bulk, to enter into long-term arrangements for purchases and sales, and sometimes to seek a more than ordinary commercial interest in their sources of supply. The foreign buyers of their products will not be able to bargain with competing producers, and foreign sellers will not be able to choose between competing cus-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

tomers. The governments will be in a position to arrange for the direct barter exchange of products and in varying degrees to ignore limitations of market demand and money production costs.

It is a common belief that economic warfare between such trading systems and our own is inevitable. I do not share this view. There may be warfare; but, if so, it will come about not because the inherent characteristics of the two types of system make it necessary but because the practitioners of either or both systems try to extort unfair advantage or use trade and investment operations as a means of injuring each other or as tools of aggressive political purpose. When bitter antagonists trade, the trade is tainted with their hostility, no matter how conducted; but the source of infection is in the spirit and intention of those who direct it. If it can be subdued in that citadel of decision, disputes over the terms and advantages sought by individual nations will still occur (as they occurred between countries relying on private and competitive-trading methods), but these will yield to treatment.

There are some possibly genuine causes of strain between countries relying primarily upon free enterprise to conduct foreign economic operations and those using state trading. By "genuine" I mean causes that engage the real interest or position of the whole nation, in contrast to those conceived out of ignorance of the proper objectives of international commerce or the wish to escape any form of foreign competition. I can touch upon only a few of these, and that very briefly.

There is a possibility that state trading systems may seek an unfair division of the advantages of trade. This might come about if the state trading country buys only what is indispensable to it, while excluding goods that might be helpful for other countries to sell, or if it is willing to sell only what it wishes other countries to have, not what they may most wish to buy. State trading systems may be able to pursue such a course of unfair selectivity more relentlessly than others, because the government has the combined power of control over access to its market, the distribution of production within the country, and the resources of the treasury.

But these powers to seek unfair advantage are more incomparable in recital than they are in fact. Private-enterprise systems have good means of defense if they choose to use them; they have shown themselves able to check attempts to exploit them. But this should be clearly in mind when considering the question: A free-enterprise

FREE ENTERPRISE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY

country, no matter how skilled its commercial bargaining may be, cannot derive a fair share of gain from its trade with state-control systems unless it is willing to accept an adequate amount of imports. It cannot refuse to do so and still expect to secure great national advantage from its external economic activity. It must satisfy itself mainly with the satisfaction of keeping busy.

Then there is the possibility that state trading systems may be deliberately directed to cause disturbance in the economic situations of other countries or to prepare the way for political alliance or subservience. It is impossible to give so great a topic its due at the end of an already long lecture, but I cannot repress a few observations.

Any country, no matter what its trading system, that possesses, in combination, great military strength, productivity, and surplus supplies of capital is certain to disturb the economic situation of other countries from time to time. It is certain also, no matter how sensitive its regard for the fears of other countries, to become a dominant influence in the economic life of some smaller foreign lands and to develop some relations of intimate dependence.

The history of the foreign economic activities of free-enterprise countries is replete with instances of disturbing situations of dependence. Existing colonial empires are largely the heritage of the private adventurers of powerful countries.

But more recently the free-enterprise countries have divested themselves of the desire to reduce others to subservience. And now free enterprise, when operating in foreign lands, is surrounded by the mist and mystic of unfriendly nationalism, subject to competition and attack, vulnerable, and forced to justify itself. It seeks only to live and prosper, not to create exclusive spheres of power for itself or the government to which it owes allegiance. It is the Singer Sewing Machine and General Electric and the Standard Oil companies, and United States Steel and all their competitors—these want to fill orders and, if they cannot lick their business rivals, join them. In other words, those who conduct free enterprise today are prepared to stay within the rules of good international society; and if they do not, they can be compelled to conform.

But state trading systems, if they are so inclined, can be more extravagant, reckless, politically designing, and forceful in the search for exclusive opportunity. Will they also stay within the rules of good international society?

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

It is well to remember that the state trading system of the Soviet Union before the war, on the whole, did so. It functioned ordinarily as an instrument of the same economic purposes that governed the commercial policy of the free-enterprise countries, that is, to secure goods wanted for use within Russia and to dispose of products that would provide the means of external payment. More recently, some of the trade and investment arrangements that the Soviet Union has imposed upon its neighbors seem overdemanding and aimed at establishing a primacy not subject to competition or rival influence. These arrangements we are correct to challenge. But differences in the form of these arrangements from those customarily made by private interests should not impair judgment of their substance. And in this matter the significant issue is probably local, not general; the arrangements are connected with the wish for reparations for war damage and a political program for a particular region.

I leave this phase of the subject reluctantly, knowing that I have not done it justice, in order to touch briefly on the matter of export competition. This may cause serious friction between the systems. It is troublesome enough when governed by competitive cost and supported only by the usual pleas of commercial attachés. A state trading system can, if it chooses, ignore this type of cost—as may the free-enterprise system if it wants to subsidize. The best defense of a free-enterprise trading system against competition in foreign markets clearly out of accord with competitive advantage is to be able comfortably to dispense with the business because good alternative occupation is available. The best ground for hope that the problem will yield to reason lies in the fact that it is ordinarily not to the advantage of state trading systems to dispose of their products on poor terms.

In summary, it is my judgment that the relations between the different forms of trading systems will be determined not by unplastic and irreconcilable attributes of each but by the intentions and the will of those who have a dominant influence in their direction. Under any system the commercial policy of a country can be grasping, inclined to seek solutions for internal difficulties at the expense of foreign countries, out to win at all costs; or it can afford the basis for fair partnership in a mutually advantageous exchange of effort and of resources. Our duty is to be ready to act as a good partner and to insist that others be the same. We must so appear that even the rough sea will grow civil at our song.

FREE ENTERPRISE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY

The inquirer into the matters with which I have tried to deal must have the buoyant hope of the traveler. When first standing in the strange business square, as the trucks rumble by and the gas-green and ice-blue and flame-red neon signs pour out their heartless light, all seems lost in confusion. Then he recalls an old lithograph of the evening scene before Barnum's circus in New York, a century ago, and he is reminded that confusion is not new. And there comes back to him the memory of well-kept houses and fertile fields seen under the morning sun, and he is reminded that confusion is not everywhere. Thus reassured, he continues his search for harmony beyond the glare.

ADJUSTMENT OF GREAT-POWER RIVALRIES FOR RAW MATERIALS AND TRADE

By CHARLES C. COLBY²

RIVALRIES for raw materials and trade on the part of great powers have been a feature of the world order ever since the Phoenicians and the ancient Greeks struggled for supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. At times the leading nations have adjusted their rivalries by dividing the commercial world into recognized spheres of operation as, under the Papal Bull, the Spaniards and Portuguese did in 1494. At other times great trading organizations chartered by governments have implemented the rivalries and led the search for commodities. More recently, individuals, corporations, and combines have been the agents of trade. They have competed openly and actively in the production, transportation, marketing, and processing of raw materials. The governments by their internal policies and their international agreements have established the rules, but, in large measure, the game has been played by private individuals and organizations.

Toward the close of the last century the advantages of widespread trade became so apparent that an ever growing world trade was taken for granted. Men argued that commerce was the best basis for international relations and that world trade had made war a thing of the past. To be sure, tariff barriers were increasing rather than decreasing, and "Trade follows the flag" was a popular adage with many national leaders.

As we look back toward the turn of the century, it becomes clear that, in so far as raw materials and trade were concerned, there were two powerful international motivations. One emphasized the acquisition of raw materials by an ever increasing industry and trade. The other thought of raw materials as one of the prizes to be gained from national expansion—by military might, if necessary. Both motivations were observable in the policies and actions of most governments, but in varying degree. Britain's policy of free trade was an

² Professor of geography and chairman of the Department of Geography, University of Chicago.

GREAT-POWER ECONOMIC RIVALRIES

example of the first, whereas her participation in the partition of Africa illustrates the second.

If, somehow, someone could have been wise enough and strong enough to have formulated and implemented a policy which would have pulled these ideas together, the great national rivalries which led to World War I might not have developed, at least not to the point of armed conflict. The world might have learned how to keep political theory and governmental practice in step with industrial and commercial expansion. All of us know that things did not happen that way. Instead, both in commerce and in government there developed a strong desire for protected industry and a monopoly position. Both trade and flag love a monopoly. Nations, like men, prefer to get rich and get rich quick. Furthermore, they like to get rich through conditions which they understand and over which they exercise control.

In theory, all nations should have access on equal terms to needed raw materials. This was recognized in the Atlantic Charter, but no one knows how the theory can be translated into effective practice. It is easier said than done. In the past, each government tried to secure its share, and, at times, more than its share, of essential raw materials. Naturally, this led to rivalry and conflict.

The modern world has become increasingly dynamic and increasingly global. New developments responding to new forces have followed in rapid and complex succession. Since 1815, for example, the population of the world has more than doubled. Since 1870, moreover, the leading nations have witnessed the development of integrated systems of railway transportation on land and integrated systems of steam navigation on the sea. In these developments science, as represented by engineering, and integration, as represented by administration, have played vital parts.

In the United States, as in the other leading nations, the pursuits which make up our economy have developed so rapidly as to present to the government one difficult problem after another. As a people, moreover, we have been much more interested in business than in government. As a result, although our fundamental concepts of government have stood the tests of time, the implementation of government has left much to be desired. The same holds true in most of the countries which participate actively in world trade.

Many conditions and ideas influence international rivalries for raw materials and trade. Some are ephemeral, but others are persistent

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

and enduring. To bring our thought together and to compress a big matter into the brief compass of this evening's round table, I shall attempt to summarize some of the conditions which to me appear basic to our problem:

1. No nation is completely self-sufficient in raw materials, either for a well-balanced peacetime economy or for an effective war program.
2. Even if one nation dominated the entire globe, it probably would not be self-sufficient in raw materials because individual initiative and enterprise by small local groups are essential in the production of many raw materials.
3. Nearly every part of the globe produces one or more commodities needed by the commercial world. Thus no part of the world can be ignored in the formulating of international policies.
4. The world's population has increased rapidly in modern times and demands for raw materials have grown accordingly.
5. Technical developments have increased greatly the number and variety of raw materials needed by contemporary society.
6. Modern developments in land, sea, and air transport have made, for the first time in history, all the world a stage for human affairs.
7. In modern times business administration, backed by the leading nations, has spread commercial and financial organizations over the inhabited earth. Although these world patterns were disrupted by World War II, it is hoped that they will be re-established in the near future.
8. Lowered prices, growing out of increased production, have brought many commodities within the reach of people in many lands. In the future the whole world, rather than a few regions, probably will be the market area for many commodities.
9. The vast quantities of raw materials required by modern industry have emphasized the significance of huge resources and great production. With but few exceptions, small reserves and limited production no longer play an important part in world affairs. In the future, great-power rivalries will center on the few areas which possess the capacity for large production.
10. Favored position in relation to the world's productive regions promises to be of increasing significance in international relations.
11. Discoveries of new resources or new methods of utilizing low-grade resources may create new problems and set in motion new rivalries.

In order to illustrate the importance of the foregoing list of basic considerations, I purpose to direct our attention to two fundamental resources, namely, forests and minerals. I trust this method will bring our thought to some of the realities which are bound to be of increasing, rather than decreasing, concern to the leading nations.

FOREST RESOURCES

The need of lumber and other forest products has led to many international rivalries in the past, and present shortages suggest more intense rivalries in the future. Up to now the United States has had the advantage of fine domestic stands of both softwoods and

GREAT-POWER ECONOMIC RIVALRIES

hardwoods. Our forest resources were so large that they met our own needs and allowed us to export lumber and other forest products to many countries. These exports have been an important part of our foreign trade. Until recently we assumed that we had within our domain sufficient timber to supply both a big domestic and a big export trade. For many years, however, the United States Forest Service has warned that the ever increasing drain on our forests would lead to a shortage of high-grade lumber, to higher prices, to greater dependence upon substitute materials, and to foreign sources of supply. The present situation in the building trades shows that the predicted shortage has caught up with us and probably will continue to plague us for many years.

World War II accelerated the technical progress which had been under way for many years in the use of wood in industry. New gluing processes have made plywood a highly useful material in construction. Chemical conversion has given us pulp, synthetic fibers, and plastics. Cellulose, or lignin derivatives, lead to alcohol, explosives, road-binding, and motor fuel. These and other uses show that wood has become almost an all-purpose raw material. As a result, it has become a resource of real international concern.

The greatly increased uses of forest products means an increasing drain on the world's forests. In fact, in most countries future requirements are likely to exceed supply. This presages increased international trade and probably intense rivalries on the part of nations. In order to suggest the extent and scope of the probable demand and supply, I have tried to summarize the international situation. My figures are unofficial and primarily are selected to further our discussion.

The annual requirements of the United States for forest products of all types may be estimated at about the equivalent of sixty-two billion board feet. The drain in 1941, a peak year, was about sixty billion board feet. Assuming that these requirements and drains will continue, we may have a deficit of about two billion board feet.

The average production and consumption of timber products in Europe in the five-year period 1930-34 was the equivalent of sixty-four billion board feet.² Military operations have devastated some of the forests, and heavy overcutting is reported from others. Possibly, postwar production will be reduced by about five billion board feet. Thus, if the postwar demand should equal that of the pre-war years,

² *International Yearbook of Forestry Statistics, 1933-35*, Vol. I (Rome, 1936).

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Europe will face a notable deficit. In most countries production will be reduced rather than increased, and, for some time at least, consumption will be a matter of recovery from the effects of the war. Probably cutting will increase greatly in eastern Europe, for the Soviet Union has large areas of commercial timber. In all probability most, or all, of this production will be needed for that country's huge demands.

Asia, for such a huge continent, has relatively small areas of merchantable forest. It is estimated that it has twenty times the forest land of Sweden and Finland but cuts about the same, namely, twelve and a half billion board feet. Except for some lumber from Siberia, shipped by the northern sea route, little in the way of exports can be expected from Asia. In this connection it should be remembered that, before the war, China and Japan imported large quantities of softwood lumber from our Pacific Northwest.

Africa contains an estimated area of timber forest of about eight hundred million acres. Most of this is tropical hardwoods, but some usable softwoods are reported. In pre-war times the northern and southern margins of the continent, where most of the commercial enterprise is carried on, consumed more timber products than they produced. It is possible that equatorial Africa, if transportation becomes available, may be able to export annually about a half-billion board feet.

South America has about two billion acres of forest land. Much of it, however, is not commercial forest. The Amazon forest has some commercial possibilities, but the great difficulty in commercial production from that area is the high number of species on any one square mile. For commercial purposes a forest needs to be made up of nearly solid stands of a single species. The fine stands of white pine in the Great Lakes states, for example, made it possible for lumber companies to turn out large quantities of good lumber, day by day, month by month, and year by year. Nothing like that is true of the Amazon forest, where there may be upward of four hundred species on a single square mile.

The "Paraná pine" of southern Brazil occurs in stands of good commercial timber over an area about as large as that occupied by our southern pine forests. Cutting has been in progress for some time and, before the war, was large enough to supply large domestic requirements and provide exports to Argentina, Uruguay, Britain, and Germany.

GREAT-POWER ECONOMIC RIVALRIES

In considering the possibility of lumber exports from South America it should be remembered that South American consumption is increasing. It may be, however, that in the postwar years exports of hardwood and softwood might reach nearly a billion board feet per year.

In North America, outside of the United States, Canada is the only country worthy of consideration. It has an export of about two billion board feet, of which about half comes to the United States and half goes to Britain.

Granted that the foregoing estimates are sufficiently accurate for our purpose, it becomes clear that, if the estimated four and a half billion board feet of exports from Canada, South America, and Africa all went to Europe, the quantity would not satisfy the estimated demand of that continent. Thus there is small hope of the United States being able to supplement its own production by imports from abroad. We can continue, as before the war, to import wood pulp and newsprint from Canada, probably some high-grade pulp from the Scandinavian countries, and hardwoods from tropical forests. We also might import some lumber from British Columbia.

The solution of our shortage of forest products calls for a policy which will satisfy our own requirements and, in some lines at least, provide for exports. We need to move toward a sustained-yield basis, so that the growth of the forest each year will be equal to, or greater than, our rate of use. This will require a much more rigorous and enlightened policy than we have pursued in the past. It also will mean that our foreign policy, in regard to timber products, should be developed along lines which accord with the demand and supply in other countries.

In order to improve the domestic situation shall we restrict or eliminate exports of lumber? This probably would prove a real hardship in some areas which have been good customers for our products in the past and would arouse active opposition on the part of some of our lumber interests. Can we stimulate production of needed products abroad by investing brains and money in foreign enterprises? Shall our government make loans to other governments in the hope of increasing forest growth in areas from which we might import? Shall we forget all interests save our own and thus increase, rather than decrease, rivalries with other nations? If, as a nation, we really become seriously interested in a development and conservation program along the lines long urged by our excellent Forest Service, we

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

could go far toward supplying our own needs. Thus we would have less need for products from abroad and to that extent would lessen the rivalries with other nations. Obviously, if we do not take vigorous hold of our domestic situation and if we purchase heavily from abroad, we shall increase, rather than decrease, the tension in the international situation.

MINERAL RESOURCE

The demand for minerals for industrial, political, and military purposes probably has led to more international rivalry than has any other group of commodities. Modern industry is based on coal, and modern warfare is helpless without petroleum products. New minerals are brought into industrial use from time to time, the full list now numbering more than a hundred. Furthermore, the quantity of minerals needed to support modern economy is increasing rapidly. In the past century the output of pig iron, copper, and mineral fuels has increased at least a hundred fold. In fact, the world's production of several essential minerals has been doubling about every ten years.

The rapidly increasing quantities of minerals required by modern industry emphasize the importance of big ore bodies and of diversified mineralized areas. In terms of size and diversity, twelve major mineral-producing areas have been recognized. These areas are widely and irregularly distributed, with at least one in each continent. As a result, no nation monopolizes mineral production. The United States is the most important mineral country and, before the war, owned, produced, and consumed about 40 per cent of the world's minerals. Moreover, it has been claimed that three-quarters of the world's mineral resources and production are controlled from the United States and Great Britain. The desirability of qualifying such a statement grows out of the fact that the mineral resources and production of the Soviet Union are not known. We do know, however, that the potentialities are large.

Minerals are among the most international of commodities. In their movement from producing to consuming areas they cross many international boundaries. Commonly, minerals make up a fourth or more of ocean-borne traffic, and they move over all the ocean routes. Thus it is not surprising that one of the big problems in international relations is the wise and proper adjustment of the rivalries of the great powers over the control of minerals.

GREAT-POWER ECONOMIC RIVALRIES

At present, as in the past, coal is the basic commodity in industry and one of the great issues in the recovery of Europe and other parts of the world. In fact, the coal question has plagued the international scene ever since World War I disrupted the orderly functioning of the world's economy. In 1913 the United Kingdom, for example, exported seventy-six million tons of coal. Twenty million tons went to western Europe, thirteen million to central Europe, sixteen million to Mediterranean countries, and about seven million to South America. This outgoing tonnage gave a big outward traffic for Britain's tramp fleet and balanced the big inward flow of foods and raw materials needed by her population and economy. This balance made shipping profitable and ocean transport remarkably cheap. Nearly all the world participated in the trade and took advantage of the shipping services.

After World War I, Britain did not recover the full extent of its coal exports. Nor did it fully recover its former import trade. As a result, many parts of the world suffered loss of business and trade. Germany likewise did not recover its large Continental coal business and the compensating inflow of commodities. Without recovery in these and other phases of international trade, it is no wonder that Europe did not prosper in the years between the two wars. World War II has occasioned greater disruptions, and Europe, with huge reserves of coal, will suffer from fuel and other shortages until industry and trade have redeveloped. During this period of readjustment which promises to be long rather than short, national rivalries of many kinds and degrees will be the order of the day.

Nature has given certain areas a monopoly of certain minerals. Thus Canada, for example, has in one small area at least 90 per cent of the world's reserve of nickel. Germany has much of the potash, Malaya and the East Indies most of the tin. Such regional concentration promotes international rivalries and gives further evidence of the need for workable international policies in regard to such areas.

I have tried to open this big question of the international rivalries over resources and raw materials. Again I remind you that these natural resources are broadly and irregularly distributed. Forests, minerals, and other natural resources are distributed in terms of nature's laws. They do not conform to the world's political pattern, but they are essential to the world's economy. Can we discover a plan under which they can be utilized so that man really will inherit the earth?

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

THE discussion of international economic problems turned mainly to the political aspects of these problems, such as the reasons for rivalries for raw materials, the means of assuring efficient exploitation of these materials, and factors hampering mutually beneficial trade. The relations of the United States and the Soviet Union assumed a prominent position, as they did in other discussions; and opinions differed as to whether the Soviet form of economy is more likely to promote international friction than the capitalistic form of economy and whether satisfactory trade-relations can be established between the two forms of economy.

EFFECT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE

MR. BERT F. HOSELITZ: Why are there rivalries for raw materials? Light may be thrown on this question by looking at the relation of international trade in raw materials to international trade in general.

In the late nineteenth century the German economist, Sombart, suggested that, as a country becomes more and more industrialized, the proportion of its imports and exports to total production declines. Sombart was contradicted, and experience, up to 1914 at any rate, did not show this declining export quota. Since the end of the first World War, however, even though international trade in total volume and value maintained, and in some years even exceeded, the pre-1914 level, the proportion of international trade to the total world income decreased, even though the number of boundaries in the meantime, especially in Europe, had increased. In other words, in the period since 1914 the proportion of the national production which entered into international trade declined.

Furthermore, fewer products or, at any rate, fewer of the mass-consumption commodities entered international trade. As countries have developed industrially, international trade has been made up more and more of highly specialized and very valuable commodities; but that means that, with the development especially of chemical and other synthetic industries, economic dependence upon foreign countries has become of much greater strategic importance. This has been

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

true because the choice has become more limited in the types of things wanted and in the places where they can be obtained, even in peacetime.

This trend which leads to international trade getting into the more valuable, more specific, types of commodities means that peoples have demands in foreign areas which are more specific, smaller in volume, but of more value. It assists a nation which, like Germany in the 1930's, wants to build up a potential for war, to do so in advance.

The Atlantic Charter calls for equality of treatment of nations in respect to access to trade and raw materials, but I have never found a clear definition of what this means.

Let us assume that two countries, A and B, both export their own commodities to a third country, which we shall call the "home country," H. If H should develop a propaganda, "Don't buy A's goods, A is an unfair nation, boycott A's goods," people in A and people around the world would probably feel that this was discriminating against A. If, however, H imposes a tariff which is insurmountable against A's goods, almost nobody will say H is discriminating against A if all countries wanting to import similar goods into H are treated alike. It is unfortunate for A if it produces goods on which the high duties are imposed. But the people in A feel they have been discriminated against; their export trade under a "nondiscriminatory" tariff may suffer more than under a boycott. The same applies to access to raw materials. If we do not have an international understanding on the meaning of "equal access to raw materials," we shall always have potential trouble. In an age in which government trading has developed as it has in our age, this problem is even more complicated.

MR. COLBY: Your second point is well taken and illuminating. In regard to your first suggestion, the disorganization of the interwar period emphasized international trade in things of high value. Furthermore, things were more completely processed in the country of origin, and consequently less bulk was on the routes. On the other hand, the world was not being served. People were not getting the commodities necessary for their proper food, housing, and clothing. So in the period of peace which I believe is ahead of us there may be a revival of international trade and large movements of what the British call their "Class I" commodities—that is, goods of low value in relation to their bulk—and likewise goods in the medium class.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. HOSELITZ: Yes, but the stimulation of domestic industries in colonial or near-colonial countries will certainly diminish the quantity of cheap cotton goods that the English have exported in the war period. This will be true of manufactured food products, of cheap shoes, utensils, spoons and knives, etc.

Part of this decline in Class I trade may be due to the fact that countries have become technologically more equal. The differences in the degree of industrialization between countries have diminished since 1914 and continue to diminish. The typical trade of finished European products against colonial raw materials has changed to a trade of specialties of one country against specialties of another country. Although raw materials still constitute more than 50 per cent of the world's trade, the proportion is decreasing, but the commodities traded are becoming more vital to the importing countries.

MR. WRIGHT: That generalization from Sombart seems contrary to casual observation. The countries that are most highly developed technically, like Great Britain and Belgium, have the largest proportion of exports. Or, if you consider a long period of history, primitive man exported very little, he lived locally. With civilization and technological progress, people have tended to consume more things from a wider area. On the face of it, the generalization seems doubtful. Is it generally accepted?

MR. HOSELITZ: Sombart made the statement, I think, in 1899 in an article in *Soziale Praxis*. It was not accepted in Sombart's time. Several articles appeared in German and other European journals in the pre-1914 period in which Sombart's thesis was refuted by actual data. Since the second World War some twenty articles have appeared in English, German, and Russian journals.

A summary article by D. H. Robertson, professor of economics at Cambridge, appeared in the 1937 or 1938 *Economic Journal*. Disregarding the diminished volume of world trade due to the depressed conditions in the early 1930's and considering only the long-term trend, he finds that, since 1914 or 1918, the total amount of imports of all countries together has declined in terms of the total national income of the world.

MR. WRIGHT: May that not be a result of the continuous accumulation of artificial barriers to trade since the first World War?

MR. HOSELITZ: The world's income seems to increase at a faster rate than the world's trade. This seems to be true, even taking into account the greatly increased trade-barriers since the first World War.

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

MR. PASVOLSKY: That is just an observation of facts; it is not proof of the relation asserted by Sombart.

MR. HOSELITZ: If you had had completely free trade, the two might have increased in the same proportion.

MR. PASVOLSKY: Or there might have been a reversal.

MR. WRIGHT: Might not this generalization be made? During the last fifty years, but especially since the first World War, the free-trade conditions which existed in the mid-nineteenth century and later have been breaking down. This suggests that artificial restrictions upon trade may, in part, account for the serious rivalries over trade-matters in the twentieth century. In other words, trade-barriers may be the heart of the question we are discussing. Because the arteries of trade have been restricted throughout the world, there has been a declining, where normally there would be an increasing, proportion of exports with the progress of technology. The result has been increasing political tensions, including two world wars.

MR. HOSELITZ: What would have happened if those trade-barriers had not developed? It is very difficult to answer. There are factors which would have tended to increase international trade—the potentiality under those conditions for specialization and rising incomes. On the other hand, certain factors would have tended to decrease trade—the development of national industries capable of competing with the older European countries and the United States. Which of the two tendencies was winning out I don't know.

MR. WRIGHT: If you take the long-run view of history since primitive man, the trend has apparently been for technological progress to increase trade and widen the areas of trade. Of course, the size of political units has increased also, so the area of trade might widen and remain domestic. That is the basic deduction of the classical economists from Adam Smith down, that you have geographical specialization with progress in transport and communication. Since both history and theory support the opposite of Sombart's thesis, one would be inclined to look for special reasons, such as barriers to trade or governmentalization of economy, to explain the apparent support for Sombart's theory in the statistics of the interwar period.

MR. PRICE: To an amateur political scientist it seems that there may be some connection between these rival theories. One theory holds that the industrialization of countries which were not industrialized before has led to decreased trade because it reduces the movement of raw materials to be processed; and the other holds that

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

trade-barriers cause the decline. But trade-barriers were put up as a means of industrializing countries that formerly were not industrialized. The argument seems to go in a circle.

MR. FEIS: If we had a logician in the room it would be easy for him to show that, in the absence of new obstacles, administrative restrictions, difficulty of transport, and technical changes, movement of trade between nations would grow as rapidly as national incomes. That, however, would be an exercise in logic rather than in reality. You must consider the influences that retard it and the influences that accelerate it.

MR. BALLANTINE: The trade between the Far East and the far West, especially the United States, largely developed on the exports from the United States and other countries of the West in the production of which capital and cheap land were principal factors, in exchange for products of the Orient, where labor largely entered into the production, such as raw silk or tea. As standards of living in the Far East rose, especially in Japan, there was a tendency for those cheap laborers to go into more highly specialized and better-paid operations. Japanese industry turned into heavy industries, where the wages were higher. That tended to reduce the volume of trade between the West and the Far East. There was a gradual rise for many years in the proportion of China's and Japan's trade with each other, as compared with their trade with the West, because of that rise in the standard of living, especially in Japan. As China establishes her own industries, she will have internal trade to take the place of export trade. It has been much cheaper to import. The freight rate from the United States to port cities in China was much less than the cost of transportation from that port to some interior point of China. As internal transportation improves, there will be a tendency to increase internal trade in China. So there is a number of factors that will tend to reduce the volume of international trade, especially between the Far East and countries of the West.

MR. PLATT: There ought to be further such analyses. Mr. Hoselitz spoke of textiles being manufactured in different parts of the world instead of being exported from Europe. But are the raw materials of textiles—cotton, for example—to be produced in a great many more places than formerly? If not, the decentralization of manufacture may not reduce trade.

The reduction of trade would seem to imply either a great increase of production for local consumption from the materials that are so

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

widely distributed that every country has them or else a much wider distribution of the production of the things that formerly entered into international trade and the use of resources that are not so concentrated as the ones we have been using.

MR. HOSELITZ: I mentioned Sombart's theory not because he propounded it but because economists of rank, such as Robertson, have taken it seriously. Sombart, as I recall, compared the trade of Germany, England, France, Belgium, and other countries in the 1830's and the 1890's. He found that the German national income had risen by a certain percentage and that the trade between Germany and other European countries had risen by a lesser percentage. He attributed this to the fact that Germany had been industrialized and in the latter period had started to produce many commodities which she had previously imported from Belgium and England. He also argued that the improvement of domestic transportation and domestic production increases domestic trade and that domestic trade has a tendency to develop faster than international trade.

MR. FEIS: Of course, the world textile trade has declined relative to world textile production. There is almost no country in the world that has not maintained high barriers to the importation of textiles. It is not a matter of theory. You have the fact that the United States hinders importation of most of the commonly used textiles except the very cheapest and some of the most expensive grades. The British colonies and the colonies of most other empires are almost completely closed to textiles from countries outside of the Empire. The main body of European consumers have to pay a heavy tax in importing textiles. The reason you do not have more import trade in textiles is obvious. You can turn around and say, "Well, it is a fact that the trade in textiles did not develop," and no one can deny you. But what are you deducing from that?

MR. WRIGHT: Wouldn't this be the point. If Sombart's generalization is right, trade-barriers seem to be valuable because they accelerate the natural trend of technology for the benefit of mankind.

The other argument holds that trade-barriers are bad because they decrease production and increase political friction. F. J. Teggert, the historian, tries to analyze long ranges of history and concludes that restrictions upon the arteries of trade are an important cause of wars (*Rome and China* [1939]). He likens trade-barriers to a tourniquet on a person's arm. The arm does not prosper very well, and he thinks people do not prosper with trade-barriers. The United States State

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Department seems to be committed to the latter theory, which underlies Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreements and Article IV of the Atlantic Charter. If this theorizing of Sombart is correct, perhaps we are on the wrong track.

MR. PASVOLSKY: Didn't Mr. Hoselitz draw another conclusion, which seems to have been lost in the discussion? Wasn't his conclusion that, in spite of the fact that the relative weight of trade in the national income was declining, the character of trade has continually made for greater interdependence?

MR. HOSELITZ: That's right.

MR. PASVOLSKY: It is an important point. The development of international trade may not be mathematically equal to the development of domestic production, and yet the international-trade factor in world prosperity may increase in weight. That would support Professor Colby's conclusions.

MR. HOSELITZ: It makes no difference whether trade is declining because of technological development or whether it is declining because of trade-barriers. If the total amount of imports decline, the marginal utility of the commodities which continue to be imported will be in higher ranges of the utility scale; hence imports tend to shift into more vital commodities than under completely free trade.

MR. PLATT: Isn't that a significant fact? The more vital commodities are the more localized, not necessarily the more valuable ones.

MR. HOSELITZ: The dependence would be greater on particular commodities and therefore on particular areas of production.

MR. PLATT: By "particular commodities" you mean localized commodities that cannot be produced everywhere and manufactured goods that are so difficult to produce that people in only a few places can produce them?

MR. HOSELITZ: Or minerals, other raw materials, or tropical products that can be produced only in limited areas.

MR. PLATT: Whereas the things that people are learning to produce all over the world, they are producing more and more for their own consumption and not for export.

RIVALRIES OVER RAW MATERIALS

MR. BRODIE: How much great-power rivalry has there been about raw materials generally? There have been a few specific cases like rubber, for example, where there was friction not because there was any important restriction but because nations chose to make an issue.

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

But after you eliminate rubber and tin and, of course, petroleum as a very special case, have raw materials been a political problem?

The problem has usually been an economic one for the raw-material-producing countries because of a surplus of these materials. Is not raw-material shortage one of the phony problems of the inter-war period? Of course, Hitler made a lot of propaganda about it, but are raw-material shortages a crucial international problem today?

MR. COLBY: Up until the first World War western and central Europe were the center of world trade and of the world order. Mineral, agricultural, and forestry producers around the world were looking toward western and central Europe for markets for their products. At that time specialties had developed within western Europe—Germany in chemicals, the British in textiles. To a degree the world recognized those specialties; but the great thing from the standpoint of the world was that any one could buy in western Europe, which was accessible to tonnage and services, the things they wanted, and they could also sell there.

The first World War disrupted that order, and Germany never recovered its position in the chemical drug and dye trades. Britain never recovered its position in the textile trades. Out of necessity, nations had attempted to manufacture textiles, shoes, and other things they needed.

Toward the end of the 1920's the old picture was returning. The volume of world trade in 1913 was somewhere between two hundred and fifty and three hundred million tons, and it was recovering toward that same volume. Then came the depression. From 1870 on, world trade was developing in volume and in value, the distribution of commodities was increasing, and the level of living in most parts of the world was on the upgrade. All that was ended by the war.

Rivalries for raw materials were not merely such as that of Standard Oil competing with Shell, but they took many forms. In some commodities there were attempts to control exports. There were attempts to control the camphor, rubber, and coffee trade on that basis.

MR. BRODIE: The coffee example is the kind I have in mind. As I recall, the attempt to control coffee was the attempt to support a collapsed market. The problem was one of surpluses. My question is: When does the lack of access to raw materials become a political problem?

MR. COLBY: It becomes a political problem if control of exports, as the attempt to control rubber, moves into the political arena. In 1930

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

the Brookings Institution brought out a volume which dealt with attempts to control exports. It dealt with the political problems which arose from these attempts.

My emphasis is upon the increasing need of international trade if the people of the world are to eat and sleep enough and be properly housed. This augments the importance of those areas which have export surpluses. Either you will have those things processed right there and then distributed; or, if it is cheaper, they will be moved, partly processed, to the country of need and processed and used there. Trade will be increasingly important—so vital that it will incite rivalry.

It is important to watch the points of stress in the world's commercial picture. These points are matters of international concern and should be the subject of international policy. For example, it would be quite possible for us to develop our domestic need and use of lumber products with due consideration to the interests of other parts of the world, or we could disregard those interests and thereby invite international debate.

REASONS FOR RAW-MATERIAL DIFFICULTIES

MR. BRODIE: What are the danger spots? "Danger," perhaps, is a strong word for this context. Where does the trouble lie? Is it a foreign-exchange problem? Is it something else?

No one seems to be trying to hold back the supply of raw materials which are needed elsewhere in the world. The difficulty of the consumer countries in getting raw materials is due to other things than unwillingness among the producers to export, to other things than consumption by producing countries of all the raw material they produce.

MR. COLBY: Willingness to export at your own terms and at your own price is one thing; willingness to export in terms of the world price, which may be set entirely outside your country, is another. If you have a monopoly, you can operate on the first basis; if you don't, you will have to accept the second. I would argue that those things can become and have become matters of grave political import.

We have new patterns of distribution, manufacture, and utilization involving many parts of the world. It isn't simply as it was when manufacturing centered in western Europe. We have economic responsibilities to the world, discharge of which will make stresses in our economy.

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

In our own country efforts will be made to get Congress to keep manufacturing on the West Coast, for example, where it may or may not be good economics. In the world, likewise, some political interventions are desirable in terms of economics and some are not, but political action which affects the economic interests of other people is likely to lead to controversy and perhaps conflict.

The pattern of primary production is also changing. Resources on which we have long drawn are running out, and we shall have to look elsewhere. Copper was formerly produced mainly in the United States and the New World. Now Africa is in the picture. All right! That is just one illustration of the changing distributions of basic resources which we have to keep sharply in mind. The developing industries is another, and the developing needs is a third.

MR. WRIGHT: Should adjustment to these changes be effected by active government policy, or should governments and international agencies create conditions so that the adjustments will be effected through the normal operation of markets—selling in the dearest market and buying in the cheapest? That is one way in which adjustments can be made, and they were made in that way to meet changing conditions through a good share of the nineteenth century.

MR. BRODIE: Can't we catalogue those commodities, access to which is made difficult by policies of the exporting country, and also those commodities, access to which is made difficult by foreign-exchange difficulties or by inability to export in order to import. The Orient has an unlimited capacity to consume, but they are not able to import because they have nothing with which to pay for it. It seems to me that the different kinds of problems might be classified in that manner.

MR. COLBY: That is a good illustration. China cannot export because of her internal financial condition, and she cannot import unless she is given loans. Shall she be given loans? That is an international problem.

One of the important questions is to determine what problems are of general international concern and what of only regional concern.

As we geographers use that term, China and the Philippines make with us the United States—East Asia region. Many problems may be settled without going outside that area. Other problems, however, cannot be settled without general international agreement, like air transportation, sea transportation, and international finance. The rivalries of significance to this discussion are those which enter the

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

general international arena. If Canada and the United States squabble over the pulp and grain that might or might not move across the frontier, that is regional.

MR. BRODIE: One kind of raw-material problem that has always been critical in international relations is the case in which an exporting country has a monopoly or near-monopoly and attempts to exploit that monopoly. The economic significance of such exploitation may have been small, but it is always an irritating factor. Rubber is the best example. Are there others?

MR. COLBY: In the Brookings Institute book I referred to, several were mentioned.

MR. WRIGHT: As I recall, that book concluded that export controls had seldom been of very great importance.

MEANS OF ASSURING EFFICIENT EXPLOITATION OF RAW MATERIALS

MR. PASVOLSKY: The League of Nations established a Committee on Raw Materials. They found, as I recall the report, that there was very little difficulty in access to commercially available raw materials. The problem was one of foreign exchange; it was a trade-problem rather than a problem of access to raw materials.

The pre-war situation was complicated by the demands of the so-called "have-not" countries. Behind that, apparently, was quite another aspect, not so much access to commercially available materials as access to exploitation and development; and behind that was the problem of sovereignty and access in case of war.

Dr. Schacht argued for colonies. He often shifted his argument: Sometimes he talked about ownership and control, and sometimes he talked about access to commercially available materials. He tried to build up a theory that foreign exchange would not enter into the picture if Germany could obtain what she needed in the colonies. He was completely wrong there, and it was not difficult to show up the fallacy of that argument in a discussion with him.

The rivalries that I think we are talking about are not those that grow out of the legitimate consideration of connections between trade and raw materials. The phrase "access to raw materials" is an unfortunate one.

Last February, Stalin argued in a speech that one of the great difficulties in the world is the stickiness of the world situation from the point of view of raw materials and trade, and he put forward an idea which may be new with him, but it is not really new. It came out at

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

the time of the peace conference of 1919, when the Italians raised it, and it has come up over and over again. The idea is that you have to have periodic redistributions of sources of raw materials, but Stalin argued that such a distribution is something that you cannot get in a capitalistic economy but can attain very easily in a noncapitalistic economy.

MR. COLBY: Speeches of Stalin and Lenin give me the impression that they were looking at trade and the distribution of materials almost exclusively from their own point of view. The good of people in Sierra Leone, Gambia, Bolivia, or elsewhere did not enter into their consideration. In the United States, in theory and, to a degree, in fact, we have always tried to keep the needs and rights of the other peoples in mind. We have been more internationally minded in this field.

MR. PASVOLSKY: Stalin says in that speech that redistribution ought to be on a basis of changing conditions of economic importance. Important to *what* and to *whom*?

MR. BRODIE: Did he imply that if copper mines happened to be situated in Chile for fifteen or twenty years, that that was long enough and they should then be moved somewhere else?

MR. PASVOLSKY: He probably implied that, if copper mines are controlled by somebody in Chile and if that somebody has declined in economic importance and somebody else has risen in economic importance, the control should be shifted along the line of economic importance. That may become a real international problem if the Soviet government presses that point of view. As far as I know, they have not done anything with it yet except put it forward in that particular speech.

MR. WRIGHT: He did not suggest that the opportunity to exploit certain resources in the Soviet Union might eventually be shifted to some foreign nation that may have a particular need for those resources?

MR. PASVOLSKY: He probably assumes that the economic weight of the Soviet Union will increase so that that question will not arise.

MR. COLBY: The Soviets appear to have the main minerals within their territory or within their command, but this is not true of most other commodities, foods and the like. Can they, then, come into the free markets of the world and buy satisfactorily? The prevailing opinion is that they might buy satisfactorily but that it would be very difficult for a trading agency or concern to sell satisfactorily.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Might international action help individual agencies to sell to the Soviet Union successfully?

MR. WHITE: Should we take seriously the possibility that technological developments will reduce the specific need for cotton? Are we going to have synthetic fibers that we can grow from milkweed in the corn belt or that Russia can grow in the wheat belt that will decrease demand for cotton?

MR. COLBY: It is hoped to find a new crop for the wheat land which will fit into the economy and also preserve the soil qualities. No such thing is over the horizon now, but it is one of the great needs of the world.

MR. WHITE: Has the soybean done anything toward that?

MR. COLBY: It has not gone much into the wheat belt; it is more in the corn belt. It is disappointing, I understand, from the standpoint of what it does for soil. From the standpoint of fiber, if we assume better clothing for the millions, the need for cotton will increase.

Do we accept improving standards of food, clothing, and housing as part of our assumption, or do we simply say that there isn't enough for most of the people of the world and therefore we shall direct our policy, both nationally and internationally, to supplying those who can pay?

EFFECT OF GOVERNMENTALIZING ECONOMIES

MR. WRIGHT: I would like to go back to Mr. Stalin's speech and ask: What would be the situation if economies were governmentalized in all countries? It seems to me that a government which exploits its own resources is going to exploit them for the benefit of its own citizens if it is honest and democratic. There is, however, a varied distribution of resources among the states of the world. Consequently, there would tend to be sharp differences in standards of living across national boundaries. A government that is supplied abundantly with natural resources would exploit them as well as it could for its citizens without consideration for foreigners, and those that had sparse natural resources would have a lower standard of living.

I should think that would be a very great strain on international relations. People don't like to look across the border and see people there living on a much higher standard than they are. That situation would be much worse, I should think, if economic activities are conducted by each state for the national interest than if they are conducted by individuals for private interest. If you have free trade, the

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

principle of relative advantage in production tends to reduce sharp differentials across national boundaries. Theoretically, the same principle might operate among governmentalized economies, but the tendency of planning is to utilize domestic products to the maximum and to avoid making the plan dependent in the policy of another state.

That seems to me the most serious aspect of increasing governmentalization of economies. The country that does not have abundant resources and, consequently, has a lower standard may have a brave people and abundant arms. It would be likely to throw a threat to use its arms into the economic bargaining when dealing with a rich and relatively unarmed government across the border. Governmentalization of economy would tend to throw the weight of military force into every economic bargain across boundaries. I don't see how any system of peace and security could stand the strain.

MR. COLBY: Nor do I. The question might be raised as to whether the techniques of private trade and commerce have advanced more rapidly and more satisfactorily than the techniques and methods of government in handling economy.

MR. FEIS: Stalin, I understand, stated that control over raw materials ought to be redistributed in accordance with shifts in political influence or military power.

MR. PASVOLSKY: "Economic weight" is the term he used.

MR. FEIS: Do you really think he meant it?

MR. PASVOLSKY: He said so.

MR. FEIS: Then Mr. Wright construed Stalin's statement and felt that it was creating for the first time an impossible world. You took the precaution of saying it wasn't new. I want to develop your precaution.

It was the British who largely shaped and bent the weight of their imperial policy to get naval stores and other products from the American colonies. It was ourselves and the British, not the Russians, who declared that our needs were so great, our economic power so great, that we needed oil here, there, and the next place. In short, I challenge the assertion that this attempt to extend control is primarily related to the economic form of the state and that there is conclusive reason for believing that control will be more uncompromising and more active under a Communist state than under a capitalist state.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. WRIGHT: States have always used governmental power to assure themselves of access to the essentials of war. Great Britain as a naval power had to have masts and timbers for her ships and she used military power to assure herself of access to forests. In the mercantilist period governments went still further. But during the nineteenth century direct governmental control of trade and economic life was less than it had been before or has been since; and that was a period when there were the least strains on the international system and most rapid development of international trade.

My contention is that that was due to the general separation of economic life from political life. The economic importance of political boundaries became less because individual traders could profit by trading freely across those boundaries. Now we have gone back to the earlier system, and the result has been that problems of raw materials and trade increasingly become political problems.

MR. FEIS: I recognize the indirect historical deduction, but I would try to slow up the application of it. As a matter of historical record, in the states in which private interests control economy, when the government has been responsive to private wishes it has often attempted to acquire control of resources. That we know as a historical fact.

MR. BRODIE: But couldn't we use Mr. Feis's own example and ask whether that does not indicate that the government's influence in the past has been spasmodic and particularized, whereas in the situation Mr. Wright is speaking about that becomes general?

MR. FEIS: The historical record may lend itself to a certain extent to Mr. Wright's conclusion. I don't know. There were periods in which governments responded constantly to the demand of private enterprise. England did this; they kept industry in the American colonies subordinated; they established monopolies; they sent fleets to secure control over points where there were resources that they wanted; they sought oil more recently. That we know. Now it may be that in the state in which the government acts in the name of the whole and on its own impulsion and without control they will be worse, but I say the evidence does not exist to conclude that they will be worse.

MR. WRIGHT: I think there is ample evidence that highly governmentalized economies have gone even further. Italy under Mussolini and Germany under Hitler, including Mr. Schacht's operations, were highly governmentalized economies. They exploited their economic

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

power to the maximum for military, political, and national purposes and brought on wars.

MR. FEIS: As national states they were intent on gaining dominance, yes.

MR. WRIGHT: A government in a world in which security depends on relative power is necessarily interested in increasing its power, so it is likely to use its economic resources for increasing its power. In proportion as the economy is governmentalized, the government finds it easy to divert economic activity to that purpose.

MR. FEIS: I don't find it impossible to assume that a government might also be interested in the peaceful welfare of its people and, being devoted to that, might think of arranging peaceful trades and dividing opportunities. There is the historic record in which the other side of the story shows itself, and I ask you to put the historic record in the scale against your powers of deduction. I don't know where it comes out.

MR. PASVOLSKY: I brought up this illustration from Stalin's last speech to emphasize the conclusion which he reached. The method he proposes and the whole idea, as I said, isn't new, but he reaches a certain conclusion; you reach exactly the opposite conclusion. I think that is the important point. He says that this process, which he considers essential, cannot be successfully handled under the capitalist system. He goes even further—he says that it cannot be handled under that system without recurrent wars. Then he brings out his thesis that this process can be peacefully and successfully handled only under a noncapitalist system.

Now you deduce from this same set of premises the thesis that under a noncapitalist system, which means a government-controlled system, this process cannot be handled successfully and peacefully. That is all right, but there still remains the possibility which Stalin rejects, and that is the possibility of handling this process peacefully and successfully under the capitalist system. Is Stalin right or is he wrong?

MR. COLBY: It would have to be just a matter of opinion with me. I think he is wrong.

MR. PASVOLSKY: I think he is wrong.

MR. HOSELITZ: If you have a complete abolition of trade-barriers, it makes no difference whether government monopolies control trade or not.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. PASVOLSKY: Because then you have complete access to available raw materials. The trouble is that that does not solve one aspect of the problem—and that is, incidentally, an aspect that came up very prominently in our Japanese peace negotiations: there may be conditions under which commercially available supplies will not be sufficient.

MR. HOSELITZ: Their prices may be raised.

MR. PASVOLSKY: They may be built up in price, but they may not be sufficient from the point of requirements, and that throws you into the question of ownership and control. It is on that plane that the problem has been revolving for a long time.

MR. WRIGHT: As I understand, Stalin wants to have an efficient exploitation of resources. He says in some cases the present exploiter has not done a good job and that a change can be effected under a socialist system but it cannot under a capitalist one. Now suppose you have every country in the world under a governmentalized economy, I cannot see that you can have any change in the authority that exploits resources except through transfer of territory. The conception of government economy is that the government exploits all the resources in its entire territory.

MR. HOSELITZ: I see no reason why you could not have trade.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, but Stalin was talking about the efficient exploitation of resources.

MR. PASVOLSKY: We have had examples of intergovernmental barter. There is nothing new in that.

MR. PLATT: Is Stalin assuming a disappearance of nationalism within a Communist world?

MR. PASVOLSKY: No, I don't think so.

MR. FEIS: Then it is not soluble under either system, is it, except through unobstructed trade?

MR. WRIGHT: If you are talking about universal socialism, that is a different thing; but the only thing we can talk about in a practical world is governmentalized economies under national states. If you are talking about that, there is no flexibility in the system at all.

MR. FEIS: There has been little flexibility, whether the state was capitalist or Communist. No state has in the past turned over the control over important resources to others—irrespective of the form of state.

MR. WRIGHT: Under capitalism, private firms exploit resources, and firms are going into new hands by sale or bankruptcy all the time.

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES

MR. HOSELITZ: The question of whether an adjustment to more efficient use of resources is more likely to be peaceful under Communism than under capitalism depends on whether you will be more likely to get trade relations under either system which will distort as little as possible that flow of trade between nations which would result if resources were allocated most economically.

TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

MR. COLBY: Is it too much to say that we have today two worlds?

MR. FEIS: Much too much!

MR. COLBY: one the Soviet lands and the other the rest of the world, and that, according to past experience and the present performance, we can hope for trade in something like rational fashion in the part of the world that does not involve the Soviet Union?

To my mind that is a good expectation. But the next question blocks my thought. How important will the Soviet lands be in the world trade of tomorrow, and in what ways can that trade be carried on? Must we admit that the Soviet Union is outside the sphere of operation, or can we hope to bring the Soviet Union into a world pattern of trade?

MR. PASVOLSKY: We shall have to adjust the world pattern of trade to the existence of government monopoly. I think an adjustment is possible. It won't be so satisfactory an adjustment from our point of view as it would be under other conditions, but I don't think that we have to assume that trade is impossible, particularly because the phenomenon of monopoly is not restricted to Russia. I think the coexistence of state economy and private economy is not so difficult of adjustment as is the adjustment of mixed economies, economies which operate in both sectors.

MR. WRIGHT: Do you think we shall have a harder time with the British than with the Russians?

MR. PASVOLSKY: I think we might have a harder time adjusting trade between economies which operate in part on one basis and in part on another than we would have in the case of governmentalized economies, provided several conditions are met.

One of them is that a completely governmentalized economy is, relatively, an unimportant economy from the point of view of international trade, and I think Russia is that. We don't know when

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Russia will become a really important international economic factor. At present she is not.

The second is that the governmentalized economy really operates on the basis on which the Soviet government intends to operate its trade-system, that is, on the basis of fair terms of trade. That question has arisen on many occasions. The Soviet reply always is, as I have heard it, that they want to get imports. They make up their programs in terms of what they want to buy. They have to pay for those imports, and they are willing to export. The question has always arisen, "Are you going to undersell in order to get those imports? Are you going to do what Germany has done, and so on?" The answer always is, "No, we want, obviously, to buy as cheaply as we can and to pay for it as little as we can, but we realize that there are limitations." The German system, of course, was based on the strange principle of selling cheap and buying dear, but that could operate for only a short time.

As a continuing system, if the Soviet policy-makers meet that condition, then there is a possibility of adjustment, provided that it is not too great a factor in the whole of international economic relations. But then we have to look again to the bulk of world trade, the bulk of world economic relations which are outside of the Soviet Union, and see what adjustment we need there as between the two sectors of operation and our commercial policy; I hope that as the subject of commercial policy develops in these discussions, some attention will be paid to that particular angle of it. I think it is there that we are going to encounter some very real difficulties and some very real problems because, in quantitative terms, those are much bigger and much more important problems.

MR. WRIGHT: As I understand, you think we can deal with the Soviets if they maintain fair prices. Is that a possible condition? If they want to import something very badly, won't they give what they have got to give in order to make the bargain?

MR. PASVOLSKY: They have two leeways: they have gold, and they have access to the credit system, more or less; and those are very important.

PART V
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

By KENNETH HOLLAND[†]

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT wrote, in his undelivered Jefferson Day address, the night before his death: "Science has brought all the different quarters of the globe so close that it is impossible to isolate them one from another. Today we are faced with the pre-eminent fact that if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples of all kinds to live together and work together in the same world at peace."

Since the end of World War II, people and governments everywhere have been giving serious thought to one practical way of "cultivating the science of human relationships"—through programs designed to promote international understanding. Without understanding, nations cannot live together on this small globe. We can fly the Atlantic in a few hours in the great new airliners. We can leave San Francisco one day and be in Tokyo the next. But we have only begun to develop the instruments of co-operation to bridge the vast chasms of misunderstanding, mistrust, and suspicion that separate the nations of the world. We live in a Buck Rogers age of radio and television, cyclotrons and split atoms; through recent developments in radar we can now extend our physical contacts to other planets. Yet we find it difficult to work out day-to-day relationships with governments and peoples in other countries.

Our hopes are based on the United Nations Organization and related international agencies. But these organizations cannot function effectively without the critical understanding, confidence, and support of the people of the world. Formerly, foreign policy was largely made by diplomats behind closed doors. Today foreign policy increasingly becomes the focused expression of public opinion. As democracy is extended and as world organizations are created, an informed world opinion becomes essential.

[†] Associate director, Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Recent developments in communications have made possible the crystallization and expression of world public opinion. They present us with new opportunities for the diffusion of knowledge and understanding; they also present us with new possibilities for friction and misunderstanding.

“PROPAGANDA” VERSUS “INFORMATION”

Our recent enemies knew how to use modern communications with telling effectiveness to support *their* purposes. Backed up by the threat of force, Axis propaganda showed the power of the ideas in men's minds. While studying and traveling in Germany, Italy, and Japan between 1929 and 1936, I witnessed the use of newspapers, radio broadcasts, motion pictures, textbooks, laboratories, and the school to corrupt and pervert the minds of Axis people and to prepare them for aggressive war against their neighbors.

The fact that the Axis used communications so effectively as a weapon for destruction has in some ways beclouded the real issue and has led many people to assume that all government information activities must necessarily be stamped as “propaganda,” and therefore condemned. This is a difficult subject to cover quickly, but it may be useful to consider where a fair and reasonable line might be drawn between “propaganda” and “information.” There is no easy definition, because “propaganda” essentially involves motives.

Elmer Davis in a recent article pointed out that propaganda may be either true or false. “Certainly false information may be propaganda, but propaganda is not always or even often false. Falsehood is easy to detect; and when it is exposed your propaganda backfires.” Then he remarked that, even if the material you send out is true, “whether it is propaganda or information depends on the *intention* and still more on the *effect* rather than on the actual content of the material.”

I personally had the opportunity of following for a number of years the Nazi propaganda program against the United States, as it was directed at German youth in the Nazi Labor Service. During successive weeks articles, illustrated with excellent photographs, vividly described a lynching, a gangster murder, a kidnaping, a flagpole sitter, a dance marathon, a violent strike, and a slum area in one of our large cities. All the articles were based on facts. But they gave a biased, false picture of the United States as a whole. The significant

CULTURAL RELATIONS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

thing about "propaganda" is that it is aimed at influencing people for reasons of your own, to do something you want them to do.

Information and cultural relations programs, on the other hand, try to present objectively facts which help people make up their own minds. A person who wants to can usually sort out factual statements from colored arguments. The safeguard lies in having enough information available so that one report can be checked against another. With enough information, individuals can usually think for themselves and come to their own conclusions.

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION OBJECTIVES

Applying these very general concepts, we can state that the purpose of the government's international information and cultural relations programs is to increase understanding among nations. We want to present to other countries a full and fair picture of the United States, with all the highlights and the shadows, and to supply enough information so that the prevailing misconceptions about the United States may be corrected. It is also a basic purpose of the United States government to increase the information available not only about America but about all countries and about the world community. We believe, furthermore, that it is essential to free the flow of information between countries. Significantly, the first of the "Four Freedoms" President Roosevelt declared essential for the future was "Freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world."

To achieve these goals the United States government is moving forward on three fronts. During the past year there has been created in the Department of State an Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs. At the same time the United States government has been active in supporting a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O.). Steps have also been taken to incorporate into the United Nations Organization an international guaranty of the freedom of all people to speak, to write, to report, and to listen.

It must be remembered, however, that the government's program and the authority are limited. The job to be done, on the other hand, is limitless. It will require, for many years to come, all that national and international agencies can do, and all that individuals and private groups can do. The government's participation in international exchanges of ideas is merely supplementary to the many exchanges that are carried out daily by private enterprise and by nonprofit organizations.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

THE O.I.C.

I will discuss, first, the State Department's Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, which is commonly known, by those who must refer to it frequently, as the "O.I.C." This office is now an integral part of the State Department, under the guidance of Assistant Secretary William Benton and the immediate supervision of William T. Stone. The Office will operate this coming fiscal year on a budget of \$19,000,000, which represents 1 cent for every \$5.00-\$6.00 which will be spent on the Army and the Navy. Personnel will total approximately 3,150 persons, including about 1,275 Americans serving in the home organization, 375 Americans serving abroad, and 1,500 nationals of other countries, locally employed. I understand that there are approximately 3,000 employees at the University of Chicago and that the University's peacetime budget runs around \$12,000,000, while its wartime budget went as high as \$31,000,000. I am also told that many large corporations, such as General Motors and Proctor and Gamble, pay from \$15,000,000 to \$20,000,000 a year for their advertising alone.

There are five major operating divisions in O.I.C.—three covering the so-called "mass-media" field, namely, radio, motion pictures, and press; and two covering the so-called "cultural affairs" field, namely, the Division of Libraries and Institutes and the Division of Exchange of Persons.

The operation of the International Broadcasting Division covers virtually the entire world. Programs which are broadcast in twenty-four languages give brief reports of world news, as well as American editorial and radio comment on the news, and statements from the President, Cabinet members, congressional leaders, and many other prominent people. Considerable time is also given to radio features on American history, science, education, arts, and general way of life.

The future of international broadcasting is not definitely settled yet, though Congress has recently agreed that the State Department should carry on for at least another year. Congress will be asked to consider the whole problem further and to determine whether international radio should be conducted permanently by the government or by some semiprivate, nonprofit organization or foundation.

In the Motion Pictures Division newsreels and documentary films about the United States are acquired from private sources, edited if necessary, and scored in foreign languages. A few are made by private

CULTURAL RELATIONS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

producers under contract with the Department. Many industries, other government agencies, and private organizations donated documentary films to the wartime information agencies for showing abroad. Already some one hundred films have been offered to O.I.C. for use during the coming year. It has been reported that, in the Latin-American republics alone during 1945, showings of nontheatrical motion pictures numbered over one hundred and ten thousand, with an estimated attendance of forty-two million people.

The Press and Publications Division sends a daily radio bulletin of textual documentary and other background materials to all United States diplomatic missions. About four-fifths of these bulletins are designed for distribution to interested publications, organizations, and individuals abroad. Material of a less timely nature is sent by mail. The Division also prepares photographic exhibits and film strips, depicting all phases of American life, for showing in foreign countries. In China, to mention just one example, such film strips currently are being seen by twelve million school children a month. Another activity of this Division is to publish the illustrated Russian-language magazine, *Amerika*, of which fifty thousand copies are now printed and distributed in the Soviet Union. Since the issues are sold, the magazine is virtually self-supporting.

The Division of Libraries and Institutes maintains twenty-seven cultural institutes in Latin America and about seventy libraries throughout the rest of the world. These libraries and cultural institutes make books, periodicals, documents, music recordings, and art reproductions available to foreign officials, students, organizations, and others interested in American developments and thought. The demand for these books and periodicals is hard to exaggerate. In one month, 17,000 persons visited the library in Paris, 4,000 in Sydney, almost 10,000 in Bombay, and over 5,000 in Mexico City. The cultural institutes in the American republics have had a longer history, and they, too, show the keen interest that other peoples have in learning more about this country. In 1945, registered members in all cultural institutes totaled 10,000; students enrolled for classes in English numbered 24,500; and attendance at all types of functions ran up to over 145,000.

The Division of Libraries and Institutes also facilitates the exchange of books and periodicals and the securing of translation rights by foreign publishers.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

The Exchange of Persons Division is responsible for facilitating the exchange of students, professors, and national leaders. About four hundred students will come to the United States under this program this year, and about sixty-five will go abroad. Some ninety will work in government departments and in industry. We hope these figures can be substantially increased next year. As examples of these exchanges, in the last few months we have had in this country, as official visitors, Señora Adela de Obregon, president of the University for Women in Mexico, who was here studying women's education; Dr. Godoy Moreira, a noted Brazilian surgeon, is here visiting medical centers; Dr. José Santos Herrera, of Peru, is interested in our dental schools and clinics; and Dr. Luis Reissig, a well-known Argentine lawyer and educator, has chosen as his special field the study of adult education. We have also had delegations of newspapermen and newspaperwomen from Egypt, Switzerland, Russia, and Czechoslovakia. During the past year reporters from a dozen countries have come here and have carried back with them firsthand reports about us. One Belgian reporter remarked that, after he had returned home, he was going to write a book which he would call "The Other America"—the America which, he said, most Europeans know nothing about.

In addition to the individuals who come on government funds, others come to the Division for advice and assistance. Each month we receive and give guidance to about fifteen hundred individuals from most of the nations of the world. Recently, the rectors of the four principal universities in Belgium visited this country on funds provided by the Belgian-American Educational Foundation. We were asked to facilitate their trip and to assist them in seeing educational, scientific, and cultural institutions in the United States. Another group that has come on their own funds is the delegation of about twelve doctors from the National Academy of Medicine in Brazil.

There is also in the Exchange of Persons Division a unit known as the "Organizational Liaison Branch." This unit has been established to work with various private organizations in the United States which are interested in carrying on cultural relations activities with other nations. As an example, the American Society of Composers, Artists, and Publishers came to us recently and asked for help in organizing the first international meeting of authors and composers. Similar assistance is being given to the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, who are also planning an international conference here in the United States. Probably \$200,000,000 is spent

CULTURAL RELATIONS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

each year on foreign programs by United States private organizations.

Closely connected with the O.I.C. is the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Co-operation, which is a coordinating body for the international programs of some twenty-six United States government departments and agencies. Many government agencies have worked out co-operative international projects, which benefit both the United States and the collaborating country; malaria control, the exchange of weather reports, the setting-up of hurricane warning stations, and experimental stations for the development of complementary agricultural products are just a few of the many projects already successfully undertaken. These departmental programs also frequently involve the exchange of government officials; a statistician from Brazil, for example, may want to study for a year in our Census Bureau. Conversely, the Chilean government may request a specialist in child care from our Children's Bureau to spend a year setting up a welfare program in that country.

In addition to these so-called "functional" divisions and the Interdepartmental Committee, there are also five area divisions in O.I.C. which service the field offices. These offices are now attached to diplomatic missions in practically all countries. Where funds permit, the typical field office is staffed with a chief, who knows the language of the country well; an information specialist, who handles the mass media; a cultural relations specialist, who is in constant touch with civic organizations, educational institutions, and learned societies; and a librarian, who directs the work of the information library.

BASIC LEGISLATION

Basic authority for carrying on an international information and cultural affairs program comes from the authority which the Constitution and Congress have vested in the Department of State for "conducting the foreign affairs of the United States." Specific legislation covering in detail the exchange of persons, information, and cultural relations programs of the State Department with the nations of the Western Hemisphere was passed in August, 1939. In 1940 this program was expanded and supplemented by the Office of Inter-American Affairs. During the war, information centers were set up in Allied and neutral nations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East by the Office of War Information. A bill now before Congress—H.R. 4982, commonly known as the "Bloom Bill"—would extend specific

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

authority, similar to that provided for the American republics, to the rest of the world.²

It is interesting to note, further, that educational interchanges have also been thought of in connection with Lend-Lease settlements and surplus-property disposals. Another bill pending before Congress—S. 1636, originally introduced by Senator Fulbright—would authorize the use as scholarships of part of the foreign exchange made available from the sale of surplus property.³ Recent Lend-Lease settlements have included clauses which would permit payment for surplus war property into education funds.

ANTECEDENTS

As this brief legislative history indicates, the antecedents of the O.I.C. were the Cultural Relations program of the State Department; the Office of Inter-American Affairs; and the Office of War Information. The Division of Cultural Relations and the Office of Inter-American Affairs, supplementing private endeavors, arranged with the other American republics for the exchange of hundreds of students, professors, writers, musicians, artists, and others. Jointly operated cultural centers were established. Assistance was given to American schools in Latin America, and thousands of books, articles, and other materials were translated and exchanged.

It was predicted in many quarters before and during World War II that this hemisphere would not stand together in fighting the Axis menace. But all the countries of this hemisphere eventually did declare war on the Axis and, with the exception of Argentina, contributed strategic materials, manpower, and, in some cases, armed forces and equipment for the common victory. It is true that they took this stand largely because of the common fear of the Axis powers; but it is also arguable that the extensive information and cultural exchange program contributed substantially to hemispheric solidarity.

The Office of War Information, while largely devoted to propaganda activities against enemy countries, also initiated, through the British Division in London and similar offices in other Allied and neutral countries, an information and cultural exchange program which paralleled in many ways the work done by the Office of Inter-American Affairs. According to one of the annual reports of the British division in London, the purpose of the office was to make

² H.R. 4982 was not passed by the Seventy-ninth Congress.

³ S. 1636 was passed by the Seventy-ninth Congress and became Public Law No. 584.

CULTURAL RELATIONS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

America better known and better understood in England in order to minimize frictions and promote teamwork. The underlying philosophy was "not to proselytize, but rather to take part in a process of mutual education and self-enlightenment." It is generally recognized that the work of the British division contributed substantially to the atmosphere of friendliness, good will, and respect which characterized the Anglo-American war effort.

POLICIES OF O.I.C

Out of all this wartime experience and past achievement, the O.I.C. has developed a peacetime policy and peacetime objectives which have been frequently and clearly expressed in public statements by President Truman, Secretary Byrnes, Assistant Secretary Benton, and others charged with the responsibility of developing our international information and cultural relations policy. These policies may be summarized under three major headings.

I. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE IS ESSENTIAL FOR A CO-OPERATIVE FOREIGN POLICY

President Truman, in his statement of August 31, 1945, creating the Interim International Information Service, declared that international information is needed in order to carry out our co-operative foreign policy. "The nature of the present-day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs. . . ."

Secretary Byrnes, in a statement before Congress, enlarged upon this idea:

We are committed as a nation to a policy of collaboration with the other peaceful nations of the world, and with the peaceful peoples of the world. We cannot withdraw from them, as the experience of two world wars has shown.

There was a time when we could afford, or thought we could afford, to be unconcerned about what other people thought of us. If the people of other nations misunderstood us it was regrettable. The passage of time would probably correct the error. It wasn't fatal.

That time is past. We shall be making decisions, within the United Nations Organization and independently, that will have repercussions affecting the lives of ordinary people all over the globe. Our attitude and our actions, and rumors thereof, will be matters of concern everywhere. As never before, we shall have to explain ourselves, and explain ourselves thoroughly and promptly.

Everyone who has traveled abroad knows that America is neither fairly nor fully understood by the peoples of other nations. Misconceptions come about unintentionally as well as intentionally. The

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

true facts and enough facts about any one country are difficult to secure in another. People's ideas about "foreigners" are usually based on a few tourists; a novel; a sensational news story, sufficiently usual to be deemed worthy of cable tolls; or a dramatic episode in a moving picture, which at home would be immediately recognized as exaggerated but which abroad is accepted as a true interpretation of American life.

Particular misconceptions about America may be traced as far back as 1775, when Samuel Johnson condemned us as a "race of convicts"; by 1812 Robert Southey commented: "See what it is to have a nation take its place among civilized states before it has either gentlemen or scholars." Eleven years later, William Faux, after a brief visit here, remarked that "two selfish gods, pleasure and gain, enslave America." By 1939 the imperfect information available led all too many people throughout the world to believe that we in America were nothing but a rich, tawdry, gun-toting, jazz-loving, unscrupulous, unreliable lot.

Added to this general picture is the information on America given to the world by Axis propaganda. Japanese propaganda presented Americans as decadent weaklings and therefore inferior fighting men. Hitler and Mussolini joined in picturing Americans as so "soft" they could think of nothing but ice-cream sodas, moving-picture shows, and jitterbug parties. Enemy leaflets dropped by planes to our troops depicted these joys of peace, on the theory that the mere reminder of them would rob us of our will to fight. It has been suggested that if the Japanese, the Germans, and the Italians had really known America, our history, our industrial capacity, and our ability to fight when once aroused they might never have gone to war with us.

In any case it is true that general misconceptions have been further distorted by over six years of Axis propaganda. For our own good and for the good of the world we must, in the words of Mr. Benton, "eliminate the areas of mass ignorance and ill-will. If areas of mass ignorance and ill-will are permitted to remain in the world, and if a fuse reaches and inflames them, they may act as detonators for an explosion that might engulf us all."

2. THE GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAM WILL SUPPLEMENT AND FACILITATE PRIVATE ENTERPRISES

Another major policy was stated by President Truman in the Executive Order of August 31, wherein he stressed the supplementary and facilitative nature of the government's information work:

CULTURAL RELATIONS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

To the fullest possible extent, American private organizations and individuals in such fields as news, motion pictures and communications will, as in the past, be the primary means of informing foreign peoples about this country. The Government's international information program will not compete with them.

Instead it will be designed to assist American private enterprises engaged in the dissemination of information abroad, and to supplement them in those specialized information activities in which commercial or other limitations make it difficult for private concerns to carry on all necessary information work. . . .

In Secretary Byrnes's words:

Private agencies and private individuals must continue to provide an overwhelming proportion of the information foreign peoples get about us.

They will get every possible encouragement from the Department. But they cannot do the whole job that needs to be done. Gaps will remain that must be filled, at least for the present, by the Government.

In some parts of the world the private agencies are not welcomed. In many other parts of the world private informational operations are unprofitable. . . . It is our hope that the private agencies will find ways of entering fields where they do not operate. As they do, the Government will withdraw.

Assistant Secretary Benton has frequently stressed these same points and has gone further in suggesting that the government's efforts will in some cases create markets for our goods. He has pointed out that "although informational and cultural programs cannot be measured in dollar-and-cents return, and should not be, it is obvious that trade with the United States will be stimulated abroad by an acquaintance with American technology and methods." On other occasions he has made the point that the United States, as the world's leading creditor and with the world's largest industrial capacity, has the greatest stake in world prosperity. Anything we can do, in co-operation with other governments, to make knowledge available on public health, on educational methods, and on industrial and agricultural development tends to raise the standard of living in other countries. "And American trade flourishes best with those nations with high standards of living."

3. OUR POLICY IN INFORMATION AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS IS TO CO-OPERATE, NOT COMPETE, WITH OTHER NATIONS

Of course, the United States is not alone in formulating an international information and cultural program; in fact, we have been a late comer in the field. Great Britain, Russia, China, and France have extensive information and cultural programs in all major capitals. They carry international broadcasts in over thirty languages; they provide lecturers and facilitate student exchanges; they distribute booklets, magazines, and films. But smaller countries also feel that

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

international information programs are important. Not the Big Four or Five alone, but forty-nine countries are today using international short-wave broadcasting. All these national programs, when they are clearly labeled and frankly presented and when their intention is to give a full and fair picture of their country, add to the total of information throughout the world and therefore to the total of world understanding.

President Truman a year ago said: "This Government will not attempt to outstrip the extensive and growing information programs of other nations. . . ." Secretary Byrnes has said that our policy should be to prevent destructive rivalry and to provide for the harmonious and efficient adjustment of these activities.

Instead of competing, it is our policy to co-operate with other nations in educational, scientific, and cultural exchanges, as our active support and indorsement of U.N.E.S.C.O. indicate.

U.N.E.S.C.O.

I have discussed at length the basic policies of O.I.C. because they reflect the philosophy that underlies all our efforts toward increasing world information and, thereby, world understanding.

Our support of U.N.E.S.C.O. dates back to 1944, when a conference of Allied ministers of education met in London to discuss the intellectual rehabilitation of the devastated countries. The delegates soon discovered, however, that they had a much broader piece of work to do—the creation of a world organization which would help build the defenses of peace in the minds of men. As a result, in November, 1945, a conference was called in London to draft a constitution for such an organization, one of the first of the specialized agencies visualized in the United Nations Charter. The Preamble of the U.N.E.S.C.O. constitution states the underlying belief that "ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause throughout the history of mankind of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world, through which their differences have all too often broken into war." Indications are that the necessary twenty nations, including our own country, will accept the constitution.⁴

What will U.N.E.S.C.O. do? It is not possible at this time to state exactly. A Preparatory Commission met in the summer of 1946 to develop the program. However, since I had the opportunity of par-

⁴ The Seventy-ninth Congress accepted the constitution of U.N.E.S.C.O.

CULTURAL RELATIONS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

ticipating in the London Conference, I believe I can list some of the activities which U.N.E.S.C.O. probably will undertake.

It will, for example, promote a free flow of ideas and information on the popular, as well as on the scholarly, level through the radio, the motion picture, and the printed page. In using the mass media which wider communications have made possible, U.N.E.S.C.O. will reach adults in their homes and in their communities, as well as students in schools and universities.

U.N.E.S.C.O. will also encourage the exchange of people—scientists, teachers, artists, students, and national leaders. It will stimulate the circulation of scientific and technological information.

It will help the devastated countries rehabilitate their art galleries, museums, schools, and laboratories.

It will encourage the development of education for world peace and international co-operation, both in schools and on the adult level.

The constitution of U.N.E.S.C.O. suggests that each member-state appoint a national commission for the purpose of associating groups interested in education, scientific, and cultural matters with the work of the Organization. It will be through the United States national commission that educational, scientific, and cultural organizations can advise on policy for U.N.E.S.C.O.

THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

Basic to all discussions of understanding through international information and cultural programs is the question of the free flow of reports and ideas over national borders. Government restrictions on news-gathering—such as censorship of reports, expulsion of correspondents who are “displeasing,” or restrictions on their free movement—are evident barriers to this free flow. Within the past year, the United States has taken several concrete steps to achieve freer international communications.

1. The State Department has worked with some success to secure the acceptance of American correspondents in all countries. According to a survey made this spring by the Associated Press, today in most countries correspondents are permitted to file uncensored stories to the United States. Not all countries will permit the uncensored publication of news, however; and in some countries there is still the veil of so-called “military censorship.”

2. The American republics, meeting in March, 1945, in Mexico City, acted on the question of free access to information. In the Act of Chapultepec they declared that “the progress of mankind depends

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

on the supremacy of truth" and that "there can be no freedom, peace, or security where men are not assured free access to the truth through the various media of public information." The American republics therefore recommended that nations recognize their essential obligation to guarantee to their people free and impartial access to sources of information; that they abandon as quickly as possible wartime measures of censorship; and that they take measures individually and in co-operation with one another to promote the free exchange of information among their peoples. Efforts are currently being made to implement this policy.

3. At the Telecommunications Conference held in December, 1945, in Bermuda, several complex and technical questions relating to telegraphic rates, which had caused discussions for twenty-five years, were considered and solved by mutual agreement. One of the agreements involved lowering press rates between points in the British Empire and the United States.

4. Under its constitution, U.N.E.S.C.O. has, as one of its functions, to "recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image."

5. The United Nations Organization is also considering the problem of freeing the flow of information. The United Nations Charter declares that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to "promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."

Secretary Byrnes, in commenting on the Charter, once said that, in the view of the American delegation, the Charter's provision for "universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all" included freedom of speech. This, in turn, included freedom of the press, freedom of communication, and freedom of exchange of information.

At the first meeting of the Commission on Human Rights in New York on April 29, proposals for drawing up a bill of human rights were received. According to the Commission's chairman, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, such a bill would be carefully drafted, circulated among all member-nations for comments and suggestions, and then put before the United Nations Assembly for final adoption. The Human Rights Commission also recommended the creation of a special subcommission to deal with freedom of information and of the press, because, according to Mrs. Roosevelt, "this is basic to the study of Human Rights, but even more, to the enforcement of any Bill finally agreed upon."

CULTURAL RELATIONS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

A RESPONSIBILITY AND A CHALLENGE

The tools of all information and cultural programs are the press, the radio, the motion picture, the book—artists, writers, scientists, students, and teachers. These may seem weak in comparison with battleships, airplane carriers, atomic bombs, and jet-propelled planes. But history offers many examples of the power of ideas. We have recently had negative examples in the skilful manipulation of ideas by which the cliques in control of the Axis countries prepared their peoples for war. But we also have examples of the positive power of ideas for peace and co-operation. The student exchanges made possible by turning the Boxer Indemnity into an educational fund have cemented the ties of friendship between China and this country. The American universities in the Middle East have turned out doctors, judges, and leaders throughout the Arab world who know and appreciate American thought and culture. One British official, who knows the Arab world well, recently stated that the understanding of American democracy and war aims gained by students at the American universities was largely responsible for the loyalty of the great majority of the Near Eastern peoples to the Allies, in spite of the frenzied propaganda of the Axis.

Understanding has also been cemented by such well-known exchanges as the Rhodes Scholarships and the fellowships made available through the Belgian-American Educational Foundation. Many other examples could be cited of the effectiveness of educational and cultural exchanges which have been developed by the United States government and by many foundations and private agencies. The more people in all walks of life can develop, in the future, programs of international co-operation, the firmer will be the foundation of the world community and the greater will be the chances for successful and effective co-operation among nations.

An international information and cultural relations program is essentially a people's program. It offers an opportunity for direct participation by individuals and private organizations in keeping the peace. The O.I.C., U.N.E.S.C.O., U.N., and international agreements of all kinds are pieces of machinery. The people of each country must give them motive power. The drive must come from national and international organizations interested in greater world understanding, and from all who believe that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."

RELATION OF IDEOLOGIES AND COMMUNICATIONS TO FOREIGN POLICY

By ROBERT D. LEIGH¹

I SHOULD like to take the usual speaker's liberty with his assigned topic to the extent of rearranging the words of the printed title for this round table. It now reads "relation of ideologies and communications to foreign policy." It would be more precise as a definition of the subject of our discussion, it seems to me, to leave out the word "ideologies," so that the title becomes "the relation of communications policy to general foreign policy." This deletion is made on the assumption that the prevailing ideology of a national state will find expression—at least roughly—in its foreign policy, so that ideologies here require no separate consideration.

Our concern, then, is with the shape of a communications policy which will express properly the nation's general purposes in its relation to other nations. And in line with the general subject of this year's Institute we are especially concerned with the communications policy of the United States vis-à-vis its foreign policy.

To prevent our attempting to cover too much ground, I suggest that we further limit ourselves by defining "communications" as "mass communication across national borders." This means press dispatches and the stories of foreign correspondents designed for newspaper, radio, or other publication, the newspapers themselves, magazines, books, radio broadcasts, motion pictures, and the agencies of physical communication by wire, wireless, airplane, and regular mail which serve the press.

By such a limitation we omit consideration of less extensive but very important means for the international exchange of information, ideas, attitudes, and purposes—through diplomatic representation, conference and correspondence, visitors, migration, academic and other professional exchanges of students and lecturers, and personal correspondence. A half-century or more ago these intensive, personal means of exchange of intelligence would have been the principal objects for any realistic study of international communication as

¹ Director, Commission on Freedom of the Press.

COMMUNICATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

affecting, and as affected by, foreign policy. Now, however, the increasingly elaborate and varied flow of words and images across national borders by impersonal, mechanical means has become the center of attention. The "mass media," as they are called, have become a major influence in the exchange of knowledge and insights, of prejudice and discord between, one country and another.

The modern development of international mass communication can be divided conveniently into three periods: (1) the systems of imperial communication, (2) the systems of war propaganda, (3) the period we are now entering, which I shall call—hopefully—the "system of international communication."

I. SYSTEMS OF IMPERIAL COMMUNICATION

From the latter half of the nineteenth century down to the middle thirties of our present century, communications outside national borders were built as part of the machinery of empire—including under the term "empire" all kinds and varieties of economic and cultural spheres of influence, along with political suzerainties. It was natural enough that, during this period, Great Britain, France, Holland—and later Germany—should each build a network for easy, frequent, and regular discourse between the mother-country and its outlying territories and peoples. It was natural also that Great Britain, with its chain of dominions, colonies, and dependent states strung round the globe, should, for purposes of empire and trade, have built the most extensive and elaborate network of overseas communication.

It was the British, not the Americans, who provided the financial backing for the pioneering proposals of our own Cyrus Field, Peter Cooper, and others for a submarine cable across the North Atlantic. It was the British who then proceeded vigorously, by aid of private ventures or by direct government ownership and operation, to build a cable network to all the points of Empire—which meant a cable network across all the oceans and seas. It was the British, not the Italians, who later provided the capital for Marconi to build a wireless network, which came also to embrace most of the Empire and, in 1929, was joined with the British cable companies to form a single huge telecommunications company. This chosen instrument of empire—Cables and Wireless—was partly governmental, partly private. With a strong monopoly position, it offered uniform, low rates to all comers, including a rate of a penny (British, 1½ cents American)

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

a word in the 1930's for press messages to and from any Empire point. The imperial system excluded direct communication lines from points outside the Empire to points within it except by way of London or the closest Empire point. With the aid of Cables and Wireless and other mechanisms described below, London was clearly established in the early twentieth century as the communications capital of the world.

The French and Dutch, with less extensive overseas possessions, built more modest networks of overseas communications, but each was shaped directly as an instrument of colonial relationship. Germany, a late entrant into the imperial race, made a beginning both with cables and with wireless, but its career was cut short at the end of the first World War and its cables, as well as its colonies, were transferred to the victorious Allies.

Not only were *physical* communications developed as an instrument of empire. Foreign news-gathering and distribution followed a similar pattern. In the mid-nineteenth century the German, Paul Julius Reuter, found in London rather than in his homeland a hospitable center for building the great Reuters news agency. Although developed as a private, commercial organization, serving foreign as well as British Empire newspapers, Reuters maintained an informal relationship with the British government which made its news service an effective aid to Empire policy as well as to general enlightenment.

Following a temporary trend in European power politics toward dividing rather than fighting over spoils, Reuter was able for a time to achieve an interimperial arrangement with its counterparts in France and Germany (Havas and Wolff), by which the world was divided between the three agencies along the lines of empire, trade, and cultural affinity (Reuter got the British Empire, North America, a number of dependent states along the Mediterranean-Suez life-line, and most of Asia; Havas got the French Empire, southwestern Europe, South America, and parts of Africa; Wolff got what was left in Europe, including Austria-Hungary, Scandinavia, and the Slavic states). To this world cartel the American Associated Press was added later as a junior and somewhat uneasy partner, with only the United States itself as its province. The cartel did not last. And it is probably significant that the newer American press associations, especially United Press, which broke through the exclusive system did so by exchanging news directly with Central and South America, a developing field of American economic interest.

COMMUNICATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

When radio broadcasting across national borders became feasible in the 1920's, the first development followed the usual imperial lines. The British, the French, the Dutch, and the Japanese, with their broadcast facilities in government hands, promoted short-wave programs as a cultural link with their nationals overseas.

A similar story could be told in the development by the British, French, and Germans of the world markets for books in their respective languages and cultures.

During this period the United States, not possessing numerous overseas possessions and engaged mainly in the development of its continental homeland, did not share to any extent in building any system of imperial communications networks. Cables and wireless telegraph and telephone systems to overseas points did develop, but as part of an expanding trade and commerce, unconnected with governmental purpose. Similarly, the three domestic press associations expanded into foreign capitals, but it was mainly for the purpose of bringing foreign news to American newspapers; and the associations meticulously avoided any formal or informal connection with governmental personnel and policy.

International broadcasting, in the United States in the hands of competing and privately owned American companies, was hardly developed at all, except for experimental purposes. And the export and foreign reprint and distribution of American books was so far neglected by our publishers as to be dubbed a "2 per cent nuisance."

In motion pictures the Hollywood product, especially in the days of the silent film, which spoke the international language of gesture and movement, was widely distributed in other countries. But here again the motive was purely commercial rather than imperial, political, or cultural. Indeed, the picture of American life spread before the world was hardly that which any State Department would approve of.

And with the coming of sound films the other countries began to take stock of this powerful, but quite accidental and irresponsible, influence of American motion pictures and entered the field in competition, at the same time urging restriction by tax and quota of the Hollywood products.

Thus America, although it shared in these ways in international communication, did *not* share in building a government-directed or imperial system, and it did not, on the whole, play a major role in the field.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

2. SYSTEMS OF WAR PROPAGANDA

The second period of overseas communications development overlapped the first. It was characterized by the use of mass communication across national territory, not to bind an empire together but to conquer the minds and wills of a foreign people—sometimes as a prelude to military conquest. Radio broadcasting was the main instrument employed.

In the late 1920's Russia began broadcasting in German, to Germany, programs designed to create converts to communism. When Hitler came to power in the 1930's, he began broadcasts to neighboring countries with the idea of softening them up for later annexation. Mussolini's broadcasts, meanwhile, to the Arab populations of the Near East were so directly hostile to British authority that they became the subject of a treaty stipulation between Great Britain and Italy forbidding their continuance. In the face of this new emphasis in international discourse, Great Britain and France revised their Empire programs to develop general international broadcasting of news and comment in foreign languages aimed at foreign populations.

With the outbreak of armed conflict, to which the propaganda war was a prelude, each of the major contestants—Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States—developed enormous engines of communication by all possible means to peoples everywhere, using two-score and more languages and dialects.

Most spectacular, in the light of the previous lack of relationship between government and the mass-communication industries, was the machinery of communication for war purposes built by the United States. The Army, the Office of War Information (O.W.I.), and the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs (C.I.A.A.) together created networks of physical communication by radio telegraph, radio telephone, facsimile, radiophoto, and voice broadcast which reached the remotest parts of the five continents and the seven seas. Air transport made 40 per cent of the globe accessible to the United States within 72 hours for the transport of newspapers, magazines, books, radio recordings, and films. Books produced in huge quantities at a cost of 6-10 cents apiece were distributed to our armed forces and to civilians all over the world. Motion pictures, selected from Hollywood current output, and documentaries, especially made to give other countries a picture of actual life in the United States, were exported in large quantity. Magazines in foreign languages were edited under government auspices and distributed abroad—notably

COMMUNICATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

En Guardia, which sold 8,000,000 copies in Latin America, and the Russian-language *Amerika*, which is still published under government auspices for the Russians, an area closed otherwise to American periodicals. A special file of news and commentary was prepared and sent by the press broadcast and facsimile process to hundreds of government posts in out-of-the-way places in Africa and Asia, where news from or about the United States had never penetrated before in any volume. Altogether, the war led the United States to improvise an enormous equipment, personnel, and program for reaching the world with current intelligence regarding America and the world at war. Similar developments, of course, utilizing the newer techniques of press broadcast, facsimile, documentary movies, and rapid transport took place in the other major countries at war.

3. THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Now we come to the third or present period of postwar reconversion in communication. The communication empires of Germany and Japan and Italy have disappeared. On the other hand, both Great Britain and Russia, taking full advantage of wartime extensions and improvements, are going ahead full steam with programs of overseas information by press dispatch, radio, motion picture, and print. France and Holland also indicate a lively interest in the resumption of their own agencies of foreign mass discourse.

The United States seems to be uncertain as to its policy and program. Our intricate, very modern, and highly efficient military network of international physical communication—probably the best world telecommunication system in existence—is not liquidated as yet, nor is it being taken over to serve civilian uses. O.W.I. and C.I.A.A., operating most of the wartime information activities, *have* been liquidated. Some of their functions, considerably reduced in volume, are being continued by the State Department. But the funds for these reduced activities have been determined in a congressional atmosphere which suggests that their continuance is not in any sense a settled policy.

What should our international communications policy be? It would seem to depend on the general foreign policy we have decided to pursue—and that seems to depend to a degree on the policy and purposes of other great powers.

Interpreting our position as one of the two great powers, which is the fashion at this Institute, are we not drawn inevitably into the

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

task of utilizing words and images to extend our influence—utilizing them offensively to give sympathetic interpretation and to build opinion based upon accurate knowledge of our policies and actions and utilizing them more defensively to correct or counteract unfavorable sentiment, misrepresentation, and distortion by other nations? If so, this requires a mass-communications machinery and policy different from what we had before the war.

But are we not also attempting to shape our influence and our decisions as a great power in such a way that we act as a kind of trustee for the United Nations and promote, as we can, the habit and mechanisms of joint or concerted action of the nations? This implies building a universe of free and popular discourse in which discussion, understanding, and agreement take place as exchange between peoples, with the mechanisms of communication themselves serving this international exchange rather than a particular national power? This policy again is something that did not exist, except in germinal form, before the war.

Pending an authoritative answer to these \$64 questions by this Institute, I assume that American foreign policy is seeking to steer a course somewhere between these alternatives—that we are obliged, perhaps eager, to play the part of a competing great power but that we are attempting to play it in such a way that our weight is thrown on the side of a growing concert of international authority making decisions on a basis of justice rather than on the short-time limited adjustments of competing imperialisms.

If this *is* our foreign policy, I would suggest that the communications policy flowing from it consists generally of the following elements:

1. That we promote in every possible way the breaking-down of the barriers of foreign censorship and other discriminations, as well as the reduction of the handicaps of professional incompetence which prevent our public from getting an accurate, balanced picture of events in other lands and the background of those events.

We are committed as a nation, legally, morally, and by our sheer power, as we never have been before, to making judgments and to taking official action about specific events and the policies of governments, in Iran, Manchuria, Greece, Spain, Palestine, and Argentina. We are also committed as a self-governing republic to resting our foreign policy and major action upon popular consent. The shadowy line which, up until recently, removed foreign affairs from popular

COMMUNICATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

participation has disappeared. The wisdom of our judgments, therefore, will depend to no little degree on the reliability of our inflowing intelligence through the mass media.

2. That we promote in every way possible the export to all countries of news, of current events, background, and way of living in the United States which are reliable and representative. Notice that I do not say export of what is only favorable or positive. Nor do I say the export only of that print and those pictures for which foreign peoples will pay most readily. I mean to say what Mark Ethridge said after his return from the Balkans, where he found "the news service not only . . . inadequate but . . . violently distorted so far as the American position in the world has been concerned . . .," owing to years of continuing propaganda from countries unfavorable to the United States. To quote: "I do not say that we should answer it by counterpropaganda in the sense of political ideology. The most effective propaganda seems to me to be a straight reflection of American life. There is no more potent or more objective way of doing it than through beaming news about what is happening in the United States to those sections of the world."

3. That we promote in every possible way the creation of those agencies and instruments of communication which will replace or overlay the systems of empire and warlike propaganda by real international exchange with their main allegiance to an international community.

These three elements in our overseas communications policy are perhaps so general as to obtain assent without much discussion. Of a fourth feature of our communications policy I am as fully convinced, but I am not so sure of general assent to it. It is that the carrying-out of the three elements named above will require extensive governmental, as well as private, action.

There are those who think the sole task is to bring the barriers down and that the private, commercial agencies of information will do the rest. True, the barriers should be brought down, and the commercial agencies should flourish and expand their foreign service. But they cannot do the whole job. And, for the most part, they do not accept the responsibilities which are inherent in doing the whole job.

There is an interesting theory, honestly held by some of the leaders of press associations, that they are laying the basis for an international news service, that they are the servants of no government,

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

not even of a United Nations, but only of people everywhere who want news. They hold that governments, ours as well as others, of necessity serve their own interests, arrange the news to their own purpose, and, therefore, issue propaganda as distinguished from the press-association product, which is not *propaganda* but *objective news*.

This is not quite the whole story. The commercial press associations do a good job, but they possess inherent handicaps which they freely admit. They collect and distribute what people in a region who pay for the news ask for—and this is based on maximum reader interest. This tends in practice to a report of the ripples of excitement on the stream of events—a constant temptation to irresponsible report of the sensational and combative. Added up as total impression, it is a report of America or a foreign land which too often distorts rather than depicts. So it is also with motion pictures that are exported on a purely commercial basis.

Again, the press association sells its file only to editors who can pay for it. It does not reach whole areas where people can afford to pay the least but where they may need and want news of America most. Naturally, we attach no blame to competing commercial agencies of communication for operating on a commercial basis. How could they operate as such on any other? But I wish merely to indicate that the news and pictures they furnish the world are, in their own way, propaganda—they select, delete, and distort to highlight the sensational and exceptional.

Intelligence furnished by government is also under constant temptation to select, to suppress, and to distort, in this case so that only a favorable picture of the government results. But it has the advantage that its selection tends toward the significant rather than the sensational and that, supported as it is by taxation rather than by subscription and advertising, it can reach those in out-of-the-way places that would not otherwise be served on a commercial basis.

At its best, commercial communication, by skill in making important intelligence attractive, is very good; at its worst it can act so irresponsibly as to replace ignorance with prejudice and misinformation rather than with knowledge. At its best, divorced so far as possible from immediate political controls, government communication can be illuminating, reliable, and of great significance; at its worst it can be misleading and harmful. What I am urging is that no policy of adequate communication across national borders can be done by one

COMMUNICATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

or the other type of agency alone. The task must be shared. Neither *laissez faire* nor government monopoly is appropriate or effective.

One can only suggest the bare outlines of the more specific items in this fourfold program:

1. The reduction of barriers to free flow of information across borders is partly a matter of general treaty or convention, such as may be framed by the subcommission on press freedom of the Human Rights Commission. Such a convention might make all censorship open and announced rather than covert and uncertain. It cannot, at the present stage, eliminate it. Bilateral treaties can, in a piecemeal fashion, push the barriers down as opportunity offers.

Elsewhere I have suggested regularizing the various corps of correspondents in foreign capitals, who now fight the day-to-day battles for access to news and freedom to transmit it without discrimination, by placing behind them a body of communications professionals in the United Nations serving to review cases of discrimination and unauthorized censorship and to make public their report before final discriminatory action—such as expulsion—is taken.

Against this proposal there has been a general outcry from the practitioners of the press, who mistrust United Nations intervention—even on the side of removing barriers—as much as they do national governments.

2. In the matter of physical communications there is some progress. It should be noted that the cheapness and extent of coverage of airplane transport and telecommunication are factors of great importance in promoting the international flow of intelligence. The recent Anglo-American Telecommunications Conference in Bermuda signaled the breakup of the imperial monopoly elements in the British system. Direct communication was legalized between the Empire points and other nations, and ceiling rates were reduced. In fact, the British were willing to reduce rates for press transmission below the point where our competitive systems thought they could afford it.

3. In the outflow of intelligence the State Department program represents a modest attempt to fill the obvious gaps where private agencies do not operate. Most significant is the continued operation by the government of short-wave broadcasting—this because private broadcasters cannot finance such an enterprise. We probably should not take too seriously the refusal of the press associations to sell their news services to the government for these short-wave broadcasts. The boycott is not complete and is more significant for the false

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

reasoning and irrational fears it reveals than for its effect upon the operation.

In the case of motion pictures, the Hays-Johnston Office has given public expression of the responsibility of the movie industry to insure that there be a selective distribution of the export product to "make certain that the American way of life is faithfully portrayed upon the world's screens." The actual efforts to achieve such self-discipline on behalf of the public interest will be interesting to watch.

The book publishers have organized themselves in a nonprofit federation for a similar purpose.

4. As for steps toward the creation of really international instruments of mass communication, there is no great progress to report. The creation of an agency in the United Nations or outside it, representing the co-operative interests of those engaged in mass communication, similar to the International Labour Organization or the International Health Organization, is a long distance off. Only with the greatest difficulty and then with halfhearted acceptance is it possible to get the leaders of the commercial enterprises in this country to meet in a room together—let alone take any leadership in the creation of organs of international co-operation.

U.N.E.S.C.O. has included mass communications in its charter and table of organization. But I believe that it is a misconception of the importance and the temperament of the mass-media leaders to include them as junior partners in a unit led largely by people interested in scholarly and cultural exchange.

5. We have yet to see a really international press service, an international radio organization, an international mass magazine, or an international documentary film corporation. But there are proposals for all these instruments. And it would seem a proper and natural part of our present communications policy to encourage these and all other instruments which represent in personnel, in function, and in sponsorship the beginnings of the international exchange of information; for in the long run it is such instruments which should replace the systems of imperialism and warlike propaganda.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By SEYMOUR BERKSON¹

NO MATTER what its current or past eccentricities may be, American foreign policy has but one major goal. That goal is permanent and universal peace based on justice. The United States is striving to achieve such a peace by progressively reducing the inflammatory frictions among nations and by encouraging the highest possible level of mutual understanding among all the peoples of the world.

In this latter connection we hear more and more nowadays about the importance of freedom of the press and of the other mass media, such as radio, magazines, books, and motion pictures. When we speak of this freedom in the modern world, what we really mean is freedom of information. In other words, the fundamental right of access to all the various means by which peoples can communicate to one another the current events and ideas that form an integral pattern of their individual and collective lives.

The establishment of this freedom throughout the world as a dynamic weapon against international hatreds and misunderstanding deserves more attention than it is receiving in the general efforts of our civilization to quarantine the virus of war.

Let us face the cold, stark reality: A peace that is not supported by the free flow of truthful information upon which the peoples of the world can build mutual faith and understanding is just another armed truce. It makes little difference how cleverly its diplomatic machinery may be designed by governments or statesmen if this so-called peace can be shattered at will by manipulating the emotions of this or that populace with false information, as Hitler did in totalitarian Germany.

The principal instrument through which American foreign policy seeks to achieve world peace is the United Nations. But, along the thorny path which that organization is treading in its search for a solution of many immediate problems, the desired establishment of

¹ General manager of International News Service.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

freedom of information as an international principle has been side-tracked thus far. True, it has been discussed in this and that advisory commission and subcommittee. Outside of the American delegation, however, this basic concept has met with little militant enthusiasm—and even less action—in the central organization of the United Nations.

Our State Department, of course, has indorsed publicly on more than one occasion the principle of free, untrammelled flow of information throughout the world. Despite numerous efforts, however, it has been unable thus far to have that principle universally adopted. And, for reasons that are increasingly apparent at this stage of international tension, it has been somewhat reluctant to press the matter too boldly.

The State Department's latest strategy is to prepare an American program on this subject for consideration by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O.) at its first general conference in Paris in November, 1947.

Some of us in the newspaper profession have been consulted informally about the preliminary draft of that program. As far as it goes, it appears at least to be a step in the right direction. The tentative draft stresses the need of international freedom for all the mass media—press, radio, motion pictures, books, and magazines. It states that U.N.E.S.C.O. should do all it can to increase to the maximum the flow of fair and accurate information among the nations of the world. Specifically, it urges: (1) broad freedom of information agreements among the nations; (2) free and equal access to news at its source in all countries; (3) elimination of censorship; (4) increased low-cost communication facilities; (5) encouragement of periodic international conferences of mass-media representatives to discuss their mutual problems; and (6) development of a plan for exchanging newspapermen and editors across national boundaries on a basis similar to the Nieman Foundation fellowships in journalism at Harvard.

Since there must be a beginning, no matter how modest, this move to plant the seeds for international freedom of information in U.N.E.S.C.O. is certainly worth while, even if U.N.E.S.C.O. cannot take direct action itself and merely recommends a program to the United Nations or its Commission on Human Rights.

It should be possible to achieve specific, concrete agreements among a simple majority of member-nations, despite the expected

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

refusal of a small but powerful minority to join in any program of actual guaranties on this subject at the present time. Such agreements among a majority of the member-nations would mark at least some progress toward the universal goal and might act as a lever to win eventual co-operation from the recalcitrant minority. Realistically, we cannot expect the same freedoms we experience in the United States today to be superimposed overnight on all the nations of the world, especially those which have had little experience or tradition in liberty.

There is another danger, however, in the present situation that is worth bearing in mind. It is the danger that we may delude ourselves with a vague general charter of high-sounding but meaningless phrases instead of achieving concrete agreements for freedom of information on a basis as nearly global as possible. It will not be enough for the United Nations to declare blandly that "there shall be freedom of information" throughout the world.

We who are accustomed in the United States to the highest standards of freedom of information and who take it as for granted as we do our right to vote must not be deluded thereby into believing that this concept will be easy to establish throughout the world. We must not believe that, by merely enacting a broad charter on this subject, the United Nations will automatically achieve universal freedom of information as if by waving a magic wand.

It will not come so easily. It will not come without long and painstaking evolution in countries where there is little or no foundation at present on which to build such freedom. And this job cannot be done by the United Nations Organization alone. It will take the concerted efforts of men with plenty of intellectual honesty and fortitude in each of the countries where a change must be effected—not merely men of government but members of the press itself—before such a charter can be translated into reality.

In a number of countries it will be as difficult to remake journalistic habits as to remake any others. Also, foundation stones of democracy must first be laid in some countries to provide the kind of fertile soil where freedom of information can function properly. For example, of what effect would freedom of information be—duly proclaimed and phrased in lofty language—if such a charter were to be issued with tongue in cheek by a totalitarian government whose very system denied the basic atmosphere required for such freedom to exist?

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

There is much spadework to be done around the world in the machinery of government "of the people, by the people, for the people," before we can hope to achieve true freedom of information on a universal scale. But there must be a beginning. And in this respect the various efforts within the framework of the United Nations are certainly worthy of the utmost encouragement.

It will be difficult enough to achieve a free and untrammelled flow of information among all the nations of the world. It will be an even more arduous task to translate that freedom into mutual understanding, for this involves the ability of peoples to evaluate intelligently the free flow of information—and that requires at least some educational background plus critical judgment. This again is a slow process—but it is worth all the effort we can contribute to it. As H. G. Wells, I believe, once said: "Civilization is a race between education and catastrophe."

Pending the development of an intelligent, as well as an informed, public throughout the world, we can only hope that, by opening the flood gates of accurate, factual information, the plain common sense of the average man will prevail.

Freedom of information has proved itself an effective safety valve against artificial inflammation of public opinion. Where both sides of a question can be presented and debated freely and openly, there is less danger that a nation can be misled easily into the violent hatreds that breed war. There is fuller opportunity for public opinion to strike a calm balance.

I have endeavored to outline some of the immediate and long-range problems involved in freedom of information as it applies to the aims of American foreign policy.

What is the situation today? The hoped-for era in which the facts about the United States would reach the rest of the world with as much freedom as the United States accords the distribution of all foreign news here is not likely to dawn for some time. Therefore, the State Department, realizing America's great stake in the world of today and its major responsibility for the world of tomorrow, has embarked on an international information program. Its aim is to inform foreign peoples about the United States, its current events, problems, and attitudes on major issues. In so doing, the State Department has decided that, pending a broader achievement of the free flow of information and ideas among all nations, the United

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

States cannot be indifferent to the adequacy with which this country is portrayed to the other peoples of the world.

There was heated debate in and out of Congress over the launching of this program by the United States. Finally, however, the bill providing \$19,000,000 for the State Department's information program was passed by Congress and signed by the President. The State Department program provides for short-wave radio broadcasts beamed abroad as "The Voice of America"; for a network of libraries and information centers in some sixty-seven countries; for a corps of press attachés in our various missions abroad; etc.

If actual freedom of the press existed throughout the world, the American press associations—Associated Press, United Press, and International News Service—could distribute their full news reports everywhere. There would then be little excuse for government broadcasts by the United States, so far as news is concerned. But the truth is that only about one-fourth of the world's population enjoys freedom of the press today. The American press associations are denied the opportunity to distribute their news services, for example, throughout those areas which are behind Europe's "iron curtain." Hence, most of the news dispatches about the United States and American affairs currently distributed in those areas are distorted and antagonistic. We must therefore recognize the existence of an emergency. In this emergency it is manifestly important for unbiased, straightforward news dispatches about America to reach those people abroad who otherwise would receive only a distorted picture of this country.

The State Department has made it clear that it entered this field not to engage in a "propaganda race" but to fill a void—to supplement, rather than compete with, the existing American press associations. This the "Voice of America" broadcasts have already begun to accomplish with remarkable success, as indicated by specific reports from such countries as Yugoslavia and Rumania, where the legitimate flow of American news-agency dispatches is prohibited. News denied them in their heavily censored newspapers is reaching those peoples over the air, which is a very difficult medium to censor.

As for the three American press associations, none of us has any intention of abdicating to government the job of news distribution abroad. All of us are serving more foreign newspapers and radio stations today than ever before in our history. We are expanding rapidly into every part of the globe where we are not denied the freedom to

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

distribute our services. For example, International News Service (I.N.S.) served fewer than fifty foreign clients before the recent war. Today we serve 510—and we are adding new clients abroad every day.

Far from considering the State Department radio newscasts a threat to our continued expansion in the foreign field, we believe that they will whet the appetites of many more foreign newspapers and radio stations for full access to the American news services themselves. We know that the State Department has been trying energetically in countless ways to facilitate the widest possible distribution of the American news services abroad on a normal free-enterprise basis. The State Department officials concerned recognize that it is in the best interests of American tradition to speed the day when barriers to universal freedom of information will be broken down completely. In that event the government's information program will either be totally unnecessary or be vastly curtailed to deal more with cultural subjects than with news.

I believe these officials agree that for the United States to engage in a "propaganda race" with other nations might have unpredictable results, as dangerous as outright distortion of the news. To become involved in such a "propaganda race" could readily inflame, rather than assuage, international tensions and might very well increase the nationalistic antagonisms that breed war.

Only so long as the State Department's international information program is predicated on telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth can such a program be reconciled with American principles of freedom of the press. There are inherent dangers in any departure from such an honest policy in telling the news of America abroad. If the American government were to engage in distortion, half-truths, or special pleading in its news programs, it would destroy faith abroad in the very principles for which America stands. If the United States were to imitate any of the techniques of Herr Goebbels, we should reap a harvest of contempt rather than of understanding. This would do more damage to our reputation abroad than any lack of unbiased news about America possibly could have done had we remained inarticulate.

The truth—unvarnished, frank, straightforward—is a greater weapon of American foreign policy than any of the artful propaganda tricks ever devised. The ability to tell the truth about one's self—the unfavorable truths as well as the favorable ones—is a real test of greatness that will command the utmost respect throughout a propa-

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

ganda-weary world. That is the American way. Neither should the news of America be told boastfully, brashly, or with an air of pious superiority. Rather, it should be told with quiet restraint and dignity, minus all artifice or bombast.

Because such a government program, no matter how honestly executed, may still arouse suspicions of devious propaganda abroad, there has been some discussion recently of another possible method of achieving the desired result. The suggestion has been made that a foundation, sponsored jointly by public and private representatives of American life, might be organized to take over and direct the "Voice of America" programs. This suggestion is being explored and may have considerable merit if the practical problems involved can be worked out. Such organizations as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Rockefeller Foundation, and others of similar standing might be able to play an important role in such an undertaking.

But the problem is a pressing and immediate one. For the present the State Department information program is practically the only hope of penetrating behind otherwise closed doors with factual information to counterbalance the distorted picture of the United States being presented in various foreign countries, day in and day out. Its effectiveness, of course, varies with the number of privately owned radio sets in the critical areas. Therefore, it would be wise as part of the program to encourage the widest possible distribution of low-cost short-wave sets to peoples throughout the world. Unless America does endeavor to have the news of this country fairly and accurately presented, it is at a distinct disadvantage in pursuing the peaceful aims of American foreign policy.

So far as the present relationship between the United States and Russia is concerned, freedom of the press is a one-way street, open to the Soviet regime but closed to America. Soviet Russia uses freedom of the press in the United States and other democratic countries to her own fullest advantage at the same time that she denies equal privilege to the Western democracies. This lack of reciprocity in Soviet-American press relations is certainly not conducive to mutual understanding among our two peoples.

A recent episode emphasized rather dramatically the sharp differences in Soviet-American viewpoints about freedom of the press. Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times*, who recently returned to

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

America after ten months in Moscow, published a series of articles in which he summed up his observations of the Soviet press as follows:

. . . . The United States is portrayed in the Soviet press as a violent imperialistic nation that is extending its power throughout the world and is trampling on the rights of small nations. . . .

During my ten months in Moscow, I never discovered in a newspaper or magazine any reference to the United States suggesting that, like the Russians, we also have creditable characteristics.

Moscow's retort to Mr. Atkinson was published several days later in *Pravda*, the official organ of the Soviet Union's Communist party. *Pravda* called Mr. Atkinson many uncomplimentary names and went on to make some general remarks about freedom of the press, reflecting the current Soviet attitude. The article referred to Atkinson as "one of these very 'informers' that capitalist newspaper owners wish to have untrammelled entrance to all corners of the globe," and added:

This is the kind of scum for whom newspaper capital-monopolists demand "freedom of the press." They demand complete liberty for slander and lies. They desire to establish as international law, irresponsibility for avowed rogues and bandits of the pen. . . .

It is the Americans' own affair if they tolerate in their country newspaper banditism under the mask of "freedom of the press," but it would be naïve to think that other peoples will be gulled by this production of the capitalist-newspaper world and will trustfully open their doors to the Mister Atkinsons.

This clash of viewpoints does not augur well for the achievement of universal freedom of information in the world today. It indicates what a hard uphill struggle we face.

The distorted and antagonistic picture of America portrayed in various foreign countries has a direct bearing on the problems of peace for which the world is seeking a sane solution. We all recall how the Axis leaders misled their peoples by feeding them false information about the United States. Hitler sold his people on the idea that the United States was too decadent to fight for its ideals. This was done largely by portraying the United States falsely in the Axis press. The Axis peoples were told we were weak and divided; and they believed it because they had access only to the distortions of a totalitarian press. They were told that our economy was broken down, our national spirit soft and flabby, our culture barbaric, our morals debased, and our freedom a mere confession of impotence. And they believed it. When the final plunge was taken, they were so completely mesmerized by the fictions of totalitarian propaganda

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

that an easy victory was considered to be "just around the corner." Thus can entire peoples be hoodwinked when they are deprived of the truth.

What happened in the 1930's and 1940's can happen again in the 1950's—or sooner—despite the staggering new horrors with which atomic energy confronts the world today. The seeds of discord will continue to sprout as long as truth is forbidden to travel a free road into the minds and hearts of all peoples. And yet all of us cling to the hope that the United Nations will succeed where the League of Nations failed. Its chances for success would be much greater if all the peoples whose destinies are at stake were able to communicate their information and ideas to each other without artificial barriers.

Freedom of information must continue, therefore, to be a paramount concern of American foreign policy until that freedom is universally achieved. Unless we can prevail upon the rest of the world as soon as possible to adopt these principles, we must continue to face the risk of war, even though the atomic bomb should prove once and for all the utter futility of resort to mass murder for the settlement of international disputes.

There is always the danger that a government which dictates what its people shall or shall not know may some day inflame them against the United Nations itself as easily as it whips up national antagonism toward this or that individual nation. We all know from bitter experience the familiar shibboleths and slogans employed by totalitarian regimes for such purposes, whether it be the war-cry of "encirclement" or the war-cry of *lebensraum*.

Scientific development of modern communications facilities has made it physically possible today to reach every nook and corner of the world—no matter how remote—with a full flow of information. There is no longer any excuse for complete ignorance of world affairs anywhere, unless such ignorance is artificially enforced by government blockade. With the atomic bomb a stark reality, the free flow of information is the concern not merely of politicians and statesmen. It is of greatest concern to the peoples of the world themselves, for they will pay a fantastically higher price than ever before, if war comes again.

It should be the fervent and unrelenting aim of American foreign policy to make certain that the two billion inhabitants of the modern world have the fullest opportunity to know and appreciate one another in a spirit of mutual understanding. To achieve such an ideal

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

result, the first and primary prerequisite is a free exchange of factual information all over the world.

The press must be free to go everywhere without hindrance, to see everything without concealment, to write and transmit and publish the *facts* without interference. The same freedom must apply equally to all other mass media whereby peoples may communicate with each other. On the other hand, those in charge of the mass media must be increasingly conscious of their responsibilities. Only if such universal freedom of information becomes an accepted and established fact in our global life shall we be truly on the road to mutual understanding and real world peace.

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

THE discussion of informational policy ranged over a wide field, including the relative value of control by private corporations, by national governments, and by international agencies and the relative value of different media of mass communication. The relation of information to propaganda and to friendly relations among peoples was considered. All approaches led, however, to the major problem of a better flow of information between Russia and the West. It was suggested that an increase in that flow would not necessarily improve and might, at first, worsen relations. It was also suggested that a better flow of information between the governments might be more important than a flow of information between peoples and might be facilitated by broadcasts. There was, however, general agreement that efforts should be made to improve both the quantity and the quality of information available to the public. The United Nations, U.N.E.S.C.O., bilateral negotiations, national broadcasts, and responsible press services might all contribute to this end.

GOVERNMENT COMPETITION IN NEWS DISTRIBUTION

MR. FOX: Does the noneconomic distribution of news tend to put the commercial distribution out of business and thus to cause a larger and larger share of the news to be distributed on a noneconomic basis, or can one have some assurance that a mixed system will stay mixed?

MR. LEIGH: You cannot have any assurance. If our government had sentiment behind it to engage in a cheap or give-away program of news broadcasts, it might steal enough of the business to make it unprofitable for the existing associations. It obviously could not steal the whole business because the well-financed editors will want to get alternative sources of information.

I think the sound policy, certainly for the present, is to suggest that the government and the private associations maintain a noncompetitive division of the world. The greatest need now is for maintenance of the government short wave as the only means of getting news into Greece, Bulgaria, and other nations. The A.P. and U.P. cannot get

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

there. The State Department has tried earnestly to get these A.P. and U.P. people to agree to such a division. The proposal which the State Department was willing to accept was that the short-wave broadcasts act as a medium for distributing—let us say to eastern Europe—A.P. news listed as A.P. news. In the fulness of time Bulgaria may again be open to commercial news, but, as a businessman, wouldn't you like to have your material delivered by the State Department until that time? The news agencies refused, and I think it was their idea that they did not want any truck with any government.

MR. FOX: I suppose it is possible that, if Bulgaria gets it free and Rumania gets it free, other nations who watch their foreign exchange very carefully may say: "If we shut down on buying from A.P. and U.P., pretty soon the Department will come around and say, 'Won't you take it free?' "

MR. LEIGH: News by short wave is not as yet competitive with point-to-point or with multiple-address transmission. It is bound to be briefer and much less adequate. Only the very poor Near Eastern editor is going to scab on that, and he would never subscribe to any press association anyway; he hasn't the money. I don't think it is competitive, and the A.P. and U.P. people would say that themselves.

We are in a delayed technological change in the distribution of news. The traditional way of carrying news is from point to point—let us say by radio telegraph to a foreign capital—and then distribution by domestic telegraph to a newspaper office or, if it is an advanced organization, by teletype into the teletype room. But the German Transocean and the Japanese Domei during the war and our O.W.I. and the British P.O. have replaced that to a large extent by broadcasting news, not to the amateur but all over the world, aimed at regions. This is picked up by a mechanical receiver in a newspaper office which pays for this service. The result is that the cost of transmitting news is greatly reduced.

The International Telephone and Telegraph Company subsidiary has received from the Federal Communications Commission permission to adopt a rate of about a cent and a half a word to send news all over the world from one place on our eastern shore and from another place on our western shore. It is a terrifically important change. If the State Department wanted to be mean and obtained two giant transmitters and a frequency, they could blanket the world with news for practically nothing.

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

MR. OGBURN: What is the distribution of facsimile receivers, and what is the procedure for distributing them?

MR. LEIGH: If the I.T. & T. subsidiary or A.P. were going to engage in this, they would sell or lease—probably lease—the receiver to a newspaper office. This depends upon a good copyright law and the enforcement of the copyright law in the receiving country. The newspaper office pays a certain amount per month for the receiver. The Germans had a great many receivers that they distributed in South America, and the British have certainly distributed receivers. The United States have them, and they are prepared to distribute them. But it is a new business and depends upon certain factors of technical production. I don't suppose it will become a major means of news distribution within ten years.

MR. OGBURN: I presume the United States government itself might distribute news and information, since it does not cost very much.

MR. LEIGH: From a political point of view it would be highly impracticable. At the present time you could not get that kind of competition.

MR. OGBURN: The government could handle the censorship problem on reports of foreign correspondents to this country. That is certainly a crucial point in our communications policy. If government distribution of news were made easy, it would offer considerable competition to correspondents in foreign countries.

MR. LEIGH: I try to avoid predictions, though it is a very tempting thing to do. The press-association technique may be replaced in time, or there may be co-operation between governments and press associations. The I.N.S. and the State Department may have been making a political invention. For the State Department to carry on short wave broadcasts subject to the condition that a news service act as a watchdog to prevent its being propaganda seems to me a very sound idea. If A.P. and U.P. entered into an agreement such as I.N.S. has, that they give news to the Department on the understanding that they do not use it as propaganda, the news services seem to have all the advantages of the government's doing it and none of the disadvantages.

MR. BERKSON: There is still a question in that. No matter how honestly the news program is handled, suspicion may be aroused, and added to by the very controversies on the subject in the United States, that the government is broadcasting propaganda. Mr. Benton and others in the State Department have therefore had under con-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

sideration a plan whereby a semipublic foundation might be set up to do this job. The State Department would be represented, but certain distinguished personalities in the field from private life would be placed in control of the foundation so that it would not be identified with the government but would be representative of American life. The Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations have been mentioned in connection with it, but nothing concrete has come out of the discussion so far.

MR. WRIGHT: Would it resemble B.B.C., which is a corporation?

MR. BERKSON: It is a corporation, but everyone identifies it with the British government.

MRS. WRIGHT: Isn't there some thought among newspaper publishers of setting up a nonprofit organization? I know that is the view that Mark Ethridge has expressed.

MR. BERKSON: I am familiar with Mark Ethridge's comments. There is a very strong feeling among a number of the newspaper publishers that all three press associations should stay in this field and that a committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors might supervise and monitor the radio programs to make certain they are news and not propaganda. This idea might develop strongly if the United States makes the mistake of engaging in propaganda tactics which would destroy all the faith built up through straightforward news reporting.

MR. WRIGHT: You think there is something in the argument of U.P. and A.P. that they might gain the reputation of being stooges of the government if they went into Benton's scheme, in spite of the fact that I.N.S. went in?

MR. BERKSON: It depends on how the program is carried out. I can understand the fears of A.P. and U.P., and there are other factors behind each of their decisions which have to do with competitive news service operations. Before the war A.P. did most of its distribution abroad through organized government agencies; in Italy they were aligned with Stefani, in France with Havas, in England with Reuters. They have been trying to break with that history, to sell to individual newspapers, and to avoid any kind of renewal of those tieups with governments. U.P. had had an advantage abroad by spreading the gospel that it was not tied up with government agencies.

MR. LEIGH: When the State Department takes news off the ticker and puts it on their program, do they label it I.N.S.?

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

MR. BERKSON: Not on each broadcast because it would become monotonous to say each time, "according to I.N.S."; but if there is a signed article that they quote from, then they credit the source. They have the option to credit or not to credit as they see fit. The thing we are mainly interested in is making certain that it is not distorted.

MR. WILLIAM V. MORGENSTERN: What kind of news stories do they use?

MR. BERKSON: In the middle of the strike period they faced the strike situation very squarely and gave it adequate and full coverage. They did not try to hide under a bushel the fact that we were having a nasty situation in this country. That would be wrong, because there is the feeling abroad that Uncle Sam is a profligate personality from whose pockets gold is pouring, and some of that comes from painting too rosy a picture of life and conditions here. In such a program there is benefit in telling all the story of America as factually as we try to do in our papers here.

MR. MORGENSTERN: Do they cover murder stories and that sort of thing?

MR. BERKSON: To my knowledge, rarely, if ever. I suppose they might devote a bit of space to a case of international interest or proportions, but not to local murder.

UNITED NATIONS NEWS SERVICE

MR. ROGERS: What are the possibilities of the development of a news service in the United Nations? What kind of news would it be, and what would be its effect on national news policies.

MR. LEIGH: So far as our policy is concerned, I believe that anything that would really tend to put the great press associations out of business would be a distinct hindrance. We don't want a monopoly—and I would think that if the government does extend its activities it should be on an auxiliary basis, or at least a basis of competition that would not hinder the success of the commercial companies. Proposals that have been made for United Nations activities in this field have not been along the lines of A.P. dispatches. General Sarnoff is quite active behind the proposal to build an international radio organization which would use a few relay points in the world and would be a direct radio-programming agency for the United Nations. So far as I can understand General Sarnoff's ideas, it would be to perform a particular function: the programming of activities of the United Nations

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

and its constituent organizations to the people. Other proposals have been made to work out a highly artificial schedule, each of the nations having its time for folk music and what not.

Proposals for international magazines have been floating around New York. Instead of having an American *Reader's Digest* translated into foreign languages and calling that international communication, it has been suggested that boards of editors, representing various nations, arrange for periodical and magazine distribution. These things are in very early stages.

MR. ROGERS: Might there be a world news service or clearing-house of news and ideas operating from a United Nations center and expressing a bias, if any, in favor of the United Nations? Such a service might furnish a yardstick with which to compare national news releases and news interpretations.

MR. LEIGH: The political aspects of mass communications seem to me crucial. The policy of an agency which has direct access to communication is important. The A.P. as a news distributor and as an organization owned by the great metropolitan newspapers of the country has great power. The commercial news agencies seem to think of the United Nations as just another government that they want to keep clear of; and they may be right, of course.

We proposed in our little book (White and Leigh, *Peoples Speaking to Peoples* [1946]) that the organized corps of correspondents in every capital should create its own "self-discipline." That word frightened them. Some of them do have self-discipline at the present time.

They are carrying on the fight especially against day-to-day discriminations that cannot be expressed in theory or treaty of any sort. That is, a man writes an article that is against the wishes of a foreign office, and his wife finds that the telephone is taken out. Such discriminations are hard to deal with, but they are the very life of the control exercised by the more or less totalitarian governments against daring statements by correspondents which may be very valuable from our point of view. Our idea was that they have some aid in their fight. They can usually get aid from the British and American Foreign Offices.

We were proposing that a semiautonomous unit in the United Nations, representing committees of correspondents in each capital, receive complaints of discriminations and publish a report of what happened before the government acted, the government engaging thus far in a treaty.

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

Some of the press people picked this out as an attempt to destroy freedom of the press. They felt that the United Nations would not, as we had assumed, have a certain impartiality but that it was just one of those governments that you had to look out for. They feared it would destroy what freedom the foreign correspondents had by supporting the totalitarian government in every case.

I think they are wrong, considering the votes in the United Nations, but that is a factor in developing any plan that might seem competitive with existing commercial agencies. General Sarnoff, who is the successful leader of a great commercial agency, is advocating a United Nations short wave without difficulty because there is no commercial short wave in the world, except maybe Luxemburg and Managua.

Mr. Fox: "Internationalization" of communications should be considered in the light of the "bipolar" world. It is in the American interest to have a straight picture presented to the rest of the world. If we can get the straight picture by having it presented on a non-national basis, that is fine. But "internationalization" may also be considered in the American interest because it may be an effective way of penetrating the core of the other power nucleus in the world, which operates on a closed basis, and because it may be a promising way of counteracting the effects of planned emanations coming out of that nucleus. Internationalization may be one instrument in redressing the balance disturbed by unfair competition between a monopolist, on one side, and unco-ordinated competitors, on the other. Only the monopolist is in a position to choose whether or not to tell his people the truth.

If that is the reason why we want to internationalize, we come up against a practical problem. We are likely to get co-operation in varying degrees from the countries of western Europe and the British Commonwealth. We are likely to get lesser co-operation from some of the countries of central Europe and East Asia. We are likely to get only reluctant and formal co-operation from the Soviet Union and some of the countries that are closely integrated with it. Is it worth while trying to set up an international section which is international without the Soviet Union?

MR. LEIGH: We have a dilemma in our foreign policy. We are a great power and need to tell the world what we are up to, especially since we are influencing people in other lands; but also we operate as a self-governing republic on the basis of public opinion and consent. Consequently, we have to present as accurate a picture as we

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

can. In addition, we are throwing our weight on the side of building up international or multinational agencies.

Purely as American policy, as one of the two great powers, we want to have adequate inflow of intelligence, and we want to tell our story. International agencies may help to these ends. But I have no great hopes about their extension, and I recognize that they are not American devices. There is, however, a dynamic character in the world situation, and we must get used to these agencies which may eventually have a world spread. So I would think that General Sarnoff's radio proposal might be supported because it would be a part of the Western pole against the Russians. Furthermore, it is a good kind of experiment to play with and to support fully because it could be extended.

MR. FOX: It is a two-pronged approach: on the one hand, strengthening our side in a bipolar world; on the other hand, working toward world unity.

MR. LEIGH: In the communications picture I would rather be on the American side than on the Russian side, because with the increasingly easy flow of words around the world and airplanes carrying people everywhere, it is harder to maintain a complete iron curtain in communications than it is to spread ideas around.

MR. EDWARD A. SHILS: I understand that throughout the war the Russians refused to permit broadcasts by the United States and Britain to Russia but that since the war the British, on their own initiative, have decided to make broadcasts to Russia without approval by Russia. Is there an agreement at present between the Soviet Union and Great Britain?

MR. LEIGH: My information is the same as yours. The British pioneered with this on their own initiative. The American State Department under Mr. Benton has been more cagey about it. They wanted to see what would happen. The British may be said to have an informal agreement in the sense that the Russians are not objecting.

MR. OGBURN: We might, as Mr. Fox suggested, use the United Nations as an instrument of foreign policy to penetrate the iron curtain about Russia, but, on the other hand, we might support it as an instrument of accurate information. Considering that the nations of the world are likely to exercise selection to make news conform to their foreign policies, we may find ourselves in a world where it is very difficult to get the straight news. A United Nations agency like

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

General Sarnoff has proposed might be an important corrective in such a situation.

MR. LEIGH: A United Nations program, supervised by the major powers and the others in the Security Council, might not add much to the information that we get.

MR. ROGERS: You mean that the information that we would get from the United Nations might be a colorless type of news because of great-power censorship?

MR. LEIGH: It would be colorless, but I don't think that would condemn it. The drama of presenting United Nations material straight from the source has a value.

MR. WRIGHT: It seems to me that the United Nations should in principle enjoy the "first freedom" in the territory of all its members. How can it exercise influence unless it can compete for a favorable opinion against the national governments even in their own territories? The Charter might well have provided that every member of the United Nations is under an obligation to permit distribution by broadcasting or otherwise of official proceedings and documentation of the agencies of the United Nations. General Sarnoff's plan, I suppose, seeks to realize this freedom.

MR. BERKSON: The only stumbling-block thus far is the fact that it will cost somewhere around twenty million dollars.

MR. WRIGHT: Would Russia permit such a broadcast to come within its territory?

MR. BERKSON: No one has brought that subject up to Russia thus far. Undoubtedly, if the appropriation is to be met by the United Nations, Russia will express its opinion when the appropriation comes up.

MR. HOSELITZ: Why would it cost twenty million dollars?

MR. BERKSON: They were thinking of having a short-wave operation of their own, their own commentators and their own digest, and to do this in every language of the world. I saw the estimate of twenty million dollars. David Sarnoff, of the R.C.A., came forward and said he would like to help them on the establishment of technical facilities.

MR. LEIGH: It probably would have to be official in every language, and it costs a lot of money to do that, as I know from O.W.I.'s experience.

MR. BERKSON: Transmitters cost a tremendous amount of money to operate. You need power plants and trained personnel. The esti-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

mate was twenty million dollars capital investment to start it going, and after that just a normal budget.

MR. WRIGHT: International organizations are going to have a wholly different order of budgets from what they had in the interwar period. The small budget of the League of Nations, seldom over five million dollars, was one reason why it was not more successful than it was.

NEWS-DISTRIBUTION POLICIES

MR. WHITE: Might an effort to work through the United Nations stimulate new communication agencies under control of national governments? May we have a half-dozen major attempts throughout the world to spread news colored by national policy?

MR. LEIGH: We have four big press associations which serve an international function: the Associated Press, the United Press, Reuters, and the International News Service. I do not find any tendency on the part of A.P., U.P., or I.N.S. to become controlled by our government. Reuters has gone through what it describes as a complete revolution in the last two or three years and has come over completely to the A.P. and U.P. point of view; that is, it is owned by British newspapers now, and it purports to be completely independent of the British government. No one, so far as I know, has made a detailed content analysis of Reuters before and after reforming, but that is their present selling point. They have seen the great opportunity, with the decline of German and Italian news, to become a world-wide agency to handle news, and to do that they have to earn a certain respect for not playing government policy too closely.

Tass and the Russian transmission of their news are much more important news-distributing agencies than they were before the war; but, aside from that, the Anglo-American news agencies are doing the big job, and, so far as I know, they are not under increasing government control—rather the opposite, if you take the short-time trend.

MR. PRICE: Is that change in Reuters responsible for their statement in reference to Mr. McMahon's survey?

MR. LEIGH: Reuters have a very vigorous public policy. They criticized Mr. McMahon; they criticized a much more guarded statement that we made in our book. They are trying to establish themselves as an independent news agency. They are coming into the United States more, too; certain radio stations and newspapers are using Reuters' bulletins quite regularly.

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

MR. WRIGHT: I remember in the Harris Institute on public opinion about ten years ago, Walter Rogers gave a detailed account of the way in which Reuters was subsidized. One point he made was that in many sections of the world British consuls would pay a considerable sum for Reuters service, and that made it possible for Reuters to sell news service in that area cheaply.

MR. HOSELITZ: I think that that was true until 1936 or 1937, when an organization of English newspapers took over Reuters. It was part of the Ministry of Information during the war but was disaffiliated a few months ago and is again functioning as a private agency.

Incidentally, the association which A.P. had with Reuters dates back to the international news cartel which was founded in the nineteenth century by Reuters, Havas, and Wolfe and to which, in 1886 or 1887, A.P. was admitted as the only American news agency. U.P. exploited its independence in denouncing the affiliation of A.P. with the cartel. It made capital out of this argument with independent newspapers in Italy, France, Germany, and England.

MR. BERKSON: That has a lot to do with the present attitude of A.P. But today you have to face the fact that neither U.P. nor A.P. nor I.N.S. is able to reach these critical areas. Would it not have been better for A.P. and U.P. to treat this as an emergency situation and to help to make it possible to get factual news dispatches into those areas?

MR. WRIGHT: I take it that the Department of State does have a possibility of getting into all these areas that the news services could not get into.

MR. BERKSON: By short-wave radio. That again depends on the number of receiving sets that can receive it. We found that in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and a number of countries in the Balkans there was a surprisingly large number of short-wave receivers in the hands of the public. The number has grown during the war, because that was a period when everybody was desperately trying to find out what was going on and that was practically the only means by which they could find out, if they were living behind the Axis iron curtain.

MR. WRIGHT: I suppose that newspapers in that area could not pick up these short waves and use them without censorship.

MR. BERKSON: They could not and would not because what short wave is doing is pumping in a constant flow of the type of information that ought to go into that area whether the newspapers or the politi-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

cal regimes like it or not. Radio is uncensorable unless you take the radio sets away. I have seen unconfirmed reports that radio sets were carted out of Hungary by Russian troops and seen in barges, piles of them, going down the Danube to an unknown destination.

MR. WRIGHT: Are there penal sanctions against listening? There were in Germany, of course.

MR. BERKSON: There are none that we know of in the satellite countries so far.

MR. HOSELITZ: Can't they jam the broadcasts?

MR. BERKSON: You would have very great difficulty in jamming them successfully unless you kept on all around the clock.

MR. DRAGNICH: Has there been any effort on the part of the press or radio in these satellite countries to counteract news coming in by short wave? Have they shown any evidence of being worried about its effect on their own people?

MR. BERKSON: I have not seen any references to the "Voice of America" broadcasts in that manner; as it grows with this new nineteen-million-dollar program, we may hear some of that.

MR. WRIGHT: Has the State Department set up any systematic means of determining the amount of listening to the "Voice of America"?

MR. BERKSON: They are trying very hard, and they do get reports back, but they are unable to do a real Gallup poll. They have had rather precise reports from their diplomatic missions in the Balkans. There were some concrete cases in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Spain, where the local press have been compelled to suppress certain news items which issued from America or from the United Nations and in which the United States was interested. When notification came here that they had been suppressed, the State Department beamed the information out on the short-wave radio, and they found that flocks of people came to the mission asking for copies of what had been said on the air. In one instance, in Yugoslavia, they distributed something like thirty-four hundred copies of the transcript.

MR. SHILS: At present, I believe, B.B.C. and American networks have contractual relationships for rebroadcasting in one of the countries, programs that emanate from one of the other country's stations. What is the feasibility of attempting to enter into relationship with the Soviet government for the rebroadcasting in each country of programs originating in the other? Might not that be preferable to a general international broadcasting agency?

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

MR. LEIGH: It might be possible to make such an arrangement if we were willing to accept the Russian notion of what should be distributed in Russia. They believe they know the truth about the United States and that they should be the judges of the truth as far as distribution in Russia is concerned. They also would want to be sure that what they sent out would be handled without deletion or change in the United States. With those two qualifications, I would say that it is within the realm of feasibility. The great advantage of short wave is the lack of that kind of control if you want to reach a country with material that it does not approve of.

MR. SHILS: Will our broadcasts be heard in Russia to any serious extent?

MR. LEIGH: I think they are meant for only twelve people, including Stalin. It is felt that these twelve people do not get the kind of thing that the State Department and the British B.B.C. want them to get.

MR. FOX: It is an alternative system of diplomatic communications in the modern world.

MR. PRICE: The reception of American broadcasts in Russia may depend, in the long run, on how many receiving instruments the Russian factories will turn out.

MR. LEIGH: Russia has apparently been able to keep out broadcasts more than any other country. They did it during the war by the heroic method of not allowing any private receivers. People listened to, or received by telephone from, the town hall, where the receiver was officially controlled.

Elsewhere the limitation of radio sets to those that do not have short-wave reception arrangements or the development of jamming have proved unsuccessful means of keeping out foreign broadcasts. There is evidence that such methods were not successful in France, Germany, or Japan; what America said in San Francisco did get around in Japan. I think the Russian method is quite impracticable in peacetime in any country, even in Russia.

MR. BRODIE: Is there any thought of utilizing radio transmission facilities in conquered Germany in order to overcome some of the technical disabilities of long-distance broadcast by short wave?

MR. LEIGH: I have not heard of that. I don't think there are any technical difficulties. The international zone of Tangier, from all that I can discover, is being reserved for short-wave relays and for the use of multiple-address relays. It may be a peculiarly fragile sort of inter-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

national zone, but with the Philippines, where we shall undoubtedly be able to maintain receivers, the technicians say we can send anything we want around the world. We don't need Germany for that purpose.

MR. BRODIE: I am dubious about sending around the world. Who hears it at the other end? It requires a very good radio and excellent atmospheric conditions to pick up programs.

MR. LEIGH: This could be made as a categorical statement: Where there is a good domestic radio news service, the short wave could never compete except for those who want to get that foreign information.

AGENCIES OF CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES

MR. CLAIR WILCOX: What are the places in Washington that are actively considering the question of international communications policy for the United States?

MR. LEIGH: The F.C.C., which licenses all the physical communications instruments engaged in foreign transmission, and the State Department, Mr. Benton's office, are two of the agencies. There is a third agency in the State Department, the Telecommunications Division, under Mr. Clayton. It carries on the diplomatic phases of the negotiations regarding the physical communications which the F.C.C. plans. Our foreign policy otherwise is handled by Mr. Benton's department, and the only other agency in this field is the Department of Commerce, which carries on minor activities in connection with quotas and taxes in foreign countries.

MR. WILCOX: Is there any interdepartmental co-ordination with War and Navy Intelligence?

MR. LEIGH: Not in a well-established sense. I am talking about *Information* now; I am not talking about intelligence activities, which is another type of thing.

MR. WILCOX: Quite recently an Interdepartmental Intelligence Activities Committee has been set up.

MR. PRICE: The United States is under a particular handicap in carrying out its foreign policy because, unlike other countries, even democratic countries; policies concerning communications, including transportation, are determined largely by independent boards, such as the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Maritime Commission, and the F.C.C. Is it not more difficult to handle a flexible communications

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

policy through collaboration of these boards than would be the case with a normal type of single-headed department?

MR. LEIGH: My observation of F.C.C., which I know most about, is that the board-form of organization has not been the slightest handicap because there has been a tendency to delegate that side of the job, which is not a major part of the commission's work, to the chairman and perhaps to an assistant member of the commission whom he may delegate for a particular job.

The administrative defect—which is probably inherent and would exist in all governments—is the triple division of functions at the present time. I think this could be overcome if our Bureau of the Budget or some agency of the President's Office could create leadership within that group. The Telecommunications Division, which is of low echelon, the Benton office, which is of high echelon, and the F.C.C., which is semi-independent, have not been easy agencies to get into a common policy.

Mr. Fly, of F.C.C., became interested in international communications and took the leadership for a while. When he left, the leadership was assumed by the Information Division. The Telecommunications Division took the leadership only in a sporadic way when Mr. Clayton became temporarily interested in it.

So there is a difficult administrative problem, not because you have boards but because there are several agencies. The Telecommunications Division and the Benton office are actually as far apart as are the State Department and F.C.C. You know that does happen in Washington.

MR. WILCOX: The world is a complicated place, and many of the problems that we have to solve have more than one aspect. Everyone who looks at one of these problems takes the view that the government ought to be so organized as to emphasize the aspect in which he is interested and subordinate the other aspects.

I don't see how you could rule the Civil Aeronautics Board or the F.C.C. or the Maritime Commission out of concern with international aspects of their problems. If you rule the Department of State out, you have no co-ordinated control of your foreign policy. The problem that arises there is the problem that arises all through government—of co-ordination through central administration—and that is a problem to which I don't believe there is any final solution. It is one that has to be worked on all the time.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. LEIGH: There is a complexity. I do not see how you would simplify the actual functional arrangements more than by having these three major divisions dealing with telecommunications and information. You need the information and the telecommunications; I think you need the F.C.C. I feel that in the stress of war and post-war problems the central administration had not paid enough attention to co-operation and co-ordination between those three existing agencies, but I would go completely along with you that I don't see how you could have one agency to do this job.

DOMESTIC NEWS

MRS. WRIGHT: Should the government use these mass media to inform the American public in a way that they can understand? You remember Congress refused to appropriate money for O.W.I. to spread information in this country, although they were permitted to do it in every other country.

MR. LEIGH: I feel a lot more skeptical about the creation of governmental agencies to do the domestic job than I do about such agencies entering the job of in-and-out news. The official agencies have the opportunity to use the commercial media in this country. The State Department has been carrying on its series of broadcasts explaining policy.

I would not think a government newspaper or bulletin or even a government magazine inappropriate. It could not conceivably represent any unfair competition, and, if there were energy and brains behind it, there is no reason why it would not be a distinct addition. I don't think that this is a major problem, as is the problem of our foreign communications. We have in the past carried on foreign communications as a purely commercial enterprise, and we now seem to be in a position where the government has to do something and doesn't know just what it should do. I think we have to do a lot more than we have done thus far.

MR. FOX: It may be true that no government agency could balance as efficiently as a commercial agency that presentation of domestic news, but government might do much to make sure that the commercial news enterprises have reasonable opportunity to gather the news around the world which they are reporting. Government might assist in breaking down censorship regulations which distort what we get and in improving professional standards so that the excuse which is used in Bulgaria and Rumania—that they cannot let

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

these fellows send out everything that they want to send out because, speaking only French and English, they talk only to their own people—could no longer be used.

MR. LEIGH: I feel that the improvement of the American domestic news service, on the whole, is to develop an attitude of professional trusteeship on the part of the commercial agencies. I would like to see the development of nonprofit organizations for domestic distribution on various levels. It may develop in the documentary film field, because commercial agencies have not been nearly so clever as government agencies in invention and in drawing artistic talent to that field.

The documentary film field is an exception to the general rule that private enterprise, because of its flexibility, is better for these semi-artistic pursuits. Government artists have developed the documentary films, leaving Hollywood people rubbing their eyes.

On the whole, the private-enterprise agencies, if they are recognized in this field as public services, carry on information activities better than government-operated agencies. There might be inventions halfway between that would be the sound way to do it.

INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

MR. FARIS: Should government broadcasting to foreign countries be frankly an effort to interpret favorably the American policy or should it be purely informational?

MR. LEIGH: Up to date, the enterprise has been run as an information agency. Comparing its file with A.P. and U.P., I think that it would be found no more propagandistic than they are.

MR. FARIS: Why shouldn't it be?

MR. LEIGH: Because the most effective way to have people in foreign countries listen to short wave is to have them acquire confidence in the objectivity of what they hear. To get a fair picture of yourself established, you have to be very careful to tell what is wrong about yourself. What you might call a "propaganda of truth" is the most effective. B.B.C. and O.W.I. in the war were vying for the support of neutral people—all the other news services had been cut off—and they both adopted that policy. I think B.B.C. had greater success than O.W.I. because they were in it earlier. That is the policy that the State Department believes in.

MR. FEIS: Would the same impartiality be applied to positions in disputed international situations?

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. LEIGH: It would present a very serious problem. I don't see how the State Department could run an operation which was critical of itself without the usual bureaucratic timidities entering into the picture. I, myself, don't believe the State Department should run short wave. I should like to see a nonprofit federation of the broadcasting companies run it. The essence of it would have to be a responsible organization that sets out to do a good job. The government is doing it, but I think with the government it is a second-best operation.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Berkson referred to certain items which the United States government rebroadcast after they had been suppressed in certain countries, because it wanted them distributed. If you give very selective information, that is less than the whole truth and becomes propaganda, doesn't it?

MR. BERKSON: That would be true. But in the instance I referred to, the question was not of selecting, because the news items had gone in the normal course through all the agencies. This material, which had been available, was simply suppressed in certain countries, and the State Department, which had probably not beamed it before, did beam it the next day.

MR. WRIGHT: In the I.N.S. arrangements with the State Department that they agree not to distort stories, I suppose that they can select what they wish to send out.

MR. BERKSON: They have to select because we are pumping to them right now about one hundred and fifty thousand words every twenty-four hours. It is impossible to get that many words on the air. There has to be that same type of selection in American newspapers.

MR. BRODIE: Speaking from the point of view of a person who has been tainted with propaganda service during the war, I am a little concerned about the insistence upon strategy of truth. During the war it was carried sometimes to rather absurd lengths. It had among other things the grave weakness of making many of our broadcasts exceedingly dull. That was certainly true of the broadcasts by O.W.I. to Germany. The French broadcasts had a lot of zip to them; and the German broadcasts were poor, putting it mildly.

MR. BERKSON: But our broadcasts were believed. All tests of the O.W.I., even against the B.B.C., showed that, because we were more factual, we were more believed.

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

MR. BRODIE: It is a valuable tenet, but I think it can be too doctrinaire. You are, after all, interested in propaganda. This business of trying to broadcast through to the Politburo looks like a propaganda effort to me. We should regard this stressing the truth as a propaganda weapon in order to create an atmosphere of acceptability.

MR. BERKSON: I would not agree with you.

MR. LEIGH: I would like to make the record straight on the British broadcasts to Russia. I don't think there was anything but truth in them. The problem was the inevitable process of selection. They told true things, but they were likely to stress the Welsh singers and the fact that these people came out of the mines and yet produced the great thing. They did not stress, let us say, the Royal Albert Choir in London. Both happened, likely. I don't want to say that the British are misleading. They believe in the strategy of truth, but they are highly selective.

MR. WRIGHT: Information must be true, or it is not information; but propaganda may be entirely true and still be propaganda.

MR. BRODIE: I know I am arguing on the side of the devil, and I certainly don't want to be interpreted as advocating that we should say things which are untrue. I have great faith in the tactical value of precisely the kind of line you are suggesting, that is, the strategy of the truth, which is what our services during the war followed consistently and, I think, on the whole with good effects, but I could see various nuances within it.

MR. BERKSON: It was not quite so sensational as the French or German or the others because it was factual.

MR. BRODIE: When I said French broadcasts I meant our own to the French, which were very good; always strategy of truth, but they were something different.

MR. BERKSON: Don't you think personnel had something to do with that, too? I happened to know the French personnel in that operation, and it was expert. You may not have had as expert personnel in other branches.

RELATIVE VALUE OF DIFFERENT MEDIA

MR. WILCOX: Do we know which of the possible media is most influential in shaping attitudes and opinions and action as between press, radio, and motion pictures, especially in other countries?

In the case of the press, for instance, the level of literacy in some of the countries in which we are interested is not very high. In the case

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

of radio I assume that the level of income is so low in many of these countries that the ownership of receivers is not very widespread. I would suppose that, for reaching a mass audience, the motion pictures are more effective than the other two. I would also suppose that the motion picture, appealing both to the eye and to the ear, would leave a more profound impression than the other media. If this is right, there is another factor, that we are more predominant in the field of motion pictures than we are in the others. If that is right, where should the decision be made as to what movies are to be sent out of the country as a picture of American life?

We do not trust the commercial companies to decide what is to be given to the American people. We have boards of censorship in a majority of our states. I know that Eric Johnston wants to establish industry censorship on exported films so as not to give a perverted picture of American life. But that is a negative approach. It is not a positive approach as to what should be prepared to be sent out. Would private or public determination of that question be preferable?

MR. LEIGH: I would certainly think that literacy hinders people from getting press material. I do not know the social habits of radio listening in all points of the world, but listening in cafés to café-owned radios is common in many countries where the individual listener could not get a receiver. My own impression is that radio is the widest medium of communication. You don't have to read and you don't have to pay if you can sit in the café.

There has been no scientific comparison of the relative psychological effect of these three media, but I incline to agree that the moving pictures have the greatest appeal. That being so, our motion-picture export policy is very important.

Domestically, my impression is that, by and large, the industry does regulate itself. Of course, the main reason for public censorship is the tax, the states get quite a bit of income from censorship of the movies, but they seldom censor a motion picture made in Hollywood. They do censor the "sex-circuit" movies, which are developed out of Hollywood, but this affects only a few people and is of no great importance. It keeps the movie censor people busy and gives them a certain amount of income. We have developed in the motion-picture industry a most elaborate system of self-control, and Mr. Eric Johnston, who is new at the business, indicates that he thinks the motion-picture people must do this foreign job themselves.

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

There is some indication that Hollywood may develop documentaries extensively; but, so far as practical policy is concerned, the motion-picture export corporations can, if they want to, act in the public service and send, wherever they are allowed to send, a representative group of the Hollywood products, not especially made for foreign export.

When it comes to the fact film, I would suspect that that will be developed in the United States by people very much alive to positive presentations: either a foundation, nonprofit people, or a nonprofit organization of Hollywood people, which would be strategically the wisest thing, or the government itself.

I think self-regulation in the industry is likely to achieve something, although I have a reasonable amount of skepticism. The greatest success of the Hays Office was in public relations, it seems to me. You had to look behind what they said to see what they did.

MR. ROGERS: The selection of media might be determined somewhat by the type of government in the receiving country. In Russia it may be sufficient to reach only a dozen people who make foreign policy. In England, with the foreign policy determined democratically, we would have to use means of mass communication.

MR. LEIGH: As far as I know, this is the first time that American communications policy has been related to the bipolar concept of American foreign policy. I don't know whether the Benton program fits or not. It certainly has to encounter the pretty deeply laid tradition in the United States that the First Amendment forbids any regulation or intervention by the government with mass communication and that the interference with commercial agencies, even though demonstrably unprepared to do the whole job that needs to be done, violates something sacred connected with the First Amendment. That is, I think, logically indefensible but politically a very powerful notion.

MR. LEISERSON: I assume that in the area of the press, as distinct from the radio, we, in general, favor freedom of enterprise as manifested in the private press associations. But with this problem of presenting a fair picture of American life to the nations in the Russian area, may it not become necessary, through U.N.E.S.C.O. or otherwise, to compromise with that principle?

MR. BERKSON: We are compromising now. After all, we are all operating in the Russia area, but it is a one-way street. We are not allowed to distribute news to them, but to a limited extent we are

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

allowed to reproduce over here those things which they publish in their own newspapers and very little more than that.

INFORMATION INTO RUSSIA

MR. LEISERSON: From the experience of I.N.S., what is the problem of getting news into those countries?

MR. BERKSON: We work the same way as A.P. and U.P. News is distributed largely by short-wave wireless newscasts that are beamed to Europe or to the Orient, and the procedure is to approach a paper or group of papers within a country and ask them if they would like to subscribe to such a service of an American news agency and then to offer that service to them, generally at very low prices, simply because we are all in a mood to want to serve wherever we can. Most of us in our service at the present time are serving at a loss in the countries where we can go.

In the case of Russia we are unable even to approach the papers, and in the satellite countries, where all of us—A.P., U.P., and I.N.S.—approached papers, we are promptly told that we are not wanted and that they cannot take our services because of the regulations under which they are living.

MR. WRIGHT: Has there been any discussion of a reciprocity? Does the Soviet government have any desire to send newscasts into the United States?

MR. BERKSON: They do send newscasts into the United States. Tass is operating in the United States. It is serving the *Daily Worker* in New York with a regular news service out of Russia and has gone very heavily into South America. There is no bar in this country against Tass's selling to an American newspaper. Whether Tass would sell them or not is another question; but, if it is a paper which is spiritually in tune with them, I think Tass would sell them their service and nobody would interfere. We have no such opportunity in Russia.

MR. LEISERSON: Under the bipolar system in international relations, should the United States try to get beyond these twelve people at the top to present their picture of the American way of life?

MR. LEIGH: Any way in which we can get beyond the twelve people would suit me very well. I don't think we would be very successful in doing it, though, under present circumstances. *Amerika*, the journal which O.W.I. sends to Russia, should be kept going in good shape. Broadcasts should be sent to Russia. I see no other method. The

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

press, books, other magazines, and motion pictures are completely controlled. That, of course, is not true in the Balkans and other Russian-controlled areas, where there are more people who want to co-operate underground.

MR. WHITE: Do you have any information on the distribution of *Amerika* in Russia?

MR. LEIGH: The copies that get there—and only a limited number are permitted—are very much used. They say that the average copy is read by fifteen people.

MR. BRODIE: We have been importing a fair number of Russian films. What has been the picture of the reverse transaction?

MR. LEIGH: I don't think they delete parts of films. They either distribute a film or do not. I understand that not many American films are used in Russia.

MR. FOX: In a bipolar world anything which tends to shatter the other nucleus has unambiguous consequences. In a world in which there are several powers, one never knows whether one wants to have another shattered. There might be grave reasons for not undermining the confidence which a people has in a government which one may later want to have as an ally. In a bipolar system you are not taking that risk.

In this particular bipolar world there is one relatively open and one relatively closed system. The open one cannot be opened because it already is open; therefore that particular weapon is less available to the closed system. I draw the conclusion that any effort to follow the kind of policy that you have been suggesting has unambiguously bad consequences for the Soviet Union from the point of view of its operating within a bipolar system.

MR. LEIGH: That's right.

ADAPTATION OF MATERIAL TO THE MARKET

MR. McMAHON: Do we indiscriminately broadcast to peoples of the world what the American life and character are like, or do we keep in mind the diversity of national manners, customs, and sentiments. The latter would imply a high level of knowledge on the part of our producers.

MR. LEIGH: In short-wave broadcasting, for instance, you broadcast in a language. You cannot help thinking of the people who listen in those languages and of certain words and symbols which have a different significance than they would have in another language.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

Good international broadcasting involves skilled personnel that is not necessary for the normal run-of-the-mine broadcasting. It is an expensive operation on the staff side, and the corporations that have done well with it have put money into it.

MR. PRICE: I am surprised, however, at how much our commercial agencies of mass communication get away with without adjusting their product to the market. *Reader's Digest* has a tremendous foreign circulation, and Mickey Mouse is popular everywhere. Someone remarked that the best qualification of a modern diplomat is to have a powerful country to represent, and I suppose that maxim may apply to mass communications.

MR. LEIGH: Your two illustrations are different. Mickey Mouse is universal; I have heard Italian audiences warmly applaud it. The popularity of *Reader's Digest* in foreign lands, if unadapted, is an unexplained phenomenon to me.

MR. FOX: It is not unadapted. In the Portuguese edition, which I have looked at with some care, 50-60 per cent of the articles are translated from the American edition, but some things are left out, others are put in; for a long time nothing about Russia was included; other articles seem to be especially written for Spanish and Portuguese editions.

MR. ROWE: They were successful in China, where to my knowledge they made no attempt to adapt the magazine, and it was printed in English, not in Chinese. The O.W.I. also made a great success of distributing their material in English. Many educated Chinese were brought up reading things about America and Western countries, and they wanted that sort of thing, particularly during the war.

MR. BALLANTINE: The first Japanese edition of the *Reader's Digest* has just been brought out. The Japanese would at the moment be more interested in learning about American life than in something that fitted more into their life.

U.N.E.S.C.O.

MR. FEIS: Do you see any contradiction between the organized government support for national outpouring of information and news interpretation and the support given to the United Nations' educational organization, U.N.E.S.C.O.?

MR. LEIGH: We have a dual program, but they are not competitive. U.N.E.S.C.O. may gradually supplant our national effort, but I have yet to see any significant development of mass communication

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

in the United Nations. There is no mass-communication group in the United States that can take the leadership. Unless America and Great Britain take the leadership in U.N.E.S.C.O.—Russia is not as yet a member—little will be done.

MR. PRICE: Rather than abandon U.N.E.S.C.O. to its scholarly and literary fate and set up a separate organization for international press people, might not opposite tactics be tried: try to get the mass-communications people interested? U.N.E.S.C.O., instead of being an agency of the French academician group, might be an agency of democratic culture.

MR. LEIGH: You don't put the health people and the labor people into the same organization. I think that scholars are a fine lot of people, and they ought to be doing things, but I don't think you would readily get Kent Cooper and Hugh Baillie and the Hollywood boys sitting in the same organization doing things with them, especially if prestige tends to attach to the scholarly type. It is a very great miscalculation of the significance of mass communications in international life that you put it in one of ten divisions in U.N.E.S.C.O., which ought to be radically reorganized by having a rotating headship at the top. I would have three sections: education, scholarship and cultural activities, and mass communications; or you might make the latter an autonomous unit. It is foolish to build U.N.E.S.C.O. with the hope that the necessary people would be interested. I am not speaking theoretically. I have seen the reactions of the mass-media people.

MR. McMAHON: To what degree is there censorship in Spain today? We have spoken about censorship in eastern Europe and Russia, but how much news are we getting out of Spain?

MR. LEIGH: The American Society of Newspaper Editors gave a general picture of Spain. They thought it an unstable situation; sometimes there is pretty complete freedom, and then they clamp down. No American newspaper correspondent in Spain feels that he can write as freely as he can in other countries without having something happen to him in one way or another.

MR. ROGERS: It was my understanding that the United Nations in New York would handle most of the immediate news, while U.N.E.S.C.O. would distribute background material. The press associations might be more interested in the immediate news coming out of New York.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

MR. LEIGH: They would, but the press-association people are not the only people that should be in a real mass-communications unit. The movie people, the radio people, the book people, and the magazine people ought to be in it, and I don't know whether they would be more interested in one than in the other; in fact, I suspect the book people would be more interested in the U.N.E.S.C.O. setup.

MR. BRODIE: Aren't those people accustomed to salaries that are far beyond anything that an international organization could offer? I understand that the attraction would not have to be solely on that basis, but don't you have the same problem there that you have in government in this country, but in greater degree because those people happen to be in a very highly paid profession?

MR. LEIGH: The newspaper salaries are deceptive. There are jobs at the top which are highly paid, and those at the bottom provide notoriously low pay. I would say that the personnel problem in the United Nations Organization is no handicap. There are better salaries than in our government service in many cases, and I think you find able people in all these professions with enough of a public service interest to be attracted to those jobs should they develop.

MR. FEIS: May not big news associations and publications like the *Reader's Digest* as a first impulse—I don't say their last impulse—regard the development of a popular education or mass-communications organization as a rival that might take business away from them, somewhat supersede them, especially in view of the expansion into international editions of some of these publications?

MR. LEIGH: I think highly successful magazines like *Reader's Digest* have a great deal of justified self-confidence that they will keep their circulation, that they have a formula that would not be outdone by any governmental department. In any case it obviously is a long task of negotiation and persuasion to discover how far the commercial-media people want to enter into co-operative activities with such people in other countries.

MR. WRIGHT: The great difficulty in working on this problem through U.N.E.S.C.O. is that the Soviet Union is not a member.

MR. BERKSON: The State Department says Russia will probably come into the November meeting.

MR. WRIGHT: The Human Rights Commission, as I recall, was given several directives by the General Assembly. One of them was to draft a universal bill of human rights, another concerned freedom of the press, and another women's rights. A universal bill of human

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

rights would necessarily include freedom of speech and of the press. The Soviet Union is in that commission and the Soviet Constitution of 1936 includes these rights (Art. 125). The Soviet Government might find it difficult to argue that rights they guarantee in their own Constitution should not be in an international bill of human rights. Such a bill might be an entering wedge in respect to the Soviet situation.

AGREEMENTS ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

MR. VON GRUNEBaum: What steps should the American government take to convince those governments which do not permit a free flow of information to change their minds about it?

MR. BERKSON: We might start framing some concrete agreements with those countries that are willing, to guarantee those freedoms of information which we have in this country and which we believe should be universal.

MR. STOLZ: But we already have that understanding with the countries that would be willing to negotiate on this subject.

MR. BERKSON: There are a number of nations on the periphery that are neither fish nor fowl. They might topple into our camp rather quickly.

MR. STOLZ: And unimportantly.

MR. BERKSON: Yes, but gradually we would get a leverage. I don't expect Russia to sit down today or tomorrow and open the doors for the kind of freedom of the press that we have in the United States. They probably have some reasons that prevent them from doing so at this time that they don't discuss.

MR. VON GRUNEBaum: How about countries not so definitely committed to suppression of news as Russia, such as Argentina. One day it allows free flow of news and the next day clamps on censorship. What inducement can we offer Argentina to settle down and permit freedom of the press?

MR. BERKSON: The United Nations is the only effective vehicle we have for that purpose today other than bilateral agreement between the United States and another country like Argentina.

MR. WRIGHT: If you attempt to negotiate a treaty with a country that is suspicious of foreign information, such as Russia, you immediately face the question of defining in the treaty a distinction between information and propaganda. Such a country may not be prepared to make a treaty at all for some time, but when the time comes it will want to protect itself against psychological warfare or propa-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

ganda. The most one could expect is that it admit information in the strict sense. Has anybody given attention to the question of drawing a treaty which would make that distinction?

MR. BERKSON: So far they have been discussing this question in the subcommittee of the Commission on Human Rights. There it has been tossed around like a hot potato and then sidetracked. I think the last episode was when Mrs. Roosevelt made a fervent plea for freedom of the press. Somebody said, "Why should we discuss freedom of the press when the Negro is so downtrodden in America?" and that wound up that conversation.

The only move today that seems to be in the offing is before U.N.E.S.C.O. That organization, which has not yet won its spurs as an agency that can act in this field, was given the job, I believe, to avoid further burdening the United Nations itself at a time when so many other burning questions were before it. In U.N.E.S.C.O. it is planned to present an American program for getting full agreement with those nations which will make them and at least partial agreements with as many of the others as possible. If they can present that program next November in Paris, I assume someone will sit down and begin to work on actual drafts of a treaty. The matter may eventually come back to the Human Rights Commission or U.N. itself.

MR. WRIGHT: James Warburg, in a recent book (*Unwritten Treaty* [1946]) tried to elaborate a distinction between propaganda and information and suggested texts of treaties using this distinction.

MR. LEIGH: There was a treaty between Great Britain and Italy before the war, I think, about 1938, where Italy agreed not to engage in propaganda in the Near East. I don't think it was effective.

MR. BERKSON: Personally, I think it would be an excellent idea if there were treaties to bar all governments from information or propaganda; just let the information come in the normal course and keep the governments' hands out of it.

MR. DRAGNICH: How can you? Where you have a Communist regime, most things are government-controlled.

MR. BERKSON: The Communist newspapers would be the voice of government and would be recognized and sent out as such. We would have to take what their newspapers say simply as what their newspapers say. Everybody will know it if they are Communist newspapers.

MR. LEISERSON: Some Communists reject the distinction between propaganda and information. Might they not prefer an agreement

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

stating precisely the type of information that might come in without getting involved in legal or technical distinctions.

MR. WRIGHT: If you tried to define positively what could come, whether you called it information or something else, you would still have a distinction which could give a ground for controversy.

MR. LEISERSON: What has been the experience of I.N.S. and other press associations in getting news into countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia since the war?

MR. BERKSON: It is impossible to get news into Poland. There is a slightly different situation in Czechoslovakia. In Prague and Bratislava several Social Democratic newspapers have survived and have grown rather strong in recent months. Some of the American news services are now reaching into those newspapers by radio. How long it will last I don't know, because it only began some weeks ago.

MR. HOSELITZ: In 1931, I think, a treaty was made between Germany and Poland concerning mutual propaganda broadcasts. If I am not mistaken, in that treaty a commission was set up which would determine not what was propaganda but what was propaganda detrimental to the other country, and a clause provided that in cases of disputes some sort of international jurisdiction could be appealed to. I also recall that a treaty was worked out under the auspices of the Moral Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1936. I believe that Spain and Russia made reservations concerning the clause dealing with political propaganda. I don't think either of these treaties was ratified, but a study of them and their history might shed some light on that question of what propaganda is and, possibly, what propaganda detrimental to the interests of the receiving country is.

MR. WRIGHT: There has been some examination of this question in the literature of international law. Dr. Vernon Van Dyke wrote a thesis at the University of Chicago on the extent to which international law requires states to prevent propaganda from leaving their territory when it is detrimental to the interests of other states.

The issue began to become active in the 1790's when revolutionary France was engaged in foreign propaganda. There were some judicial opinions and a number of treaties. For example, in the 1840's the conservative states of Europe—Prussia, Russia, and Austria—mutually agreed that each of them would impose criminal penalties upon persons in their territories who sought to engage in propaganda that would cross national lines hostile to the existence of these conserva-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

tive monarchies. The democratic states that had a free press always refused to enter into such treaties.

Fairly recently we have had some cases in this country; for example, Mussolini claimed that the United States was under an obligation of international law to suppress General Smedley Butler, who had made some utterances inimical to Mussolini. I believe there was a protest from Germany when Mayor La Guardia made some remarks about the Nazis. Diplomatic protests against states for allowing utterances to proceed from their territory that were deemed to be directly hostile to the dignity of the monarch or the integrity of the government are not uncommon. The Litvinov agreement of 1933, accompanying our recognition of the Soviet Union, sought to prevent propaganda by the Communist International.

A study of the literature of international law might provide a definition of the kind of propaganda or information which has generally been deemed so hostile to the interests of other states that it ought to be suppressed. The difficulty lies in the radical difference of opinion on the subject between dictatorial or autocratic governments, on the one hand, and liberal governments, on the other. Liberal states have tended to take a very loose view and say that information and propaganda ought to be allowed to flow freely, that discriminating between them is not possible. Positive steps toward insisting on the obligation to suppress dangerous propaganda have come from countries with dictatorial or autocratic governments.

MR. STOLZ: Surely you are not suggesting that that kind of provision would be useful in solving the problems of the world that face us at this moment. I should say that the one most useful thing we could do would be to expose the Russians to the Russians. If we cannot do that, everything we do is perfectly futile.

MR. WRIGHT: We must assume that the Russians will not allow unlimited material to come in; but if we want to have any access to Russia at all, we are going to have to agree to keep out some kind of material that they would object to. It may be better to get half a loaf rather than none.

MR. STOLZ: I cannot see that at all, because what we want to do is to tell them what we think of them; why we think they are wrong; why we think they are breaking their agreements; why we think this and that about them that they don't want their people to know. Anything that we would say that would be useful in these circum-

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

stances would be exactly the sort of thing that they would attempt to keep out.

MR. WRIGHT: Not necessarily. They might like to have a realistic picture of what the United States is really like. Maybe they would permit that, even though it were a counterblast to things in the Russian press that give a very hostile and unreal picture of the United States. They certainly would not let anything definitely hostile to the Soviet Union go in.

MR. DRAGNICH: It would be a big step forward if we could get them to accept straight information about America.

MR. STOLZ: The government there controls the press; every editor is a civil servant, subject not only to the loss of his job if he does not behave properly, but to death. In those circumstances, to suggest that the editor of *Pravda* is going to print anything that Stalin does not want printed is just nonsense.

MR. LEISERSON: Shouldn't we challenge the Russians to the issue of democratic propaganda versus Communist propaganda?

MR. STOLZ: The challenge won't be accepted. The nub of the problem is to let Russians talk to Russians. They are not allowed to do that. If Russians were allowed to talk to Russians, they might tell our story for us; and, of course, if Russians told it, it would be very effective. Coming from American sources, it has very little effect, partly because it is alien in origin and more especially because it can be overwhelmed by the home-grown variety of news and propaganda.

MR. LEISERSON: As you put it, the issue is insoluble.

MR. STOLZ: Exactly so! It is insoluble in terms of the Russian regime, and in that sense I think this whole Benton controversy has been exaggerated far beyond the importance that it has.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Benton has obtained the right to send fifty thousand copies of his paper into Russia.

MR. LEIGH: The Benton program is not really aimed at getting into Russia. The satellite countries that are not completely controlled are, I think, the real issue: Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia.

MR. BERKSON: The broadcast is going in, but to a very limited extent, because the short-wave sets are not in the hands of the people. They have a system of using the loudspeaker on the street corner. People gather either there or in the community town hall and listen to a loudspeaker over which the material is pumped by the government and controlled by the government. Nothing is relayed over those loudspeakers that is not passed upon. If the Russian gov-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

ernment ever permits the people to have radio sets, then, of course, such a program would reach them. We don't know whether there are any secretly held receiving sets in Russia.

RELATION OF INFORMATION TO FRIENDSHIP

MRS. WRIGHT: Can we assume that if we all knew the facts about each other we would have mutual understanding and therefore peace? Take England, for example; we speak the same language, have a great deal of intercourse and reading matter, but the debates on the British loan, Lend-Lease, and so on show that we do not have a very profound understanding of Britain and Britain's position now. The problem may become more difficult because, although we might distinguish between information and propaganda, how are we going to distinguish between different kinds of news? The quantity of news is the thing that depresses me these days. One cannot possibly cope with it except through highly selective principles, and what are going to be the guiding principles for selection? Those principles constitute a sort of propaganda.

MR. BERKSON: I would say that when we reach the day when our debates with Russia are on the level of our debates with Britain, we will have made a tremendous amount of progress. Regardless of misunderstandings on this or that question, there is not the type of discord or misunderstanding in Anglo-American relations which could create war.

MRS. WRIGHT: Because we know too much about each other, or enough. Is that it?

MR. BERKSON: Yes, we have had enough exposure to each other's ideas and enough mutual exchange of information and freedom of movement backward and forward. No free flow of information is going to eliminate disagreements on questions like the British loan, but the free exchange of information and viewpoints does act as a curb on explosive nationalistic tempers.

MR. WRIGHT: I suppose there was a considerable flow of information between the North and the South in this country before the Civil War.

MR. BERKSON: That is true, but not so much as there is today.

MRS. WRIGHT: We have very little information about the Chinese; we don't know the language and don't see many Chinese people; but we have for the Chinese the kind of sympathy that leads to a healthy international situation.

MR. BERKSON: We have had a great flow of information out of China and quite a flow to China. They know more about us and we

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

know more about them, I believe, than Russia and the United States know about each other.

MRS. WRIGHT: I was saying that there is a lot of sympathy for China despite the lack of information, and in spite of a lot of information about Britain there is a lack of sympathy, so I wonder how far we are going to get merely through exchange of information.

MR. WRIGHT: From the recognition of the United States by Russia in 1809 up to the outbreak of various controversies which arose largely because of pogroms in the 1890's—a period of over three-quarters of a century—the United States and Russia had, for the most part, friendly relations. The czar liberated the serfs at the same time that Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. Russia was friendly to the North in the Civil War and ceded Alaska soon after. It was a tradition that Russia and the United States were friendly, but there wasn't any flow of information. The minute you began to get a flow of information, that friendship broke. The information came largely because of pogroms and immigration of Russian Jews to this country in the 1890's. The result of information was to rile Russian-American relations.

MR. EGGAN: If the improvements in the means of mass communication are to improve relations between peoples, won't it be necessary to improve social and cultural backgrounds?

We have had a Russian correspondent in this country for several months recently. Summary translations of what he is saying about American life don't seem to jibe with my understanding or many other people's understanding of life in this country. If the spot news is projected against that kind of background, I don't think it makes much difference whether the Russians get 100 per cent of that kind of spot news or whether they get 50 per cent or 20 per cent. They will still misinterpret it.

MR. LEIGH: When we talk about mass communications, the tendency is to consider press-association dispatches. What we mean by mass communications has to do also with those agencies which provide background material. Outside of the formal school system—which could easily be overrated in this regard—you have books, periodicals, and motion pictures. Probably in the long-time sense, they are more important than press dispatches because they are the means by which press dispatches are interpreted. They create the mental background.

MR. WRIGHT: Furthermore, one has to make a distinction between a peaceful condition of affairs resting upon common standards of

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

world public opinion and a peaceful state of affairs which rests upon a diplomatic equilibrium. I think the world is in a state of transition from one to the other.

I was impressed a good deal in San Francisco by the continual anxieties of the British about the behavior of the American press. The press was publishing everything, even the secret meetings of the Big Five. The British looked back to the halcyon days of Lord Castlereigh, when diplomats could get together in secret, make arrangements, and each carry them out in his own country because the governments would all limit publicity to what would win the support of the public for the arrangements which had been made.

That, I suppose, is the idea that the Soviets have now. They want the leaders of the countries to get together in conferences and make adjustments in the method that was characteristic of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But we are in a state of transition, so that international relations are becoming a problem of peoples and not merely of governments and diplomats.

Governments can no longer block up channels of information, and consequently we have to go the whole way and get a free flow of information so that a world public opinion will be formed with certain common standards, on the basis of which peaceful adjustments can be made among peoples. But in the initial stages this flow of information may make the situation worse. It will make it much more difficult to make some of those diplomatic adjustments which Castlereigh and Metternich could make. Increasing freedom of information among peoples decreases the freedom of governments and diplomats.

I agree with Mr. Berkson. We have to move forward toward a freer flow of information among peoples. Out of that, conditions will develop in which a world opinion can be formulated about certain common symbols, qualifying the excessive nationalisms with which the world is pervaded and providing the basis for a peaceful world order, not based upon a diplomatic balance of power, but upon what Mr. Vandenberg called a "town meeting of the world."

APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA

MR. BRODIE: You have a situation today in which the Russian government is deliberately interposing itself between the Russian people and the American people in a way that exacerbates relations. What Mr. Berkson is advocating might tend to eliminate that, and that would be a substantial gain. I don't believe any of these pro-

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

posals can guarantee good relations, but we have a right to expect that there might be some amelioration if it could be brought about.

But when you have something which is so basic to the Russian form of government as censorship, what kind of *quid pro quo* agreement do we have to offer which would cause them to lower those barriers substantially? I fail to see any real bargaining point by which we might induce them to make even moderate adjustments to our point of view.

MR. BERKSON: I can offer no solution of it.

MR. WRIGHT: The only thing one can think of is to assure them unlimited opportunity to propagandize in the United States.

MR. STOLZ: They already have that.

MR. LEISERSON: The discussion seems to have brought us to this point. The world is divided into two camps; therefore, we cannot assume that there is a world public opinion which could be a sounding-board against which to challenge the Russians and perhaps show them up to the world as afraid to enter into a free competition between the "democratic-capitalistic" way of life and the "democratic-communistic" way of life. I don't think we should accept that assumption. We should rather attempt to enter into agreements with as many countries as possible to assure a free flow of information on the basis of certain standards and then enter frankly into this struggle to win world public opinion. U.N.E.S.C.O. might provide the forum.

We do not have to assume that there is no possibility of communication with the Russians and of modifying opinions by such communications. I do not agree with those who say, "Why should we try to communicate with the Russians? We already know what they want and what we want. They want conflict, therefore sooner or later we are going to have to fight it out with them."

MR. DRAGNICH: I think the hope is along that line; that is, official contacts through U.N.E.S.C.O. or through, say, the Russian government's permission to have us distribute that magazine *Amerika*. If those facilities can be expanded, opinions may change. But, initially, the gap can be bridged only through understandings between governments rather than through private individuals or associations.

MR. BERKSON: I agree that we should not give up in despair and say that nothing can be done. Discussions in U.N.E.S.C.O. may develop a certain area of agreement among a certain number of powers. That at least will focus a spotlight on the question and will

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

put on the spot those countries which are holding out against this principle. Some of them may come into the fold to avoid the spotlight, and each additional one adds to world opinion. Spain, for example, is not behind the Soviet iron curtain but is tucked between the Western democracies. It ought to be possible to deal with Spain on this question. I don't know what the Franco government may fear in the way of revolution, but everybody who comes out of Spain says there is no making of a revolution inside Spain, unless it be a peaceful coup d'état by mutual agreement to set up a new regime.

Arrangements might be made with certain countries: with Bolivia, which has just taken over the whole press in one fell swoop; with Uruguay, which has just instituted some new regulations of the press requiring everybody to go to the government and register; with Argentina and Brazil. Russia won't overnight come into any arrangement, but in time we may have more leverage than we have today to achieve something. At least, it is worth trying. The nations that are willing to recognize this principle may be brought together instead of letting the matter lapse into a slipshod, chaotic state. That is the condition today. There are very different barriers to the flow of information, country by country, all over the world. Regulations are by no means standardized even among the countries that we would consider liberal.

For example, we think of France as a democratic country which permits a free flow of information. That is true, except that newsprint in France is controlled and doled out by the government. When you control newsprint in a tight newsprint situation such as exists today, you control the publication of opinion, because the papers are well aware that, if they go too far against the government, newsprint may not be available. Furthermore, the French news agency, A.F.P., which was supposed to be organized as A.P. and Reuters now are, has been trying for months to free itself of government control without success. There are many border-line cases like that. Theoretically, the French press is free to print whatever it wishes to print; practically, it is not that free.

EDUCATING THE PROFESSION

MRS. WRIGHT: Is the newspaper profession talking much about the training of foreign correspondents? With the increased interest by the public and increased volume of material, the people who have to report situations in different countries have a terrific responsibility.

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

MR. BERKSON: That is a serious problem. With true freedom for the flow of information, the people in the mass-media fields have a tremendous responsibility, not just the press but also radio, magazines, books, and films. There is much room for improvement in the caliber of men in the newspaper field who have to treat international politics, domestic politics, economics, science, or just run-of-the-mill reporting, but I think the situation is better today than it was twenty-five years ago. When I broke into the newspaper business here in Chicago, a college-trained man was looked upon with a bit of suspicion in newspaper offices.

That has changed completely today. The newspapers and the press services are demanding more background and more training, but improvements are not so noticeable as they should be, partly from economic reasons. The news services and newspapers don't always pay salaries that attract the cream of the crop that flows from the universities. Progressive newspapers will have to pay more money and also will have to show that real careers can be made, not only adventurous careers but important careers that will command respect in the community.

Furthermore, when you talk about free flow of information, as you pointed out, that does not guarantee mutual understanding. Understanding begins in the grammar schools. The children ought to be taught as they grow up how to read newspapers properly; they ought to be taught how to exercise critical judgment in reading about current events.

MR. STOLZ: Furthermore, as was suggested, it may be argued plausibly that a fuller flow of news from some countries would make not for better relations but for worse relations. That could well be true about China, and I am quite sure it would be true about Russia.

MRS. WRIGHT: Also about the United States. If some of the facts about the United States were better known we might be debunked in the eyes of some people.

MR. STOLZ: I doubt whether it applies equally to the United States because, after all, Tass's reporters can go anywhere they want, find any nasty thing they want, and send all they want about it without censorship; but Mr. Atkinson does not have an equal right in Russia. If American reporters in Russia were free to move about and report, certainly almost the first story they would go after would be the slave labor, the concentration camps.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

If I were sending a reporter over there with a free hand to look around, I would give him as his first assignment: "Find out whether there are three million, ten million, fifteen million Russians doing forced labor in concentration camps," because I think that would be the most important story he could find. When that story came out in an authoritative fashion, "I saw them, I counted them, this is what they were wearing, this is what they were eating, and this is what they were doing," from the short-term point of view that would not make for friendly relations with Russia, but it would be a very useful story to anyone who wants to understand Russia.

SOVIET CENSORSHIP

MR. BERKSON: Mr. Stolz may have suggested a way of reaching Russia, on the basis of the selfish advantages she may have from a freer flow of information. The suspicion that there are fifteen or twenty million people incarcerated in some parts of Russia doing slave labor might be disproved by free reporting. What is Russia trying to hide by this system of rigid secrecy so long after the war? We could understand it during the war. But does she continue it from inertia or from reasonable policy?

MR. STOLZ: This is not a war phenomenon. This began long before the war and was hardly intensified during the war.

MR. BERKSON: I understand, though, that there had been an evolution since the revolution. I am asking what reason is there today to hide everything that is going on within Russia. For example, why can't our people move freely out of Moscow into the fields and factories of Russia and report factually what life is like, what the average fellow gets in the way of a standard of living? Does Russia realize that, by hiding that information, the suspicions and the distrust abroad may be ten times greater than the facts justify unless what she is hiding is even more menacing than our most alarming suspicions?

MR. WRIGHT: At times in the past, say, 1934 or 1935, there has been far more freedom for reporters to get information out of Russia than there is today. When I was there in 1934, there were many reporters in Moscow. Of course, they had to go through the censorship, but I had the impression that they were getting a great deal out.

MR. BERKSON: It is materially worse today. The Russians that our correspondents formerly mingled with are afraid to speak because

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

people have begun to disappear who have shown too much friendship for American or other allied correspondents. The job of reporting today in Moscow is one of the most hopelessly impossible jobs that a newspaperman can conceivably have.

MR. DRAGNICH: Speaking of the responsibility of reporters, hasn't Mr. Atkinson, by making the comments he did, made it almost impossible and useless for Mr. Middleton to be in Moscow at the moment?

MR. BERKSON: No. The Russians probably won't go so far as to throw Middleton out simply because Atkinson made that type of comment.

MR. DRAGNICH: But the chances are he will be pretty circumscribed as to what he can see, where he can go.

MR. BERKSON: Everybody is circumscribed already. There is not much difference in what they can do to him and what they are doing to everybody. You cannot go into the factories of Russia and talk to the technicians today. You cannot go anywhere except on officially conducted tours.

CHARACTER OF REPORTING ON RUSSIA

MR. BRODIE: From the point of view of practical politics, in trying to improve relations between the two countries, we have to limit at least our first ambitions to getting the American case presented in Russia rather than the other way around. Our chances of reaching a *modus vivendi* with Russia would be improved if we were able to get a lot more news out of Russia; but I can also see a great deal of importance in opening up channels in the other direction, and it seems to be a lesser problem, though, nevertheless, a very great one.

MR. WRIGHT: Are you sure it is lesser. It is easy to see why the Soviet Union thinks it is dangerous to have a free flow of information in. Most of the capitalist world has a far higher standard of living than the Russians. The Soviet government does not want its people to find this out. It tried to keep its soldiers from contact with American soldiers partly for that reason. With a free flow of information, the Russians might see advantages in the capitalistic economy.

MR. BRODIE: I am inclined to agree with you; but if they have something to hide of this slave labor sort, I can see why they would be extremely sensitive on that point; why they would be reluctant to raise the immediate indignation which they are pretty sure it would raise.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

As has been suggested, an important corollary to the problem of the free exchange of information between countries is the responsibilities of the press. I can see the news value of a story about slave labor in Russia and I can see its moral value, but I would question the importance of getting news out of Russia that would concentrate on the negative aspects. The Russians may have some justification in expecting that that is precisely what they would encounter.

MR. STOLZ: If a reporter going over there, free to write, should find a less number of slave laborers, I should be delighted if he reported it, of course. I should be skeptical, but if he could prove it, I would regard that as an even greater story.

MR. WRIGHT: Objective reporting of Russia should always consider the present regime in relationship to earlier Russian history. In reporting conditions in Russia today, it is unfair to compare them with conditions in other countries. Russia has had oppression and espionage from time immemorial under the czars, and a reporter with a real sense of responsibility should be aware of Russian history and should realize that a country does not change overnight. Only qualified reporters can overcome the tendency to compare foreign conditions with those at home with which their readers are familiar, especially if the comparison is favorable to the latter.

MR. STOLZ: For many years the reporting from Russia was definitely pro-Russian. Eugene Lyons stands as a symbol of that kind of reporting, when he was reporting and not after he came back. The attitude of the representatives of the American press in Russia was much too friendly if your goal is truly objective reporting, whatever that means.

MR. WRIGHT: While they were there. I imagine Russia might have been irritated when William Henry Chamberlin, after giving rather favorable reports about Russia for some time, left Russia for good and published extremely unfavorable books. If a reporter sends out favorable stories while he is in Russia and the moment he gets out writes a "now-it-can-be-told" story, he stultifies himself, prejudices the stories which have been sent out, and interferes with the future freedom of reporting in Russia.

MR. BERKSON: That is the result of the very mystery which the Russian government creates. If there were not that serious question mark, there would not be that mark for the now-it-can-be-told story. The mystery of what goes on in Russia is getting undue attention today. The average American probably has in the back of his mind

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

that Russia, behind the veil of mystery, is preparing God knows what for us. We get that feeling out of a lack of the free flow of information. It is emphasized day in and day out that no one knows what is going on, therefore he suspects that the worst is going on. Where there is nothing to contradict that suspicion, it can grow and grow.

MRS. WRIGHT: That was obvious in the recent discussion of the U.N.R.R.A. appropriation, when the House and the Senate insisted on putting on a rider that U.N.R.R.A. funds cannot be used where the press is not allowed to go, in spite of the fact that the men in charge of the U.N.R.R.A. mission in the Ukraine had sent reports that they had gone everywhere, seen everything they wanted to see, and felt that they were treated as well as anybody could be treated. Even after that report, the Senate again passed the rider.

MR. BERKSON: I would rather side with the Senate on that. I am not sure that U.N.R.R.A. and its representatives are trained in the art of getting information about a situation such as the distribution of U.N.R.R.A. materials in an area like the Ukraine. In Yugoslavia, U.N.R.R.A. had reported that everything was satisfactory, but reports that came out later were contradictory. The fact that U.N.R.R.A. itself was there does not mean that a checkup was not desirable of the type that would be given by a corps of free-swinging newspapermen.

MRS. WRIGHT: They did let a corps of journalists in, French and British.

MR. BERKSON: A conducted tour. Reporters must have freedom of movement to report the unvarnished truth.

MR. WRIGHT: The criticism of the Senate's rider was not that it was undesirable to have reporters but that it was mixing political pressure with a humanitarian effort.

COMMUNICATION WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

MR. LEISERSON: Might it be desirable for the time being to relinquish the problem of communication between peoples and try to establish better communications between the governments. If some such channel could be established on a *quid pro quo* basis, it might do a great deal toward letting us find out how secure and stable the Russian government felt and what the conditions might be under which broader lines of communication and understanding might be established. Press reports have suggested that some of Mr. Byrnes's reactions to Mr. Molotov's behavior resulted from a lack of under-

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

lying staff work. He was always being surprised and irritated by positions of the Russian government of which he had had no preliminary notice or information whatsoever. The absence of direct communication between policy-makers may be doing a great deal to maintain the atmosphere of secrecy, uncertainty, and misunderstanding.

MR. WRIGHT: What can be done beyond the ordinary diplomatic meetings that take place?

MR. LEIGH: I have already pointed out that the B.B.C. is sending broadcasts in Russian to Russia now, and the State Department is proposing to do the same thing. About twelve people in Russia are able to listen or to receive the material officially. I refuse to rule out the occasional dissident who may hide a radio receiver for reasons that we don't know, as the Japanese businessmen listened to American broadcasts because they wanted to get the stock reports. I suspect that we get something fairly reliable from our embassy in the diplomatic pouch.

MR. LEISERSON: I was thinking of the possibility of the State Department's establishing on a personal basis a closer means of communicating at the staff level with members of our diplomatic mission or representatives of the Soviet government. I was thinking not of information designed to create a favorable or unfavorable impression but of information which would be of value to representatives of both countries in the conduct of negotiations: essential economic, military, or other types of information which would help the representatives of governments to understand the positions of their opposite members better.

MR. STOLZ: We have scores of people in the Embassy at Moscow to do just that.

MR. WRIGHT: Is the problem one of keeping the Russian negotiators informed of things which they ought to know on the assumption that they lack information and consequently negotiate in ignorance of conditions in the United States? It may be difficult to remedy that situation because of the tendency of Soviet authorities to interpret information, even that of their own agents, in terms of their ideologies.

If the problem is our lack of information about Russia, the difficulty is greater. Nobody in any way connected with a Russian mission will talk on matters pertaining to the mission without very direct authority from his chief, and in matters of any importance the chief is silent until he has specific instructions from the Kremlin. That is

DISCUSSION OF INFORMATIONAL POLICIES

fundamental in negotiations with Russia. It is part of their policy not to give any information except authorized statements in direct course of negotiations.

MR. LEIGH: I have seen the monitoring on the B.B.C. broadcasts to Russia, and there is no doubt that it is the policy to get into Russia a lot of information which it is hoped may be picked up by some people in the top hierarchy that would not get it in the regular diplomatic channels. That is why they are going to all the trouble to do it.

It is an extremely clever set of broadcasts. It deals with the general representative news of British life, especially political news, always played over toward the left. Now with the Labour party in power, folk and popular activities are played up a great deal. They hope that by this means they may give some of the Russians a picture that they don't get through their regular sources. Although the American State Department broadcasts will probably be couched in terms of the Russian people, they will really be aimed at the Russian government in the same way. It is an interesting new type of intercourse.

MR. BRODIE: Brooks Atkinson's articles that got so much attention both here and in Russia stated that the Russian government is probably the poorest informed of all great governments of what is going on in other countries. The reason for that misfortune is not hard to see. People who are reporting to the Russian government have to conform to it, that is, they are slaves of the Russian philosophy in their own thinking and also they know that their jobs and perhaps more than their jobs depend on sending data which are acceptable. This broadcasting to the government may be important from that point of view.

I was associated with an office in the Navy that was feeding material to O.W.I. for broadcasting to Japan, and we always asked: "Whom should we regard as our chief target?" We decided that the only ones we could reach anyway were the really high people, that is, naval officers of high rank, apart from the technicians themselves. Especially in the latter stages of the war, they were the ones to whom the propaganda was addressed rather than the enlisted man.

MR. WRIGHT: How hopeful is that, really, in giving the top people information? They must be tremendously busy men, with the centralization of government in Russia. I wonder whether they really have much time to pay attention to information that comes that way.

MR. LEIGH: The studies which I think are fairly reliable of Japan showed that such information went through the hands of monitors

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

up to the top. Furthermore, if you cut off the regular inflow of news but have a certain number of radio receivers, as in the Balkan nations, rumor and underground circulation may spread that news better than in a country that has a good news service. It is the thought that the same process may operate in a bureaucratic machinery. If the bureaucracy does not maintain a solid front, if there is a break, as sometimes happens, then the rumor circulates. That may be much better than a news service.

MR. BRODIE: It depends on the shrewdness of those who send the news. Really shrewd persons can send the kind of information that is likely to go to the people they want it to go to.

APPENDIX

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

ALDIS, GRAHAM, Trustee, University of Chicago
 AXELSON, C. F., Trustee, University of Chicago
 BALLANTINE, JOSEPH W., Brookings Institution, formerly Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
 BERDAHL, CLARENCE A., Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois
 BERGSTRAESSER, ARNOLD, Associate Professor of German Cultural History, University of Chicago
 BERKSON, SEYMOUR, General Manager, International News Service, New York City
 BOBRINSKOY, G. V., Associate Professor of Sanskrit, University of Chicago
 BRODIE, BERNARD, Research Associate, Institute of International Studies, Yale University
 BURGESS, ERNEST W., Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago
 COLBY, CHARLES C., Professor of Geography, University of Chicago
 COLE, FAY-COOPER, Professor of Anthropology, University of Chicago
 COX, GARFIELD V., Dean, School of Business, University of Chicago
 COX, ISAAC J., Professor Emeritus of History, Northwestern University
 CREEL, H. G., Associate Professor of Chinese Literature, University of Chicago
 DRAGNICH, ALEX N., Assistant Professor of History, Western Reserve University
 EGGAN, FRED, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Chicago
 FAIRCHILD, DONALD, Trustee, Library of International Relations, Chicago
 FARIS, ELLSWORTH, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, University of Chicago
 FEIS, HERBERT, Formerly Economic Adviser, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
 FISHER, WALTER T., Executive Committee, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
 FOX, WILLIAM T. R., Research Associate, Institute of International Studies, Yale University
 FRODIN, REUBEN, Assistant to the Vice-President, University of Chicago
 GRUNEBaum, G. E. von, Associate Professor of Arabic, University of Chicago
 GULICK, LEEDS, Professor of Japanese, University of Chicago
 GURIAN, WALDEMAR, Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame
 HADEN, ALLEN, Editor, Farmers Economic Fund Press Service, Washington, D.C.
 HARRIS, CYNTHIA, Winnetka, Illinois
 HARRIS, STANLEY G., Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago
 HAZARD, J. N., Professor of Public Law, Columbia University
 HAVIGHURST, ROBERT J., Professor of Education, University of Chicago
 HOLLAND, KENNETH, Associate Director, Office of Information and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
 HOSELITZ, BERT F., Instructor in Economics, University of Chicago
 HUTH, C. F., Professor of History, University of Chicago
 JOBST, VALENTINE, III, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois
 KATZ, WILBER G., Dean of the Law School, University of Chicago
 KIEWIET, C. W. DE, Professor of Modern European History, Cornell University
 KNIGHT, FRANK H., Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

LEAVENS, DICKSON H., Research Associate, Cowles Commission, University of Chicago

LEIGH, R. D., Director, Commission on Freedom of the Press, New York City

LEISERSON, AVERY, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago

LEONHARDT, HANS L., Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State College

LYON, SCOTT, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

MACCHESNEY, BRONSON, Professor of Law, Northwestern University

McMAHON, FRANCIS E., Writer and Lecturer, Chicago

MACNAIR, HARLEY F., Professor of Far Eastern History, University of Chicago

MARCUS, RALPH, Associate Professor of Hellenistic Culture, University of Chicago

MASSEY, GEORGE B., JR., Executive Director, Pan American Council, Chicago

MERRIAM, CHARLES E., Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Chicago

MILLER, C. PHILLIP, Professor of Medicine, University of Chicago

MORGENSTERN, W. V., Director of Public Relations, University of Chicago

OGBURN, WILLIAM F., Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago

PARRY, ALBERT, Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University

PASVOLSKY, LEO, Director of International Studies, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; formerly Assistant to the Secretary of State

PHEMISTER, DALLAS B., Professor of Surgery, University of Chicago

PLATT, ROBERT S., Professor of Geography, University of Chicago

PRICE, DON K., Associate Director, Public Administration Clearing House, Chicago

PRITCHETT, C. HERMAN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago

REQUA, ELOISE, Director, Library of International Relations, Chicago

ROGERS, W. C., Public Administration Clearing House, Chicago

ROTHFELS, HANS, Professor of History, Brown University

ROWE, DAVID N., Associate Professor of International Relations, Yale University

SHILS, EDWARD A., Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago

STOLZ, LEON, Chief Editorial Writer, *Chicago Tribune*

UTLEY, CLIFTON, News Analyst, National Broadcasting Company, Chicago

WHITE, WILBUR W., Dean of the Graduate School, Western Reserve University

WILCOX, CLAIR, Director, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

WILSON, JOHN A., Professor of Egyptology, University of Chicago

WRIGHT, LOUISE LEONARD, Director, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago

WRIGHT, QUINCY, Professor of International Law, University of Chicago

Secretaries: ARTHUR P. KRUSE and ALFRED J. HOTZ

INDEX

- Allied Council for Japan, 133
 American Society of Newspaper Editors, 352, 373
 American Sugar Institute, and Cuban politics, 255
 American Zionist Emergency Council, 166-67
Amerika, 317, 333, 370-71, 383
 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, 165-69, 170-71, 176, 179, 186-88
 Anglo-American Telecommunications Conference, 337
 Anticlericalism in Latin America, 228, 237-38, 244
 Anti-Semitism, 165-66, 182
 Arab League, 163, 165, 173, 180, 182
 Arabia; *see* Saudi Arabia
 Arabs and Arab states, 68, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 173-89
 Argentina: beef production in, 241; Brazilian attitude toward, 231; Byrnes and, 218; immigration policy of, 243; informational policy of, 375, 384; invitation of, to San Francisco Conference, 10; labor in, 244; nationalism in, 239-40; Soviet relations to, 47; trade with, 210, 215, 218, 232; United States policy toward, 196
 Armaments, regulation of, 80, 82
 Arnold, H. H., on atomic bomb, 123
 Asia, southeastern, United States policy in, 161
 Associated Press (A.P.): and freedom of press, 343; and government broadcasts, 350, 351, 352; and government control, 358; and Reuters, 359; and Russia, 370; and United Nations news service (proposed), 354
 Atkinson, Brooks: and Soviet press, 345-46, 385; and Soviet union, 387, 391
 Atlantic Charter: and access to raw materials, 285, 293; and government of eastern Europe, 203; and security system, 75; and trade, 147, 298
 Atomic bomb: and balance of power, 107-12; and control, 105-6; and disarmament, 120-22; and international law, 112-15; and security, 89-96, 103; and Soviet Union, 220; strategic influence of, 122-24; and United States position, 5-6
 Atomic energy, peacetime uses of, 119-20, 125
 Atomic energy control, 90-91, 103-7, 110-15, 118, 119-22, 124-25; and denaturing process, 116, 118-19; importance of, 16; Lilienthal-Baruch plan, 115-19, 124; retaliation in, 104-7; and United States position, 4-6
 Attlee, Clement, on Palestine, 166, 179
 Australia, United States and British interests in, 66, 67
 Balance of power, 50-55; and atomic bomb, 107-12, 125; *see also* Great powers; Power politics
 Baldwin, Hanson, on guided missiles, 124
 Balfour Declaration, 165, 186
 Balkans: buffer between United States and Soviet Union, 219; communism in, 197; and eastern Europe, 195; freedom of information in, 371; proposed invasion through, 20; and Soviet Union, 164; trade with, 213, 216; United States broadcasts to, 359, 360; United States policy in, 219; United States support of Britain in, 70-71
 Ballantine, Joseph W.: on atom bomb, 111; on China, 156, 157, 158; on eastern Europe, 203, 220; on economic policy, 296; on Far East, 129-38; on informational policy, 372; on Japan, 139-61; on Latin America, 241; on Near East, 170, 171, 172; on southeastern Asia, 161; on United States China policy, 160; on United States foreign policy, 254; on United States foreign service, 251-52
 Baruch, Bernard: on denaturing process, 118; proposals on atomic energy control, 4, 5, 6, 90, 110, 119, 124; *see also* Lilienthal-Baruch plan.
 Basch, Antonin, on Danubian basin, 209
 Belgium: and security system, 18, 55, 56; trade with, 208, 211
 Benton, William: on informational policy, 323, 379; on propaganda, 322
 Berdahl, Clarence A., on Near East, 183, 184
 Bergstraesser, Arnold, on eastern Europe, 207, 208, 209, 212, 222
 Berkson, Seymour: on freedom of the press, 339-48; on informational policies, 351-89
 Bipolar system: and balance of power, 52-53; suggested for Europe, 13-14

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

- "Bloom Bill," 319-20
 Bolivia, and freedom of information, 384
 Brady, Cyrus, on Latin America, 228
 Brazil: and Catholic church, 234, 235; immigration policy, 243; United States policy in, 231
 British Broadcasting Corporation (B.B.C.), 352, 360, 361, 365, 366-67, 390-91
 British Empire, *see* Great Britain
 British Labour party; *see* Labour party (Great Britain)
 Broadcasting; *see* Radio broadcasting
 Brodie, Bernard: on atom bomb, 103, 104, 120, 123-25; on atomic energy, 89-96; on balance of power, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112; on British Empire, 69, 70, 71; on China policy, 159, 160, 161; on disarmament, 121; on eastern Europe, 206, 212, 216, 220, 223; on economic policies, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 306; on Far East, 143, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155; on finance and security, 98; on informational policy, 361, 362, 366, 367, 371, 374, 382-83, 387, 388, 391, 392; on Latin America, 239, 240, 241, 242; on Lilienthal plan, 118; on Near East, 176, 177, 178, 187, 188, 189, 190; on security, 101, 102; on Soviet Union, 37; on Western security bloc, 57, 58, 60
 Bulgaria: democracy in, 204; Soviet policy in, 202-3; United States broadcasts to, 350
 Byrnes, James F.: on displaced persons, 53; on freedom of speech, 326; and great-power disagreements, 10; on informational policy 321, 323, 324, 326; on Nazis, 218; and Soviet Union, 36, 218, 389-90; on trusteeship, 153
 Cable and wireless systems, 329-30, 331
 Cairo Declaration, 129
 Canada, and Pan American Union, 230
 Catholicism (Catholic church): in Latin America, 226, 228, 231, 234-38, 248; in Near East, 184-86
 Chamberlin, William H., and Soviet Union, 388
 Chapultepec, Act of, 325-26
 Chile: immigration policy of, 243; labor in, 243-44
 China: economic conditions in, 131-32; as great power, 7; political parties in, 155-59, 301; possible Communist revolution in, 49, 50; trade with, 132, 296, 301; United States policy in, 129, 135-37, 221-22, 380; and United States-Soviet relations, 159-61, 221-22
 Chinese Changchun Railway, 137
 Christianity, in Near East, 184-86
 Churchill, Winston: and Atlantic Charter, 75; and France, 18; and iron curtain, 12; and Russia, 4; with Stalin and Roosevelt, 20; suspicions of Russia, 19; White Paper of 1922, 186
 Civil Aeronautics Board, 362, 363
 Clausewitz, Karl von, on war, 89
 Coal, and international rivalries, 290-91
 Colby, Charles C.: on economic policy, 293, 299-309; on raw materials and trade, 284-91
 Collective security; *see* Security
 Communications, international, 328-38; imperial systems of, 329-31; postwar reconversion in, 333-38; war propaganda systems, 332-33
 Communications, internationalization of, 355; *see also* United Nations, and freedom of information
 Communications media, 328-29, 367-70; *see also* Cable and wireless systems; Motion pictures; Radio
 Communications policy; *see* Informational policy
 Communism (Communist party), 38-39, 46, 218; in China, 49, 50, 135, 136, 155-59, 222; in eastern Europe, 197-98, 203, 204, 205, 206, 217-18; in Europe, 14, 37, 159, 217; in France, 57-58, 61; and freedom of information, 376-77; in Germany, 45-46, 48-49; 199-200, 216, 217; in India, 49; in Japan, 134, 143, 145-46; in Latin America, 244; in the Near East, 168, 172, 180, 181; and propaganda, 378-79; and use of resources, 304-9
 Comte, Auguste, influence of, on Brazil, 231
 Conservative parties, United States support of, 59, 60
 Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs (C.I.A.A.): liquidated, 333; and war propaganda, 332
 Corbett, Percy E., 7 n.
 Cox, Isaac J.: on Japan, 147; on Latin America, 236-37, 247
 Creel, H. G.: on China, 156-57, 158-59; on Japan, 146; on United States Chinese policy, 160
 Cuba, United States policy in, 227, 255
 Cultural relations: with Latin America, 247-50, 320; with Near East, 171-72; with Soviet Union, 32; *see also* Informational policy
 Czechoslovakia: communism in, 196; freedom of information in, 377, 379; production and trade of, 207, 208, 210, 212, 213, 214; United States policy in, 198, 204

INDEX

- Dairen, 136-37
 Dallin, David J., on Soviet Union, 11
 Davis, Elmer, on propaganda, 314
 De Gollyer, E. L., on oil reserves, 189-90, 191, 192
 Democracy: in China, 135, 156-57; and communism, 14, 50; in eastern Europe, 196, 198, 204-7; interpretations of, 196; in Islam, 180; in Japan, 134, 140, 141, 145-46; in Near East, 168; in Spain, 64
 Disarmament, and atomic bomb, 112-14, 120-22; *see also* Armaments, regulation of
 Displaced persons, 53-54
 Dragnich, Alex N.: on eastern Europe, 195-221; on informational policies, 360, 376, 379, 383, 387; on Latin America, 238
 Dumbarton Oaks Conference: disagreements in, 10; great powers in, 77; and international jurisdiction, 87; proposals of, 78; and veto, 78-79
 Eastern security bloc; *see* Europe, eastern, security system of
 Economic and Social Council; *see* United Nations Economic and Social Council
 Eggan, Fred: on Africa, 63; on informational policy, 381
 Egypt, religious oppositions in, 185
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., and invasion of Europe, 20
En Guardia, 332-33
 Ethridge, Mark, on propaganda, 335, 352
 Europe, central: as buffer zone, 222-23; effect of Russian orientation on trade, 207-13
 Europe, eastern, 195-223; American diplomacy in, 203-7; future economy of, 207-13; past United States policy in, 198-99; security system of, 19-21, 56, 164; Soviet economic policy in, 213-16
 Europe, United States-Soviet zones of influence in, 12-16
 Europe, western, security system of, 18-21, 55-62, 66, 98-103
 Evatt, Herbert V., and veto, 7
 Fadiman, Clifton, on atomic war, 53
 Far East: economic conditions, 130-32; Soviet Union in, 130, 164; United States policy in, 129-61; United States trade with, 296
 Far Eastern Commission, 133
 Faris, Ellsworth: on atom bomb, 120; on disarmament, 120; on informational policy, 365; on Japan, 140; on Latin America, 234; 235, 246; on Near East, 179; on Soviet characteristics, 38, 39
 Fascism: in eastern Europe, 198-99; in Germany, 199
 Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.), 350, 362, 363, 364
 Feis, Herbert: on economic policy, 296, 297, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309; on free enterprise and commercial policy, 271-83; on informational policy, 365, 372, 374; on Near East, 179, 190, 191, 192, 193
 Finance, and collective security, 97-98
 Finland: democracy in, 198; Soviet policy in, 28-29, 45, 47
 First Amendment, and government broadcasts, 369
 Food and Agriculture Organization, 81
 Forest resources, 286-90
 Fox, William T. R.: on Anglo-American conflicts, 67; on atom bomb, 111; on atomic energy control, 104-5; on balance of power, 52-53; on British Empire, 70, 71; on great powers, 3-16; on informational policies, 349, 350, 355, 356, 361, 364-65, 371, 372; on Lilienthal-Baruch report, 116, 117; on security, 102; on Soviet policy, 36, 42; on superpowers, 75, 95; on Western security bloc, 55, 56, 57, 60
 France: and freedom of information, 384; in Near East, 162, 163, 164, 171, 172; policy toward Germany, 199, 200; proposed union with Great Britain, 18; and Siam boundary dispute, 161; and Soviet Union, 14, 219; United States and internal politics of, 57-61; and United States *Proposals on World Trade*, 269; veto power, 7; and Western security bloc, 55, 56, 60-61
 Free enterprise, and commercial policy, 271-83; *see also* Trade, international
 Freedom of information; *see* Informational policy
 Freedom of the press, 325, 326, 339-48, 354-55; agreements on, 375-76; in Europe, 206; in France and Spain, 373; Soviet-American viewpoints regarding, 345-46
 Frodin, Reuben, on eastern Europe, 214
 Germany: and economy of Europe, 207-10; 212-13; as Europe's center of gravity, 15; French demands against, 58, 61; political ideas in, 48-49; and Soviet-American relations, 11, 45-46, 218, 219, 221-23; Soviet policy toward, 61, 217-18; trading system in, 216, 306; United States policy toward, 199-200, 205-6; and Western security bloc, 56-57
 Good Neighbor policy, 224-25, 227
 Governmentalized economies; *see* State trading systems
 Gratian, on free enterprise, 271

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

- Great Britain: empire of, 21-24, 68-71; foreign policy of, 64-71; in Near East, 162-69, 170-74, 178, 179, 183-84, 186, 190-91; policy in Germany, 199, 200; proposed union with France, 18; radio broadcasts to Russia, 356, 366-67; and security system, 17-24, 98, 99, 101; trade with Latin America, 232, 239; in United Nations, 7; United States loan to, 17, 22-24; and United States *Proposals on World Trade*, 269; United States relations with, 17-24, 64-71; and Western security bloc, 18-21, 56
- Great powers, 3-16; and balance of power, 51-55; relationships between, 34-71; rivalries between, for raw materials and trade, 284-91, 298-304; and United Nations, 86-87; *see also* Power politics
- Gromyko, Andrei, 6, 44, 124
- Grunebaum, G. E. von: on freedom of information, 375; on Near East, 180-82, 185, 186; on Palestine, 180-82, 185, 186, 244, 245
- Gulick, Leeds: on China, 156; on Japan, 143, 144, 145, 156
- Gurian, Waldemar: on Anglo-American conflicts, 64-65; on atom bomb, 105, 106, 107, 114; on balance of power, 107; on Soviet policy, 37, 43-46; on Soviet-United States balance of power, 53, 54, 55; on Western security bloc, 60-61
- Haden, Allen: on eastern Europe, 213, 218, 219, 220; on Latin America, 224-55
- Haganah, 166-67
- Harris, Stanley G., on Soviet policy, 43
- Havas, 330, 359
- Haya de la Torre, on Indians, 226, 232
- Hays-Johnston Office, 338, 369
- Hazard, John N.: on international law, 112, 113, 114; on Soviet Union, 37, 38, 39, 40-50, 55; on United States Soviet policy, 25-33; on Western security bloc, 59
- Holland, Kenneth, on United States informational policy, 313-27
- Hoselitz, Bert F.: on eastern Europe, 203, 209-16; on economic policies, 292-98, 307, 308, 309; on informational policies, 357, 359, 360, 377
- Hull, Cordell: and international organization, 75, 77, 78, 82-83; on United States foreign policy, 87-88
- Human rights, 166, 326
- Human Rights Commission, 326, 337, 340, 374, 376
- Hungary, Russian policy in, 29, 47
- Hutchins, Robert M., on world government, 94, 106-7, 108
- Huth, C. F.: on Japan, 153; on Latin America, 243, 246-47, 250, 252, 253
- Iceland, United States base in, 47, 48
- Immigration: Jewish, 165, 166, 169, 173, 181, 183, 187-89; Jewish and Arab, 177; Latin-American policies on, 242-43
- India: Great Britain in, 69, 70; independence of, 62-63; industrial and social revolution in, 22, 23, 24; possible Communist revolution in, 49
- Indians in Latin America, 226, 232, 234, 235
- Industrialization: and international trade, 292-98; of Latin America, 238-42
- Inflation, in United States, and foreign policy, 98
- Information, freedom of; *see* Informational policy
- Informational policy, 313-92; and adaptation of materials to market, 371-72; and agencies of control in United States, 362-64; agreements on freedom of information, 375-80; basic legislation for, 319-20; co-operation in, with other nations, 323-24; and domestic news, 364-65; government versus private agencies as instruments of, 322-23, 335-38, 343-45, 349-53, 358-62, 369; and news distribution, 358-62; and propaganda, 314-15, 365-67; relation of information and friendship in, 380-82, 385-86; relative values of different media, 367-70; and Soviet Union, 355-57, 360-62, 369-71, 382-84, 386-92; and United Nations, 353-58; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and, 372-74
- Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Co-operation, 319
- Interim International Information Service, 321
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 81
- International economic policies; *see* Trade, international; Free enterprise; Raw materials, and great-power rivalries.
- International informational and cultural relations policies; *see* Informational policy
- International Labour Organization, 81
- International law, and atomic bomb, 112-15
- International Monetary Fund, 81, 265
- International News Service (I.N.S.), 343, 344, 351, 352-53, 358, 359, 366, 370, 377
- International organization, United States support of agencies of, 80-83, 260; *see also* United Nations
- International trade; *see* Trade, international
- International Trade Organization, proposed, 265, 266, 268, 269

INDEX

- International War Crimes Tribunal in the Far East, 134
International Yearbook of Forestry Statistics, 1933-35, 287 n.
 Iran: oil in, 189, 190-91, 192; Soviet Union and, 180, 216
 Iraq, religious oppositions in, 185
 Islam (Islamic movement): ineffective in Near East, 165, 180; as unifying political force, 184
 Italy, trusteeship of colonies of, 155
 Iwo Jima, 152
 Japan: economic conditions in, 130-31, 146-51; island bases of, 151-55; trade with, 130, 146-51, 296; United States policy in, 129, 130-31, 132-34, 139-45, 220
 Jews (and Jewish question), 68, 163, 165, 166, 173-89
 Johnston, Eric, and motion pictures, 368
 Johnston Office, 338
 Jordan Valley Authority, proposed, 168, 175, 181
 Kiewiet, Cornelis W. de: on Africa, 63; on Anglo-American relations, 65-68; on British Empire, 69-70; on finance and security, 97-98; on India, 62-63; on security system, 99, 100, 102-3; on Soviet Union, 34-35, 36, 39, 40, 48-49; on Spain, 64; on United Nations, 64; on United States and the United Kingdom, 17-24; on Western security bloc, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62
 Knight, Frank H., on Near East, 176
 Korea: economic conditions in, 131; United States policy in, 129, 134-35, 221
 Kuomintang, 135, 156-59
 Labor, in Latin America, 243-44
 Labour Organization, International, 81
 Labour party (Great Britain), 14, 38-39, 59, 164, 174
 Lasswell, Harold D., 15 n.
 Latin America, 224-33, 234-55; Catholic church in, 226, 228, 231, 234-38; cultural relations with, 247-50, 320; differences from United States, 225-27; government of, 244-45; immigration policies in, 242-43; industrialization in, 238-42; labor in, 243-44; United States official contacts with, 250-54; United States policy in, 195-96, 224-25, 229-33; universities in, 245-47
 Lattimore, Owen, on Asia, 50
 League of Nations: Committee on Raw Materials, 302; defects of, 76; and great powers, 7; mandates under, 154, 179, 184; Permanent Mandates Commission on Palestine, 179; Russia in, 25, 30; unanimity in, 78
 Lebanon, religious oppositions in, 184-85
 Leigh, Robert D.: on communications and foreign policy, 328-38; on informational policies, 349-58, 361-81, 390, 391, 392
 Leiserson, Avery, on informational policies, 369, 370, 376, 377, 379, 383, 389-90
 Lend-Lease, 268, 320; to China, 160; to Palestine, 176; to Soviet Union, 40
 Lenin, Nikolai, 41, 42, 44, 45
 Leonhardt, Hans L.: on eastern Europe, 205, 212, 213, 215, 217, 220-21; on Palestine, 178, 179; on Soviet policy, 35
 Lilienthal, David, on atomic energy control, 4, 119
 Lilienthal-Baruch plan, 90, 104, 106-7, 110-12, 115-19, 124
 Lippmann, Walter: on Europe, 15; on Molotov, 217
 Lowdermilk, W. C., on Palestine, 175
 Lyons, Eugene, and Soviet Union, 388
 MacArthur, Douglas, 133, 139, 140, 142; and Japanese trade, 147
 McMahon, F. E.: on informational policy, 371, 373; on Lilienthal-Baruch report, 117, 118; on Soviet Union, 37; on Spain, 63, 64
 Manchuria, 131, 136-37
 Marshall, George, in China, 136, 156
 Mass communications; *see* Communications, international
 Massey, George B., on Latin America, 235, 242, 248, 250-51, 253, 254
 Mediterranean, British position in, 66, 67-68, 171
 Merriam, Charles E.: on atomic energy, 110, 119-20; on eastern Europe, 205, 206, 207, 213, 214, 215, 217, 219; on poverty of power, 6
 Middle East, 65, 67, 68; industrial and social revolution in, 22, 23, 24; oil in, 189-93
 Mineral resources, and international rivalries, 290-91
 Molotov, V. M., 4, 44, 61, 217, 218, 389
 Moral Disarmament Conference, 377
 Morgenstern, W. V., on news, 353
 Moscow Conference (1943), 75, 76
 Moslems, in Near East, 184-86
 Motion pictures, 316-17, 331, 332, 338, 368-69
 Mouvement Républicain Populaire (M.R.P.), 59, 61
 Nationalism: in Europe, 56, 218-19; in Germany, 46; in Latin America, 238-40; and security, 99, 117; and Soviet relations with United States, 220
 Nationalist party (China); *see* Kuomintang
 Navy (U.S.), and Pacific island bases, 152-53, 155

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

- Near East, 162-69, 170-94; importance of, in United States policy, 193-94; oil problem in, 189-94; Palestine problem in, 173-84, 186-88; religious oppositions in, 184-86; and security system, 100; union, proposed, 181-82; world aspects of problem, 188-89
- News agencies, 330, 358-59; *see also* Press associations
- News distribution: agencies in control of, 362-64; of domestic news, 364-65; government participation in, 349-53; policies of, 358-62; by United Nations, 353-58; *see also* Communications, international; Informational policy
- Newspaper profession, education for, 384-86
- Nimitz, Chester, on weapons, 92
- Notestein, F. W., on Palestine, 177
- Office of Inter-American Affairs, 319, 320
- Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (O.I.C.), 315-24; Division of Libraries and Institutes, 317; Exchange of Persons Division, 318-19; International Broadcasting Division, 316; Motion Pictures Division, 316-17; Press and Publications Division, 317
- Office of War Information (O.W.I.): and *Amerika*, 370; broadcasts replace teletype in, 350; and domestic news, 364; liquidated, 333; war propaganda of, 332, 365-66, 391
- Ogburn, William F.: on Anglo-American conflicts, 65-66, 67; on British Empire, 68-69, 70, 71; on informational policies, 351, 356-57; on Soviet policy, 47, 58, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71; on Western security bloc, 58
- Oil, in Near East, 162, 167, 168, 170, 173, 188, 189-94
- Okinawa, American occupation of, 151, 152-53, 154
- Ortega y Gasset, José, on Spanish character, 226
- Outer Mongolia, 137
- Pacific, United States in, 67, 151-55
- Palestine, 163-68, 170-88, 193-94; Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry report on, 186-88; Anglo-American differences regarding, 65; British interests in, 170-71; demographic trends in, 176-78; economic potentialities of, 176-78; importance of, in United States policy, 193, 194; problem of, 173-74, 178-84; religious oppositions in, 184-86
- Pan-American bloc opposed, 229-33
- Pan American Congress (1938), 237
- Pan American Council, 250
- Pan American Union, and Canada, 230
- Pan-Islamic movement; *see* Islamic movement
- Pan-Slavism, 202-3
- Parry, Albert: on China, 159; on Japan, 140, 142, 143, 148, 153; on southeastern Asia, 161
- Pasvolsky, Leo: on atomic bomb, 91; on atomic war, 122; on economic policy, 295, 298, 302, 303, 305, 307, 308, 309, 310; on Japan, 139, 140, 141, 142, 147, 149-50, 154, 155; on power politics, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102; on Soviet policy, 41; on trade, 295, 298, 305, 307-10; on United Nations, 75-88
- Platt, R. S.: on eastern Europe, 216; on economic policy, 296-98, 308; on Latin America, 236, 237, 243, 247, 248, 250, 253, 255; on Russia, 64; on Western security bloc, 61
- Poland: economy and trade, 207, 212, 217; freedom of information in, 377; and Soviet Union, 45, 54; United States relations to, 14-15, 198, 203
- Political parties, European, and United States policy, 59-61, 204-6
- Port Arthur, 136-37
- Potsdam Declaration, 129, 132, 206
- Power politics, and collective security, 51, 64, 98-103
- Powers, world; *see* Great powers
- Pravda*, 178, 346 (quoted), 379
- President (U.S.), and foreign policy, 254
- Press associations, 330, 311; and government participation in information distribution, 335-37, 343-45, 349-55, 358-59, 369, 373-74
- Price, D. K.: on Anglo-American conflicts, 67; on atom bomb, 103, 104, 116, 123; on economic policies, 295-96; on informational policies, 358, 361, 362, 363; 372, 373, on Lilienthal-Baruch plan, 115; on Near East, 174, 184; on Palestine, 174, 184; on security, 102; on Western security bloc, 59, 60
- Propaganda: Axis, 322, 346-47; contrasted with information, 314-15, 335, 336, 365-67; Soviet, 29, 47; and State Department broadcasts, 343-45, 351-52; systems of war, 332-33; treaties barring, 376-78
- Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and Employment* (U.S.), 132, 264-70
- Puerto Rico, United States policy in, 230-31
- Radek, Karl, on Soviet policy, 39-40 (quoted), 44
- Radio broadcasting, 331, 332, 353-58, 365-68
- Raw materials: forest resources, 286-90; and international rivalries, 284-91, 298-304; mineral resources, 290-91; oil, in Near

INDEX

- East, 189-94; resources in Latin America, 239-240
- Reader's Digest*, 354, 372, 374
- Reparations, 267-68; from Europe, 214, 267-68; from Germany, 199, 200, 208, 209, 217; from Japan, 131
- Reuters (news agency), 330, 358, 359
- Robertson, D. H., on world trade, 294, 297
- Rockefeller, Nelson, 253
- Rogers, W. C.: on finance, 97; on informational policy, 353, 354, 357, 369, 373, on security, 97; on United Nations, 64
- Rogers, Walter, on Reuters, 359
- Roman Catholic church; *see* Catholic church
- Roosevelt, Eleanor, on freedom and human rights, 326, 376
- Roosevelt, Franklin D.: and Arab rulers, 173; and Atlantic Charter, 75; eastern European policy of, reversed, 199; and freedom of speech, 315; Good Neighbor policy of, 224-25; on human relationships, 313; and international organization, 77-78, 82-83; and postwar security, 19-21, 69-70; and Soviet Union, 20-21, 36; as symbol of American policy, 60; and Western security bloc, 19-21, 55-56; compared with Woodrow Wilson, 20-21
- Rothfels, Hans, on eastern Europe, 202, 206, 210
- Rowe, D. N.: on China, 155-56; on informational policy, 372; on Japan, 139-40, 142-43, 145, 146; on United States policy in China, 160
- Ruhr, 58, 61, 199
- Rumania: Soviet policy in, 217; and informational policies, 343, 350, 359, 360, 364, 379
- Russia; *see* Soviet Union
- Saar, 58, 61
- San Francisco Conference, 10; and dependent peoples, 161; and international jurisdiction, 87; and United Nations Charter, 80; and veto, 78
- Sarnoff, David, and proposed international radio organization, 353-57
- Saudi Arabia, oil in, 162, 190, 192, 193
- Schacht, Hjalmar, on raw materials, 302
- Schuman, Frederick L., 14 n.
- Sea power, in atomic war, 94-95
- Secretary of State (U.S.), and foreign policy, 205, 254
- Security: and atomic energy, 89-96, 97, 103-25; disturbers of security system, 8-9; eastern European security system, 19-21, 56, 164; finance and security, 97-98; Great Britain and security system, 17-24, 56, 98; power politics and security, 98-103; United States and Western security bloc, 19-24, 55-62, 66; western European security system, 18-21, 55-62, 98-103; *see also* United Nations
- Security Council; *see* United Nations Security Council
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 254
- Sharp, Roland Hall, 228
- Shils, Edward A., on informational policy, 356, 360, 361
- Siam, boundary disputes of, 161
- Silesia, industries of, 212
- Sino-Soviet treaty, 136-37
- Slavs; *see* Pan-Slavism
- Smith, Adam, 240, 271 (quoted), 272, 273, 295
- Smith, Walter Bedell, on strategy, 89
- Smoot-Hawley tariff, 149
- Smuts, Jan C., proposed union of western European democracies, 18
- Social Democratic parties: in Europe, 59; in Germany, 206
- Socialism (Socialist party): in eastern Europe, 197; in France, 61; in Germany, 199; in Great Britain, 38-39; in Latin America, 244; Soviet, 29, 44, 46
- Sombart, Werner, 292, 294, 295, 297, 298
- South America; *see* Latin America
- Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.): and atomic energy control, 4-6, 90, 103-4, 112, 113, 115, 116-18; characteristics and philosophy of, 26-29, 37-41; and China, 136, 156-57; in eastern Europe, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202-3; and eastern European security system, 19-21, 56, 62, 164; and eastern European trade, 207-16; and Far East, 130, 131, 136-38; foreign policy of, 34-37; and Germany, 199, 200, 201, 206, 217-18; as great power, 4-6; industrial revolution in, 23; informational policies of, 345-46, 355-57, 360-62, 369-71, 374-75, 378-92; in Korea, 131, 134-35; in Manchuria, 136-37; in Near East, 163, 164, 168, 171-72, 180, 190-91; and Palestine, 178-79; Roosevelt's concessions to, 20-21; and trade, 282, 302-4, 309-10; and trusteeship of strategic areas, 154-55; and United Nations, 30, 55, 220, 223, 374-75; United States relations with, 10-16, 25-33, 41-55, 64, 159-61, 218-23, 381; and veto power, 7-10; and Western security bloc, 18-19, 55-62; and world revolution, 28-29, 36-37, 44-45, 47-49
- Spain: and informational policies, 360, 373, 384; and Western security, 61, 63-64
- Stalin, Josef: on Germany, 218; and policy decisions, 43; and Roosevelt, 20-21; on trade and raw materials, 302-3; on trading systems, 304, 305, 307, 308

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

- State Department (U.S.): and China, 159-60; and foreign policy, 205, 254-55; and free trading system, 214; informational policy of, 337, 340-43, 349-53, 359-63, 365-67, 390-91; and Latin America, 224, 250-55; and Near East, 172, 205; and south eastern Asia, 161; and Soviet Union, 218-21; and trade barriers, 297-98; *see also* Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs
- State trading systems, 213-16, 279-82, 304-10; of Soviet Union, 282
- Stolz, Leon, on informational policy, 375, 378-79, 383, 385, 386, 388, 390
- Strategy, 67, 68, 89, 101; and atomic bomb, 103, 122-24
- Sugar Quota Act, 230
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (S.C.A.P.), 141, 145; *see also* MacArthur, Douglas
- Tannenbaum, Frank, on Negro, 226
- Tass, 358, 370, 385
- Teggert, F. J., on trade barriers, 297
- Telecommunications, 329, 333, 337
- Telecommunications Conference (1945), 326
- Toynbee, Arnold, and universal state, 53
- Trade Agreements Act, 149-50, 259, 268
- Trade, international: agency for, 81; barriers to, 260-63, 284, 294-98; and China, 132, 296, 301; and eastern Europe, 207-16; expansion of, 259-70; Far East, 296; and free enterprise, 271-79; and governmental control, 279-82, 304-10; and great-power rivalries, 284-310; and industrialization, 292-98; and Japan, 130, 146-51, 296; and Latin America, 239-40; and Soviet Union, 31, 32, 213-16; 282, 302-4, 309-10; and United States policy, 271-83, 300-301
- Trieste, 12, 219, 220
- Truman, Harry: on international information, 321, 322-23, 324; on Palestine, 165, 167, 173, 187-88
- Trusteeship; *see* United Nations Security Council
- Tydings bill, on Puerto Rico, 230-31
- United Kingdom; *see* Great Britain
- United Nations (Organization): difficulties and dangers of, 83-88; and eastern Europe, 198, 201; and freedom of information, 337-42, 347, 353-58; and great-power disputes, 16, 55; and Near East, 165; in Pacific area, 138; and power politics, 64; as security system, 8-9, 99-100; and Soviet Union, 30, 55, 220, 223; and trade, 147; and United States, 75-88, 97-98, 120, 313
- United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 6, 90, 118
- United Nations Charter, 9, 80; and disarmament, 121; Dumbarton Oaks proposals on, 78-79; and human rights, 166, 326; veto in, 7, 9, 10
- United Nations Economic and Social Council: majority vote in, 78; and international trade, 266, 268; and Soviet Union, 30, 39
- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O.), 81; and atomic energy, 116; and freedom of information, 315, 324-25, 326, 338, 340-42, 372-76, 383
- United Nations General Assembly: majority vote in, 78; and trusteeship of strategic areas, 153-55
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (U.N.R.R.A.), 81, 388; in China, 132
- United Nations Security Council: and trusteeship of Palestine, 170-71, 178-79, 184; and trusteeship of strategic areas, 153-55; and United States trusteeship of Pacific islands, 152-55; veto power in, 7, 9, 78-79
- United Press (U.P.), 330, 343, 349, 350, 351, 352, 358, 359, 365, 370
- Unity party (Germany) 45, 46, 206
- Utley, Clifton, on British Empire, 71
- Uruguay: freedom of information in, 384; labor in, 244
- U.S.S.R., *see* Soviet Union
- Van Dyke, Vernon, on propaganda, 377
- Veto: in United Nations Charter, 7-9, 78-79; "of indispensability," 7-8
- Viner, Jacob, 14 n.; on Soviet and United States, 52
- "Voice of America," 343, 345, 360
- War Crimes Tribunal, 134
- War Department (U.S.), influence of, on foreign policy, 218, 219, 220
- Warburg, James, on information, 376
- Welles, Sumner, and State Department, 229
- Wells, Herbert G., 342
- Western security bloc; *see* Europe, Western security system
- White, Llewellyn, on information, 354
- White, W. W.: on atom bomb, 105, 108, 109, 122; on economic policies, 304; on freedom of information, 359, 371; on Latin America, 239, 241, 243, 244, 245, 251; on Near East, 180, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194
- Wilcox, Clair: on information policies, 362, 363, 367-68; on trade, 259-70
- Wilson, John A.: on India, 62; on the Near East, 162-88

INDEX

- Wilson, Woodrow: compared to Roosevelt, 20-21; and self-determination principle, 168
- World Conference on Trade and Employment, 268, 269
- World government, 81-85, 108, 117; and atomic energy development, 119; Hutchins on, 106-7, 108; Roosevelt rejects idea of, 77-78
- World revolution; *see* Soviet Union, and world revolution
- World trade charter, proposed, 266, 268
- Wright, Louise L.: on informational policies, 352, 364, 380, 381, 384, 385, 389; on Latin America, 237
- Wright, Quincy: on atom bomb, 103, 104; on atomic energy, 125; on balance of power, 50-51, 53, 107, 109-12; on Baruch report, 116-19; on China, 158; on disarmament, 121, 122, on eastern Europe, 202-23; on economic policies, 294, 295, 297-98, 301-10; on freedom of information, 352, 357-60, 366, 367, 370, 374-83, 386-91; on international trade, 294, 295, 297, 298, 301, 302, 303; on Japan, 141, 144, 145, 146-55; on Near East, 173, 174, 176-88, 191, 192, 193; on security, 103, 104, 107, 109-13, 116-19; on southeastern Asia, 161; on Soviet policy, 41; on world unity, 120
- Yalta conference, 78, 79, 195, 206; voting formula of, 7, 9, 10
- Yoshida, 141, 143, 144
- Yugoslavia, 198, 343, 359, 360, 389
- Zaibatsu, 131, 141
- Ziff, William B., on balance of power, 11-12 (quoted)
- Zionists (Zionism), 163, 165, 166, 174-78, 182-87